VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0830/01 2751508
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021508Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9479
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4878
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2063
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1062
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6261

S E C R E T GENEVA 000830 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) THIRD MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2009 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019) 
     ¶B. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151 
        (U.S.-PROPOSED INSPECTION PROTOCOL) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-017. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 25, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 - 6:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The third meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working 
Group (IPWG) was held at the Russian Mission on September 25, 
2009, to continue discussion of the similarities and 
differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches under the 
Inspection Protocol (IP).  The Russian Delegation conveyed 
its vision of the inspection activities presented in the 
Russian-proposed draft of Section V of the Treaty Annex, 
which addresses "Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions" (REF 
A).  The U.S. Delegation provided the Russian Delegation a 
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for Sections I and II of 
the IP, which incorporated appropriate provisions from 
Section V of the Russian-proposed Treaty Annex.  Several 
similarities between the draft versions were identified and 
discussed, with a few agreements reached where the two 
Party's texts had originally differed.  Both sides agreed to 
study the two proposals, as well as the U.S.-proposed merged 
JDT, to determine whether additional text could be agreed and 
whether some details could be relocated elsewhere, such as 
into a "third level" document below the level of the 
U.S.-proposed IP and the Russian-proposed Annex. 
 
------------------- 
COMPARING U.S. AND 
RUSSIAN DRAFT TEXTS 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting by stating that the 
purpose of the day's meeting was to work through the first 
two sections of the Russian-proposed Section V of the Treaty 
Annex that discusses "Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions" 
and the U.S.-proposed IP, both of which address "General 
Obligations" and "Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of 
Inspectors, (Monitors for the United States), and Aircrew 
Members."  Ilin referred to a Russian side-by-side comparison 
document that analyzed and compared the proposed Russian text 
with the U.S.-proposed text.  This document had been sent to 
the U.S. Mission the previous day, and handouts were given to 
the U.S. delegates at this meeting. 
 
¶5.  (S) Dr. Warner provided a U.S. informal JDT, both in 
English and in an un-official Russian translation that merged 
the first two sections of the U.S.- and Russian-proposed 
drafts.  In addition to the differences between the sides 
being reflected in footnoted brackets, the U.S. JDT was 
color-coded with plain text reflecting original U.S.-proposed 
text, magenta indicating agreed text, green for 
 
 
Russian-proposed text, and yellow for text that the U.S. 
proposed and believed was important to keep, but could be 
moved into a "third level" document, which the U.S. proposed 
to call an "annex."  The U.S. idea was to have a similar 
structure as exists under START, where the concepts in the 
treaty text drove what was in the IP which, in turn, drove 
what was in the various annexes to the IP. 
 
¶6.  (S) Warner handed over to the Russian Delegation the 
U.S.-proposed JDT in two additional documents; one with the 
yellow text removed from the overall joint draft document, 
and the second representing the "third level"/annex document 
that was created by pulling together the "yellow" text that 
had been removed from the JDT.  Warner explained that, in 
creating the JDT, the United States believed it was important 
to work from the U.S.-proposed draft text rather than the 
Russian draft, because the U.S. version included a 
substantial amount of text that was missing from the Russian 
version. 
 
¶7.  (S) Ilin thanked Warner for the documents, which 
increased the visibility of each side's approach through the 
highlighted text.  Ilin commented that, by looking at the 
JDT, he could see that the U.S. Delegation kept pushing for a 
more extensive document, but promised that the Russian 
Delegation would study the JDT to see if it was acceptable. 
He noted that the day's work would be easier for the U.S. 
Delegation than it would be for the Russian Delegation, since 
the U.S. had been handed the Russian document the previous 
day and the Russian Delegation had just received the U.S. 
documents. 
 
¶8.  (S) Warner pointed out that, in Section I of both texts 
concerning General Obligations, the United States and Russia 
agreed on everything except the inclusion of continuous 
monitoring in START Follow-on (SFO).  Warner then proposed to 
move forward to Section II leaving the reference to 
continuous monitoring as bracketed U.S.-proposed text until a 
decision was made at higher levels regarding resolution of 
the issue on continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production 
within SFO. 
 
------------------------ 
A QUESTION OF CONCEPTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) Ilin stated that the Russian proposal for the new 
treaty was one that only has two levels; the Treaty Articles 
and an Annex, and asked whether it was the intent of the 
United States to have all three levels, treaty articles, 
protocols, and annexes, all subject to national ratification. 
 Mr. Brown stated that, in START, documents at all three 
levels were concluded prior to the end of negotiations and 
all were submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification.  He 
noted as well that some annexes--third level documents--were 
added later by agreement between the sides, which was reached 
through negotiations within the Joint Compliance and 
Implementation Commission (JCIC) and, thus, these additional 
annexes were not ratified by either side.  In fact, portions 
of both the second/protocol and third/annex levels were 
changed by subsequent agreements concluded within the JCIC 
during the course of START implementation well after 
ratification by both sides. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Warner noted that the U.S. position was to take 
advantage of the agreed procedural details regarding 
inspections that were already contained in START's IP and 
various IP Annexes.  These procedures have been used in 
practice over the past 15 years of successful START 
implementation, and the United States did not want to discard 
that experience by renegotiating these procedures from 
scratch via the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) as 
called for in the Russian draft IP.  Ilin countered that the 
Russian side believed new processes should be developed and 
that was why the Russians proposed deferring the negotiation 
of specific inspection procedures to the BCC after 
ratification was complete.  In the Russian vision, the BCC 
would certainly take into account the insights gained from 
inspections from the START experience. 
 
¶11.  (S) Warner reiterated his concern that he did not 
believe the U.S. Senate would ratify a treaty that provided 
for inspections without actually describing critical 
inspection procedures in documents subject to ratification. 
Warner also added that if the procedures had been worked out 
and agreed to in the past, why would the Russians want to 
back away from them now?  Since these procedures had worked 
well or been adapted via the JCIC, the United States wanted 
to maintain them. 
 
---------------------- 
A QUESTION OF LEGALITY 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Ilin asked whether an annex, or third level 
document, could be a non-legally-binding document.  Warner 
answered that he believed that was not possible, but it would 
require further study.  Brown asked Ilin whether he meant 
that this material would not be a part of the treaty or 
whether it might only represent a political commitment.  Ilin 
said he could not answer such a legal question, but his 
personal view was that, in START, procedural decisions were 
made in the JCIC, so such decisions also could be made under 
SFO by the comparable BCC. 
 
¶13.  (S) Warner again reiterated that, in his view, the U.S. 
President could not present a treaty to the Senate for 
ratification that did not contain the key details of the 
verification procedures needed to verify compliance with that 
treaty.  Ilin countered that the Russian Delegation's 
direction from Moscow was not to create a new treaty that was 
a copy of START in either size or content.  Warner then 
proposed to agree on the fact that the new treaty would have 
a third level document where the more detailed processes 
could be moved and, by doing so, the sides could jointly 
draft a new, stream-lined IP that would be closer to the size 
of the proposed Russian draft of the IP contained in Section 
V of its Annex. 
 
------------------------- 
CALL 'EM LIKE YOU SEE 'EM 
------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Warner moved the discussion to the actual names for 
the various types of inspections, pointing out that both 
sides had agreed to exhibitions.  He reiterated the U.S. 
 
 
desire not to use the word "visit" in the new treaty.  The 
word "visit" implied a less rigorous activity and would be 
perceived negatively in the United States.  Contrary to the 
Russian approach that characterizes inspections as tougher, 
more "strict," and rigorous than "visits," which are 
inspection activities focused on non-deployed strategic 
offensive arms,  Warner asserted that, in the U.S. view, both 
what the Russians label as "inspections" and "visits" should 
have the same degree of rigor, accuracy in confirming 
declared data and importance. 
 
¶15.  (S) Ilin suggested the possibility of changing the name 
of "visit" to "inspection-visit"; a term proposed by Colonel 
Ryzhkov.  That would raise its status; it had a verification 
purpose of confirming the data contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding, but it would continue to be different than an 
inspection.  Warner stressed the U.S. preference not to use 
the term "visit" and noted that describing certain inspection 
activities as "softer" or less strict than others did not 
appear supportable.  He stated that this misunderstanding 
could be a matter of translation, but the United States 
wanted to have the names of the inspections reflect the 
actual type of inspection being undertaken.  For example, for 
inspections focused on confirming data regarding deployed 
Strategic Offensive Arms (SOAs), a proposed name could be a 
"Deployed SOA and Warhead Inspection," which would include 
inspections of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, 
deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed 
heavy bombers as well as the warheads/armaments deployed on 
these systems.  The term "visit" could be changed to 
"Non-Deployed SOA Inspection-Visits".  The non-deployed 
inspection-visits would not involve inspection activity that 
was any less rigorous than that involved in an inspection of 
the deployed SOA. 
 
¶16.  (S) Ilin asked whether these new terms would be added to 
the definitions section.  Warner replied they would.  Ilin 
asked whether a "Deployed SOA and Warhead Inspection" would 
include delivery vehicles, warheads, missiles, and bombers. 
Warner replied they would, but the details could be worked 
out later.  Ilin explained that it was important that 
agreement was reached that identified which inspection 
activities were to be focused on deployed SOA and which were 
focused on non-deployed systems.  Warner stated that was the 
whole reason for suggesting the more detailed names for the 
inspections and visits.  Ilin said that the Russians would 
discuss this among themselves and get back to the U.S. 
Delegation. 
 
--------------------------- 
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. proposal included the 
possible use of commercial aircraft and Open Skies aircraft 
with regard to the types of aircraft that the inspecting 
Party could use for transportation of inspection teams to the 
point of entry (POE).  Warner stated that the use of 
commercial aircraft was acceptable and the U.S. Delegation 
would add it to Section II, but that the U.S. side would have 
to study the possible use of Open Skies aircraft for this 
purpose and then get back to the Russians on this matter. 
For the time being, use of Open Skies aircraft to transport 
 
 
inspection teams would be included in the text, but bracketed 
as a Russian proposal.  Warner asked Ilin where he believed 
the identification of aircraft used for this purpose should 
be located, and Ilin responded within the text of the second 
level material, that is the protocol/Russian Section V. 
 
¶18.  (S) Warner asked the Russian side why it had decreased 
the maximum number of inspectors on the inspector list from 
400 to 200.  Ilin stated that, since the number of 
inspections conducted annually had been reduced substantially 
in the proposed Russian draft IP, they had lowered the 
proposed number of inspectors on the list accordingly.  Ilin 
asked why the United States had not lowered the number of 
inspectors on the list at all.  Warner responded that the 
U.S. side proposed to lower the annual quota for certain 
types of inspections but had raised others, consequently, it 
has maintained about the same number of annual inspections 
and, therefore, saw no reason to lower the number of 
inspectors on the inspector list.  Ilin countered that the 
number of Russian inspectable facilities had dropped since 
START negotiations, so why not lower the number of inspectors 
on the treaty list for SFO?  Warner said the United States 
would consider that point, but noted that the number of 
inspections was not directly related to the number of 
inspectors on the list and the United States wanted to 
maintain flexibility with regard to the inspector list. 
 
¶19.  (S) Ilin added that the number of inspectors on the list 
was also a matter of cost to the Russians.  Russia could not 
afford to keep large numbers of inspectors who would be idle 
most of the time.  Russia also did not understand why the 
United States wanted to update the list of inspectors every 
21 days as opposed to the Russian proposal to revise the list 
once every three months.  It would mean that the inspector 
pool would turn over completely twice a year.  Warner stated 
that once again the United States wanted to maintain 
flexibility in the list and preferred the 21-day update 
approach. 
 
-------------------------- 
FINDING SOME COMMON GROUND 
-------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (S) During the discussion of the IP text, both sides 
agreed that the number of individuals on the aircrew list 
would be determined at the discretion of each Party, and that 
the number of aircrew allowed on an inspection airplane 
during each inspection would not exceed ten.  Additionally, 
Warner asked about the provisions for inspector visas, which 
the Russians had not addressed.  Ilin explained that this 
matter was covered in the Russian-proposed Section on 
Notifications contained in Section IV of the Annex, but that 
it could be moved back into Section V on Inspections, if the 
U.S. side desired this shift. 
 
¶21.  (S) Warner pointed out that, under START, a proposed 
inspector for the treaty list could be rejected by the other 
side only for his having committed a criminal act, but for 
aircrew and monitors, individuals could be rejected without 
any reason being identified.  Under the Russian proposal, the 
START reason for rejection due to criminal activity had been 
dropped for inspectors, making the rejection of both 
inspectors and aircrew totally subjective.  Warner questioned 
 
 
the Russians' reason for this change.  Ilin commented that it 
often happened that Russians were refused a U.S. visa for no 
reason.  He later backtracked that he had no specific 
complaint, but Russia was simply protecting its own 
interests.  There was no reason to accord someone a special 
status before that person had even become an inspector.  He 
concluded by agreeing to move these details to the third 
level document, and stating that the Russian legal advisor 
would explain Russia's rationale during a subsequent session 
of the IPWG. 
 
¶22.  (S) Following a brief discussion among the U.S. 
Delegation, Warner suggested to Ilin that Russia's proposed 
reduction in the number of inspectors for an exhibition from 
20 to 10 was acceptable to the United States.  Warner pointed 
out that the Russians had dropped the number of inspectors on 
an inspection team from 10 to 9 for an inspection and from 10 
to 7 for a visit.  It was the U.S. view that the level of 
effort during an inspection and during a visit  would be 
roughly the same as we had experienced under START, and it 
was better to have an even number of inspectors to simplify 
the process of setting up subgroups that could be used to 
simultaneously inspect large facilities.  Ilin replied that, 
since the number of inspectable sites was going to go down 
under SFO, the number of inspectors per team could drop as 
well.  Warner countered that the logic did not follow and 
reiterated that the level of effort at each inspection site 
was not likely to be reduced from what it was under START. 
Ryzhkov added that the Russian site diagrams would be 
shrinking and, therefore, the number of inspectors needed to 
conduct an inspection should also drop.  Warner stated that 
the United States would not agree to redrawing boundaries on 
a site diagram to create a smaller inspection site simply to 
meet the reduced capabilities of smaller inspection teams. 
 
¶23.  (S) Warner suggested that both sides agree to ten 
inspectors for inspections of both deployed and non-deployed 
items.  Ilin suggested that, for the time being, the sides 
agree to disagree on the number of inspectors per inspection 
and visit team.  Ilin closed by suggesting that the United 
States review the Russian Notification portion of the Annex, 
Section IV, to see if anything else should be brought back 
into Subsection II of the Inspections Section. 
 
¶24.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- Proposed merged Draft of Inspection Protocol Sections 
I and II. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian side-by-side analysis of proposed Russian 
Draft of Annex Section V and the corresponding U.S. draft 
sections. 
 
¶25.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Bosco 
 
 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Fortier 
Maj Johnson 
Mrs. Pura 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ilin 
Mr. Leontiev 
Col Novikov 
Gen Orlov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Gen Poznihir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Mr. Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶26.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS