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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) FIFTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009, P.M. SESSION 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-030. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 29, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. 
               Place:  R.F. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The U.S. and Russian Treaty Text and Definitions 
Working Groups (TTDWG) met at the Russian Mission for the 
fifth meeting.  The group developed agreed text in the "final 
provisions" of the Treaty Articles, including language 
addressing issues such as treaty ratification, duration, 
extension options, withdrawal rights, amendment process, and 
registration under the United Nations Charter. 
 
¶4.  (S) Some decisions on language pertaining to treaty 
extension options and withdrawal rights were deferred to a 
later date.  Each side recognized that agreement on the 
Russian-proposed language explicitly permitting withdrawal in 
event of a buildup in the capabilities of missile defense 
systems could not be reached at this time.  The sides agreed 
that this matter would require resolution at a more senior 
level. 
 
---------------------------- 
START FOLLOW-ON RATIFICATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Each side agreed to refer to the Moscow Treaty by its 
formal name in both the Preamble and the final provisions of 
the new treaty, rather than using the "hereinafter referred 
to as" phrase in the Preamble.  The Russian delegation made 
clear its discomfort with the U.S. term "Moscow Treaty" while 
the U.S. delegation had the same feeling about the Russian 
abbreviation "SORT."  The agreed text in the Preamble was 
updated to be consistent with this decision. 
 
¶6.  (S) The two sides agreed on the following language based 
on the U.S.-labeled Article XV regarding the duration of the 
treaty. 
 
Begin text: 
 
This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless 
superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction 
and limitation of strategic offensive arms. 
 
End text. 
 
¶7.  (S) (Begin comment:  During this discussion, and 
throughout this particular working group meeting, the Russian 
side accepted U.S. reasoning that strongly favored precedent. 
 The sides recognized the concepts and wording employed in 
the original START Treaty were preferable.  End comment.) 
 
------------------------------ 
PROVISIONS GOVERNING EXTENSION 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S) Koshelev objected to the U.S.-proposed language 
regarding extension of the new treaty originally requiring a 
meeting between the two sides 1 year prior to the treaty's 
expiration, at which time the Parties would consider 
extension of the treaty.  Koshelev said the decision would be 
reached by its country without holding an actual meeting. 
The Russian side also disagreed with the time requirement in 
the U.S.-proposed text. 
 
¶9.  (S) The sides briefly discussed the appropriate level for 
the decision regarding extension (e.g., Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC), cabinet-level official or head 
of state), and agreed that it was best to leave it 
unspecified to retain maximum flexibility. 
 
¶10.  (S) During the meeting, the U.S. proposed the following 
compromise language to capture each side's position: 
 
Begin text: 
 
No later than 1 year before the expiration of the Treaty, the 
Parties shall jointly consider extending this Treaty for a 
period of no more than 5 years unless it is superseded before 
the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on 
the reduction and limitation of strategic arms. 
 
End text. 
 
¶11.  (S) The Russian side pledged to review and fully 
evaluate the U.S. proposal prior to the next TTDWG meeting. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ROLE OF BCC IN AUTHORIZING LOWER- 
LEVEL CHANGES TO THE TREATY 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) The working group began a discussion regarding the 
amendment process, covered in the U.S.-numbered Treaty 
Article XVI.  The Russian side had proposed language 
permitting involvement of the BCC in the execution of minor 
changes to subordinate treaty documents that "do not affect 
substantive rights and obligations of the Parties under the 
Treaty." 
 
¶13.  (S) Mr. Dean asked the Russian side to more fully 
explain its rationale for this proposal.  In general, the 
United States wanted to understand the Russian argument in 
favor of modifying the new treaty via the BCC rather than by 
using the normal amendment process. 
 
¶14.  (S) Ms. Kotkova responded that the proposal was 
consistent with the manner in which the Joint Compliance and 
Inspection Commission (JCIC) had conducted itself in recent 
years, so the new wording would simply codify existing 
practice.  Each side noted that similar wording to the 
Russian proposal already existed in the original START 
Treaty, but was found at the end of each Protocol.  Kotkova 
further explained that the Russian-proposed Annex was not 
structured to include final provisions, so the language 
covering the role of the BCC in treaty changes was moved up 
into the actual Articles themselves.  Ultimately, the Russian 
 
 
side recognized that the location of this provision depended 
on the final structure of the START Follow-on Treaty, and 
stated that they did not prefer one level of document over 
another. 
 
¶15.  (S) Ambassador Ries pointed out that this topic was more 
suited in a discussion on the overall role of the BCC, and 
proposed that it be revisited when the working group tabled 
the Protocol governing the BCC.  The Russian side concurred. 
 
--------------------- 
WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Ries began discussion on the provision governing 
withdrawal by saying that the U.S. approach drew heavily from 
established precedent in other arms control agreements.  In 
addition, the United States believed it was not necessary to 
specify circumstances under which withdrawal might be 
appropriate.  This could artificially constrain the Parties 
in the future. 
 
¶17.  (S) Koshelev replied that he was familiar with the U.S. 
position.  He stated that a complete agreement on this 
provision of the treaty was impossible at this time due to 
the Russian position on missile defense.  The 
Russian-proposed text specifies that "quantitative and 
qualitative buildup in the capabilities of strategic missile 
defense systems" would be grounds for withdrawal from the 
treaty.  The U.S. side agreed that this issue needed to be 
resolved at a more senior level. 
 
¶18.  (S) The Russian side then presented its rationale for 
using the word "terminate" to describe the withdrawal of one 
Party from the treaty.  Kotkova stated that the word 
"withdrawal" was typical in multilateral agreements, but did 
not make sense for a bilateral agreement since the act of 
withdrawal by one Party would immediately nullify the treaty. 
 She did acknowledge that the original START Treaty uses the 
word "withdrawal." 
 
¶19.  (S) Dean responded that "withdrawal" was a 
well-established term for this provision, that it set a more 
appropriate tone in English than the Russian-proposed 
"terminate," and that, logically speaking, treaty termination 
was a result of one Party's withdrawal.  For all these 
reasons, the United States believed "withdrawal" was the 
appropriate word. 
 
¶20.  (S) The Russian side acknowledged the U.S. position, but 
suggested a deferral of the discussion to allow each side to 
think creatively on the matter.  The U.S. side concurred. 
 
¶21.  (S) Mr. Luchaninov then asked the U.S. side to clarify 
its approach by describing the "extraordinary events" that 
might justify withdrawal from the treaty.  Dean repeated the 
U.S. position that this was well-established and universally 
accepted language from existing international agreements. 
 
¶22.  (S) Luchaninov followed up by asking the U.S. side to 
explain the words "related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty," which the United States had used to qualify the 
"extraordinary events" justifying withdrawal.  Dean replied 
 
 
that the events would have to be related to reductions in 
strategic offensive arms.  Luchaninov asked Dean to name 
examples of such events, and Dean answered that it would not 
be productive to speculate.  He also elaborated on Ries' 
earlier comment, stating that to include such an example in 
the treaty text could have an unintended consequence. 
Specifically, it could prompt future discussion about whether 
a given basis for withdrawal rose to the level of the example 
specified in the treaty.  This could constrain the Parties' 
ability to exercise discretion under this clause. 
 
¶23.  (S) Ries then engaged the Russian side on the timeframe 
for withdrawal.  Ries defended the U.S. case for 6 months, 
stating that the longer advance notice signaled the gravity 
of such a decision, and reflected the fact that the START 
Follow-on Treaty was a complex document with complicated 
procedures.  Koshelev appeared sympathetic to the U.S. 
position, and admitted that he did not know why the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had changed the Russian-proposed 
text to specify 3 months.  He pledged to research the matter 
and readdress the issue during the next meeting. 
 
---------------------------------- 
BCC ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN MEETINGS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (S) Koshelev began a discussion of the Treaty Article 
XIII governing the role of the BCC by saying the sides had 
two differences, neither of which was substantive.  Kotkova 
elaborated by stating that the Russian-proposed text 
specified that the BCC was subject to procedures described in 
subordinate treaty documents.  This was consistent with 
similar phrases in the treaty regarding inspections, 
notifications and the database.  The Russian side pointed out 
that the verbiage here was again unable to be completely 
resolved until the final structure of the new treaty was 
established. 
 
¶25.  (S) Ries acknowledged the Russian position and agreed 
that approval of final text in this area would have to wait 
until the sides finalized treaty structure.  She added that 
the U.S. side felt it important that the Parties "meet within 
the framework of" the BCC rather than "hold sessions."  She 
explained that this broader construction better captured the 
reality of JCIC activities during recent years, which 
included jointly observed demonstrations and exhibitions. 
 
¶26.  (S) The two sides then engaged in a lively discussion of 
recent JCIC activities, with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Taylor 
providing numerous examples of recent JCIC demonstrations 
that were conducted by agreement of the Parties in the JCIC, 
but outside the context of a sit-down session in Geneva.  The 
Russian side recognized the merit of the U.S. position but 
asked to consider the matter further before returning to 
discuss it. 
 
---------------------------- 
ROLE OF BCC WITH RESPECT TO 
NEW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶27.  (S) The meeting concluded with a short discussion on the 
role of the BCC with respect to new strategic offensive arms. 
 
 
 Ries reviewed the U.S.-proposed language on this subject, 
and stated it provided a clear procedure for the BCC to 
follow in this case. 
 
¶28.  (S) Koshelev pointed out that this text was again 
problematic due to the unresolved treaty structure, since it 
referred to the U.S. Notification Protocol rather than an 
Annex.  He believed that a parallel notification (regarding 
newly developed strategic offensive arms) did not exist in 
the Russian-proposed Articles or Annex.  Koshelev further 
opined that discussion of this matter would be more 
appropriate in the meetings of the Elimination-Notification 
Working Group.  Ries agreed. 
 
¶29.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
¶30.  (S) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Amb Ries 
LCDR Brons 
Mr. Connell 
Mr. Dean 
Mr. Dunn 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Taylor 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Col. Kamenskiy 
Mr. Kostuchenko 
Ms. Kotkova 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶31.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER