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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 000403 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/20/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINR IN
SUBJECT: MAHARASHTRA OFFICIALS WELCOME TRAINING TO PREVENT ANOTHER 
TERRORIST ATTACK 
 
REF: A. MUMBAI 000233 
     ¶B. 08 MUMBAI 000296 
     ¶C. 08 MUMBAI 000518 
 
MUMBAI 00000403  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Newbill, Consul for Economic and 
Political Affairs, Pol/Econ, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Maharashtra state Home Secretary Chandra 
Iyengar and senior police officials discussed security 
enhancements since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and 
expressed interest in pursuing in-country USG training, during a 
recent meeting with visiting Embassy Political Counselor and 
Congenoffs.  While the officials praised the performance of 
Mumbai's police during the attack, they recognized the need for 
improved response capabilities.  The creation of a new crisis 
response team is taking shape, but the state seeks additional 
specialized training for the unit on multiple fronts.  Iyengar 
suggested that a U.S.-India memorandum of understanding on 
counterterrorism (CT) cooperation could facilitate Maharashtra's 
pursuit of USG training opportunities.  In the meantime, Post's 
Regional Security Office (RSO) is working with the police to 
promote training and cooperation, but remains concerned that 
Mumbai still lacks the response capability to deal with another 
26/11 type attack.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
MUMBAI SECURITY OFFICIALS PROUD OF POLICE, BUT MORE TRAINING IS 
NECESSARY 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Chandra Iyengar, Maharashtra's Additional Chief 
Secretary in the Home Department (Public Safety), D. 
Sivanandan, Commissioner of Police - Mumbai City and Himanshu 
Roy, Joint Commissioner of Police-Law and Order, discussed steps 
taken since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks (known in India as 
"26/11") to enhance the state's prevention and reaction 
capabilities in a September 24 meeting with visiting Embassy 
Political Counselor and Congenoffs.  Iyengar, who took office in 
April 2009, five months after the attack, said her officers 
performed well during the Mumbai attacks, remarking, "We should 
be proud of the city police.  They did the best they could under 
the circumstances."  Noting that the police are trained to 
address crowd control and street level crimes, not terrorism, 
Iyengar acknowledged that additional training is needed to 
better prepare them for future attacks. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Iyengar explained that the state's greatest "lesson 
learned" from 26/11 was the realization that India was 
vulnerable to significant, military-style attacks anywhere in 
the Indian heartland.  Prior to 26/11, these kinds of attacks 
were limited to border areas in Kashmir and Northeast India, 
where the army was equipped to handle them.  She said it was a 
stark awakening to realize that "bad guys" could enter Mumbai 
without the army knowing about it or being prepared to prevent 
it.  Accordingly, the police needed to learn to respond to these 
kinds of attacks because "the army could not be everywhere." 
Nevertheless, despite calls for a more robust police force from 
some critics, Iyengar asserted that Indians did not want a 
militarized police presence in their communities, and 
policymakers must strike a balance between increasing security 
and maintaining free and open societies. 
 
 
 
POLICE PLAN "THREE-TIERED" RESPONSE STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Iyengar claimed that the Maharashtra government had 
improved the city's readiness and response capabilities since 
the attack.  Introducing the most recent security enhancements 
in the state, Iyengar pointed to the establishment of "Force 
One," an elite strike force, as a major step.  Sivanandan 
explained his implementation of a "three-tiered" response 
structure.  The first tier is the local police officers, who 
will continue to address normal public disruptions.  The second 
tier is policing units known as Quick Response Teams (QRT), 
which will be given more sophisticated weapons and specialized 
crisis response training.  Currently, 682 men have completed the 
QRT training and 1100 are partially trained, he said.  (Note: 
QRT forces participated in the Consulate's Crisis Management 
Exercise (CME).  RSO advises that while the QRTs are more 
 
MUMBAI 00000403  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
prepared than regular police units, they would not be able to 
deal with a 26/11-style attack.  End Note.)  Sivanandan 
indicated that the police have purchased new weaponry from the 
U.S. for the QRTs, and a U.S. private firm, AimPoint, provided 
training in using the sights on the weapons. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) The third tier of the state's crisis response structure 
is known as Force One, an elite, highly trained squad. 
Sivanandan said he hoped for a fully-trained Force One strength 
of 200-250 officers.  When fully implemented, Force One would 
have hubs across the state, Iyendar added.  Iyengar said her 
office was planning a large training center in Pune to give 
state police working in urban areas specific anti-terrorism 
training, but that proposal had yet to be presented to the 
legislative assembly.  (Note:  Two Israeli security and training 
consultants who have trained Force One recruits in Pune told 
Congenoff that these units are unlikely to ever be a 
well-trained, effective force.  As an example, they pointed out 
that the police had purchased new Glock guns, but wrong-sized 
holsters.  Once stuck inside the holsters, the police could not 
remove the guns, but continued to train with the weaponry 
anyway.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
COASTAL SECURITY STILL A VULNERABILITY 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) While the state is working to improve its forces, 
 
Iyengar was frank about areas that still need to be addressed. 
The risk of terrorist infiltration from the sea is of great 
concern to Maharashtra's security forces, Iyengar said.  While 
security along the coast is the responsibility of her office, 
she noted that they cannot patrol in international waters and 
must rely on the nation's coast guard for that protection. 
Iyengar said her office is training local fishermen to be 
vigilant and report suspicious activity, and she reported that 
they are issuing identity cards to Maharashtrians working on 
boats.  Deflecting a suggestion of joint cooperation on port 
security measures, Iyengar evinced less concern with security 
threats at major ports in Maharashtra, explaining that 
terrorists were more likely to come ashore undetected at smaller 
ports or inlets along the coast. 
 
 
 
CENTER-STATE RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED SINCE 26/11 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Iyengar claimed that relations with the central 
government had grown closer since 26/11, with improved 
information-sharing and responsiveness.  While some detractors 
criticized the central government for not taking a more 
proactive role to protect the states, Iyengar insisted that 
centralizing counter-terrorism efforts would not work.  Under 
the Indian constitution, law enforcement is a state issue; with 
India's diverse language and customs, a truly centralized law 
enforcement structure would be hampered by its inability to 
properly analyze and prioritize intelligence reports and inputs 
originating at the state level, where knowledge of local 
conditions, personalities, and practices is key. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Nevertheless, Iyengar, Sivanandan and Roy voiced some 
concern over the inability to get immediate, credible 
information relevant to potential terrorist threats.  They 
lamented that Maharashtra has no independent intelligence 
gathering entity and must rely on information that is gathered, 
analyzed, filtered, and supplied by the central government. 
Given the vastness of India, Sivanandan was skeptical that the 
central authorities could have detailed information on all the 
possible threats.  He noted that Mumbai alone has 1,400 vital 
installations. (Note:  Those would include infrastructure such 
as bridges, two airports, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, two 
stock exchanges, diplomatic missions, government offices and 
numerous other targets. End note.) 
 
 
 
MUMBAI 00000403  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  In discussing national/state level cooperation, 
PolCouns relayed actions taken by the U.S. since 9/11, including 
forming the National Counter Terrorism Center to coordinate 
information sharing among the various law enforcement and 
investigative agencies.  Iyengar responded that there is a newly 
created National Investigative Agency charged with investigating 
terrorism and counterfeiting; some state police have been 
"deputed" to serve with the agency for the next several years. 
She also said that Union Minister for Home Affairs, P. 
Chidambaram, is working on a national law that would allow the 
central government to act in the event of a terrorist attack, 
but without compromising states' rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
MAHARASHTRA POLICE WELCOME TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Sivanandan and Roy enthusiastically welcomed the 
possibility of having their forces receive USG critical incident 
training in India, noting the difficulty of sending large 
numbers of trainees abroad.  Sivanandan specifically requested 
training in hostage negotiation, information sharing, terrorist 
financing, hijacking situations, post-blast investigation and 
cargo transportation safety.  Sivanandan said that crisis 
training in a broad range of potential threat scenarios is 
essential, as the terrorists are unlikely to use the same means 
of attack twice.  He posited that the next attackers might be 
suicide bombers, or could target schools.  Sivanandan urged that 
any training be done in Mumbai to maximize the number of 
officers that can participate in the training. 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) Iyengar noted that the state has gratefully accepted 
training from other countries - such as Israel -- and would be 
pleased to receive training from U.S. specialists.  Echoing 
Sivanandan, Iyengar recommended that the training be done in 
Mumbai, where the conditions are most appropriate for the 
challenges.  Offering an example, she explained that while 
surveillance cameras are often used in other cities, the railway 
stations in Mumbai are so crowded that other methods must also 
be used to monitor movements and threats. 
 
 
 
IYENGAR PROPOSES TRAINING MOU FOR COUNTER TERRORISM 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C) PolCouns welcomed the training suggestions, and noted 
that such law enforcement cooperation is a major U.S. priority. 
However, Mumbai Pol/Econ Chief reminded Iyengar that the Los 
Angeles Police Department had wished to send a training team to 
Mumbai, but could not get permission from the Minstry of 
External Affairs (MEA).  Iyengar suggested working with the 
central government to establish a memorandum of understanding 
which would allow for a host of training opportunities -- a 
"large shopping list" - which states could select and pursue as 
needs and opportunities arose, without seeking central 
government approval on a case-by-case basis.  (Comment: As a 
deliverable for PM Singh's November 23-25 state visit, Post is 
pursuing a U.S.-India law enforcement and security initiative 
which should facilitate training in the areas sought by Iyengar 
and Sivanandan.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
COMMENT:  LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING MOU WORTH PURSUING 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Comment:  Maharashtra leaders have been criticized 
since the Mumbai attacks for failing to take visible steps to 
improve the city and state's security.  Efforts to build Force 
One are still in their infancy, and the state police will 
continue to stumble due to corruption, political apathy, a lack 
of coordination, and poorly trained, staffed, and paid 
personnel, challenges faced by police forces throughout India. 
Nevertheless, there are good opportunities to engage with the 
 
MUMBAI 00000403  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Maharashtra police in order to boost their capabilities - and 
raise their comfort level in working with U.S. security 
officials and experts.  At the invitation of the RSO, Mumbai 
police participated in a recent Consulate Mumbai crisis 
management training exercise for the first time, hopefully 
setting the stage for additional joint training exercises.  RSO 
at post continues to work with local authorities to bring 
training specialists to Mumbai in the specific areas identified 
during this meeting.  End Comment. 
FOLMSBEE