VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #1966/01 3031526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301526Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6504
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 8674
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4986
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 001966 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR IPA AND FRONT OFFICE; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR 
ALSO FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/OFM, AND L 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ODIP KREC KTIA ASEC EAID KWBG PREL IS US
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PROCEDURES AT USG-REFURBISHED JALAMEH 
CROSSING, GATEWAY TO NORTHERN WEST BANK, HINDERING USG 
MOTORCADES 
 
¶1.  (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Tel Aviv. 
An action request for the Department is in para 16. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) While new GOI personnel at the Jalameh crossing, 
north of Jenin in the West Bank, claim to be applying 
long-established standard procedures, their actions are 
preventing USG personnel from using the crossing to exit the 
West Bank.  On three occasions since October 14, U.S. 
diplomats have been detained at Jalameh, on the basis of 
requirements not applied at any other checkpoint in the West 
Bank.  ConGen Jerusalem and Embassy Tel Aviv have intensively 
lobbied GOI security contacts for a solution, but the current 
GOI position would require unacceptable compromises on our 
own security procedures for crossing West Bank checkpoints. 
The unavailability of the Jalameh crossing makes Jenin a 
farther-away, harder-to-reach destination for USG personnel, 
and obstructs our ability to support high-priority 
initiatives in security, rule of law, and economic 
development in the northern West Bank.  It also has 
significant implications for our ability to exit the West 
Bank quickly.  The Jalameh crossing was recently upgraded by 
USAID in coordination with the GOI at a cost of USD 1.75 
million.  End summary. 
 
Strike One at Jalameh 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The GOI's Crossing Points Authority assumed control 
of the Jalameh crossing from the IDF in October 2009.  On 
October 14, a ConGen motorcade attempted to cross it for the 
first time since the handover.  The motorcade was allowed 
through the crossing from "Green Line" Israel to the West 
Bank, en route to Jenin, after a delay.  Returning from Jenin 
en route to Jerusalem later that day, it was denied passage 
altogether.  Crossing operators demanded that USG 
locally-employed staff (LES) passengers exit the vehicles and 
submit to security screening.  They further demanded that 
official American passengers hand over their diplomatic 
passports for inspection.  Neither of these demands are part 
of post's standard operating procedures for crossing Israeli 
checkpoints within the West Bank, between the West Bank and 
Israel, or between the West Bank and Jerusalem, and ConGen 
personnel declined to comply. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Motorcade personnel contacted the Regional Security 
Officer (RSO) in Jerusalem, who advised them to adhere to 
standard operating procedures and not to open their vehicles' 
doors or windows.  Jerusalem's RSO engaged IDF contacts, who 
claimed that the Jalemeh crossing operators' demands were in 
line with official procedures for all West Bank checkpoints. 
This IDF claim is contrary to post's long-accumulated 
experience at checkpoints throughout the West Bank, including 
at Jalameh prior to October 14. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Alerted by Jerusalem,s RSO to the impasse at the 
Jalameh crossing, Embassy Tel Aviv's RSO likewise engaged 
Israeli contacts and urged their cooperation in facilitating 
the ConGen motorcade's passage.  While the IDF did send an 
officer to the crossing, the officer only reiterated the 
demands of the crossing's operators, who then laid spike 
strips behind the lead vehicle, preventing it from reversing 
away from the checkpoint back into the West Bank.  After 75 
more minutes, with Jerusalem's and Tel Aviv's RSOs continuing 
to work their contacts, crossing operators removed the spike 
strips and directed the vehicle back to the West Bank.  The 
motorcade eventually transited the Shave Shamron crossing 
near Nablus, following standard checkpoint crossing 
procedures without incident. 
 
Strike Two... 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) On October 20, another ConGen motorcade to Jenin 
was detained on its return trip to Jerusalem through the 
Jalameh crossing.  As on October 14, when the lead vehicle 
entered the checkpoint, crossing operators demanded that 
official American passengers hand over their diplomatic 
passports and that LES passengers exit the vehicles for 
screening.  They again placed spike strips behind the vehicle 
to prevent it from reversing out of the checkpoint.  RSO 
Jerusalem and RSO Tel Aviv both engaged Israeli security 
contacts and urged them to allow the motorcade to cross.  The 
 
 
response from Israeli authorities, in short, was that the 
Jalameh crossing operators were following long-established 
procedures. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) At the direction of RSO Jerusalem, personnel in the 
motorcade displayed their photo identification through the 
armored vehicle windows but refused to comply with further 
demands.  The crossing operators eventually responded by 
ignoring the motorcade, leaving it pinned inside the 
checkpoint for three hours while RSO Jerusalem and RSO Tel 
Aviv pressed their respective contacts for assistance. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Just before 5:00 p.m. local time, the crossing's 
operators began to close it for the day.  When it became 
clear that the motorcade and its passengers might be left 
trapped in the crossing overnight, RSO Jerusalem conveyed 
through their IDF contacts that the motorcade would reverse 
out of the checkpoint if the spike strips were removed and 
the barriers dropped.  At approximately 5:20 p.m. local time, 
the crossing operators removed the spike strips and dropped 
the barrier, allowing the motorcade back into the West Bank. 
The motorcade safely reached the Shave Shamron crossing well 
after dark and crossed the checkpoint following standard 
checkpoint procedures without incident. 
 
Strike Three... 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) On October 22, a third ConGen motorcade attempted 
to cross into "Green Line" Israel at the Jalameh crossing en 
route from Jenin to Jerusalem.  Crossing operators again 
refused passage and detained the vehicles at the crossing. 
Based on the experience of the previous two motorcades on 
October 14 and October 20, post decided to avoid another 
prolonged standoff.  The vehicles reversed away from the 
checkpoint after waiting 45 minutes, then returned to 
Jerusalem through the Hizma crossing following standard 
checkpoint procedures without incident. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  In all three cases, the convoys' information, 
including the number of passengers and the vehicle license 
plate numbers, had been provided to the GOI in advance. 
 
Context 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) It has been a long-established post security 
practice not to open armored vehicle doors or windows at 
checkpoints within the West Bank, between the West Bank and 
Israel, and between the West Bank and Jerusalem.  With the 
current exception of Jalameh, Israeli crossing operators 
(whether IDF or civilians) routinely identify passengers by 
examining their identity cards or passports, which the 
passengers press to their vehicle,s closed window.  ConGen 
motorcades continue to adhere to this standard procedure at 
all other West Bank checkpoints without difficulties. 
(ConGen personnel routinely exit the West Bank through 
Israeli checkpoints without displaying any identification at 
all.)  Post strongly believes that a "closed door" procedure 
serves a practical security purpose by physically separating 
two sets of armed individuals -- the Israeli crossing 
operators and the U.S. protective security personnel -- in 
the event that a misunderstanding leads to raised tensions. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In addition, Israeli authorities have never 
proposed or attempted to apply special requirements on LES 
accompanying official Americans in ConGen motorcades at any 
West Bank crossings, with the recent exception of Jalameh. 
Post has serious reservations about this demand for reasons 
described in para 11, as doing so would necessitate opening 
vehicle doors to allow LES passengers to exit for searching. 
It also would have the practical implication of leaving USG 
protectees in a vehicle without a driver, should an emergency 
situation arise. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Finally, post is concerned that granting this 
concession would put us on a slippery slope, leading to 
situations where crossing operators demand that all 
passengers, LES and official Americans alike, exit the 
vehicle, that all passengers be subject to search, that 
crossing operators enter the vehicle, and so on. 
 
Why Jalameh matters 
------------------- 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The USG has placed a priority on supporting 
development and expanding security and rule of law in Jenin 
and the surrounding northern West Bank.  USAID has 33 ongoing 
activities in the Jenin Governorate, and Jenin is often 
trumpeted as a success story of West Bank economic 
development.  Many ConGen elements, including our INL, 
Political and Economic Sections, as well as USSC and 
high-level visitors from Washington, regularly travel to 
Jenin to meet key stakeholders and monitor ongoing projects. 
While alternate routes to Jenin that avoid the Jalameh 
crossing do exist, they take significantly longer on 
poor-quality roads, and would complicate an evacuation in the 
case of an emergency. 
 
¶15.  (U) USG efforts in the northern West Bank have included 
the Jalameh crossing itself.  On October 1, USAID completed a 
USD 1.75 million upgrade to the crossing to allow private 
vehicles to pass through, with the goal of increasing 
economic activity in the area. 
 
¶16.  (U) Action request for the Department:  Post requests 
guidance on this issue. 
 
RUBINSTEIN