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Viewing cable 09PARIS1418, FRENCH NSA ON AF/PAK, CLIMATE CHANGE, EUROPEAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PARIS1418 2009-10-21 16:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO6188
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1418/01 2941623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211623Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7388
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0106
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2125
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0611
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1306
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1053
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0914
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0293
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3272
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001418 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019 
TAGS: PREL EAID KCFE KGHG KMFO NATO AF PK CN RS
IS, KN, FR 
SUBJECT: FRENCH NSA ON AF/PAK, CLIMATE CHANGE, EUROPEAN 
SECURITY, GOLDSTONE, AND MORE 
 
REF: A. NATO 453 
     B. STATE 108183 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles H. Rivkin, Reasons 1.4(b), (d). 
 
1.(C/NF) SUMMARY: In an October 21 meeting with Ambassador 
Rivkin, Diplomatic Counselor to the President 
(NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte clarified GOF policy on a 
number of key issues.  Discussing next steps in Afghanistan's 
political drama, Levitte also framed GOF opposition to 
funding the NATO AWACS (ref a) as based on an assessment that 
limited resources could be better used for other equipment. 
He also undertook to try to hasten French aid to Pakistan 
(ref b).  On climate change, Levitte said France is anxious 
to work with the United States to help bring the U.S. and 
European positions closer together, and believes that an 
interim summit could serve to bring major players together in 
advance of Copenhagen.  Levitte provided the clearest 
explanation yet of evolving French thinking on how to use an 
OSCE summit to engage the Russians on European security by 
tying it to the Corfu process and the U.S. "reset" policy. 
He also put the GOF's non-vote on the Goldstone report in the 
context of French and UK efforts to encourage the Israelis to 
set up their own credible investigation.  Levitte said he had 
spoken earlier in the day with NSA Jim Jones about the Vienna 
talks with Iran and expressed optimism about the outcome. 
Levitte also addressed the future of the French MFO air asset 
in the Sinai and the mission of the new special envoy to 
North Korea, Jack Lang. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
2. (C/NF) Levitte opened the conversation by saying he had 
earlier that day spoken with NSA Jones about the Vienna talks 
with Iran.  He was comfortable that we had a common position 
and was modestly hopeful about the outcome. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AFGHANISTAN: ELECTIONS AND AWACS 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (C/NF) Remarking that Afghans "took to politics quickly," 
Levitte described Karzai's acceptance of a second electoral 
round as a difficult situation well managed by international 
players.  He emphasized SFRC Chairman Kerry's role - bringing 
in the French and UK ambassadors - in pushing Karzai on the 
issue.  Levitte said a deal on a unity government with 
Abdullah was still possible, but that Abdullah was driving a 
hard bargain.  Asked about the French vote against using 
common NATO funding for the deployment of an AWACS for use in 
Afghanistan (ref a), Levitte argued that the AWACS seemed to 
be a poor use of limited resources.  He said when the AWACS 
proposal first surfaced, France was reeling from the August 
2008 ambush in Uzbin in Afghanistan that left 10 French 
troops dead, a disaster Levitte said was intensified in part 
by a lack of helicopters to bring reinforcements and to 
provide close air cover.  Further, the French understanding 
was that the AWACS would be used primarily for air traffic 
control to make up for weak infrastructure in Afghanistan. 
Thus the GOF's opposition at the NATO Senior Resource Board 
was based on a conviction that using common funding on the 
AWACS would be wasteful as this would not address the most 
pressing operational needs. 
 
---------------------------- 
AID TO PAKISTAN: NO TIMELINE 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Delivering the Secretary's message contained in ref b, 
Ambassador Rivkin emphasized the need for France to move 
quickly on disbursing the 200 million euros the GOF pledged 
at the Tokyo Conference.  Levitte responded that, while 
President Sarkozy reiterated French support for Pakistan to 
President Zardari in New York during UNGA, France was still 
just a "junior partner" in Pakistan.  When the Ambassador 
countered that French pledges for Pakistan were significant 
and that the GOF was indeed an important partner, Levitte 
acknowledged that it was important to disburse the French 
 
PARIS 00001418  002 OF 004 
 
 
pledge quickly, although he provided no specific timeline to 
do so. (NOTE: Post will follow up with relevant GOF agencies 
for more details about plans to disburse aid to Pakistan. END 
NOTE.) 
 
------------------------------- 
CLIMATE CHANGE: WE WANT TO HELP 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (C/NF) Turning to climate change, Ambassador Rivkin asked 
for Levitte's reaction to the recent discussion between 
Presidents Obama and Sarkozy.  Levitte said that the French 
want to be of assistance to the United States as we all seek 
a way forward.  However, he worried that the U.S. was 
handicapped by its relatively late start, noting that the 
European Council had agreed on an EU position in December 
2008.  Ultimately, Levitte said, the United States had to 
agree to emissions cuts comparable to those agreed by Europe. 
 However, France was willing to meet the USG half way, 
suggesting that, for example, if the United States agreed to 
overall emissions cuts of 80% by 2050, the Europeans could 
agree to the United States extending to 2030 the reduction 
targets which Europe would meet by 2020.  Meanwhile, because 
the GOF believed it would be difficult for the U.S. Senate to 
approve a climate change bill by December, the French were 
thinking that the Copenhagen Summit could be used to produce 
a detailed but non-legally binding political commitment which 
could be translated several months later into a treaty. 
Levitte recognized President Obama's reluctance to entertain 
an interim summit, but said there is growing support for one 
that could be held, for example, on the margins of APEC on 
November 15-16, prior to President Obama's trip to China, to 
bring together all the major actors in a final pre-Copenhagen 
push.  According to Levitte, the time was ripe: the Indians 
and Russians had indicated an interest and UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon 
was actively supporting such a meeting.  Levitte also said he 
thought the Chinese might be making progress and be more 
ready to talk about concrete numbers.  He said France had 
reason to believe that Chinese President Hu Jintao had two 
speech texts before him in New York, one with numbers and one 
without.  He chose to use the one without numbers after 
hearing President Obama's speech.  Levitte cautioned that 
this needs to be checked out, but, if true, would indicate 
that the Chinese too are getting more serious. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
EUROPEAN SECURITY: WE NEED A SUMMIT TO ENGAGE RUSSIA 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
6. (C/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's request for an 
update on French thinking about Russia, Levitte said the 
Russians remained unwilling to admit that they could not 
maintain a sphere of influence over neighboring states. 
Nevertheless, it was critical to engage Russia as a partner 
in European security, not an adversary, and Western allies 
needed to provide a counterproposal to the suggestions the 
Russians made in 2008.  The OSCE is the perfect forum for 
such engagement, since it brings together not only European 
and North American allies with Russia, but also includes 
Central Asian states and non-NATO ally Russian neighbors such 
as Ukraine and Georgia.  Additionally, unlike NATO, the OSCE 
is designed to deal with non-military aspects of security, 
including democracy and human rights, as called for in the 
Helsinki Final Act.  An OSCE summit, perhaps at Vienna 
following the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, would allow the 
West to set the agenda for European security discussions, and 
could include consensual topics, such as counterterrorism and 
counternarcotics.  Deputy Diplomatic Counselor Damien Loras 
elaborated, saying an OSCE summit would also allow Western 
allies to put frozen conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistria on the table, together with the Treaty on 
Conventional Forces in Europe.  Further, such a summit would 
fit well with the Obama administration's "reset" policy with 
Russia.  In an attempt to calm concerns about President 
Sarkozy's public suggestion of an OSCE summit during his 
recent visit to Kazakhstan, Levitte clarified that Kazakhstan 
would not be an appropriate host, but that close links 
between the Kazakh leadership and Medvedev meant that the 
Kazakhs could be useful in encouraging Russian cooperation. 
 
 
PARIS 00001418  003 OF 004 
 
 
7. (C/NF) Asked whether the GOF felt the ongoing Corfu 
process was insufficient, Levitte stressed that Russia could 
not be allowed to slip away from the commitments it made at 
the last OSCE summit in 1999, and specifically that the 
Russians needed to reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki 
Final Act.  However, the OSCE ministerial in December would 
provide an opportunity to probe further, and if Russia 
evinces no political will to engage constructively, then 
plans for a summit could be scrapped.  Loras added that the 
Russians seem to be backing away from the Corfu process and 
that it will have largely run its course over the next two to 
three months.  Instead of letting it fade away, an OSCE 
summit could represent an outcome of Corfu. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
GOLDSTONE REPORT: WE ARE TRYING TO HELP ISRAEL 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8. (C/NF) Levitte said the French decision to not vote on the 
resolution on the Goldstone report was the result of a "tough 
discussion" with Israeli authorities and was coordinated with 
the UK.  France's goal was to encourage the GOI to undertake 
a credible investigation into the allegations in the report. 
Such self-examination should be a source of Israeli pride in 
their democratic values, and Levitte likened a potential 
Israeli investigation to inquiries carried out by the USG in 
the wake of Abu Ghraib and by France on questions related to 
the massacre at Srebrenica and the genocide in Rwanda. 
Additionally, France hoped to press Israel to allow greater 
humanitarian access to Gaza.  Levitte said that if Israel had 
shown willingness to address these concerns, France would 
have voted no.  Ambassador Rivkin pointed out that we cannot 
simply ignore the Goldstone report, which is all the more 
unhelpful given efforts underway to relaunch peace 
negotiations. Levitte agreed, and said the French had even 
hoped to delay the vote to give the Israelis more time, but 
were unsuccessful.  In the end, the French decision to not 
vote at all allows the GOF to remain in a position to be 
helpful to the Israelis in the event the GOI decides to go 
ahead with an investigation. 
 
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SINAI: UNIFIL A BETTER USE OF FRENCH RESOURCES THAN MFO 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
9. (C/NF) Ambassador Rivkin stressed to Levitte the 
importance the USG places on France maintaining the plane it 
has deployed to the Sinai peninsula as part of the 
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).  Levitte said the 
GOF was looking to save money globally on its military 
operations, and added that the French view was that, as the 
Sinai peninsula was stable, there was little need to keep the 
French plane there.  Acknowledging that weapons and drug 
smuggling were problems, Levitte said the French plane was 
not able to address these issues, and was intended to monitor 
troop movements, which France felt was not a pressing 
concern.  Levitte said France was much more concerned about 
sufficiently resourcing its much larger deployment to UNIFIL 
in southern Lebanon, where the chances for conflict - and the 
need for monitoring resources - were much more significant. 
Levitte suggested that another European nation could replace 
the French plane in the Sinai, and offered to support the USG 
in demarching potential candidates. 
 
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NORTH KOREA: SPECIAL ENVOY WILL COORDINATE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10. (C/NF) Levitte expressed his thanks for the State 
Department's agreement to meetings "at the appropriate level" 
in Washington for new French special envoy to North Korea 
Jack Lang.  He added that Lang's trip to Washington 
demonstrated the GOF's commitment to coordinating with the 
USG on North Korea, and that the French were not looking to 
interfere in negotiations.  Admitting that the North Koreans 
had still not to his knowledge agreed to a meeting with Lang, 
Levitte added that the French were especially interested in 
consulting with the United States on how to most usefully 
play their one card of diplomatic recognition. 
 
 
PARIS 00001418  004 OF 004 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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11. (C/NF) Hitting many of the current hot-button issues in 
our bilateral relationship in a nearly hour-long meeting with 
Ambassador Rivkin, Levitte provided critical context backed 
up by the authority of a close relationship with President 
Sarkozy.  While deploying his considerable diplomatic skills 
to deflect criticism on some questions, such as AWACS funding 
and France's lack of coordination on the Goldstone vote, he 
was able to frame other issues more constructively than other 
GOF interlocutors have done recently, including France's 
evolving plans for engaging Russia on European security. 
RIVKIN