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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) SIXTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, P.M. SESSION 
 
REF: GENEVA 0857 (SFO-GVA-V-042) U.S.-PROPOSED JDT OF 
     THE BCC PROTOCOL 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-035. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 30, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the sixth Treaty Text and Definitions Working 
Group (TTDWG) meeting of the session, the Parties revisited 
some items from the fifth meeting.  The U.S. delegation 
provided the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the 
Protocol on the Bilateral Consultative CommisQn (BQ) 
(Reftel). 
 
¶4.  (S) The delegations differed on whether the withdrawal 
notification period should be 3 or 6 months, what term,Q"withdraw from" or "terminate") was appropriate for pulling 
out of the treaty, and the need for a meeting to discuss 
extending the treaty.  The U.S. delegation also explained its 
positions on the BCC Protocol JDT, including the need to 
allow for provisional application. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AGREEMENT ON TREATY ARTICLE XVII 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Before the working group turned to the U.S.-proposed 
JDT of the BCC Protocol, Ms. Kotkova clarified one item in 
Article XV of the treaty regarding its registration. 
Specifically, she explained the use of the words "shall" and 
"will," which should be "shall" in the English text and 
"will" in the Russian text.  "Will" was the Russian word that 
corresponded to the English "shall" in Russian treaty 
practice.  Ambassador Ries had no objection. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
THREE- OR SIX-MONTH NOTIFICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6.  (S) Koshelev focused on another paragraph in Article XV 
which stated that the Parties would provide 6 months 
notification prior to withdrawing from the treaty.  Koshelev 
stated that the Russian version had a 3-month notice citing 
the Moscow Treaty as precedence.  Ries replied that in 
recognition of the significance of this arms control treaty 
and since START, which had worked so well, had the same 
timeframe, 6 months was an appropriate interval. 
Additionally, Ries pointed out that 6 months gave both 
parties a moderate period to adjust to such a major event. 
Koshelev responded by noting the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty had a 6-month withdrawal clause and when the United 
States exercised its withdrawal right, it had made a 
"national" decision.  As the U.S. demonstrated, once such a 
decision was made it was too serious to be reconsidered. 
 
 
Koshelev's second point was that the rationale for the 
6-month clause in START, and in the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, was to provide an adequate 
interval for the Parties to remove their continuous 
monitoring equipment and supporting teams.  However, in this 
treaty, the technical aspects did not require such a lengthy 
period.  Koshelev concluded by stating the Russian delegation 
was not "insisting" on a 3-month period but that it was 
requesting the U.S delegation to give the reasons for its 
position. 
 
¶7.  (S) Ries complimented the Russian delegation for its 
thorough analysis but noted that verification measures were 
still in negotiations and the U.S. position was still that 
continuous monitoring should carry over into the new treaty. 
Again, Ries emphasized the value of utilizing the 15 years 
experience gained from START and that the decision to 
withdraw was a very weighty one which merited a longer 
withdrawal period.  Dr. Fraley reminded Koshelev that the INF 
Treaty had already incorporated the 6-month withdrawal clause 
before it was decided to include continuous monitoring into 
its verification regime.  Koshelev agreed with Fraley and 
contended that the Russian delegation was still trying to 
better understand the rationale for the 6-month clause; even 
some of his own delegation members had made the same 
arguments as the U.S. delegation.  Koshelev jokingly offered 
a compromise solution of meeting each other halfway; such as 
a 4 and one half-month period. 
 
----------------------------- 
"WITHDRAW" VERSUS "TERMINATE" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Continuing with Article XV, Koshelev stated that at 
the previous meeting he had requested that the U.S. 
delegation think about substituting "terminate" for "withdraw 
from" in the phrase "each party shall have the right to 
withdraw from this treaty..."  Mr. Dean responded that 
"withdrawal from" was a more precise legal term.  Mr. Taylor 
pointed out that the same term was used in the previous 
bilateral treaties negotiated between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.  Ms. Kotkova agreed that "withdrawal from" 
had been used in the INF, START and the Moscow Treaties but 
implied that after the first time this term was used, it was 
carried over into subsequent treaties without adequate 
analysis.  Ms. Kotkova offered to submit a new proposal at a 
later time for the U.S. delegation to consider.  Ries 
concurred. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
IS A TREATY EXTENSION MEETING NECESSARY? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Koshelev questioned the need for the Article XV 
statement, "No later than 1 year before the expiration of the 
10-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether 
this Treaty will be extended."  He stated that the treaty 
could only be extended if both Parties agreed.  If one party 
wanted to extend the treaty, it could make the proposal and 
then there would be such a meeting.  Otherwise, the meeting 
was superfluous.  Ries countered that this meeting was 
intended to have both sides jointly consider the issue and 
noted that it was hardly an onerous obligation.  Koshelev 
 
 
stated that such a decision of this nature would only be made 
at the highest level of the national governments and that if 
it was decided not to extend, having a meeting between the 
Parties would not change anything.  Koshelev referenced the 
recent START situation where both the United States and the 
Russian Federation separately made the "national" decision 
not to extend START; therefore, the obligatory meeting had 
served no purpose.  Ries stated she understood that this 
meeting could not undo a national-level decision but that it 
provided the forum for both sides to jointly consider the 
effects of such a decision.  Mr. Dunn also noted that this 
meeting added to the predictability and stability of this 
arms control regime.  Koshelev recapped that representatives 
at such a meeting had no authority to decide, they could only 
inform.  Kotkova proposed the following "as an idea" for 
consideration: 
 
"Each of the Parties shall have the right to address the 
other party with the proposal to extend this Treaty, in such 
a case, the Parties shall jointly consider the possibility of 
extending this Treaty." 
 
Ries said that the U.S. delegation would consider it and also 
Koshelev's explanation. 
 
------------ 
BCC SESSIONS 
------------ 
 
¶10.  (S) Ries turned to the BCC Protocol.  Koshelev stated 
the Russian delegation had just received the Russian 
 
translation of the JDT at the beginning of this meeting and 
so had not had the opportunity to study it.  As a follow-up 
to the previous day's discussion, Koshelev referred back to 
the treaty Article XIII (BCC) and questioned what 
"activities" come under the BCC. Should the BCC have other 
meetings besides the "sessions" called for in the protocol? 
Noting that at yesterday's meeting, Taylor had mentioned 
exhibitions.  Koshelev stated that exhibitions were not 
sessions.  Referencing START's Joint Compliance and 
Inspection Commission (JCIC), Koshelev declared that this 
body had no other activities except sessions.  The JCIC could 
make decisions at such sessions but the event itself, e.g., 
an exhibition, came under the purview of another organization 
such as a military unit.  Taylor countered that sessions were 
held in Geneva under the JCIC but that the framework of the 
JCIC also included notifications, agendas, and 
communications.  Also, decisions on demonstrations such as 
Russia's 2005 proposal on supplemental radiation detection 
equipment (RDE), the U.S. proposal on Trident reentry vehicle 
on-site inspection (RVOSI), and the Minuteman III front 
section demonstration were all made within the framework of 
the JCIC.  Admiral Kuznetsov responded that the JCIC practice 
was to only conduct sessions.  Kuznetsov proposed that if 
both delegations intended for the BCC to go outside of the 
JCIC construct, then this should be discussed now.  Ries and 
Koshelev agreed. 
 
¶11.  (S) Kuznetsov stated that he had carefully reviewed the 
BCC Protocol that had been provided by the U.S. side and 
observed that it only referenced "sessions."  (Begin comment: 
 Document had been handed over only ten minutes earlier.  End 
Comment.)  There was no mention of any other activities such 
 
 
as "meetings."  Koshelev stated that Kuznetsov's observations 
had gained the attention of the Russian Prime Minister's 
Legal Department.  They discerned that the terms "meetings" 
and "sessions" were typically used in discussions but that 
the BCC Protocol contained only the term "sessions." 
Koshelev put forward that if the two terms were to be used, 
they must be defined within the framework of the BCC.  (Begin 
comment:  The term "meeting" was in the U.S.- and 
Russian-proposed BCC protocols, Paragraph 3 and 6 
respectively.  End comment.) 
 
---------------- 
THE BCC PROTOCOL 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Ries stated that as with other treaties, there were 
always some unresolved items and details at the time of 
signature.  Experience showed having an agreed channel made 
for easier resolution of such issues.  After START was 
signed, the JCIC began meeting shortly afterwards and it 
accomplished a good deal of useful work.  For these reasons, 
the U.S. delegation advocated for a provisional application 
for launching the BCC. With that, Ries proposed going through 
the document, highlighting the differences between the U.S. 
and Russian versions and providing rationale for the U.S. 
text.  Koshelev asked if there was anything different from 
START.  Dean replied that it was substantially the same. 
Kuznetsov noted that in developing the Russian version, the 
writers removed clauses that were seldom or never used such 
as the special session.  The objective was to make it shorter 
and clearer. 
 
¶13.  (S) Ries asked for the Russian view on provisional 
application.  Kotkova replied that this would be solved when 
the other working groups finished their work.  For example, 
the Inspection Protocol Working Group was considering putting 
the development of some inspection procedures under the BCC. 
If this happened, there would be a need for a provisional 
application but if everything was resolved by the working 
groups, there would be no need for one. 
 
¶14.  (S) Starting in Section I, Composition of the 
Commission, Paragraph 1, Ries stated that the United States 
favored having the names of the BCC commissioners exchanged 
30 days after "signature" vice after "entry into force" 
because of the possibility of provisional application.  Also 
in Paragraph 1, Ries concurred with the Russian version of 
the Parties communicating "through diplomatic channels" 
because the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center was viewed as a 
diplomatic channel.  In Paragraph 3, Ries explained that the 
term "head representative" provided for more flexibility than 
"commissioner," since in the U.S. proposal a session of the 
Commission may be convened without the participation of the 
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner.  In such a case, 
each Party could be represented by their alternates, members, 
advisors or experts. 
 
¶15.  (S) In Section II, Convening a Session of the 
Commission, Paragraph 1, Ries asked why the Russian version 
proposed two obligatory BCC sessions per year.  Koshelev 
replied that in the last 2 years, as the head of the Russian 
delegation to the JCIC, he had experienced difficulties in 
calling together a JCIC meeting.  However, Koshelev agreed to 
 
 
reconsider the Russian position.  In the same paragraph, 
regarding the agenda, Ries noted the Russian version stated 
that in regard to the reply to a request for a BCC session, 
the other Party "may express its consent to the proposals 
received."  Did that mean that a Party had a right to object? 
 Koshelev replied that every one of a Party's concerns should 
be discussed; the BCC should address all questions.  In 
Paragraph 3, Ries explained the U.S version "...the 
Commission shall remain in session..." was more precise than 
the Russian version "shall last no longer than..." Continuing 
with Paragraph 4, referring to the phrase "The 
Commissioner...may communicate with the Commissioner of the 
other Party..." Ries explained that the U.S. version "may" 
was preferable to the Russian version "shall."  Koshelev 
replied that the Russian Ambassador to the United States 
wanted all communications to go through the Russian Embassy 
in Washington.  For that reason, Koshelev preferred the U.S. 
version that allowed the BCC Commissioners to communicate 
with each other at their discretion.  Lastly in this 
paragraph, the Russian version had the phrase "concerning 
questions that are related to the competency of the 
Commission."  Ries queried on the use of the term 
"competency."  The delegations ascertained that it was a 
translation issue; Koshelev said a better word in English may 
be "authority." 
 
¶16.  (S) The Russian version had deleted Section III, 
Convening a Special Session of the Commission.  Ries stated 
that that U.S. version kept it because it allowed for a 
quicker convening of a BCC session to address an urgent 
issue.  Koshelev noted that a special session had never been 
called for in the 15 years of START.  Kotkova offered that 
for such scenarios, the BCC commissioners were already 
empowered to communicate directly. 
 
¶17.  (S) Lastly, in Section V, Work of the Commission, the 
Russian version proposed to dispense with the provision for 
the authenticity of the BCC documents.  Kotkova argued that 
since this was already common legal practice and appeared in 
each of the Commission's documents, it did not need restating 
in the protocol.  Dean countered that the authenticity 
statement needed to be retained to ensure the practice 
continued.  Ries suggested resolving this at the next 
meeting. 
 
¶18.  (S) Documents exchanged: 
 
      -- U.S.-proposed JDT of the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission, dated September 30, 2009 (English and unofficial 
Russian) 
 
¶19.  (S) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Connell 
Mr. Dean 
Mr. Dunn 
Dr. Fraley 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Sims 
Mr. Taylor 
 
 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Col Kamenskiy 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Adm. Kuznetsov 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶20.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER