P 070354Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8230
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000197 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/7/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: FATA MNAS CLOSE TO AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A) ISLAMABAD 2382; B) PESHAWAR 194 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  FATA Caucus leader Munir Orakzai told PO 
October 4 that Prime Minister Gilani had agreed to satisfy key 
grievances that had prompted the FATA ministers' resignation 
from the government (ref A).  The government, which Orakzai said 
had reneged on promises of increased development funding for the 
FATA, had just delivered two tranches of funds amounting to a 
total of 2.1 billion rupees ($25.2 million), and it had 
committed to restoration of further development funding to the 
FATA by January.  Gilani had allayed FATA parliamentarians' 
concerns about the potential installation of a new Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP) governor; the current governor and 
current 11th Corps commander both will be staying on at least 
until the conclusion of the pending Waziristan operation. 
Orakzai appears to have leveraged the government's concern about 
a potential challenge from Nawaz Sharif to extract solid 
concessions from the government at no cost to his caucus, which 
even declined Gilani's request that they support the upcoming 
Waziristan operation in return.  End summary. 
 
 
FATA Grievances 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an October 4 meeting the leader of the National 
Assembly's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Caucus 
Munir Orakzai told PO that the resignation of three FATA 
parliamentarians from their ministerial positions and threatened 
alignment of 15 with the opposition had been an attempt to force 
government action on several longstanding FATA grievances. 
Based on his October 2 meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, he 
said, these grievances appeared to be close to a satisfactory 
resolution.  He indicated, however, that he would keep up the 
pressure until he could verify that the government would honor 
its commitments. 
 
¶3.  (C) Primary among the FATA parliamentarians' grievances were 
unfulfilled promises for development spending on the FATA, which 
Orakzai said had made the FATA parliamentarians look foolish and 
ineffective.  According to Orakzai, the GOP promised 34 billion 
rupees ($540 million) for development work; however, the 2008-9 
budget had only totaled 8.56 billion rupees ($103 million) - and 
2.28 billion ($27.3 million) rupees of this sum had been 
diverted to other priorities during the year.  To add insult to 
injury, Orakzai said, President Zardari had promised earlier 
this year to double development spending in the FATA for the 
2009-10 budgetary year, only to reveal a budget in which 
development spending had increased by just 18 percent. 
 
¶4.  (C) Similarly, Orakzai said, the government had promised a 
special 2.5 billion-rupee ($30 million) package for electricity 
in the FATA, but then cut the package to 1 billion rupees ($12 
million); in the end, it had delivered only 600 million rupees 
($7.2 million) of that package.  FATA residents felt 
disadvantaged in other ways as well; Orakzai claimed that 
victims of terrorism from the FATA received less than half of 
the compensation that residents of other parts of Pakistan 
received.  All of these failures by the federal government, 
according to Orakzai, had caused FATA residents to blame the 
MNAs for pocketing the difference between the amount of spending 
to which they felt entitled (based on federal government 
promises or the standards of their neighbors) and that which 
they were actually receiving. 
 
¶5.  (C) Outside of perceived spending discrepancies, Orakzai 
said, the FATA parliamentarians felt that they had been 
insufficiently consulted on several issues pertaining to their 
area.  These issues included appointment of Political Agents 
based on candidates suggested by the Awami National Party (ANP) 
that rules the NWFP, the potential appointment of a new governor 
for the Northwest Frontier Province (who as the President's 
representative has full authority over the FATA), and  military 
operations in the FATA - particularly the ongoing operation in 
the Khyber Agency.  (Note:  A journalist contact of the 
consulate, in a separate conversation, added one further 
grievance:  the government's failure to provide any of the FATA 
MNAs the houses they had been promised in return for their 
support for the government's preferred FATA senatorial 
candidates when the senate seats turned over in early 2009.  End 
note.) 
 
 
Government Commits More Funds 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Orakzai claimed that the federal government had now made 
steps toward sufficiently addressing these grievances for the 
time being.  He passed a copy of an official fax declaring the 
government's intention to return the 2.28 billion rupees ($27.3 
million) diverted from the 2008-9 budget and to add several 
billion rupees in additional funding to the amount proposed for 
the 2009-2010 FATA development budget.  Orakzai said that 75 
percent of the diverted 2008-9 money (1.7 billion rupees - $20.4 
million) had already been released by the federal government for 
development spending.  The government had also released the 
remaining 400 million rupees ($4.8 million) of its electricity 
package.  (Note: the FATA Secretariat's chief financial officer 
confirmed the outlines of this package to the PO on October 5 
and said he was now racing to complete development projects 
before the onset of winter; the money must be spent by the end 
of the GOP fiscal year on June 30.) 
 
 
Governor to Stay; Waziristan Operation to Go Ahead 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7.  (C) The question of consultation on a potential new NWFP 
governor, Orakzai admitted, was at this point not really an 
issue, as current Governor Owais Ghani would be staying on. 
Orakzai confirmed that 11th Corps Commander LTG Masood Aslam 
would be staying on in his current position for another year 
until the impending campaign in Waziristan had concluded (ref 
B), and said that Masood had agreed to the extension only on 
condition that Ghani remain governor through the end of his 
tour.  Nonetheless, Gilani had given the FATA parliamentarians 
guarantees that they would be consulted at such time as the 
government did in fact move to change governors.  Orakzai said 
he did not support the proposed candidate to replace Ghani, 
retiring Lt. General Hamid Khan, primarily because the governor 
should not be a military man. (Note: the fact that the ANP is 
supporting Khan's appointment is no doubt another reason for 
Orakzai's opposition.) 
 
¶8.  (C) In return for these commitments by the government, 
Orakzai said, Gilani had asked only that the FATA 
parliamentarians publicly express their support for the upcoming 
Waziristan operation.  The FATA parliamentarians had refused to 
do this, though Orakzai said that their refusal to commit was 
based more on fear of militants' retaliation against the members 
and their families rather than on actual opposition to the 
operation, which he personally supported.  Orakzai did not 
indicate any commitment by the government regarding the ongoing 
operation in Khyber. 
 
¶9.  (C) Orakzai confirmed reports from Embassy Kabul that the 
ongoing dispute between Shi'a Turi and Sunni Bushara tribes 
continued to spill across Paktiya-Kurram border into Orakzai's 
constituency.  However, Orakzai said he believed that less than 
1,000 Bushara, including women and children, would likely cross 
over to Sadda, in Lower Kurram.  If the Turi actually granted 
safe passage, the Bushara would be warmly welcomed and taken 
care of by their fellow tribesman, he predicted.  He dismissed 
reports of Bushara-Taliban ties, although when pressed agreed 
that there were notable pockets of militant control in Kurram 
Agency. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment:  Without ceding anything in exchange, Orakzai 
appears to have skillfully exploited rumors that Nawaz Sharif 
might try to bring down the government to wrest concessions out 
of a Pakistan People's Party government that cannot afford to 
lose FATA's current 11 National Assembly votes.  However, a full 
reconciliation between the government and FATA parliamentarians 
may be unlikely as long as the current military operation in 
Khyber continues; that operation is the primary grievance of 
Hamidullah Jan Afridi, the other ringleader of the FATA walkout, 
who is under pressure from targeted warlord Mangal Bagh.  End 
comment. 
 
 
PUTNAM