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Viewing cable 09KATHMANDU898, NEPAL: LET'S ENGAGE THE KEY PLAYERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KATHMANDU898 2009-10-01 03:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kathmandu
VZCZCXRO8645
OO RUEHCI
DE RUEHKT #0898/01 2740329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010329Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0811
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7145
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 7466
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2802
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 5507
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6628
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3254
RUEHWLB/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY 0007
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 4779
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2425
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3676
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000898 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER MARR KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: LET'S ENGAGE THE KEY PLAYERS 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., Jeffrey A. Moon. Reasons 1.4 ( 
b/d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  See paras. 5 and 9. 
 
2. (C) Summary.  Post proposes a new approach to remove two 
conflict-era impediments to effective U.S. engagement in 
Nepal: (1) restrictions on U.S. military assistance to the 
Nepal Army, and (2) ongoing inclusion of the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoists) on two U.S. Government terrorist lists. 
The military restrictions and terrorist designation limit our 
ability to engage the Army and the Maoists, perhaps the two 
most important players in Nepal's current -- and future -- 
political landscape.  The time is ripe to resolve these 
issues, using them as leverage to generate positive movement 
on the peace process, democracy, and human rights.  Both the 
Maoists and Army have new incentives to work with us at this 
critical time in Nepal's peace process.  Moving forward 
simultaneously with both parties gives U.S. initiatives added 
credibility.  Success is by no means assured, but the 
alternative is the status quo and ongoing stalemate in the 
peace process.  We request that the upcoming Nepal 
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) carefully consider this 
new approach for achieving broader U.S. goals in Nepal.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------- 
Nepal Army 
---------- 
3. (C) Since 2005, the U.S. Government has limited military 
assistance to the Government of Nepal due to concerns about 
the lack of respect for democracy and human rights.  Congress 
has separately conditioned military assistance to Nepal on 
concrete action by the Nepal Army on conflict-era human 
rights cases and other issues, and is considering a similar 
proposal for FY2010.  The restrictions on military assistance 
limit the U.S. ability to engage the Nepal Army, including 
our capacity to support the Army's involvement in 
international peacekeeping operations, such as the currently 
proposed operations in Darfur (Nepal is the fifth largest 
troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions).  The Nepal 
Army leadership, many of whom were trained in the United 
States, resents the restrictions, viewing them as an affront 
to the Army's credibility and professionalism.  Since the 
signing of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Nepal 
Army has been confined to barracks, and there have been no 
credible allegations of human rights abuses against the Army 
since 2006.  In part due to U.S. support, the Army has 
integrated human rights training into its core curriculum. 
 
Ending Impunity 
--------------- 
4. (C) Senior Army officers would like to put the issue of 
conflict-era human rights abuses behind them.  At a time when 
the political situation in Nepal continues to shift, the Army 
remains concerned about its future in a "new Nepal."  It 
seeks international support and legitimacy, but remains 
dogged by human rights accusations.  The recently-appointed 
Chief of the Army Staff (CoAS), General Gurung, told Charge 
d'Affaires on several recent occasions that he is willing to 
cooperate with civilian officials on punishing Army officers 
guilty of grave human rights abuses.  We should seize this 
opportunity in close coordination with the international 
community.  The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) continues to press the Government of Nepal and 
Army to prosecute those guilty of human rights abuses.  The 
European Union and other key donors have separately launched 
a new impunity strategy focused principally on holding the 
Nepal Army accountable for past abuses. 
 
Concrete, Doable, Measurable Steps 
---------------------------------- 
5. (C) Post proposes presenting a list of concrete actions to 
the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Nepal Army that the Army 
must take in order to remove all restrictions on U.S. 
military cooperation.  Actions requested must be clearly 
defined, doable, and measurable.  To maximize international 
 
KATHMANDU 00000898  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
leverage, actions sought by the U.S. Government should be 
consistent with -- if not identical to -- steps requested by 
the United Nations and like-minded countries.  This approach 
might include specific, emblematic human rights cases, such 
as the Maina Sunuwar case, as well as more systematic reforms 
such as a vetting process for international peacekeeping 
participation.  Working closely with OHCHR and other 
embassies, Post would press for action that would demonstrate 
the Army's commitment to human rights and democracy.  Post 
would inform the Nepal Army that the U.S. Government is 
seeking similar actions on the part of the Maoists.  In 
return, the U.S. Government should be prepared to deepen our 
relationship with the Army:  expanding assistance as 
permitted by U.S. law; considering requests for lethal 
assistance consistent with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
and U.S. policy objectives; expanding training opportunities 
for the Nepal Army; and increasing the number of senior-level 
U.S. military visits.  We could also reiterate our commitment 
to a professional and independent military under civilian 
control, and our willingness to stress this point with key 
political parties. 
 
6. (C) Before approaching the MOD and Nepal Army, the 
Department would likely need to seek U.S. Congressional 
support for the strategy.  Once Post presents the key 
conditions to the Army, it would be unhelpful if the 
goalposts move.  As noted above, Post would work closely with 
OHCHR, which also provides information to Congress on human 
rights conditions in Nepal.  If OHCHR supports the proposed 
strategy, OHCHR could be a useful ally in convincing key 
congressional actors. 
 
------- 
Maoists 
------- 
7. (C) In 2003, the United States listed the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoists) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
under Executive Order 13224, and in 2004 added the Maoists to 
the Terrorist Exclusion List.  While the designations may 
have served U.S. objectives during the conflict, Post 
believes the value of the "terrorist label" has largely 
eroded.  The terrorist designation limits our ability to 
engage with the Maoists, the largest political party in 
Nepal.  The related visa restrictions only irritate the 
Maoists and are limiting our ability to include the Maoists 
in civilian-military programs intended to foster consensus on 
key political and military issues.  Since the Maoists joined 
the peace process and particularly following the April 2008 
elections, the United States has discussed with the party 
leadership the steps necessary for removal from the U.S. 
Terrorist list.  In June, A/S Blake repeated to Maoist leader 
Dahal four conditions:  (1) renounce the use of terrorism and 
violence; (2) reform the Maoist-affiliated Young Communist 
League (YCL); (3) address U.S. concerns about the killing of 
two Embassy guards and the bombing of the American Center in 
Kathmandu; and (4) remain engaged in the peace process. 
 
Quest for Legitimacy 
-------------------- 
8. (C) While some Maoists may value "revolutionary 
credibility" that attaches to the U.S. terrorist label, Post 
believes most senior Maoist leaders would prefer not to be on 
the U.S. terrorist list.  The Maoists are positioning 
themselves to return to government in the coming months.  Any 
new Maoist government will seek international legitimacy, an 
effort only undermined by the U.S. terrorist label.  In 
recent weeks, the Maoists have taken some steps that suggest 
that they have decided to cooperate more fully with the peace 
process.  For example, the Maoists have resumed participation 
in the Special Committee for Integration and Rehabilitation 
of Maoists Combatants and are fully engaged in the 
constitution-drafting process.  YCL activity throughout the 
country appears down significantly, although the reasons 
remain unclear.  While these steps may be temporary or 
superficial, they are encouraging and should be tested, not 
dismissed. 
 
 
KATHMANDU 00000898  003 OF 003 
 
 
Parallel Pressure 
----------------- 
9. (C) Post recommends renewing high-level contacts with 
Chairman Dahal and other key Maoist leaders on the steps 
necessary for removal from the terrorist list.  We advocate 
equal, parallel pressure on both the Maoists and the Nepal 
Army and using this balanced approach as leverage against 
both institutions.  Post suggests working with the Department 
on refining the criteria for removal from the terrorist list 
to include more specific actions, and presenting a non-paper 
to Chairman Dahal with these necessary steps.  For example, 
OHCHR has identified certain human rights abuses by YCL 
activists.  Action on those cases could constitute a 
benchmark satisfying U.S. concerns about the need for YCL 
reform.  Similar benchmarks should be developed with respect 
to other outstanding issues. 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
10. (C) Post is under no illusion that the Maoists have 
become moderate democrats or that the Nepal Army has suddenly 
embraced human rights accountability.  However, current U.S. 
policy limits full political engagement to the established 
political parties and keeps us at arms' length from the two 
most powerful political institutions in the country: the 
Nepal Army and the Maoists.  The ongoing peace process can 
only succeed if we engage all institutions across the 
political spectrum.  To do so, we must remove the two 
conflict-era impediments to normalized U.S.-Nepal relations. 
 
11. (C) Success is by no means assured, but the alternative 
is the status quo and ongoing stalemate in the peace process. 
 Powerful forces in both the Army and Maoists will resist 
positive movement.  However, we strongly believe that any 
leverage the U.S. Government gained through imposing military 
restrictions and labeling the Maoists terrorists is now 
outweighed by the negative impact on our ties with these two 
key Nepali actors.  Removing military restrictions and the 
Maoists from the terrorist list does not mean that the U.S. 
Government will stop pressing aggressively for the end to 
violence, human rights accountability, democratic reform, and 
completion of the peace process.  We will simply do so 
through comprehensive diplomatic engagement and a broader 
range of tools at our disposal. 
MOON