VZCZCXRO0250
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLJ #0337/01 2991557
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261557Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7547
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: POLITICAL DECISION ON OMLT, CAVEATS 
LIKELY LATE OCT, EARLY NOV 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Sue Shultz, reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) are both preparing for the government to make a 
decision on the possibility of a Slovene-led Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in late October or early 
November, according to MOD State Secretary Uros Krek and MFA 
Director General for Multilateral Affairs Andrej Benedejcic. 
Krek and Benedejcic told CDA that the ministries are "pushing 
ahead" and are hopeful that the government will lift caveats 
and approve an OMLT.  Both Krek and Benedejcic acknowledged 
that political opposition to deploying an OMLT and lifting 
caveats came from within the coalition, not the opposition. 
They also highlighted the important role public opinion plays 
in shaping Slovenia's efforts in Afghanistan, with Benedejcic 
stressing the need to "fight the perception that there is no 
endpoint."  CDA offered post's assistance on the public 
diplomacy front, and Krek and Benedejcic strongly agreed with 
CDA's emphasis on getting Slovene and Afghan voices involved 
in the broader debate on why Slovenia is and should be 
involved.  End Summary. 
 
Increase Effectiveness, Not Numbers 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) MOD State Secretary Uros Krek told CDA on October 19 
the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense committees 
would take up the issue of overseas operations on October 29 
in a joint meeting.  Krek noted that increasing the number of 
Slovene troops in Afghanistan was "politically unacceptable," 
but he was hopeful that the government coalition would 
recognize that the "only viable way" for Slovenia to 
contribute more would be to field the OMLT and lift caveats. 
Krek acknowledged that OMLTs are a centerpiece of building 
capacity of and shifting responsibility to Afghan forces, and 
that a Slovene OMLT would provide greater added value than 
sending more Slovene troops in the current force protection 
role with caveats.  He highlighted that budget cuts would not 
affect Slovene participation in Afghanistan, saying that the 
transition to a deterrent posture in Kosovo meant that any 
reduction in overall Slovene deployments abroad would stem 
from the drawdown there. 
 
¶3. (C) Resistance to the proposed OMLT would likely come from 
within the governing coalition, Krek told CDA, while the main 
opposition party SDS would likely support the proposal. 
Franco Juri, a parliamentarian from coalition party ZARES, 
has recently called for a withdrawal of Slovene forces from 
ISAF.  Krek was pleased to note, however, that Juri will 
accompany Krek on a November trip to Afghanistan, becoming 
the first parliamentarian to travel there.  Though not 
optimistic that Juri would change his mind on withdrawal, 
Krek said that Juri's trip was a good start towards getting 
Slovene politicians and public to see and understand the 
"broader picture" of why NATO is in Afghanistan. 
 
Timeframe Key Selling Point 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Although the "general climate is full of doubt about 
the Afghan endeavor," MFA Director General Andrej Benedejcic 
told CDA on October 21 that the MOD and MFA are pushing ahead 
on "strengthening the (Slovene) presence" in Afghanistan. 
Benedejcic noted that the biggest obstacle to political or 
public support for Slovene efforts was the perception of "no 
endpoint" in sight.  He said that parliament would have a 
"discussion role," though no formal role in the decision, and 
providing a timeframe for Slovene commitment would address 
many of the doubts from parliamentarians. 
 
¶5. (C) Both Krek and Benedejcic expressed concern on how 
politicians and the public would handle any Slovene 
casualties, though Benedejcic indicated that he was 
optimistic that Slovenians would have a similar response as 
the publics in the Baltic states after their first 
casualties--"initial shock," but then moving forward.  He 
said the reaction would be completely different were the 
Slovene Armed Forces still on a conscription system rather 
than the all-professional military model. 
 
Painting the Broader Portrait 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In response to CDA's offer of public diplomacy 
assistance, Krek and Benedejcic heartily agreed that getting 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000337  002 OF 002 
 
 
Afghan speakers or Slovenes with civilian experience in 
Afghanistan in front of the public would significantly 
enhance any PD efforts.  Both acknowledged that Slovene 
audiences, public and official, needed to see the context of 
general development, of which security is the essential first 
step.  Benedejcic specifically cited women's rights as a 
topic that would resonate in Slovenia.  He also outlined the 
MFA's plan to hold some PD events around the November 13 NATO 
Strategic Concept meeting in Slovenia, with Madeleine 
Albright to possibly headline the event as the chair of the 
group of experts. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Government of Slovenia's upcoming decision to 
possibly lift caveats and approve an OMLT will be an 
important test of the Pahor administration's resolve to 
continue Slovenia's active engagement in Afghanistan, 
especially given Defense Minister Jelusic's recent 
announcement of projected budget cuts that will decrease the 
number of Slovene troops deployed abroad.  With Prime 
Minister Pahor already taking a political beating over 
negotiations to resolve the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute, 
an OMLT offers a more concrete timeframe that can help dispel 
public qualms over an endless commitment in Afghanistan, thus 
avoiding yet another potential landmine for the embattled 
government.  If the PM is able to win over skeptical 
coalition partners to support the OMLT, he could likely find 
uneasy common ground with opposition leader Janez Jansa, who 
as leader of the previous government sent four Slovene 
soldiers to Iraq as trainers.  Committing to an OMLT would 
also earn Slovenia greater credibility within NATO, as ISAF 
is looking to increase the number of both military and police 
OMLTs in Afghanistan.  Public diplomacy efforts will be 
critical in the government's efforts; Post will work closely 
with both the MFA and MOD to shape an effective PD strategy. 
FREDEN