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S E C R E T GENEVA 000860 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) THIRD MEETING OF THE START FOLLOW-ON CONVERSION OR 
ELIMINATION AND NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 99070-99072 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003: 
        U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT START FOLLOW-ON 
        ELIMINATION PROTOCOL) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 00811 (SFO-GVA-V-024) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-027. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 29, 2009 
                Time:  10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The third meeting of the Conversion or Elimination 
Working Group (C or E) WG was held at the Russian Mission on 
September 29, 2009.  The U.S. chair provided charts outlining 
differences on elimination between START I, U.S.-proposed 
text for the START Follow-on Elimination Notification (Ref 
A), and Russian-proposed text on elimination (Ref B), 
unofficial Russian translation of the U.S. Elimination 
Protocol. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. side explained that the sides continue to 
have different philosophies on how to conduct elimination 
activities--the Russian side favors less specificity in 
actual procedures than does the United States.  The U.S. side 
noted the importance of ensuring verification of those 
actions.  The Russian delegation raised the issue of 
financial costs involved in eliminating systems, but also 
recommended the United States spend whatever is necessary to 
ensure we use unambiguous methods.  The Russian side also 
continued to object to what they perceive to be special U.S. 
interest in mobile missile elimination verification. 
 
¶5.  (S) The U.S. side noted that we likely have more in 
common than the different sizes (lengths) of the respective 
U.S. and Russian proposals would suggest.  Many key phrases 
used are similar.  The U.S. proposal goes into greater 
detail, but the concepts are quite similar. 
 
-------------- 
OPENING SALVOS 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Both sides began the third meeting of the C or E WG 
by noting each side had reviewed the other's respective 
proposals and were prepared to ask questions.  Mr. Elliott 
suggested that the respective Parties' positions may not be 
as different as some might think.  Elliott handed over charts 
outlining the differences between START, U.S.- and 
Russian-proposed C or E procedures. 
 
¶7.  (S) The following text was handed over to the Russian 
delegation; however, it was not discussed during this 
meeting.  Each charts' four columns were Column One:  Item, 
Column Two:  START, Column Three:  U.S. SFO and Column Four: 
Russian SFO. 
 
 
 
 
Begin Text: 
 
Slide One, Column One: 
 
      Elimination of Heavy Bomber for Nuclear Armaments. 
 
Slide One, Column Two: 
 
      All of the following: 
 
(a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be severed from 
the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint; 
 
(b) The wings shall be separated from the fuselage at any 
location by any method; and 
 
(c) The remainder of the fuselage shall be severed into two 
pieces, within the area of attachment of the wings to the 
fuselage, at a location obviously not an assembly joint. 
To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped 
for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays equipped to carry 
nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to render them 
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.  All external 
attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external 
attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be 
removed or modified so as to render them incapable of 
carrying nuclear armaments; 
 
Verification by NTM and inspection. 
 
Slide One, Column Three: 
 
      Any of the following: 
 
(a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be separated 
from the fuselage at a location that is obviously not an 
assembly joint using any method; 
 
(b) All weapons bays and all external attachment areas for 
pylons shall be modified as to render them incapable of 
employing nuclear armaments; 
 
(c) All internal and external launcher assemblies shall be 
modified so as to render them incapable of employing nuclear 
armaments; or 
 
(d) Other procedures, developed by the possessing Party, that 
render the heavy bomber incapable of being utilized for its 
original purpose in a manner that the other Party can 
confirm, shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC. 
 
Prior to the elimination of the first heavy bomber of each 
type...conduct a one-time demonstration. 
 
Verification by NTM and inspection 
 
Slide One, Column Four: 
 
Elimination of heavy bombers shall be carried out using 
procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the 
elimination, which provide for removal or destruction of the 
 
 
 
basic design elements and which ensure that a heavy bomber is 
rendered inoperable. 
 
Conversion of heavy bombers shall be carried out in such a 
way that the converted heavy bombers have external or 
functional differences indicating that they cannot perform 
functions involving the armaments with which they were 
equipped prior to conversion. 
 
Verification by NTM and Visit 
 
Slide Two, Column One: 
 
Elimination of Silo Launchers of ICBMs 
 
Slide Two, Column Two: 
 
      All of the following: 
 
(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed 
and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by 
excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by 
explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; and 
 
(b) Following completion of the procedures provided for in 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the silo may be filled to 
the level of the bottom of the hole created by the excavation 
or explosion...the resultant hole may be graded during the 
180-day period...but not filled with earth until expiration 
of the 90-day period. 
 
Conversion from one accountable type to another accountable 
type. 
 
Verification by NTM/Notification 
 
Slide Two, Column Three: 
 
      Any of the following: 
 
(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed 
and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by 
excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by 
explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; 
 
(b) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled or destroyed 
and the silo shall be completely filled with gravel.  The 
silo door shall not be reinstalled; or 
 
(c) Other procedures, developed by the possessing Party, that 
render the silo launcher incapable of being utilized for its 
original purpose in a manner that the other Party can 
confirm, shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC. 
 
Prior to the elimination of the first launcher of each type 
of ICBMs using procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(c), 
possessing Party shall conduct a one-time demonstration. 
 
For a nuclear-capable to nuclear-capable conversion, only a 
notification is required. 
 
Verification by NTM and inspection 
 
 
 
 
Slide Two, Column Four: 
 
Elimination of ICBM launchers shall be carried out using 
procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the 
elimination, which provide for rendering them incapable of 
launching ICBMs. 
 
Conversion of ICBM launchers shall be carried out in such a 
way that the converted launchers cannot thereafter contain 
ICBMs of the type for which they were intended prior to 
conversion and that they have external or functional 
differences. 
 
Verification by visit and NTM 
 
Slide Three, Column One: 
 
Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
Slide Three, Column Two and Column Three: 
 
Elimination process for mobile launchers of ICBMs and mobile 
training launchers: 
 
(a) The erector launcher mechanism and leveling supports 
shall be removed from the launcher chassis; 
 
(b) The framework of the erector launcher mechanism on which 
the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations 
that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately 
equal size; 
 
(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the 
launcher chassis; 
 
(d) The mountings of the erector launcher mechanism and of 
the launcher leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher 
chassis and each such mounting shall be cut at a location 
that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 
 
(e) A portion of the self-propelled launcher chassis, at 
least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
axle and that portion shall be cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and no component, including those 
removed in accordance with the procedures provided for in 
this paragraph, shall be mounted, welded, or attached by any 
other means to an eliminated launcher chassis so as to 
increase the length of such a chassis. 
 
Upon completion of these elimination procedures for mobile 
launchers of ICBMs, the vehicle may be used only for purposes 
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. 
 
Verification by inspection. 
 
Slide Three, Column Four: 
 
Elimination of ICBM launchers shall be carried out using 
procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the 
 
 
 
elimination, which provide for rendering them incapable of 
launching ICBMs. 
 
Verification by NTM and visit. 
 
Slide Four, Column One: 
 
Elimination of SLBM Launchers 
 
NOTE:  There are no conversion procedures for SLBM launchers 
in the START C or E Protocol. 
 
Slide Four, Column Two: 
 
      Any of the following: 
 
(a) The missile section shall be removed from the submarine; 
 
(b) The missile launch tube(s), and all elements of their 
reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular 
structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well 
as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire 
portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the 
superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes 
pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube 
penetrations shall be removed from the submarine.  Missile 
launch tube(s) that have been removed shall be cut into two 
pieces of approximately equal size and shall remain in the 
open in the vicinity of the submarine until completion of the 
elimination procedures, after which they may be removed from 
the elimination facility; 
 
Verification by NTM 
 
Slide Four, Column Three: 
 
      Any of the following: 
 
(a) As in START 
 
(b) As in START 
 
(c) The launchers height or diameter shall be reduced in a 
manner such that the launcher can no longer contain the 
smallest SLBM deployed by the possessing Party; 
 
(d) Critical components required to launch an SLBM that can 
be confirmed by the inspecting party, shall be removed. Such 
critical components may include but are not limited to gas 
generator(s) and related launcher sub-systems; or 
 
(e) Other procedures, developed by the possessing Party, that 
render the SLBM launcher incapable of being utilized for its 
original purpose in a manner that the other Party can 
confirm, shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC. 
 
Prior to the elimination of the first launcher of each type 
of SLBM launcher using procedures provided for in 
subparagraph 5(c), 5(d), and 5(e), the possessing Party will 
conduct a one-time demonstration. 
 
For a nuclear-capable to nuclear-capable conversion, only a 
 
 
 
notification is required. 
Verification by NTM and inspection 
 
Slide Four, Column Four: 
 
Elimination of SLBM launchers shall be carried out using 
procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the 
elimination, which provide, inter alia and which ensure that 
the SLBM launchers being eliminated are rendered incapable of 
launching SLBMs. 
 
Conversion of SLBM launchers shall be carried out in such a 
way that the converted launchers cannot thereafter contain 
SLBMs of the type for which they were intended prior to 
conversion and that they have external or functional 
differences. 
 
Verification by NTM and visit. 
 
Slide Five, Column One: 
 
Elimination of ICBMs for Silo Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs 
 
NOTE:  There are no elimination procedures for ICBMs and 
SLBMs in the START C or E Protocol 
 
Slide Five, Column Two: 
 
Treaty Article III Paragraph 7 
 
ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject 
to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they 
have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding 
their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the 
discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs. 
 
Notification 
 
Slide Five, Column Three: 
 
Treaty Article III Paragraph 7 
 
ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject 
to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they 
have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding 
their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the 
discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs, or 
otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for 
in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in 
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol or as agreed between 
the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission. 
 
Notification 
 
Slide Five, Column Four: 
 
Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be carried out using 
procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the 
elimination, which ensure that they are rendered inoperable, 
precluding their use for their original purpose. 
 
 
 
Verification by NTM for solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs 
 
Slide Six, Column One: 
 
Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
Slide Six, Column Two and Column Three: 
 
      Prior to the confirmatory inspection : 
 
(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicle or vehicles; 
 
(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices 
of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile 
and its launch canister; 
 
(c) may remove the missile from its launch canister, remove 
the missile attachment devices from the launch canister, 
disassemble the missile into stages and the self-contained 
dispensing mechanism, and detach rocket motor nozzles and 
interstage skirts of the missile from stages; 
 
(d) may remove propellant from stages; 
 
(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices 
installed on the missile and its launch canister; 
 
(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their 
attachment and release; 
 
Elimination process for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs: 
 
(a) If solid fuel has not been removed from stages, the 
stages shall be destroyed by explosive demolition or burned; 
 
(b) Rocket motor nozzles and cases, as well as the interstage 
skirts of a missile remaining after completion of the 
procedures provided for in subparagraphs 2(c), 2(d) and 4(a) 
of this Section, or after the completion of static testing 
provided for in paragraph 3 of Section VI of this Protocol, 
shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion; and 
 
(c) The self-contained dispensing mechanism, as well as the 
front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the 
front section shroud, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into 
two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by 
explosion. 
 
      ¶5.  Elimination process for launch canisters of ICBMs 
for mobile launchers of ICBMs: 
 
(a) The body of the launch canister shall be crushed, 
flattened, or destroyed by explosion; or 
 
(b) If the body of the launch canister is composed of 
segments, each of the segments shall be cut into two pieces 
at a location that is not an assembly joint. A launch 
canister, the body of which is of unitary construction, shall 
be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or cut 
into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 
1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a 
 
 
 
launch canister. 
 
Verification by inspection 
 
Slide Six, Column Four: 
 
Elimination of ICBM launchers shall be carried out using 
procedures to be determined by the Party conducting the 
elimination, which provide for rendering them incapable of 
launching ICBMs. 
 
Verification by NTM and visit 
 
End Text. 
 
¶8.  (S) Ryzhkov suggested that the two parties have 
fundamentally different approaches.  Ryzhkov noted that to 
Russia, elimination means the launchers and facilities can no 
longer be used for its intended purposes and would no longer 
be subject to the treaty.  Conversion means the items can no 
longer be used for its intended purpose but remain subject to 
the terms of the treaty. 
 
----------------------------------- 
HEAVY BOMBERS AND DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Elliott asked whether converted items would no longer 
be subject to numerical limits, but would be subject to 
verification.  Ryzhkov said yes.  Elliott asked whether this 
would apply to the category of former heavy bombers?  Does 
converting bombers to a non-nuclear configuration make them 
former heavy bombers?  Ryzhkov demurred, not using the term 
former heavy bomber, saying instead that they would be heavy 
bombers converted to a non-nuclear configuration.  He went on 
to say conversion procedures could also be used to convert 
them back, and visits to confirm that this had not happened 
would be an important aspect of the protocol.  Elliott then 
asked how Russia would treat non-flyable B-52 bombers at 
Davis Monthan.  Ryzhkov answered that any heavy bomber is 
subject to the treaty until the moment it has been 
eliminated.  Elliott noted the importance of agreeing in the 
appropriate treaty article the existing types of heavy 
bombers, and by doing so, determine the status of B-52Gs. 
Ryzhkov responded, saying he wasn't speaking of counting 
rules, but rather of including heavy bombers in reporting 
data as non-deployed items. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN DELEGATION EXPLAINED THEIR APPROACH 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Rzyhkov elaborated on the approach used by the 
Russian Delegation in developing their proposed conversion 
and elimination annex.  He relayed that there were three 
aspects used throughout their annex:  1) the fundamental 
principle of rendering an item inoperable for its intended 
purpose is applied across all strategic offensive arms (SOA); 
2) harmonization, in that the same procedures would be used 
for the same types of SOA; and 3) simplification in that both 
parties should not be limited to a specific list of 
procedures. 
 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
RUSSIA:  ICBMS AND SLBMS 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (S) Ryzhkov then moved the discussion to ICBMs and SLBMs 
stating that Russia advocated flexibility in determining what 
method to use to eliminate SOAs.  Ryzhkov regularly 
emphasized the similarities of U.S and Russian ICBMs and 
SLBMs such as each have solid-propellant fuel and number of 
stages.  Ryzhkov made the point that if each party's 
solid-propellant ballistic missiles are the same then the 
elimination procedures for both Parties should also be the 
same.  Additionally, each party should be allowed to select 
their own methods, preferably simplified procedures, deleting 
those START I methods now considered to be unnecessary.  For 
example, Ryzhkov inquired as to why specify filling silos 
with gravel?  He said that gravel can be expensive in certain 
parts of Russia, so why not use soil?  Rzyhkov asserted that 
a Party selecting their own procedures would give Russia the 
flexibility to do eliminations economically. 
 
¶12.  (S) Elliott responded by expressing an understanding of 
their position, and suggested some procedures could be 
developed now, and some later, with the important principle 
being one of successfully removing the item from 
accountability.  Ryzhkov responded by saying if the 
respective Party gets to select its own procedure, then we 
are in agreement.  Some procedures should be mandatory, for 
example, removal of the silo door, and some should be at the 
discretion of the Party, such as soil versus gravel, and when 
decided upon by the eliminating Party, informing the other 
Party of the method used, and perhaps discussed in the BCC. 
Elliott suggested the list of examples could be expanded, any 
of which would be acceptable.  Ryzhkov said the U.S.-proposed 
text as written doesn't come across that way, it says the 
Parties must agree to procedures.  Elliott suggested that the 
Parties consider having a list of elimination methods. 
Ryzhkov questioned the need for a list.  Elliott said that 
appropriate level of Protocol detail and specific procedures 
are important for the U.S. ratification process. 
 
----------------------------------- 
I'M GLAD YOU ASKED ME THAT QUESTION 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Ryzhkov asked why the United States insisted on 
requiring mobile ICBMs such as the Russian SS-25 to have 
different elimination procedures than the U.S. Minuteman III? 
 Elliott highlighted that the original intent was to create a 
treaty to follow the START Treaty with a degree of certainty 
and transparency for both sides.  It was not to discriminate 
against one side or the other side.  However, due to the 
characteristics of the mobile missiles these items raise 
verification challenges.  NTM can verify the elimination of 
ICBM silos and SLBM submarines.  Elliott maintained that the 
intent is not to discriminate between U.S. and Russian weapon 
systems, but to verify the elimination of systems that, due 
to their differences, have different verification 
requirements,regardless of which Party possesses them. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF OPTIONS TO DUMA RATIFICATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶14.  (S) After a break, Ryzhkov returned to the importance of 
Russia having the flexibility to choose elimination methods, 
expressing a concern that if specific elimination procedures 
that are different for each Party are mandated, it may be 
difficult to ratify the treaty.  He also spoke of using three 
levels of text in the treaty (treaty articles, protocols, and 
annexes).  Elliott noted the possibility of using three 
levels of text was being discussed in the Inspection Protocol 
Working Group but it required further analysis for its 
applicability for this working group. 
 
¶15.  (S) Elliott then introduced the subject of 
demonstrations, using them as a confidence building measure 
that would also contribute to verification.  Ryzhkov said it 
could be problematic, as with the conversion of a heavy 
bomber to a non-nuclear configuration.  He asserted that 
eliminations should be no problem.  Ryzhkov said that 
conversion and demonstration should be aimed at confirming 
the heavy bomber was converted to another kind of SOA.  For 
example, when one side opts to use the changing of electrical 
cables to accomplish a conversion, the other side will have a 
lot of problems confirming the conversion.  The Parties 
should use procedures, regardless of cost, to accomplish 
convincing the other Party that the conversion has been 
completed.  Elliott agreed--the same applies for mobile 
missiles.  Mr. Smirnov noted the Russian preference for NTM, 
not inspections.  He asked why the United States needed 
inspectors to observe the process of elimination and why does 
the United States want to retain the detailed elimination 
provisions for mobile missiles?  Elliot said that for some 
systems like a silo launcher of ICBMs or submarine, NTM will 
work, however, for other, smaller systems it won't work.  One 
possibility for smaller systems is an exhibition 
demonstration when the elimination is complete.  Elliott 
noted that the United States was trying to keep things simple 
too, as in the case of B-52s, simply cutting off the tail. 
 
¶16.  (S) Elliott asked what the Russian delegation envisions 
as the basic design elements of heavy bombers?  Rzyhkov 
pointed out that the tail, wings or fuselage of the aircraft 
can all be characterized as basic design elements of heavy 
bombers.  Smironov interjected that both the United States 
and Russia had the same basic text but must bear in mind a 
set of procedures to be selected. 
 
------------- 
THE NEXT STEP 
------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Elliott provided Ryzhkov with a U.S.-Proposed joint 
draft text on the Elimination Protocol in both U.S. and 
Russian languages, suggesting both Parties find common 
language.  Ryzhkov recommended the U.S. delegation study the 
Russian proposal, suggest changes, and that the Russian 
delegation would do the same for the U.S. version. 
 
¶18.  (S) Documents exchanged: 
 
U.S.: 
 
 
 
 
      - Charts Illustrating Comparative Elimination 
Requirements Under START, U.S. and Russian proposals for the 
Elimination Protocol; 
 
      - Unofficial Russian Translation of the U.S. 
Elimination Protocol; and 
 
      - U.S.-proposed Text for the Elimination Protocol 
(Begin comment:  Document will be provided in a SEPTEL.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶19. (S) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Siemon 
Lt Col Comeau 
LTC Leyde 
Lt Col Goodman 
Mr. Dwyer 
Mr. Strauss 
Dr. Fraley 
Mr. Hanchett 
LCDR Brons 
Mr. McConnell 
Ms. Purcell 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Col Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Col Zaitsev 
Col Ilin 
Gen Venevtsev 
Mr. Kostyuchenko 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶20.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER