VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0846/01 2801540
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071540Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9524
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4916
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2101
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1103
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6299

S E C R E T GENEVA 000846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) MEETINGS ON VOTKINSK CLOSURE DOCUMENTS 
 
REF: STATE 098566 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-004 MOBILE MISSLE 
     MONITORING PROVISIONS) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-043. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 30, 2009 
                Time:  11:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) As instructed (Ref A), U.S. Representative to the 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), Mr. Taylor 
met with his Russian counterpart, Mr. Koshelev, to discuss 
the JCIC Agreement on Principles and Procedures for 
Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the 
monitored facility at Votkinsk, as well as the associated 
letters on Ground Transportation and Settlement of Accounts. 
Taylor confirmed that the Russian-proposed agreement on 
Votkinsk, dated June 8, 2009, which was provided to the U.S. 
delegation on September 21, 2009, in Geneva, was the same 
document that had been provided to the United States in 
January 2009 (e-mailed to Washington, no reporting cable). 
Koshelev explained that the Russian delegation had been 
prepared to table the document in June in the JCIC, but the 
U.S. delegation had informed the Russian delegation it had 
been instructed not to discuss the document.  Koshelev and 
Taylor discussed the notification timelines and agreed to 
conform the document once both sides had exchanged the 
revised official texts.  Taylor also provided copies of the 
associated letters (on ground transportation and on 
settlement of accounts) and requested copies of Russia's 
response to the letters soonest. 
 
------------------------- 
DELAY NECESSITATES CHANGE 
IN NOTIFICATION TIMELINE 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Taylor pointed out that the Russian-proposed text 
required notification by the United States NLT 60 days prior 
to the requested moving date, with a subsequent reply by 
Russia NLT 30 days prior to the requested date.  Since the 
Parties were proposing to sign the document later than had 
been anticipated when the drafts were first presented, those 
dates would be impossible to meet with the treaty expiring on 
December 5, 2009.  Koshelev agreed asking what the United 
States proposed to do.  Taylor told him that the United 
States believed it would be reasonable to have a 10-day 
notification, with a 5-day response.  This was based on a 
planned date of approximately November 15, 2009, for movement 
from Votkinsk.  This would permit an initial notification of 
November 5, 2009. 
 
¶5.  (S) Koshelev stated that he had talked with the Votkinsk 
plant manager who had informed him that the process would 
take about 2 weeks, and he asked Taylor whether he could tell 
his military colleagues that movement would begin on November 
¶15.  Mr. Smith noted that the United States had flexibility 
 
on the precise date and that discussions would begin with 
"Department 162" on detailed planning.  The United States 
would need to ensure that the monitors requested sufficient 
services and that Russian officials in Votkinsk would help 
dispose of equipment and supplies. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
QUESTIONS ON WHO WILL SIGN THE DOCUMENT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Koshelev asked whether there was enough time to put 
this agreement into force, and noted that Ukraine may raise 
the question of its participation in the signing of the 
agreement.  He noted that his lawyer (Ms. Kotkova) had told 
him that if this was not an agreement within the framework of 
the JCIC, it would be difficult for the Russian side to do it 
as a stand-alone executive agreement, so it would have to be 
within the JCIC. 
 
¶7.  (S) Koshelev then asked who would sign the document. 
Taylor offered that perhaps the permanent representatives of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the Conference on 
Disarmament, located in Geneva, could be given authority to 
sign the document.  Koshelev said that he did not believe 
that would be workable, noting that the Kazakhstani 
representative in particular was far too timid to do 
something like this, and suggested that the United States and 
Russia could invoke the JCIC silence procedures under the 
provisions of Section V of the JCIC Protocol.  This would be 
an appropriate use of the provision as the business was of a 
bilateral nature.  Taylor noted that the silence procedures 
provided for a 30-day window, after the Parties not signing 
the agreement receive the documents, for the agreement to 
enter into force.  This time gives each Party not signing the 
agreement an opportunity to object to the agreement.  Taylor 
explained that if the agreement is signed during the week of 
October 12 under the silence procedures, the soonest possible 
date for the agreement to enter-into-force would be 
approximately November 13.  This would be 2 days prior to a 
notional planned notification date for the movement of 
equipment and supplies. 
 
¶8.  (S) Kotkova raised the possibility of temporary 
observation of the agreement in accordance with the last 
unnumbered paragraph of Section V of the JCIC Protocol 
(paragraph 7 of Annex 1 to the JCIC Protocol).  Under the 
provision, Parties that sign an agreement may, on a 
case-by-case basis, agree to temporary observance of the 
agreement, provided it does not alter the rights and 
obligations under the treaty.  Kotkova noted that during the 
period of temporary observation, the provisions of the 
agreement would be legally binding on Russia.  Mr. Brown said 
this was interesting and that he would look into the 
approach.  (Begin note:  Brown later conferred with Taylor 
and confirmed that the provision in the JCIC Protocol 
appeared to provide for temporary observance of the 
agreement, and that would be a legally available option.  End 
note.) 
 
------------------------------------ 
WHEN AND WHERE FOR SIGNING DOCUMENTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) Taylor and Koshelev discussed the idea of the signing 
 
of the JCIC agreement and exchange of letters  during the 
week of October 12 as he and Brown would both be in Moscow 
for the START Follow-on discussions.  Koshelev said that this 
would be an excellent idea and he would be prepared to do so. 
 Taylor said that he would send the ad-ref text to Washington 
with this idea and notify Koshelev as soon as possible of 
Washington's response. 
 
¶10.  (S) The Parties exchanged official texts of the JCIC 
agreement, the letter on ground transportation and the letter 
on settlement of accounts.  Koshelev said that he would 
provide an answer as to Russia's acceptance of the 10-day 
notification and 5-day response later that day.  Koshelev 
later confirmed Russia's agreement to the 10- and 5-day 
proposals and a conforming session was set for Thursday, 
October 1 at 2:00 pm. 
 
-------------------------------- 
LIKELY REACTION OF OTHER PARTIES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Koshelev asked whether Taylor thought that Ukraine 
might call for a JCIC session, and whether Taylor was 
planning to meet with Ukrainian Ambassador Nikonenko when the 
latter came to Geneva.  Taylor responded that there may be a 
need for another session and that he had no intention of 
meeting with Nikonenko.  Koshelev stated that the Ukrainians 
continue to mention extended security guarantees and wants a 
JCIC session to raise their issues.  Concerning Belarus, 
Koshelev commented that the Belarusians said they had no 
problem with the letter on ground transportation.   Taylor 
noted that the United States had proposed a new paragraph 
1(d) in Section I of the JCIC agreement but that the United 
States would not insist on its inclusion:  it had been 
requested by the Russian and Belarusian sides, including COL 
Ryzhkov.  Koshelev responded that he would consult with 
Ryzhkov and whether there was a need for discussion with the 
Belarusians, but he did not believe it would be a problem. 
Koshelev confirmed on Thursday, October 1, 2009, that there 
was no need for the paragraph in the document. 
 
-------------------------------- 
JCIC AGREEMENT TEXT IS CONFORMED 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) On Thursday, October 1, 2009, Brown and Mr. French 
met with Kotkova and Ms. Evarovskaya to conform the text. 
The following changes were made in the English language text 
(or in the Russian language text to conform to proposed U.S. 
text accepted by the Russian side): 
 
- Section I, subparagraph 1(b):  Add "continuous" in front of 
"monitoring activity" 
 
- Section I, subparagraph 1(c):  "at the monitored facility" 
replaced "within the perimeter continuous monitoring area," 
as the U.S.-proposed change had not been discussed in the 
JCIC.  The phrase, "as specified in Section III" was replaced 
by "included on the list noted in Section III," and Russia 
accepted the phrase "transferred or returned to the inspected 
Party." 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 1(a)(ii):  The Russian proposed 
sentence ("The procedure for providing these materials shall 
 
be determined by agreement between the monitoring team leader 
and the in-country escort.") was accepted. 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 1(d):  The Russian side agreed to 
the U.S.-proposed text. 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 1(f):  Both U.S. ("at the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area") and Russian ("in that 
area") formulations were dropped. 
 
- Chapeau of Section II, paragraph 2:  The Russian-proposed 
formulation was accepted ("Notifications provided in 
connection with the activities provided for in this Annex") 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 2(c):  The phrase "to be 
delivered" was replaced by "intended for delivery" 
 
- Section II, paragraph 3:  The word "may" was replaced by 
"shall," in the final sentence 
 
- Section II, chapeau of paragraph 4:  The word "building" 
was not included, nor was the U.S.-proposed phrase, 
"remaining on the territory of the inspected Party," on the 
grounds that this had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 4(a):  "at the monitored facility" 
was accepted in the first sentence.  At the end of the second 
sentence, the phrase "at the monitored facility at Votkinsk" 
was added.  In the final sentence, the U.S.-proposed 
additional phrase, "for future disposition or," in front of 
the phrase "and suitable for further use," was not accepted 
as it had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 4(b):  Conforming change made ("at 
the monitored facility").  Also, U.S.-proposed text in the 
penultimate sentence ("consistent with their ordinary use") 
was not accepted as it had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, U.S.-proposed subparagraphs 4(c) and 4(d):  Not 
accepted because they had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, paragraph 5:  The phrase "place taxes" was 
replaced by "exact taxes" as being a better description of 
the activity being proscribed and as a more accurate 
translation of the Russian, and the other proposed U.S. texts 
were deemed to be covered by this change and in any event had 
not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, paragraph 6:  "monitored facility" accepted 
vice "perimeter continuous monitoring area." 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 7(c):  The U.S.-proposed exception 
was not accepted as it had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, U.S. proposed subparagraph 7(d):  Not accepted 
because not discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 7(e):  The settlement of accounts 
reference as proposed by the Russian side was accepted ad 
ref, but later (see below) the U.S. reference ("ground 
transportation vehicle related services pursuant to 
subparagraph 1(a)(iii)") was explained to the Russian side as 
being the preferred option of Russian experts as well. 
 
- Section II, subparagraph 7(g):  The U.S.-proposed addition 
in the middle of this subparagraph was not accepted because 
it had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Section III, paragraph 1:  The phrase, "in coordination 
with the in-country escort" was changed to "together with the 
in-country escort."  U.S.-proposed text that added the 
concept of the list as specifying "the final disposition" of 
the buildings etc., was not accepted because it had not been 
discussed in the JCIC, and the phrase "at the monitored 
facility" was made as a conforming change. 
 
- Article Three:  U.S.-proposed subparagraphs 19(d) and 19(e) 
were not accepted as they had not been discussed in the JCIC. 
 
- Article Four:  The final provisions were changed to the 
procedures contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Annex I to the 
JCIC protocol. 
 
¶13.  (S) Brown noted that he was still working on the text of 
the letter of acceptance to respond to the Russian proposal 
on ground transportation and that he would convey the letter 
to the Russian side as soon as possible.  He also stated that 
he was working on the text of the letter of acceptance on the 
Russian proposal concerning the settlement of accounts. 
(Begin comment:  Both were conveyed later in the day to 
Andrey Malyugin, to pass to Kotkova.  End comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FROM CONFORMING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) During the Russian reception the evening of October 
1, 2009, Smirnov discussed the conformed Votkinsk closure 
documents with Smith.  Smirnov noted his concern that the 
ground transportation costs associated with the closure of 
Votkinsk had been included in normal START cost settlement 
procedures, but the factory personnel at Votkinsk still 
preferred the direct payment method, as had been the past 
practice.  Smirnov explained that although he had concerns 
during the talks, he had remained silent so that the 
documents could be signed.  Smith told him that he would 
investigate this issue.  (Begin comment:  Upon further 
analysis of the closure documents, it was determined that a 
reference had been changed (in Section II, subparagraph 7(e)) 
which did have the unintended consequence of shifting cost 
settlement exactly as Smirnov described.  The U.S. intent was 
for ground transportation costs to be handled under the 
normal payment contract currently in place.  All other costs 
for the closure of Votkinsk would be handled under START cost 
settlement practices which entail paying the Russian 
Federation through a government-to-government billing process 
after the fact for services provided.  End comment.) 
 
¶15.  (S) Taylor called Koshelev who met with Taylor on 
Friday, October 2, 2009.  Taylor explained that when the 
document was reviewed by DTRA personnel an error was 
identified, which had the unintended consequence of placing 
the ground transportation payment under the normal cost 
settlement procedures.  The United States preferred to handle 
the ground transportation payments under the direct payment 
method, which had been the standard practice.  Koshelev 
thanked Taylor and said that he would be in touch with his 
lawyer who was already on her way back to Moscow.  Malyugin 
 
would be in touch with the U.S. Mission early the next week 
with their response.  Later in the day, Taylor called the 
Russian Mission and spoke to Malyugin, in Koshelev's absence, 
about the differences that had been uncovered between the 
U.S.-proposed letter of acceptance on the settlement of 
accounts and the original Russian proposal--the former was 
much broader.  Taylor asked that the Russian side consider 
the U.S. proposal as it addressed all the costs that might 
remain unsettled at the termination of the START Treaty. 
Malyugin said that he would pass this on to Kotkova. 
 
¶16.  (S) On October 5, 2009, Kotkova called the U.S. Mission 
from Moscow and spoke with Brown.  She requested that the two 
letters of acceptance be sent to her as soon as possible, 
since she had not understood from Malyugin what the issue 
was.  Brown agreed to provide them to the Russian Mission in 
Geneva as soon as they were ready. 
 
¶17.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER