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S E C R E T GENEVA 000852 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) FOURTH MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) (RUSSIAN 
        FEDERATION-PROPOSED TREATY ANNEX TEXT) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 0850 (SFO-GVA-V-029) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-032. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 30, 2009 
                Time:  10:00 a.m. - 12:50 p.m. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The fourth meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Working Group completed a review of the U.S. 
side-by-side comparison of the categories of data in, and 
structures of, the U.S.-proposed MOU and the Russian-proposed 
Annex Section II (Ref A).  The Russian delegation also 
completed its presentation on the main composition and 
structure of the Russian-proposed MOU database. 
 
¶4.  (S) The sides exchanged opposing views on whether or not 
to include listings of support equipment, existing types, and 
space launch facilities in the MOU.  While the Russian 
delegation debated that support equipment listings were no 
longer needed in the MOU, the U.S. side defended its 
inclusion to support the inspection regime.  The Russian side 
probed the U.S. rationale for not considering the Peacekeeper 
ICBM and Trident I SLBM to be existing types in the new 
treaty.  Lastly, the sides discussed the Russian proposal to 
merge space launch facilities and test ranges into one 
category of facility in the MOU. 
 
---------------------------------- 
A FEW LEFT OVER ISSUES FROM BEFORE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Quickly summarizing the previous meeting's work, 
General Orlov invited Mr. Trout to complete his presentation 
of the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the two approaches to 
structuring the MOU (Ref B). 
 
¶6.  (S) Trout opened by seeking clarification on whether 
Russia intended to retain both loading facilities and static 
displays as categories of data in the MOU.  Orlov agreed to 
retain loading facilities and agreed in principle to removing 
static displays.  Trout asked whether Orlov could agree to 
list space launch facilities and eliminated facilities in 
their respective sections of the MOU.  Orlov stated that his 
delegation would think about space launch facilities and 
questioned the need for the eliminated facility section. 
Trout explained that a listing of eliminated facilities was 
needed to support formerly declared facility inspections 
proposed by the United States.  Orlov said Russia would 
consider it, but did not see any major problem with it. 
 
----------------- 
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Trout and Orlov agreed with retaining a section 
containing technical data on ICBMs and SLBMs except for the 
proposed addition of throw-weight by the U.S side.  Orlov 
urged that it be left out as it was no longer needed in the 
new treaty. 
 
¶8.  (S) Seeking clarification on Russia's decision to remove 
fixed structures and support equipment from the MOU, Trout 
asked Orlov how inspectors would be able to recognize support 
equipment.  Citing the U.S.-proposed ban on support equipment 
at eliminated facilities, Trout described the dilemma for 
inspectors of trying to confirm the absence of items that had 
never been declared or identified in the first place.  Orlov 
agreed to think about the issue before Colonel Ryzhkov firmly 
reminded the U.S. delegation that only strategic offensive 
arms (SOA) would have to be removed from a facility in order 
for it to be considered eliminated.  As such there was no 
need to list additional items. 
 
¶9.  (S) Using training model of missiles (TMOM) as an example 
of support equipment, Trout asked how inspectors would know 
the TMOM was not an SOA if the TMOM was never declared in the 
MOU.  Ryzhkov declared that the focus of inspectors at an 
eliminated facility should be on the absence of SOA and not 
support equipment.  He affirmed that the Russian side did not 
consider support equipment accountable under the new treaty. 
Trout explained that the United States envisioned retaining 
some of the same MOU data and structure from the START Treaty 
to facilitate verification, and related how TMOMs could be 
confused for actual ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
¶10.  (S) Attempting to shift the focus of the discussion, 
Orlov asked the U.S. delegation what other types of support 
equipment would be of concern.  After reading the definition 
of support equipment from the U.S.-proposed Definitions 
Annex, Trout asked if launch-associated support vehicles 
(LASV), a type of support equipment associated with 
road-mobile launchers, could remain at an eliminated ICBM 
base.  Orlov said that the LASVs would not be located at such 
a closed-out facility but could be relocated to an 
operational base. 
 
¶11.  (S) Asking whether the U.S. side was prepared to accept 
similar procedures, Colonel Novikov related how the United 
States had declared support equipment associated with heavy 
bombers and had provided an MOU photograph of the equipment, 
but subsequently refused to allow inspectors to search for 
such items during the close-out inspections of certain air 
bases.  Trout stated that support equipment, by definition, 
was not applicable to heavy bombers and reminded the Russian 
delegation that information on the heavy bomber equipment in 
question was provided in START simply as transparency. 
 
----------------------- 
BACK TO THE MOU ANNEXES 
----------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Trout compared the last three sections of the U.S.- 
and Russian-proposed MOU, which showed that the Russian side 
was in agreement with the U.S.-proposed MOU structure, but 
not necessarily content, for heavy bomber technical data 
(U.S. MOU Annex G), heavy bomber nuclear armament technical 
 
 
data (U.S. MOU Annex H) and other data (U.S. MOU Annex I). 
Russian had not considered the U.S. proposal to reorganize 
the section on heavy bomber technical data.  Both sides 
agreed to discuss MOU Annex J during a later meeting. 
 
-------------------------- 
COMBINING SPACE LAUNCH 
FACILITIES AND TEST RANGES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Referring to a proposal provided by the Russian side 
during the previous meeting of the MOU Working Group, Orlov 
asked whether the two sides could agree to combine space 
launch facilities (SLF) and test ranges into a single type of 
facility.  Trout stated that the United States was still 
evaluating the concept but had some concerns with the 
implementation of the Russian proposal.  Later, Mr. DeNinno 
requested further clarification citing potential 
inconsistencies between the Russian proposal and the 
Russian-proposed treaty text.  He reminded the members of the 
working group that the U.S.-proposed treaty prohibits test 
launchers from being located at SLFs and imposes different 
verification measures on SLFs and test ranges.  Specifically, 
test ranges are subject to inspection while SLFs are not. 
 
¶14.  (S) Ryzhkov asked whether the United States believed 
that this merge would increase transparency.  Trout replied 
that it would be difficult to determine that if the United 
States does not completely understand the details of the 
Russian proposal.  Ryzhkov then asked how the situation at 
Leninsk would be different from the U.S. SLF at Meck Island. 
Trout explained that Meck Island was an SLF declared under 
START, but that under the U.S.-proposal, Trident I was no 
longer an accountable missile.  There would be no prohibition 
against its location there. 
 
¶15.  (S) Referring to patterns of cooperation, DeNinno asked 
how Russia planned to treat transfers of SOA to Kazakhstan if 
SOA was not being transferred to a third Party.  Since an 
item being delivered to Leninsk remained under Russian 
control, Ryzhkov stated that they did not plan on 
transferring such an item to a third party.  He continued by 
assuring the U.S. delegation that an appropriate notification 
(analogous to a START Format 144) would be sent reporting the 
movement of any such item and that the item would remain 
accountable under the treaty until launched.  Such items 
would only be in Kazakhstan for a short time.  Referring to 
an ICBM or SLBM being relocated to Leninsk, Trout asked where 
the accountable item would be listed in the MOU.  General 
Poznihir said that the location would be designated in the 
MOU to the assigned base or storage facility, but provided no 
further details. 
 
------------------------- 
PEACEKEEPER AND TRIDENT I 
------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) In response to Orlov's inquiry as to where the 
United States planned on listing the 50 Peacekeeper ICBM 
silos, Trout declared the silos were non-functional and, 
under the U.S. proposal, would not be subject to the new 
treaty.  Referring to a U.S.-proposed silo elimination 
method, Orlov asked whether the United States intended to 
 
 
fill the 50 silos with gravel before signature of the new 
treaty.  Trout indicated that the United States had made no 
decision on eliminating these launchers and that acceptance 
of the simplified elimination procedures could affect whether 
the silos ended up in the MOU. 
 
¶17.  (S) Following a similar inquiry concerning Trident I 
launchers on the four U.S. modified SSBNs, Trout explained 
that the Trident I launchers in question would not be 
included in the MOU data as they were not existing types 
under the U.S. approach to the new treaty.  Orlov asked twice 
how the Russians would be able to confirm this, to which 
Trout replied that is a matter for the Inspection Protocol 
Working Group. 
 
¶18.  (S) After a quick break, Mr. Buttrick clarified the U.S. 
position regarding Peacekeeper and Trident I by reminding the 
Russian delegation that only the existing types of strategic 
offensive arms listed in paragraph 9 of Article III to the 
U.S.-proposed treaty would be considered accountable.  He 
emphasized that neither Peacekeeper nor Trident I would be 
listed as existing types.  He continued by declaring that the 
Peacekeeper ICBM was no longer deployed and that the silos 
did not contain ICBMs or warheads.  Similarly, he stated that 
the tubes on the four modified SSBNs did not contain SLBMs or 
warheads and could no longer be used as SLBM launchers.  He 
referred any additional questions about existing types to the 
Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG). 
 
¶19.  (S) Orlov stressed that the launchers remained in 
existence and should remain declared as non-deployed items in 
these cases.  Mr. Luchaninov asserted that it was the job of 
the MOU Working Group to provide an initial listing of MOU 
data to the TTDWG.  Nevertheless, Trout cautioned the Russian 
delegation to not get ahead of the TTDWG since that group had 
not yet discussed what the existing types would be. 
 
¶20.  (S) Orlov also asked whether the United States intended 
to provide data on B-1s that had been converted to 
non-nuclear heavy bombers and those B-1s that remained 
unconverted.  Trout assured him that data would be provided 
in both cases but reminded Orlov that the U.S. proposal 
considered any nuclear-capable heavy bomber converted to 
non-nuclear status as eliminated from accountability. 
 
---------------------------- 
WE ARE CLOSER THAN YOU THINK 
---------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (S) Orlov quickly completed his review of the Russian 
summary of items to be included in the MOU emphasizing two 
points.  He sought agreement on the proposed listing of types 
of bases and the type of data to be exchanged for such bases. 
Noting that most of the information corresponded to the U.S. 
approach, Trout stated that the United States saw no need to 
list silo launch control centers or other launch control 
centers as proposed by the Russians. 
 
¶22.  (S) Orlov opined that the sides' approaches to 
structuring the MOU were actually very similar and proposed 
looking beyond the differences in the titles of sections. 
Trout and Orlov agreed to have separate sections for ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and heavy bombers similar to the START structure. 
 
 
Additionally, Orlov proposed placing aggregate numbers up 
front in these sections followed by the lists of bases and 
other facilities.  He then agreed to consider the U.S. 
approach for including space launch facilities and eliminated 
facilities. 
 
¶23.  (S) The two sides agreed to each prepare joint draft 
texts of the MOU before the next negotiation session. 
 
¶24.  (U) Documents exchanged: 
 
U.S. 
 
      - U.S.-Proposed Inspection Protocol Annexes 1-14, dated 
September 15, 2009; and 
 
      - U.S.-Proposed Elimination Protocol, dated September 
24, 2009. 
 
¶25. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S.: 
 
Mr. Trout 
LtCol Blevins 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Colby 
Mr. DeNinno 
LT  Lobner 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Rust 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Gen Orlov 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Kostyuchenko 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Pishchulov 
Gen Poznikhir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Gen Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶26.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER