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P 291354Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8859
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0882
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1242
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1294
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000698 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: TAWASSOUL: PUSH TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL PRESENCE 
FINDS LUKEWARM SUPPORT AMONG IMAMS 
 
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 659 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 505 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Moderate Islamist party Tawassoul has been one of 
the few winners in the past year of political crisis -- 
successfully establishing itself as a credible political 
movement and poised to expand its influence.  This political 
party, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which Taya's 
government would not recognize and set out to repress, went 
on to join the government under President Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi.  Abdallahi's inclusion of Tawassoul in the 
political process raised red flags with the majority and was 
one of the justifications for the coup d'etat.  After playing 
an active role in the anti-coup coalition Front National pour 
la Defense de la Democratie (FNDD), Tawassoul parted ways 
with the FNDD and decided to run an independent candidate in 
the July 18 presidential election.  Now, to everybody's 
surprise, the party that the majority once rejected is 
fielding a common list with majority party Union Pour la 
Republique (UPR) for the November senatorial elections (Ref 
A) and Tawassoul President Jemil Ould Mansour is optimistic 
that President Aziz will offer the Islamists a cabinet 
position in a future government (Ref B). 
 
¶2.  (C)  PolOff met on October 21 with Mansour to discuss 
Tawassoul's future and partnership with majority party UPR 
for the upcoming senatorial elections.  Mansour stated that 
Tawassoul's current strategy is focused on reinforcing its 
base and political presence in Mauritania.  According to him, 
Tawassoul remains a middle-ground opposition party and its 
alliance with UPR is currently motivated by electoral 
ambitions but it could eventually lead to a permanent 
relationship.  According to Mansour, there are commonalties 
between President Aziz's and Tawassoul's program.  Given the 
right conditions, Tawassoul would be willing to join the 
government.  Those conditions include a comprehensive 
dialogue about the government's program and Tawassoul's 
objectives as well as freedom for Tawassoul's ministers to 
implement their programs.  "We are political partners, we 
don't follow orders," stressed Mansour.  Comment: There have 
been widespread rumors that Aziz's ministers have no leeway 
to exercise their functions and that they merely follow 
orders from the top.  Mansour's comment seems to confirm 
these rumors.  End comment. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Given Tawassoul's controversial role in Mauritania's 
political landscape, PolOff met with various Oulema -- 
influential imams -- to inquire about their views on 
Tawassoul.  They all agree that the political process should 
be open to anybody interested in participating. 
Nevertheless, they unanimously rejected any Tawassoul 
aspiration to monopolize Islam, stating that Tawassoul is one 
Muslim party among many and one school of thought among 
others in this almost exclusively Islamic country. 
Tawassoul, they argue, introduces foreign currents that do 
not represent traditional Mauritanian Islam, which is Maliki, 
Suni and organized around brotherhoods.  Comment: 
Brotherhoods are Islamic societies gathering the faithful 
around cheikhs who teach Islam according to the tradition of 
their spiritual leaders.  The most influential brotherhoods 
in Mauritania are the Tidjani and the Khadria.  This 
phenomenon is typical to West Africa where the brotherhoods 
have tremendous power and influence, including across 
borders.  End comment.  Imam Hademine Ould Saleck from the 
Ibn Abass Institute openly stated that there was dissension 
among many Islamic schools of thought and that many did not 
agree with Tawassoul's principles.  Tawassoul is perceived as 
an exclusive group of people that politicizes Islam and that 
is seeking power.  Imam Abass Diaby stressed that none of the 
Oulema belong to Tawassoul despite having been approached by 
Tawassoul for support.  Imam Hamden Ould Tah, President of 
the Oulema Association, dismissed Tawassoul as a fad, a party 
that appeals to young people who are looking to experience 
new and foreign ideologies -- just like the Communist party a 
few decades ago.  Imam Mohamed El Hafedh Ould Enahoui, 
President of the Cultural Islamic Group, does think that 
Tawassoul's participation in government should be accompanied 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000698  002 OF 002 
 
 
by the participation of other Sufi Islamic currents to 
balance a potential Tawassoul tendency to want to present 
itself as the sole representative of Islamic thought.  Imam 
Hamden stated that the difference between Tawassoul and the 
Oulema is that the Oulema were willing to work with those in 
government to ensure the government included Islam whereas 
Tawassoul had a political agenda that aimed at forcibly 
bringing Islam to the government through the acquisition of 
political power.  Tawassoul, he states, does not have the 
right to monopolize a universal concept that belongs to all 
like Islam.  None of the imams passed judgment on President 
Aziz's change of mind regarding Tawassoul's participation, 
highlighting that they were all "on the side of power."  Imam 
Enahoui stated Aziz's new tolerance for Tawassoul was 
motivated by this party's timely recognition of Aziz's win 
and that it was only normal that Tawassoul wished to be on 
Aziz's good side to avoid being persecuted. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Comment:  With less than five percent in the July 18 
election but with an impressive nine parliamentarians, 
Tawassoul remains an influential voice among Mauritania's 
major political players.  With its sense of discipline and 
strategy, it emerges as one of the winners of the political 
crisis and, ironically, it is apparently poised to acquire 
more influence under an Aziz government.  As one of the imams 
stated, one should not forget that being part of the 
government in Mauritania means access to resources and power 
that generate more resources and power.  Nevertheless, 
Mauritanians remain wary of political Islam and foreign 
influences.  Tawassoul's support among religious and 
political leaders -- and even among the population -- remains 
limited.  To an extent, the traditional ulema see Tawassoul 
as a potential contender for their leadership role.  Even 
though the Tawassoul leadership presents itself as moderate 
-- indeed, they have worked well with the embassy -- many in 
politics and religious leadership fear an Algeria-like effort 
to put on a friendly face and use the democratic system for 
decidedly undemocratic purposes.  The FNDD opposition leaders 
now complain about their former Tawassoul partners as "Aziz 
moles" because they so quickly recognized the elections and 
are willing to work with Aziz.  Tawassoul will say they 
accepted the elections because they have better grass roots 
ties than the other opposition parties and saw that the 
elections did, in fact, reflect the will of the people. 
Their goal of restoring constitutional rule attained, they 
were willing to work with Aziz to ensure their political 
relevance.  End comment. 
BOULWARE