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S E C R E T GENEVA 000850 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 097473 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-002) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-029. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 29, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the September 29, 2009, meeting of the Working 
Group on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), chaired by 
Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, the delegations went through a 
comparison of each side's proposed categories of data to be 
included in the database for the new treaty.  The Russians 
confirmed that they would include many of the same categories 
of data as the United States on facilities and the items 
located there.  Russia's aggregate data reflected its 
proposed treaty limits and counting rules, with the addition 
of aggregates of non-deployed items.  Orlov unsuccessfully 
pressed for U.S. agreement to categorize data the way Russia 
had proposed. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian delegation agreed to include repair and 
production facilities for both mobile ICBM launchers and 
their associated ICBMs, and ICBM and SLBM loading facilities. 
 They would not agree to include throw-weight, and would not 
list separate aggregate numbers for mobile launchers or their 
associated ICBMs.  They reacted negatively to the U.S. view 
that the Peacekeeper ICBM would not be declared in the new 
treaty because it was no longer deployed.  For their part, 
the Russians made a new proposal to combine space launch 
facilities and test ranges. 
 
--------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION OF MOU DATA CATEGORIES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Orlov opened the working group meeting and confirmed 
he had received the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the U.S. 
and Russian proposals (Refs A and B) for the MOU data base 
that was provided earlier in the day, and he agreed to 
discuss it.  He then provided an unofficial Russian paper 
titled, "Main Composition of Data Base the Parties Intend to 
Exchange under the New Treaty." 
 
Begin official translation of that paper: 
 
Handed over by the Russian 
Side on September 29, 2009 
 
Official Translation 
 
Main Composition of the Data Base the Parties Intend to 
Exchange under the New Agreement 
 
      ¶1.  List of SOAs proposed for inclusion in the data 
 
 
base: 
 
            Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers; 
            Warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Non-deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. 
 
      ¶2.  Aggregate data proposed for inclusion in the data 
base: 
 
            Aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
HBs; 
            Aggregate number of deployed ICBM launchers and 
SLBM 
               launchers; 
            Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, 
               SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
               HBs. 
 
      ¶3.  List of facilities for which it is proposed that a 
data base be provided: 
 
            ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with 
SLBMs, 
               and air bases for HBs; 
            Storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs; 
            Test ranges for ICBMs and SLBMs; 
            (Space launch facilities); 
            Training facilities (ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs); 
            HB flight test centers; 
            Repair facilities for SLBMs and HBs; 
            Conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, 
            SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Conversion or elimination facilities for mobile 
               launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers; 
            Production facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs; 
            Production facilities for ballistic missile 
               submarines; 
            Static display. 
 
      ¶4.  List of ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped 
with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs for which the data base is 
provided: 
 
      Russian Federation 
 
            ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs: 
            e.g., Dombarovskiy 
 
            ICBM bases for mobile ICBMs: 
            e.g., Vypolzovo 
 
            Submarine bases: 
            e.g., Yagel'naya 
 
            HB bases: 
            e.g., Ukrainka 
 
      U.S. 
 
 
            ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs: 
            e.g., Minot 
 
            Submarine bases: 
            e.g., Silverdale 
 
            HB bases: 
            e.g., Dyess 
 
      ¶5.  Data with respect to ICBM bases, bases of 
submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs, for 
which the sides intend to carry out exchanges: 
 
      Name and coordinates of the base; 
 
      Type of ICBM (SLBM, HB); 
 
      For each type: 
            Aggregate number of deployed ICBMs (SLBMs, HBs); 
            Aggregate number of deployed ICBM launchers (SLBM 
               launchers); 
            Aggregate number of warheads on delivery vehicles 
               located at a base; 
            Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs (SLBMs and 
               HBs); 
            Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBM launchers 
(SLBM 
               launchers); 
            Launcher groups; 
            Silos used as launch control centers; 
            Other launch control centers. 
 
End text. 
 
¶6.  (S) Trout indicated that the U.S. paper contained a 
side-by-side list of the categories of data that each Party 
proposed to include in analogous sections of the data base. 
Orlov jokingly regretted that the paper did not include a 
third column with compromise proposals.  Trout responded that 
once the sides identified and understood the similarities and 
differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches, the U.S. 
delegation hoped to draft a proposed joint draft text (JDT) 
during the break in sessions.  His goal for this meeting was 
to confirm what each side believed should be in the MOU. 
(Begin comment:  The following paragraphs represent the U.S. 
side-by-side comparison of the U.S. positions and the Russian 
positions that were provided to the Russian delegation.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶7.  (S) The United States would include in Section I of the 
MOU (Aggregate Numbers) the following two aggregate numbers: 
 
      - Deployed ICBMs/SLBMs and their associated launchers, 
      deployed heavy bombers; and 
 
      - Nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs/SLBMs, Nuclear 
      armaments on or associated with deployed heavy bombers. 
 
¶8.  (S) Russia's Section I of their draft annex (Ref B) 
included the following five aggregate numbers: 
 
      - Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers; 
 
 
      - Deployed Launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs; 
 
      - Warheads on Deployed ICBMS, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers; 
 
      - Non-Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers; and 
 
      - Non-Deployed Launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs 
 
¶9.  (S) Orlov said the U.S. Non-Paper on the MOU (Ref A) that 
had been provided on September 21, 2009, had stated that 
throw-weight data should be in Section I.  However, the 
United States had since decided that throw-weight should be 
declared in Annex F on ICBM and SLBM technical data.  Orlov 
commented dryly that Russia would omit throw-weight data 
entirely, so moving it to Annex F was a step in the right 
direction. 
 
¶10.  (S) Trout asked why Russia included an aggregate number 
for non-deployed items in Section I when Russia was not 
proposing any numerical limits on such items.  Colonel 
Ryzhkov answered that, in the Russian approach, non-deployed 
items would be subject to some limitations under the treaty, 
some information would be provided about them, and certain 
verification provisions would apply.  Indeed, Ryzhkov added, 
one aim of the verification regime was to monitor 
non-deployed delivery vehicles, even though it would be only 
be to a limited extent.  Russia considered it logical to list 
aggregate data for all items in Section I.  In turn, Ryzhkov 
asked what the U.S. goals were for the verification regime 
regarding non-deployed delivery vehicles, and where the 
United States would list such aggregate data.  Trout 
responded that the United States would include the data 
somewhere in the MOU, but viewed Section I as relating only 
to the central limits as defined in the treaty.  Trout also 
described the U.S.-proposed verification regime for and 
limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers. 
 
¶11.  (S) Ryzhkov indicated dissatisfaction with limits on 
mobile ICBMs, and asked what the U.S. reasoning was for 
imposing them.  Trout explained that the United States had 
always been concerned that mobile ICBMs were the only force 
that could be rapidly expanded without being readily 
observable.  The START restrictions on mobile ICBMs were 
equal because the United States was planning at the time of 
the START negotiations to deploy Peacekeeper ICBMs in a 
mobile configuration.  While many things were different now, 
the monitoring problem had not changed.  The United States 
was looking mostly for transparency, along with some 
restrictions.  Orlov commented that Russia could ask for the 
same with regard to other "mobile" systems, such as 
submarines, if the United States kept talking about mobile 
ICBMs. 
 
¶12.  (S) Trout went on to note that the United States would 
include a Section II in the MOU:  Additional Aggregate 
Numbers.  He said that Russia's proposal did not contain it. 
The numbers in it were associated with the limits the United 
States was proposing in our Article IV of the treaty. 
Section II would include: 
 
      - Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
      - Non-Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at Test Ranges 
 
 
 
      - Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
        -- Mobile Test Launchers at Test Ranges 
 
      - Mobile Training Launchers 
 
      - Test Heavy Bombers 
 
----------------- 
ICBM-RELATED DATA 
----------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Trout added that the United States would retain an 
MOU Annex A:  ICBMs and ICBM Launchers, which Russia had as 
part I of Section II of Section II of its Annex.  The U.S. 
would again include two aggregate limits, as well as the 
following data: 
 
      - Additional Declared Values: 
 
        -- Non-Deployed Aggregates 
 
           --- ICBMs for Mobile Launchers 
           --- ICBMs at Test Ranges 
           --- Mobile Launchers for ICBMs 
 
        -- Other Launcher Aggregates 
 
           --- Test Launchers 
           --- Mobile Test Launchers 
           --- Training Launchers 
           --- Mobile Training Launchers 
 
      - Facilities listed: 
 
        -- Bases and Maintenance Facilities 
 
        -- Loading Facilities 
 
        -- Production Facilities 
           --- ICBMs 
           --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
        -- Storage Facilities 
           --- ICBMs 
           --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
        -- Repair Facilities 
           --- ICBMs 
           --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
        -- Test Ranges 
 
        -- Training Facilities 
 
        -- Elimination Facilities 
 
      - ICBM base data: 
 
        -- Name and Coordinates of Facility 
 
        -- Two Aggregate Numbers 
 
 
 
        -- Coordinates of each silo 
 
      - Other facility data, to include the maintenance 
facility 
        at ICBM bases: 
 
        -- Non-Deployed ICBMs, Training Models of Missiles 
        (TMOMs) 
 
¶14.  (S) Trout said the Russian Federation's Section II: 
ICBMs, SLBMs, Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM Launchers, 
and SLBM Launchers; (I) ICBMs, Warheads on ICBMs, ICBM 
Launchers, would include the following data: 
 
      - Five aggregate limits would be declared at the 
      beginning and for each base 
 
      - Additional Declared Values: 
 
        -- None 
 
      - Facilities listed: 
 
        -- Bases 
 
        -- Production Facilities 
 
        -- Storage Facilities 
           --- ICBMs 
           --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
        -- Test Ranges 
 
 
        -- Training Facilities 
 
        -- Conversion or Elimination Facilities 
           --- ICBMs 
           --- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 
 
      - ICBM base data: 
 
        -- Name and Coordinates of Facility 
 
      - Other facility data: 
 
        -- Unknown 
 
¶15.  (S) After considerable probing by Trout, Orlov 
acknowledged it would make sense to list production 
facilities for mobile launchers in the Russian data.  In 
addition, the sides decided it would be best to retain the 
category of loading facilities for both ICBMs and SLBMs. 
Although neither Party had any ICBM loading facilities, the 
category could be desired in the future.  Russia also agreed 
to add repair facilities for ICBMs and mobile launchers if 
the United States would include that category too.  The 
Russians promised to include aggregate numbers of items at 
each base, and the coordinates of each silo launcher, just as 
in START. 
 
----------------- 
SLBM-RELATED DATA 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Trout added that the United States would retain an 
MOU Annex B (SLBMs and SLBM Launchers) with the following 
data: 
 
      - Two Aggregate Limits 
 
      - Additional Declared Values: 
 
        -- Non-Deployed Aggregates 
           --- SLBMs at Test Ranges 
 
        -- Other Launcher Aggregates 
           --- Test Launchers 
           --- Training Launchers 
 
      - Facilities listed: 
 
        -- Bases 
 
        -- Loading Facilities 
 
        -- Production Facilities 
           --- SLBMs 
           --- Ballistic Missile Submarines 
 
        -- Storage Facilities 
 
        -- Repair Facilities 
 
        -- Test Ranges 
 
        -- Training Facilities 
 
        -- Elimination Facilities 
 
      - Submarine base data included: 
 
        -- Name and Coordinates of Facility 
 
        -- Two Aggregate Numbers 
 
        -- Non-Deployed SLBMs 
 
      - Other facility data: 
 
        -- Non-Deployed SLBMs, TMOMs 
 
¶17.  (S) Trout continued that the Russian Federation's 
Section II:  ICBMs, SLBMs, Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM 
Launchers, and SLBM Launchers; (II) SLBMs, Warheads on SLBMs, 
SLBM Launchers, included the following data: 
 
      - Five aggregate limits would be declared at the 
      beginning and for each base 
 
      - Additional Declared Values: 
 
        -- None 
 
      - Facilities listed: 
 
        -- Bases 
 
 
 
        -- Production Facilities 
           --- SLBMs 
           --- Ballistic Missile Submarines 
 
        -- Storage Facilities 
 
        -- Repair Facilities 
 
        -- Test Ranges 
 
        -- Training Facilities 
 
        -- Conversion or Elimination Facilities 
           --- SLBMs 
           --- Ballistic Missile Submarines 
 
      - SLBM base data included: 
 
        -- Name and Coordinates of Facility 
 
      - Other facility data: 
 
        -- Unknown 
 
¶18.  (S) Since Russia would provide the total number of 
non-deployed SLBM launchers at submarine bases, Trout asked 
whether Russia would provide the number of empty SLBM 
launchers in each 6-month update.  Orlov affirmed this would 
be the case, with Ryzhkov adding it would be the case if the 
United States provided it.  Trout did not respond, but 
promised to declare elimination facilities for both SLBMs and 
SLBM launchers. 
 
----------------- 
HEAVY BOMBER DATA 
----------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Trout continued that the United States would retain 
an MOU Annex C (Heavy Bombers) with the following data: 
 
      - Two Aggregate Limits 
 
      - Additional Declared Values: 
 
        -- Non-Deployed Aggregates 
           --- None 
 
        -- Other Aggregates 
           --- Test Heavy Bombers 
           --- Training Heavy Bombers 
 
      - The following facilities are listed: 
 
        -- Bases for Deployed Heavy Bombers 
 
        -- Production Facilities 
 
        -- Storage Facilities 
 
        -- Repair Facilities 
 
        -- Flight Test Centers 
 
 
 
 
        -- Training Facilities 
 
        -- Elimination Facilities 
 
      - Air base data included: 
 
        -- Name and Coordinates of Facility 
 
        -- Three Aggregate Numbers 
           --- Includes Nuclear Armaments Weapons Storage 
           Areas with coordinates 
 
      - Other facility data: 
 
        -- Training Heavy Bombers, Test Heavy Bombers 
 
¶20.  (S) The Russian Federation's Section III:  Heavy Bombers 
and Warheads on Them, would include the following data: 
 
      - Two aggregate limits would be declared at the 
      beginning and for each base 
 
      - Sub-aggregate limits 
 
        -- Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range 
        Nuclear ALCMs 
 
        -- Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear 
        Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs 
 
        -- Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for 
        Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs 
 
        -- Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for 
        Nuclear Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs 
 
      - Additional Declared Values: 
 
        -- Non-Deployed Aggregates 
           --- Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers 
 
        -- Other Aggregates 
           --- Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear 
Armaments 
           --- Test Heavy Bombers 
           --- Training Heavy Bombers 
           --- Heavy Bombers Converted to Ground Trainers 
 
      - The following facilities are listed: 
 
        -- Bases for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range 
        Nuclear ALCMs 
 
        -- Production Facilities 
 
        -- Storage Facilities 
 
        -- Repair Facilities 
 
        -- Flight Test Centers 
 
        -- Training Facilities 
 
 
 
        -- Conversion or Elimination Facilities 
 
      - Air base data included: 
 
        -- Name and Coordinates of Facility 
 
      - Other facility data: 
 
        -- Unknown 
 
¶21.  (S) Orlov asked Trout to clarify what was meant by the 
term "nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with 
each air base."  Trout explained that, under the U.S. 
concept, accountable warheads could be either on heavy 
bombers or in storage facilities that were associated with 
the air base.  Orlov asked whether it could be said that the 
storage facilities were situated at the air base.  Trout 
clarified that the storage facilities could be at the air 
base or some distance from the base.  Orlov asked how far 
away the storage facilities could be.  Trout clarified 
further that the issue was not distance, but which facility 
provided the warheads that would be carried by the heavy 
bombers at an air base.  In other words, the declared weapons 
storage area would be wherever the nuclear armaments that 
would be used to load the bomber would be drawn from.  He 
said he was not talking about central storage. 
 
¶22.  (S) On receiving this clarification, Orlov asked about 
the U.S.-proposed verification regime for heavy bomber 
warheads.  How did the United States propose to count such 
warheads?  Trout explained that the U.S. vision was to report 
the number of warheads in storage at the storage facilities 
that directly support the heavy bomber airbase, as well as 
any warheads actually loaded on heavy bombers.  The 
U.S.-proposed Inspection Protocol discussed warhead 
inspections at air bases to confirm the number of heavy 
bombers, the number of warheads on them, and the number in 
storage at weapons storage areas directly supporting the air 
bases.  Orlov stated that the Russians had a different 
understanding on this issue and almost certainly would oppose 
it.  Trout noted that this issue was broader than the purview 
of the MOU Working Group. 
 
¶23.  (S) Going through Russia's paper on the data base, Orlov 
sought to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement.  He 
pressed for agreement to include Russia's five groupings of 
aggregate data somewhere in the MOU.  Trout continued to 
resist, inasmuch as the United States characterized and 
grouped the data differently from Russia's proposal.  The 
United States also had a different concept as to when or if a 
launcher or heavy bomber would be considered non-deployed. 
Trout confirmed that the U.S. proposed to provide complete, 
comprehensive data in the MOU and its annexes. 
 
----------------------------- 
DISAPPEARANCE OF PEACEKEEPERS 
AND SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (S) Orlov then asked whether the United States planned 
to declare its Peacekeeper ICBM silos as non-deployed 
launchers and the missiles as non-deployed ICBMs.  Trout 
 
 
informed him that Peacekeepers would not count in this treaty 
because they would not be an existing type as of treaty 
signature.  Amid exclamations of "Why, why?" from several 
Russian participants, Orlov said that was not the correct 
answer.  The Russian delegation would not be able to explain 
it to their leadership.  Orlov asked how Russia would be able 
to confirm that the Peacekeeper launchers were not 
launch-capable.  He said further discussion was needed in the 
working groups and at higher levels. 
 
¶25.  (S) When asked about declaring static displays in the 
MOU, Trout confirmed that the United States would not include 
them, because the United States would consider static 
displays as eliminated items.  Orlov promised that Russia 
would study that proposal. 
 
¶26.  (S) Orlov proposed that the sides agree to combine in 
the data base the facilities that were declared as space 
launch facilities and test ranges under START.  Surprised at 
this new proposal, Trout asked what inspection rights would 
apply.  Orlov repeated that Russia wanted to combine such 
facilities and call them all test ranges, with no 
verification measures.  (Begin note:  Orlov's statement was 
inconsistent with Russia's proposed treaty text, which states 
that visits shall be conducted at test ranges, inter alia. 
End note.) 
 
¶27.  (S) Documents exchanged: 
 
-- U.S.: 
 
   - Side-by-side comparison of U.S. and Russian proposals 
for the MOU data base, dated September 29, 2009. 
 
-- Russia: 
 
   - Unofficial paper titled, "Main Composition of Data Base 
the Parties Intend to Exchange under the New Treaty," dated 
September 29, 2009. 
 
¶28.  (S) Participants: 
 
U.S.: 
 
Mr. Trout 
Lt Col Blevins 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Colby 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dwyer 
Mr. Johnston 
LT  Lobner 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Rust 
Mr. Sims 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Gen Orlov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Col Novikov 
 
 
Mr. Pishchulov 
Gen Poznikhir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Gen Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶29.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER