VZCZCXRO8858
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHJS #0087/01 2740933
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010933Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL SURABAYA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0462
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0009
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0451
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 0027
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0473

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SURABAYA 000087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP AND CA/VO/KCC 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/EAP AND DS/ICI/CR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC ID
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - (SURABAYA) 
 
REF: A) 09 SURABAYA 025, B) 09 SURABAYA 009, C) 08 SURABAYA 0103 
 
SURABAYA 00000087  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  Please find below the semi-annual fraud report for U.S. 
Consulate General Surabaya for the period March - August 2009. 
 
¶A.  Country Conditions 
 
Indonesia is an archipelago of over 17,500 islands spanning 
three time zones and 3,400 miles along the Equator.  Its 
population of 245 million comprises more than 300 ethnic groups 
and six official religions.  Inter-island economic migration is 
common (especially to and from Java).  Indonesia is a poor 
country -- nearly half the population earns less than two 
dollars a day -- but about 10% of the population is part of the 
moneyed economy enjoying a middle class or higher standard of 
living.  Bribery and corruption are common. 
 
Although the incidence of consular fraud in Surabaya was low 
during this reporting period, consular fraud in Surabaya 
generally ranges from medium to high, but is generally not very 
sophisticated.  Visa brokers and document vendors take advantage 
of visa seekers' lack of familiarity with the visa process to 
charge them exorbitant amounts for mediocre documents. 
 
Consular Officers in Surabaya do not rely heavily on 
documentation and focus more on visa interviews in evaluating 
applicants' ability to overcome 214(b).  When an applicant is 
suspected of being the client of a document vendor, adjudicating 
officers refer the cases to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) for 
further investigation.  When fraud is confirmed and/or follow-up 
investigative interviews are likely to yield additional 
information, the Fraud Prevention Manager refers the case for a 
secondary interview.  Secondary investigative interviews 
generally involve the Regional Security Officer (RSO), the Fraud 
Prevention Manager, the Consular Fraud Prevention LES, and the 
RSO LES Investigator.  Referrals have led to arrests and/or 
raids of document vendor operations. 
 
¶B.  NIV Fraud 
 
During the past six months, the incidence of non-immigrant visa 
fraud in Surabaya has declined significantly.  Post only 
recorded nine (9) cases of confirmed visa fraud during the 
reporting period.  No arrests occurred as a result of visa fraud 
investigations in Surabaya, although two document vendors/alien 
smugglers (and one client) associated with applicants who 
applied at Embassy Jakarta were arrested in Surabaya's consular 
district (in Bali and Ponorogo). 
 
PPT - During the reporting period, no applicants applied using 
new passports with new identities. 
 
A3/G5 - Post only received one application for an A3 visa during 
the reporting period. 
 
B1/B2 - There were no arrests related to fraudulent B1/B2 visa 
applications submitted in Surabaya during the reporting period. 
While it is likely that some applicants who were refused visas 
in accordance with Section 214(b) had fraudulent documents in 
their possession at the time of their interviews, adjudicating 
officers do not routinely ask applicants for unnecessary 
documents unless fraud is suspected.  In cases when fraud is 
clearly suspected, however, adjudicating officers ask applicants 
to submit all documents they brought to their interviews for 
follow-up investigation in an effort to determine if a document 
vendor supplied the documents. 
 
In August, FPM and the Consular Fraud Prevention Assistant 
visited the addresses of several B1/B2 visa applicants (both 
prior refusals and issuances) from the cities of Kediri and 
Malang in East Java.  The visits provided additional credibility 
in regard to the qualifications of two applicants who had 
previously been refused and demonstrated misrepresentation on 
the part of one applicant who had been issued multiple visas. 
The latter has been entered into CLASS as a quasi refusal P6C1. 
 
Post plans to conduct its annual B1/B2 validation study this 
winter, covering issuances during the Dec 1, 2007, through May 
31, 2008, time period (Ref C). 
 
C1/D - As a result of Post's occasional investigation of C1/D 
applicants' employment and training histories, three cases of 
fraud were confirmed during the reporting period.  In total, the 
training and employment histories of 41 C1/D applicants were 
investigated during the reporting period.  Three applicants (7 
percent) were determined to have provided either a fraudulent 
training certificate or false employment history.  In July, Post 
visited the three crew recruitment agencies in Bali responsible 
 
SURABAYA 00000087  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
for most of Surabaya's C1/D applicants and discussed the 
aforementioned applicants.  Each of the recruiters is registered 
with the Consulate and Embassy through the crew recruiter 
registration program.  The recruitment companies appear to have 
quality operations and generally do a good job screening their 
recruits.  A new crew recruiter in Bali has requested to 
register with the Consulate and Embassy.  Post's Fraud 
Prevention Manager plans to visit the company in mid-September. 
 
H1B - Most H1B applicants who apply in Surabaya received their 
university degrees in the United States.  For H1B applicants who 
do not have U.S. university educations, Post verifies their 
education credentials.  The same practice applies to applicants 
for L visas.  The incidence of H1B and L visa fraud in Surabaya 
is low. 
 
H2B - Surabaya began adjudicating H2B visas again on October 1, 
2008, after they had been adjudicated only in Jakarta during the 
2007 - 2008 time period.  While post has experienced no 
H2B-related fraud since resumption of H2B adjudication, we have 
also received very few applications.  Most of the recruiters who 
planned to begin recruiting potential H2Bs were unable or 
unwilling to meet the new DHS requirements regarding fees 
charged to workers as a condition of employment.  Post did 
receive a few applications from applicants who had been charged 
fees that are no longer allowed by regulation and, therefore, 
requested a revocation of the petition. 
 
In July, FPM visited a labor recruitment company in Malang.  The 
company plans to begin recruitment of H2B laborers for the U.S. 
market within the next year.  During our discussions with the 
company director, he advised that both his firm and the U.S. 
recruiter planned to charge the workers fees as a condition of 
their employment.  While his company planned to charge 
approximately $500 per worker as a processing fee, the U.S. 
recruiter reportedly planned to charge $2000 per worker. 
Following FPM's explanation of the latest rules regarding 
prohibited fees, the company has postponed plans to recruit 
labor for the U.S. market until it can find a more suitable 
U.S.-based recruitment partner and restructure its recruitment 
scheme.  Currently, the core of the company's business is 
recruitment and training of domestic laborers for Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.  Note:  Post utilizes the same registration program for 
H2B agents that is used in Jakarta, similar to the registration 
process for C1/D agents. 
 
F1 - Among the least qualified applicants for F1 visas 
interviewed at Post are those who are enrolled in short-term 
English language programs in the United States, usually at stand 
alone ESL schools that are not associated with universities or 
community colleges.  Students applying to participate in these 
ESL programs tended to be less capable of demonstrating 
sufficient finances and were often working age adults who had 
poor employment histories and were unable to demonstrate ties to 
Indonesia.  In some such cases, the source of funds was from an 
American friend or boyfriend in the United States. 
 
J1 - Shortly after the H2B cap was reached, Post began to 
receive a few J1 trainee visa applicants who planned to work in 
jobs that would normally be filled by H2B workers.  In one such 
case, APEX USA had recruited seven applicants to join a J1 
trainee program in the United States.  Several of the applicants 
had previously participated in J1 trainee programs arranged by 
APEX.  None of the applicants could explain what if any training 
was provided during their previous trainee programs.  All seven 
applicants were refused due to the fact that they were not 
qualified for J1 visas and the J1 trainee visas appeared only to 
be an attempt to provide H2B labor.  Following the refusal, the 
applicants confirmed ConOff's suspicions and indicated that APEX 
USA originally planned to send them to the U.S. to perform 
exactly the same work on H2B visas, but the petitions were 
denied due to the H2B cap, thus the effort to obtain J1 visas 
for the seven applicants.  Note:  A validation study of APEX USA 
recruited applicants who were issued J1 trainee visas calendar 
year 2006 demonstrated a 33 percent non-return rate (Ref B). 
 
Post FPM and Fraud Prevention Assistant visited a hotel in Bali 
in July.  The hotel is currently post's largest source of J1 
trainee visa applicants. The hotel has a history of sending J1 
trainees to its sister hotel in Miami for 12 month 
hospitality-related trainee programs and has maintained a good 
track record.  We met with more than 25 returnees and confirmed 
not only their return but also that many had received promotions 
shortly after returning. 
 
M1 - No new M1 fraud cases during the reporting period. 
 
 
SURABAYA 00000087  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
R1 - No new R1 fraud cases during the reporting period. 
 
¶C.  IV fraud. 
 
Surabaya does not adjudicate Immigrant Visas. 
 
¶D.  Diversity Visa (DV) fraud. 
 
Surabaya does not adjudicate Diversity Visas, but has assisted 
with occasional DV investigations and DV visa outreach efforts. 
 
¶E.  ACS and Passport Fraud. 
 
Post did not identify any cases of ACS or passport fraud during 
the reporting period, but did receive two applications for 
reports of birth and passports in which the American citizen 
parent was unable to demonstrate sufficient physical presence in 
the United States to transmit citizenship. 
 
¶F.  Adoption fraud. 
 
Surabaya does not process adoptions. 
 
¶G. Use of DNA testing 
 
There are no special circumstances with regards to DNA testing 
in Indonesia and Post receives results in a timely manner.  Post 
requests DNA testing for American citizenship cases when 
insufficient proof of parentage is provided. 
 
¶H.  Asylum/DHS benefit fraud. 
 
No cases during reporting period. 
 
¶I. Alien smuggling, trafficking, organized crime, terrorist 
travel. 
 
During a fraud prevention site visit to the cities of Kediri and 
Malang in July 2009, we visited the office of a document vendor 
who was arrested in Malang in January 2009.  We were able to 
confirm that his business is closed.  The document vendor is 
incarcerated and serving a two year sentence. 
 
The Surabaya police arrested three document vendors and one 
human trafficker in the past two months. The police shared the 
biodata of those arrested, which we entered as CLASS lookouts. 
Likewise, police in Kediri reported arresting two human 
traffickers (internal trafficking) and one document vendor who 
was involved in producing fraudulent business licenses, although 
apparently bearing no relationship to visa applications. 
 
Additionally, there were raids on document vendor / smuggler 
establishments that led to arrests in both Bali and Ponorogo 
(East Java) during the reporting period.  Both cases were 
related to fraudulent visa applicants who applied for visas at 
Embassy Jakarta.  One client of the document vendor arrested in 
Ponorogo had applied for a visa in Surabaya some months in the 
past and was refused 214(b).  His name was found on the document 
vendor's client list obtained by police. 
 
¶J. DS criminal investigations. 
 
The FPM and the RSO enjoy an excellent working relationship. 
The Consular Section has employed a Standard Operating Procedure 
for referral of suspected visa fraud cases to the Fraud 
Prevention Unit and, when necessary, to the RSO for follow-up 
investigation.  The FPU leads Post's fraud prevention activities 
up to the point of secondary investigative interviews and police 
involvement, at which time the RSO takes the lead.  Results of 
investigations as well as police and court actions are always 
shared and discussed. 
 
During the past six months, the incidence of non-immigrant visa 
fraud in Surabaya has declined significantly.  During the 
preceding twelve months, several visa fraud-related arrests were 
well publicized in local newspapers and may be a factor in the 
recent decline, as well as increased police efforts to take 
action against document vendors. 
 
¶K. Host country documents. 
 
See Embassy Jakarta's latest Fraud Prevention Summary. 
 
¶L.  Host government authorities. 
 
The Consulate has requested the assistance of local police on a 
few occasions during the reporting period, receiving mixed 
 
SURABAYA 00000087  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
cooperation. 
 
¶M.  Areas of particular concern / general remarks. 
 
There are no areas of particular concern during the reporting 
period. 
 
¶N.  Staffing and training. 
 
Consular Chief/FPM - has attended the ConGen course; Fraud 
Prevention for Consular Managers, Detecting Imposters; Detecting 
Fraudulent Documents; and DHS Fraud Prevention Workshops. 
 
LES Consular Fraud Prevention Assistant - has attended the Fraud 
Prevention Course for LES (PC-542); a Customs and Border 
Protection fraud prevention training session in Jakarta; and an 
ICITAP course on the prevention of smuggling and human 
trafficking in Jakarta. 
 
Regional Security Officer (RSO) - Has not yet attended fraud 
prevention-related training. 
 
RSO LES Investigator - has attended an ICITAP course on the 
prevention of smuggling and human trafficking in Jakarta. 
MCCLELLAND