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RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFISS/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15 
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM PTER KHDP EC CO
SUBJECT: Engaging Civilian Leadership to Improve Mil to Mil Relations 
 
REF: QUITO 829; QUITO 708; QUITO 616 
 
CLASSIFIED B...



id: 229888
date: 10/15/2009 20:53
refid: 09QUITO885
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO616|09QUITO708|09QUITO829
header:
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0195
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RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000885 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15 
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM PTER KHDP EC CO
SUBJECT: Engaging Civilian Leadership to Improve Mil to Mil Relations 
 
REF: QUITO 829; QUITO 708; QUITO 616 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Heather Hodges, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Embassy is receiving mixed signals regarding 
the Ecuadorian military's willingness to continue historically 
strong cooperation.  Likely causes are: instructions by civilian 
leadership to lessen dependency on the U.S.; a lack of information 
and communication within the Ecuadorian military; political 
posturing; and fewer financial resources.  Engaging the military's 
civilian leadership, even when the Ecuadorian uniformed military 
attempts to keep issues within their own channels, will need to be 
a central part of the Embassy's strategy to improve military 
cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Military to Military Relations Skittish 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ecuadorian military has recently displayed skittish 
behavior toward engagement with the U.S. military, expressing 
apparently earnest requests for cooperation in certain sectors, 
while rejecting cooperation in other areas.  An example of the 
former would be the numerous requests the Joint Command of the 
Ecuadorian Armed Forces has sent for assistance in the destruction 
of munitions and arms (Ref B), and its hosting of a delegation from 
Washington to perform an assessment of the GOE's munitions, weapons 
and storage bunkers.  The Joint Command requested that the U.S. not 
only destroy the munitions, but also train its personnel and assist 
in paying for upgrades to its facilities.  The Ecuadorian Army's 
northern border units have maintained good working relations with 
the Embassy for the past two years, most recently in the 
development of riverine capacity and training. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) In contrast, despite over ten years and approximately $4 
million in support for a TPS-70 radar in Ecuador's northern border 
region, Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) Commander Brigadier General 
Rodrigo Bohorquez refused to allow U.S. Air Force technicians 
access to make repairs on the radar in August, 2009.  Bohorquez 
subsequently sent an official memorandum complaining that the USG 
failed to provide operational and maintenance support for the 
radar, even though a 1998 U.S.-Ecuadorian bilateral agreement 
clearly stated that the GOE was responsible for the operations and 
maintenance of the radar.  (Note:  Due to the above, and the lack 
of commitment to the radar by the GOE, U.S. Southern Command has 
discontinued USG support of the radar.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Throughout the transition of the Forward Operating Location 
(FOL) at Manta, the Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) was very 
cooperative.  However, it is likely that the Ministry of Defense 
and other civilian leadership gave instructions to the FAE to keep 
quiet about any positives from the ten-year relationship with the 
U.S. at the FOL.  Instead, civilian leaders and a parliamentary 
committee sought to smear the U.S. presence and contributions.  The 
GOE did not attend the July 17 FOL "last flight" tribute ceremony 
(Ref C), and did not invite the Embassy to attend a last minute 
ceremony marking the transfer of the FOL to Ecuador on September 18 
(Ref A). 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In the same schizophrenic vein, Navy Commander Admiral 
Aland Molestina asked the Embassy's Naval Attache to initiate a 
request to formalize information sharing between the Ecuadorian 
Navy and USG, with the ostensible justification that this would 
ensure onward cooperation if the commander were replaced in the 
near future.  We understand that the real reason for the request is 
Molestina's fear that his informal cooperation with the U.S. on 
narcotics trafficking leaves him exposed to political and legal 
attack, as happened in February against police units cooperating 
 
with the USG.  (Note:  The Embassy MilGrp is working with U.S. 
Southern Command to review the potential impact such an initiative 
may have on our bilateral cooperation, and counternarcotics 
information sharing between Ecuador and the Joint Interagency Task 
Force (JIATF) South.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
Increasing Civilian Leadership (and Control) 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The Correa government has placed an increasing number of 
political appointees in the Ministry of Defense so as to establish 
civilian control over the Armed Forces.  Perhaps the biggest change 
in leadership occurred on January 2009 with the appointment of Vice 
Minister of Defense Miguel Carvajal to the position of Coordinating 
Minister of External and External Security.  Several uniformed 
military have noted to us that initiatives were harder to get 
approved after Carvajal's appointment, not just because of an 
additional layer of approval, but mostly because of Carvajal's 
leftist ideological leanings.  Initial concerns and uncertainty 
among senior military officers regarding promotions and assignments 
have calmed, especially after the August 10 presidential 
inauguration.  However, senior officers are still adjusting to the 
increasing level of control exerted by the civilian leadership. 
 
 
 
Why the Mixed Message? 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) The conflicting messages regarding the Ecuadorian 
military's willingness to pursue cooperation with the U.S. are 
likely the result of several factors: 
 
 
 
-- Directives from civilian leadership to lessen dependency on the 
U.S.  Defense Minister Ponce said during his April 2008 
inauguration that the MOD would review all cooperation with the USG 
to determine what cooperation could be directed elsewhere, and has 
repeated this mantra since. 
 
 
 
-- Lack of information.  The Ecuadorian military and civilian 
leadership often do not share information, and have limited trust 
in each other.  The military and its leadership are often also 
unaware of the overall bilateral relationship the U.S. shares with 
Ecuador, even in terms of security cooperation. 
 
 
 
-- Political posturing/survival.  Now that it is clear that Correa 
has staying power, military leaders know their options are either 
to visibly cooperate with their civilian leaders, or lose their 
careers. 
 
 
 
-- Financial crunch.  The GOE has turned to China, Russia and other 
countries prepared to offer financing or barter payment to fund the 
purchase of weapons and/or equipment. 
 
 
 
Forward Strategy 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) While mixed signals make cooperation more challenging, the 
Embassy has developed a strategy to remain engaged with the 
Ecuadorian military.  Using the experience of our renewed 
cooperation with the Ecuadorian National Police, we will allow 
 
pressure to build from within the Ecuadorian military on the GOE 
political leadership for the broad, quality-based assistance only 
the USG provides.  This strategy will be implemented as follows: 
 
 
 
-- Embassy will require that requests for assistance by Ecuadorian 
military counterparts will need to be in writing, and when 
appropriate, channeled through the Ministry of Defense. 
 
 
 
-- Cooperation will be reviewed to determine the degree of U.S. 
benefit in the proposal, and whether the Ecuadorian military is 
using assistance effectively and as originally agreed.  Absent high 
marks under these criteria, that cooperation may be discontinued or 
the GOE's request for assistance denied.  For example, as described 
above, assistance for the TPS-70 radar was cut.  Due to a lack of 
access to the Ecuadorian military's northern border units, the 
Military Group relocated its counter drug Joint Planning Assistance 
Team officer from Coca to Ibarra. 
 
 
 
-- Areas of cooperation that are very much in the USG interest that 
we will want to continue include the following: renewing the 
exchange of diplomatic notes to provide protections for TDY 
military personnel in Ecuador; a Section 1033 Memorandum of 
Understanding to allow assistance to the military's 
counternarcotics efforts along Ecuador's northern border; and 
cooperation in the destruction of missiles and munitions as well as 
humanitarian demining. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) At the same time, the Embassy will take the following steps 
to improve military to military relations, and protect longer term 
access: 
 
 
 
-- The Embassy Country Team will increase engagement with the 
military's civilian leadership to attempt to increase the comfort 
level of civilians in working with the USG.  The Embassy will begin 
by providing information via meetings and briefings on our 
bilateral cooperation, in security, development and other areas. 
 
 
 
-- The Embassy intends to use visits, both Ecuadorian civilian and 
military leaders to the U.S., as well as U.S. civilian and military 
leaders to Ecuador, to discuss security cooperation. 
 
 
 
-- The Embassy will pursue civilian-military seminars, as well as 
short-term training opportunities in areas of interest to the 
Ecuadorian military, such as weapons and munitions handling, 
humanitarian demining, etc. 
 
 
 
-- The Embassy will also propose funding under Section 1207 to 
assist the Ecuadorian security forces to secure Ecuador's northern 
border region and to promote civilian leadership of the military 
and police, and to improve GOE interagency coordination. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Note:  These strategies and initiatives to regain full 
cooperation with the Ecuadorian military may prove more difficult 
than with the Ecuadorian National Police, since DefMin Ponce seems 
more inclined to follow Security Minister Miguel Carvajal's lead, 
and is less likely to stand up for the military's interests.  End 
Note. 
 
Comment 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Maintaining positive military-to-military relations is 
important to achieving USG objectives in Ecuador.  Our historically 
good relations have provided excellent counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism information, and operational access.  Moreover, 
some leaders within the Ecuadorian military are sincerely focused 
on improving the military's ability to combat narco-trafficking and 
to repel the encroachment of illegal armed groups such as the FARC 
into Ecuador.  Working with the civilian leadership of the 
military, even when the Ecuadorian uniformed military attempts to 
keep issues within their own channels, will need to be an integral 
part of the USG's engagement strategy in Ecuador. 
HODGES 

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