VZCZCXRO3541
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0681/01 3021423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291423Z OCT 09 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0251
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1541

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TR GR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT: "THE SIDES 
CANNOT FINALIZE DEAL WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT" 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 678 
     ¶B. ALLISON-FITZPATRICK OCTOBER 16 E-MAIL 
     ¶C. URBANCIC-KAIDANOW OCTOBER 21 E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: Amb. Frank Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: "The sides cannot finalize a deal without 
international involvement," Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader 
Mehmet Ali Talat warned the Ambassador during an October 21 
lunch. Although he admitted that progress was possible, Talat 
lamented what he dubbed the "acquiescence" of the 
international community to the Greek Cypriot (G/C) notion of 
a "Cypriot Solution." He wanted upgraded UN involvement to 
prevent what he termed G/C "violations" of established UN 
parameters and get the sides to "yes." Talat urged the USG to 
"encourage" the UN to increase its footprint and lobbied for 
the appointment of a US Special Envoy for Cyprus.  He said 
the rhetoric of G/C leader Demetris Christofias "fluctuated 
between good and bad." He said the leaders planned a joint 
media strategy to counter increasingly hostile anti-solution 
voices on both sides (Reftel A).  Regarding the talks 
themselves, Talat said the sides were still making 
constructive proposals, but that, at present, the "give and 
take" phase was still "remote." For his part, the Ambassador 
said that the USG had looked long and hard at the possible 
appointment of an envoy, but had to consider the possibility 
that such a step might do more harm than good by triggering a 
G/C backlash and fueling hard-line opposition. He also said 
he was in regular contact with UNSYG Special Adviser Downer 
and would pass on Talat's desire for a more robust UN role. 
End Summary 
 
"The sides cannot finalize a deal without international 
involvement" 
 
¶2. (C) In an oft-heard refrain, Talat complained that, 
although progress was possible, "the sides cannot finalize a 
deal without international involvement."  He said that the 
international community had uncritically adopted the G/C 
mantra of a "Cypriot Solution", i.e. minimal outside 
involvement. He said that a purely "Cypriot Solution" as 
envisioned by the Greek Cypriots was "nonsense" and would, in 
the end, result in failure. 
 
¶3. (C) In fact, he charged, the present G/C position on 
property and bi-zonality violated the "established UN 
framework" and would stymie on-going property talks unless 
Greek Cypriots walked back their demand that the original 
property owner had the right of first refusal (Note: G/Cs 
owned a majority of property in the north pre-1974, i.e in 
the area that would form a future T/C constituent state. End 
Note) This position, Talat hinted, would lead to majority G/C 
property ownership in the future T/C constituent state--a 
clear redline for him. To strengthen his point, Talat pointed 
to 1992 UNSCR 750 that defined bi-zonality as majority 
population/property ownership in the titular constituent 
state of a given community. Christofias, he claimed, accepted 
the principle of majority population only, but rejected 
majority property ownership as evident in his position on 
property. (Note: A UN Good Offices' staffer told us on 
October 28 that the UN's goal is to get the sides to focus on 
creating solutions to the property issue, not debating past 
issues over which the sides vehemently disagree. End Note) 
 
¶4. (C)  Talat urged the USG to use its own good offices to 
encourage the UN, which until now had behaved "timidly," to 
play a more "salient" role and call out the G/Cs on their 
"violation" of bi-zonality. Talat also urged the appointment 
of a Special US Envoy for Cyprus without clearly defining 
what he expected such an individual to do, aside from 
"encouraging" the G/Cs. The Ambassador noted that the USG had 
considered the appointment of an envoy, but had to weigh the 
possibility that it might trigger a G/C backlash and harm the 
common goal of achieving a solution. The Ambassador added 
that the Embassy enjoyed regular and good contact with the UN 
Good Offices Mission and would raise Talat's concerns with 
UNSYG SA Alexander Downer. 
 
"Difficult to understand Christofias' repeating controversial 
topics" 
 
¶5. (C) Talat voiced consternation over what he said were 
Christofias' often unhelpful press statements, though Talat 
admitted that sometimes Christofias' rhetoric was "good." He 
said that is was "difficult to understand Christofias' 
repeatedly raising controversial topics", such as his 
insistence on the post-solution continuation of the RoC and 
 
NICOSIA 00000681  002 OF 002 
 
 
the need to put pressure on Turkey. Talat said he avoided 
raising hot-button issues in public, like "virgin birth." 
Unfortunately, however, this sensitivity was not 
reciprocated. Talat said that Christofias had even voiced 
public support for Talat against his probable challenger in 
2010 "presidential elections", hard-liner Dr. Dervish Eroglu. 
Such a tack, he said, was sure to "backfire" given 
deep-seated Turkish Cypriot suspicion. Talat shared with the 
Ambassador a conspiracy theory in circulation in the north, 
with which he did not agree but dubbed "logical." According 
to the theory, Christofias is secretly working to undermine 
Talat and secure Eroglu's election on the assumption that 
Eroglu's hard-line will allow Christofias a blameless exit 
strategy. (Note We have heard this sentiment voiced with 
conviction by two of Talat's high-ranking supporters and 
advisers. End Note).  To counter this, Talat said that he 
would propose a "common media strategy" to Christofias, but 
did not go into further detail. 
 
"Christofias frightened by criticism" 
 
¶6. (C) Talat said Christofias was "frightened by criticism," 
especially from his coalition partners EDEK and DIKO. He 
added that Christofias still believed that Turkey "would 
surrender" in the face of EU pressure as advocated by his 
partners. Talat hoped, however, that the October 19-20 visit 
of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou might have a 
positive effect on Christofias since "Greece was back in the 
game" after the defeat of New Democracy, which he felt was 
more willing to follow Nicosia's lead (Note: Talat's 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) has excellent relations with 
PASOK, which helped CTP obtain observer status in the 
Socialist International. End Note). The Ambassador noted that 
former RoC President George Vassiliou told him in a recent 
meeting that Papandreou had delivered a strong pro-solution 
message to Christofias. 
 
"Give and Take Phase still remote" 
 
¶7. (C) Talat said that the sides were still "making 
proposals" and trying to take each other's concerns into 
consideration. That said, he warned that the "give and take 
phase" was still remote. He said that property and 
governance, the present focus of the on-going second round, 
were different issues and did not lend themselves to 
trade-offs; that would come later when they started to tackle 
issues such as territory, which could be coupled with 
property. 
 
¶8. (C) Talat said that they had, for the time being, put the 
various proposals on electing the executive made during the 
second round "on the shelf."   The final G/C proposal (Ref 
B), which envisioned weighted, single-ticket cross-voting, 
was "rejected in principle" by the T/Cs, but not 
"categorically." He said that the G/C proposal met the 
requirements of "political equality," but fell short on 
"bi-communality" since it allowed Greek Cypriots to have a 
say in whom the T/Cs elected. He said that nationalism would 
grow on the T/C side post-solution since the Turkish Cypriots 
would, at least short-term, suffer property and territorial 
displacement. Right-wing parties would then manipulate this 
unease to increase their votes. If Greek Cypriots voting in 
Turkish Cypriot elections stymied this will by allying with 
left-wing T/C parties, he argued, there would be an ugly 
backlash. 
 
 
 
 
 
URBANCIC