VZCZCXRO5619
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3472/01 3021318
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291318Z OCT 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2662
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003472 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA MARKINGS) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS TO USAID ASIA OFFICE AND S/SRAP STAFF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 
TAGS: EAID EFIN ENRG KPWR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KAJAKI DAM: MORE ENERGY AWAITS ENHANCED SECURITY 
 
REF: 08 KABUL 2546 
 
KABUL 00003472  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for Reasons 1.4 (b 
) & (d) 
 
¶1. (S/REL ISAF, AFG) SUMMARY:  The Kajaki Power Dam project in 
Northern Helmand -- a signature U.S. development program in 
pre-war Afghanistan undergoing rehabilitation for several 
years -- could generate sufficient electricity to benefit 
330,000 residents of Helmand and Kandahar provinces. 
Completing the project would advance U.S./ISAF 
counterinsurgency strategy by creating jobs and providing 
energy and water for agricultural development, thereby 
winning locals to the side of the Afghan government. 
Unfortunately, implementing the next phase -- a two-year, 
$170 million project to install a third on-site turbine and 
construct necessary transmission lines -- requires improved 
security at the dam and in the area.  Neither ISAF nor GIRoA 
can commit to providing the required security until at least 
2011, if then.  Meanwhile, USAID's contract security for the 
parts stored on site is costing $1 million per month. 
Therefore, USAID will take immediate steps to mothball the 
parts and entrust their protection to the GIRoA site manager. 
 Effectively, this means the abandonment of the last phase. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ADDITIONAL ENERGY GENERATION ON HOLD 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) Although USAID completed repair of one of the dam's 
two operational turbines in October, lack of secure access to 
the dam has delayed plans to install a third turbine and 18.5 
MW generator and build a 110 KV transmission line to carry 
low-cost power to an additional 120,000 people in the 
troubled south.  Increased electricity would stimulate 
economic growth and create jobs in Helmand and Kandahar; 
provide a return on a substantial U.S. investment; and likely 
entice other donors to invest in much-needed development 
projects such as building cold storage and value-added 
agricultural processing facilities.  All of these outcomes 
would promote our counterinsurgency strategy by tangibly 
demonstrating that the Government of Afghanistan -- rather 
than the insurgents -- can deliver services, opportunities 
and hope for a better life to its people. 
 
COMPLEX OPERATION, LIMITED FORCES 
--------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) Insurgent strength and activity, however, are 
significant obstacles.  In September 2008, ISAF forces 
ensured the safe delivery of the $20 million, 20-ton, 18.5 MW 
turbine itself along the 180 km route from the Ring Road to 
Kajaki (reftel) using close air support, ground troop 
deployments and a road-clearance package to detect and defuse 
IEDs.  The turbine has been in storage since then, awaiting 
appropriate security for delivery of the installation 
materials and subsequent construction. 
 
¶4. (S/REL ISAF, AFG) Installing the third turbine and building the 
transmission lines requires transporting heavy equipment and 
900 tons of cement and aggregate to the site via the 
dangerous 87 km route from the Ring Road to Kajaki. 
Insurgents are entrenched in the Kajaki area; although 107 
British troops defend the dam itself the troops are too few 
to provide security for the installation and transmission 
lines construction stages of the project.  Current ISAF 
strategy in the province is focused on securing population 
centers -- Marjah, Garmsir, Nawa and the approaches to 
Kandahar City in the south -- rather than northern Helmand 
where the dam and transmission lines are.  Future ISAF plans 
for the region are still under development. 
 
¶5. (C/REL ISAF, AFG) USAID will continue to provide contracted 
security for the technical advisors and turbine parts at the 
site through the end of April 2010 at the latest, at a cost 
of $1 million per month.  Given that neither ISAF nor GIRoA 
can commit to providing the needed security until 2011, if 
then, and that USAID's contract security for the site costs 
$1 million a month, USAID is taking steps to inventory the 
turbine parts and store them until appropriate security is 
available.  USAID will continue with plans to upgrade 
Kandahar city's electrical distribution system, which will 
improve power services in the city even without additional 
power from Kajaki.  However, additional possible enhancements 
affecting up to 640,000 Afghans -- such as raising the water 
level in the Kajaki dam reservoir to increase irrigation and 
generate more power; building a new power-house for an 
additional 100MW of power; and constructing a new 
transmission line from Kajaki to Kandahar -- would also have 
to wait for improved security. 
 
¶6.  (S/REL ISAF, AFG) COMMENT:  Moving ahead on this project 
 
KABUL 00003472  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
requires an improvement in security.  There are clearly 
significant benefits to be gained if this can be 
accomplished.  The U.S. and ISAF are pursuing a 
counterinsurgency strategy focused on protecting the 
population and demonstrating that the Afghan government can 
and is delivering on its promises to improve the lives of its 
citizens, and Afghans seek access to electricity and 
employment opportunities above all other development goods or 
projects.  Installing the 18.5 MW turbine and constructing 
the new transmission line would meet those needs by enabling 
the government to increase the reliable supply of low-cost 
electricity, provide more water for irrigation, promote 
agricultural production and create jobs.  Such tangible 
evidence would contribute to our stabilization efforts and 
make a strong counter-insurgency statement.  Plans for 
stabilization and development in northern Helmand and 
Kandahar are contingent upon enhanced security, absent which 
USAID will mothball the project until the security situation 
permits a new start.  END COMMENT. 
EIKENBERRY