VZCZCXRO0602
RR RUEHCD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHGD #0379/01 2752039
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 022039Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1595
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2779
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGD/AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA 5675

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 GUADALAJARA 000379 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DHS FOR CIS/FDNS, DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC MX
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - (GUADALAJARA) 
 
GUADALAJAR 00000379  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Country Conditions 
 
¶1. (U) Guadalajara is the second largest city in Mexico and the 
consular district covers the Mexican states of Jalisco, Colima, 
Nayarit, and Aguascalientes although both post accepts 
applicants from throughout Mexico.  Conditions within the 
consular district are similar to other parts of Mexico; the 
continuing Mexican economic crisis and high unemployment rates 
coupled with the dramatic increase in narco-related violence 
over the last year have not diminished the desire of many 
Mexicans to live, work, or study in the United States.  These 
conditions have also resulted in a significant increase in 
confirmed visa fraud at post.  While demand for nonimmigrant 
visas has increased 7% over the prior reporting period, 
confirmed fraudulent applications have increased 137%.  Post had 
a significant increase in Passport and Consular Report of Birth 
Abroad applicants as result of WHTI implementation, however, 
confirmed ACS fraud has remained relatively constant over the 
reporting period.  Post has not seen increased instances of SBA 
related fraud as reported by Consulates closer to the border 
region. 
 
NIV Fraud 
 
¶2. (U) Post adjudicated 81,513 NIV applications during this 
reporting period. 59,106 applications were approved and 22,407 
applications were refused for an overall refusal rate of 27.5%. 
Of these refusals, 21,258 were in the B1/B2/BBBCV category. 
During this period, 422 NIV cases were referred to FPU, with 247 
confirmed fraudulent and 16 pending further action. 
Additionally, 673 applicants were found ineligible under 6C1 of 
the INA, with the difference between FPU confirmed fraud and 
actual application of 6C1 attributable to false identities 
discovered through IDENT, conversion of quasi-P6C1 CLASS hits 
when subjects newly apply for visas, and reapplication of prior 
6C1 ineligibilities for purposes of waiver processing. 
 
¶3. (U) Guadalajara continues to experience high levels of NIV 
fraud that primarily consists of mala fide NIV applicants who 
present altered, false, or counterfeit documents intended to 
inflate their employment status or education.  Many of these 
fraudulent applicants are found ineligible under 214b of the INA 
by the adjudicating line officers, as the fraud is easily 
detected through normal interviewing techniques and electronic 
FPU resources available in the interviewing windows. 
 
¶4. (U) Falsified documents are readily available from a variety 
of sources, including various known mala fide visa facilitators 
just steps from the Consulate.  These facilitators offer a range 
of products, from false bank documents to false education 
credentials, from a cost of $15 USD to upwards of $1,500 USD. 
FPU prescreening, RSO Surveillance Detection, and trained line 
officers work together to identify those who trade in documents 
and carry them to their visa applications. 
 
¶5. (U) FPU performs vigorous pre-screening of H2B, H2A, and P-1 
applicants and groups applying for visas to participate in 
sporting, musical, or cultural exchanges in the US on B1/B2 
visas, providing NIV officers with necessary information to 
assist them in the adjudication process.  The FPM regularly 
conducts LexisNexis checks on unknown business petitioners and 
FPU uses various internet tools such as Facebook, YouTube, 
MySpace, and Google to verify group member lists, tour dates, 
and claims of notoriety. 
 
¶6. (U) The H2B and H2A categories are generally low fraud 
categories at Post.  Individual beneficiaries often attempt to 
conceal prior immigration violations and criminal histories, but 
generally applicants are qualified and intend to undertake the 
work petitioned.  However, Post has seen an increase in 
applicants who wish to work for employers for whom they have 
previously worked without legal status; in some instances 
coached to conceal their prior work history by the petitioner or 
local agent. Post has discovered several mala fide petitioners 
and/or local agents who have charged applicants fees to become 
beneficiaries; sometimes when petitions had no available slots 
or when there was no approved petition.  We continue our 
outreach efforts with local press and NGOs to educate workers on 
their rights and prohibition of the payment of any fees. 
 
¶7. (U) The P-1 category continues to be a significantly high 
fraud category.  FPU investigators routinely uncover phantom 
band members added by local agents or band owners/managers who 
have no clear role in the groups and/or are unknown to 
long-established group members.  FPU works to unravel fraudulent 
"ringer" additions and to identify the source, fellow members or 
unscrupulous agents, to ensure bona-fide group members can 
travel to perform and fraud perpetrators are held accountable. 
 
GUADALAJAR 00000379  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
In addition, Post has continued to see the trend of prior P-1 
visa holders that use their visa to undertake unauthorized 
employment to avoid scrutiny at the Port of Entries for extended 
back-to-back six months stays in the United States that a 
tourist visa holder is likely to experience. 
 
¶8. (U) Another significant NIV fraud category is encountered 
among groups applying for tourism visas to participate in 
sporting, musical, or cultural exchanges in the US.  These 
include cultural exchanges (artists, dancers and musicians) 
coordinated between local municipalities and sister 
cities/US-based Mexican social organizations, sports teams (both 
professional and amateur), invited to participate in tournaments 
in the US, and arts and crafts vendors invited to display and 
sell their wares at various cultural fairs. Many times the 
exchanges and events are bona-fide, but individual applicants 
may exaggerate their positions within organizations and/or 
employment status and conceal details on how the trips are to be 
financed.  FPU routinely trains officers in the application of 
the requirement under 9 FAM 41.31 N11.4 for payment of expenses 
of professional entertainers and 9 FAM 41.31 N13.7 for amateur 
performers. 
 
¶9. (U) Finally, Post has experienced a marked increase in the 
number of unqualified/fraudulent TN/TD visa applicants, 
specifically in the Management Consultant and Scientific 
Technician categories, and E visa applicants with non-qualifying 
business activity.  Post's denial rate for TN/TD has increased 
over 58% from the prior reporting period to 19%.  For E visa 
applicants, the denial rate has increased over 78% from the 
prior reporting period to 31%.  FPU is working with NIV to 
increase prescreening and analysis in these visa categories. 
 
IV Fraud 
 
¶10. (U) Post does not process immigrant visas. 
 
DV Fraud 
 
¶11. (U) Post does not process Diversity Visas. 
 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud; 
 
¶12. (U) Post accepted 4,334 new passport book/card applications 
during this reporting period.  During this same period, 4,090 
passport books/cards were issued and 305 were denied.  Of these 
applications, 143 cases were referred to FPU, with 16 confirmed 
fraudulent and 54 pending further action. 
 
¶13. (U) Post accepted 448 Consular Records of Birth Abroad 
during this reporting period.  During this same period, 412 
CRBAs were issued and 157 were denied.  Of these applications, 
26 cases were referred to FPU, with five confirmed fraudulent 
and 15 pending further action. 
 
¶14. (U) FPU works closely with ACS to train officers and local 
staff on document fraud and to verify civil documents with local 
authorities.  FPU devotes a majority of its officer time to 
working ACS cases, assisting in this important work program for 
the Consulate and Mission Mexico.  Although actual confirmed 
fraud rates are relatively low, many cases referred to FPU are 
eventually denied under 7 FAM 1381 D (3) as applicants fail to 
respond to requests for additional information and/or documents 
within ninety days. 
 
¶15. (U) The majority of referred passport cases are for fraud 
hits related to previously abandoned domestic applications, 
often for multiple abandoned prior cases with more than one 
person claiming to be the true owner of the identity, but with 
little secondary proof of either identity or birth in the United 
States.  Home births and births registered by midwife also 
represent a significant portion of ACS referrals.  The FPM 
investigates all cases with existing fraud hits, all cases that 
involve non-institutional births (home births, mid-wife 
deliveries) and all cases that are otherwise referred by ACS 
officers. 
 
¶16. (U) FPU continues to detect CRBA fraud, with AMCITs who are 
not the birth parents attempting to obtain CRBAs for children 
they are attempting to "adopt."  As in the prior reporting 
period, one such case resulted in the arrest of the supposed 
parents and the pediatrician that sold them the baby.  FPU also 
has investigated several cases of falsified physical presence 
documentation for the transmittal of citizenship. 
 
¶17. (U) Additional confirmed fraud includes falsified parental 
consent, narco-traffickers with multiple passport identities, US 
mail fraud, selling of passports, falsified adoptions, false 
 
GUADALAJAR 00000379  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
births, etc. in greater numbers than prior years, likely due to 
passport requirements for travelers under WHTI.  One new trend 
post noted is for parents to apply for a passport domestically 
when their child is an infant, claim that the passport was lost 
in the mail and reapply at post for a different child. It is 
quite difficult to identify these infant/toddler imposters, 
especially when the PIERS record is of a very young baby and the 
parents of the real holder of the identity are present and have 
excellent secondary proof of birth and other official documents. 
 
Adoption Fraud 
 
¶18. (U) Post does not process adoption cases. 
 
Use of DNA Testing 
 
¶19. (U) Post utilizes DNA testing in ACS cases where doubt 
exists regarding paternity.  In some cases, DNA analysis is the 
only viable means of confirming the paternal relationships that 
are claimed. Post suggests that DNA testing could be used to 
resolve outstanding uncertainties on such cases but makes it 
known that DNA tests are not required.  During the reporting 
period, FPU did not refer any applicants for DNA testing. 
 
Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud 
 
¶20. (U) Post continues to provide support to DHS offices located 
in the U.S. by conducting field investigations and verifying 
casework information and other documentation. 
 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
 
¶21. (U) Mexico is a major transit country to the U.S. for both 
Mexican citizens and third country nationals attempting to enter 
illegally and for narcotics trafficking.  The P-1 visa category 
remains vulnerable to alien smugglers planting non-qualified 
applicants on petitions for a fee. 
 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
 
¶22. (U) The FPU enjoys a strong relationship with RSO and the 
recently arrived ARSO/I.  The ARSO/I program, which includes the 
DS Special Agent and the H/L FSNI, has quickly integrated their 
work with that of FPU and continue to strengthen Post's ties 
with local law enforcement.  Since the arrival of the ARSO/I at 
post, more arrests have been made including an H case and a 
document vendor. The ARSO/I program has also been involved with 
several successful internal investigations and has assisted with 
sensitive American Citizen Services child endangerment cases, 
which have resulted in fugitive returns and arrests in the 
United States.  The ARSO/I program continues to strengthen 
post's fraud prevention profile and has committed to provide 
Fraudulent Document Training, in coordination with Diplomatic 
Security Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, to both the FPU 
staff and to local contacts. 
 
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
 
¶23. (U) The Mexican passport contains a large number of security 
features, such as microprint, digital photographs, ghost 
photographs, 3D barcodes, latent imaging, fingerprint image, UV 
features, etc.  The Mexican passport security features have been 
effective against counterfeiting and photo substitution. FPU has 
detected a handful of cases of NIV applicants with genuine 
Mexican passports under false or cloned identities. 
 
¶24. (U) Impostors obtain the genuine passports with false 
identities by presenting false IDs (false birth certificates 
and/or false voter's cards) at the passport offices of the SRE 
(Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs).   Other means of 
fraudulently obtaining Mexican passports include cloning an 
identity using a genuine birth certificate and/or a voter card. 
Post has observed that it is easy to obtain a genuine birth 
certificate with fraudulent information from many civil 
registries.  Corruption among the staff in civil registries in 
small towns is common and sometimes civil registry employees 
work with document vendors.  This situation is further 
complicated as some states in our consular district now utilize 
the equivalent of an ATM-type machine to issue certified (i.e. 
already signed) birth certificates provided one has the name, 
date, and place of birth.  Again, IDENT and Facial Recognition 
are useful tools in helping to combat this type of identity 
fraud. Post recommends the adoption of Facial Recognition 
technology to passport applications as soon as possible so that 
we have another effective tool in our fraud toolbox.  Post does 
use "FR on Demand," but it is technologically unwieldy and only 
compares faces against the terrorist screening list and visa 
records and not against prior passport applications. 
 
GUADALAJAR 00000379  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
 
¶25. (U) Post continues to enjoy a high degree of cooperation 
with host government agencies and individual government 
officials, particularly with the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (IMSS) and the State Civil Registry Offices for 
Jalisco, Colima, Aguascalientes and Nayarit.  Our host 
government contacts continue to assist in detecting fraud at all 
levels.  Our contacts within IMSS and the Civil Registry Offices 
provide accurate and timely information needed to verify 
employment and income levels and birth, marriage, death and 
divorce records.  To date, Post has had limited success with 
local prosecutors and police in arresting and prosecuting 
document vendors for false private documentation such as 
employment letters and bank statements.  Our ARSO-I has begun 
laying the groundwork in the state of Jalisco for greater 
attention from local authorities in the prosecution of false 
document vendors who sell purported official government 
documents such as birth certificates and official government 
education documents known as cedulas. 
 
Areas of Particular Concern 
 
¶26. (U) Post has seen a recent trend of well organized "fraud 
buses" from out of consular district, primarily from the states 
of Durango and Coahuila, where between 10% and 15% of the 
applicants have complete false document packages.  These buses 
typically take between 10 and 12 hours to reach Guadalajara from 
these out-of-district areas and Post is not sure why they are 
choosing to come to Guadalajara over other posts which are much 
closer such as Monterrey or Nuevo Laredo.  Many applicants state 
that it is because Guadalajara does not have an Applicant 
Service Center which requires a two day process for visa 
applications and others mention it is easier to get an 
appointment in Guadalajara than other posts even though as of 1 
Oct 2009 we have a current 18 day backlog versus 3 days at both 
Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo.  Post continues to research this 
trend. 
 
Staffing and Training 
 
¶27. (U) The Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) consists of a full-time 
FS-03 Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM), a FSN-9 Senior Fraud 
Prevention Assistant and three FSN-8 Fraud Prevention 
Assistants.  The Fraud Prevention Manager currently divides time 
between investigating ACS and NIV fraud cases, with the bulk of 
the officer's time spent on PPT and CRBA fraud cases.  The LES 
staff supports both ACS and NIV, with two positions supporting 
NIV, one supporting ACS and the other supporting all other 
agency and FPM investigative requests.  The staff rotates 
monthly through these various positions. 
 
¶28. (U) Fraudulent documentation and imposter training courses 
are provided for airport and airline personnel, immigration and 
public security officials in Guadalajara and throughout the 
consular district.  However, due to the deteriorating security 
situation, post RSO has prohibited all official overnight travel 
within the Consular district with the exception of Puerto 
Vallarta as well as travel at night, which has greatly limited 
FPU's ability to do training and outreach through our very large 
geographic area of responsibility. Despite the constraints, 
during the reporting period, the unit provided onsite training 
to civil registry, SRE (Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
and airline personnel in Puerto Vallarta and Aguascalientes. 
 
¶29. (U) FPU participates in monthly in-house consular training 
days, providing training to NIV and ACS staff.  FPU offers a 
variety of courses focusing on specific industries/businesses, 
detecting false documents and imposters, and highlighting fraud 
indicators that are commonly seen at post.  In addition, FPU 
offers a "Fraud City Tour" to new NIV officers designed to 
introduce them to the various neighborhoods/areas of Guadalajara 
and to the types and scales of businesses/business activities 
found in these neighborhoods. 
KELLER