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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND 
NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUPS, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 99070 AND 99072 
     ¶B. GENEVA 0812 (SFO-GVA-V-008) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-014. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 25, 2009 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The second meeting of the Conversion or Elimination 
(CorE) and Notifications Working Groups was held at the 
Russian Mission on September 25, 2009.  The U.S. side 
explained the U.S. approach used to draft the U.S.-proposed 
Elimination Protocol, and explained the document's key 
elements (REF A).  The Russian Head of Delegation, Ambassador 
Antonov, attended the meeting as an observer. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. side indicated that there appeared to be 
agreement on the principles that each side should have the 
right to decide which procedure(s) would be used to eliminate 
specific treaty accountable items, that costs should be 
reduced and flexibility maintained in its text and that this 
corresponded with Russia's concerns. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation sought clarification on why 
the United States had removed the term "conversion" from the 
protocol.  The Russians also complained about the appearance 
of inequality in the U.S. draft, because it left procedures 
for elimination of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, as in 
START, but proposed new procedures for other items. 
 
¶6.  (S) The Russian Delegation proposed a new concept that 
would provide for visits to, and notification of movement of 
heavy bombers (HBs) equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
However, the non-nuclear HBs would not be subject to the 
central limits of the treaty.  The U.S. Delegation said that, 
under the U.S. proposal, such HBs would no longer be 
accountable and should not be subject to the treaty. 
 
------------------------- 
U.S. CONCEPTS AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF ELIMINATION 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Elliott opened the Elimination WG meeting and 
delivered the following points on the key concept and 
elements behind the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol. 
 
Begin points: 
 
     - In the U.S. view, elimination is the process of 
removing an accountable item from accountability by rendering 
it incapable of use for its original purpose.  For example, 
rendering a SLBM launcher incapable of launching a ballistic 
missile. 
 
 
     - However, the U.S. side also believes it is entirely 
consistent with this concept that some items may be used for 
other purposes not inconsistent with the treaty.  For 
example, altering an SLBM launcher for another use, so it is 
no longer capable of launching a ballistic missile, but is 
usable for another purpose, as we have done with the former 
Trident I system.  We seek this flexibility due to the 
enormous cost of building new systems. 
 
     - We appreciate that this process must meet two 
fundamental criteria:  1) the eliminated item must not be 
usable for its original purpose; and 2) it must be visible to 
the other party.  We differ with the Russian side in one 
aspect here, that in order to meet this latter requirement, 
national technical means (NTM) of verification may not always 
be suitable to confirm the change.  We believe this will 
become apparent when the possessing side selects its 
procedure for elimination. 
 
     - Importantly, we agree in principle with the Russian 
view that each side should decide for itself the procedures 
to be used. 
 
     - However, we have proposed an approach that includes 
examples; choices from which one might pick.  Our view is 
that if some of the procedures contained in START are useful 
we can include them, but not require them.  I would also like 
to clarify a point on non-nuclear warheads on ballistic 
missiles.  We are well aware of the Russian view on this 
matter.  My question earlier this week was not intended to 
speak of this matter, but rather it was intended to address 
the issue of altering SLBM launchers to another use--not 
inconsistent with this treaty.  We will leave the matter of 
non-nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles to our respective 
political leaders. 
 
     - Now, turning to our detailed explanation of this 
protocol, I would like to reiterate that the U.S. proposal 
for the Elimination Protocol draws on previous language from 
the START Treaty, while also offering new, more 
cost-effective options. 
 
     - I want to emphasize a point made by Colonel Ryzhkov 
earlier this week.  We want to remove the rigid structure 
that can lead to difficulty in carrying out the obligations 
of this treaty, while preserving a sense of predictability 
for both sides.  START's Conversion or Elimination Protocol 
has served as a solid foundation to remove items from each 
Party's force structure and fulfill the fundamental 
obligation of reducing strategic offensive arms.  Using 
similar language and procedures from the START Protocol, 
adapted and simplified, where possible, we hope to reinforce 
the U.S.-Russian relationship based on shared knowledge, 
understanding and expectations. 
 
     - I understand that the Russian approach is based on 
concepts drawn from the Moscow Treaty, capitalizing on the 
new relationship between the United States and Russia and the 
need for simplified, less costly measures.  It is prudent 
that we, collectively, work to find an appropriate balance 
between the U.S. approach with our need for verification and 
the Russian approach with your need for less specific 
procedures. 
 
 
 
     - After studying the Russian-proposed Procedures for 
Conversion or Elimination, it is clear there are areas where 
we agree and areas where we need further clarification.  I 
want to focus initially on the areas where the U.S. and 
Russian approaches agree. 
 
     - We note that your treaty Article VII provides language 
specifying conversion or elimination procedures that ensure 
that strategic offensive arms are rendered inoperable, 
precluding their use for their original purpose.  The U.S. 
agrees with this approach.  The key point is that the U.S. 
and Russia need to agree on the procedures to get to that 
state.  Once an SOA is rendered inoperable, we believe there 
is no reason for it to be subject to the limitations of the 
treaty. 
 
     - Russia proposes that verification of elimination or 
conversion procedures shall be carried out by national 
technical means, notifications and visits.  The U.S. agrees 
that notifications are an important part of the verification 
and transparency measures.  However, the concept of NTM 
supplemented by undefined visits requires further 
clarification. 
 
     - Elimination procedures for silo launchers of ICBMs, 
mobile launchers of ICBMs, submarines undergoing SLBM 
launcher elimination, and heavy bombers shall remain visible 
to NTM.  The United States agrees with this approach, but 
also notes that NTM only brings a certain level of 
confidence.  Inspections coupled with NTM will raise the 
confidence that the procedures have been completed. 
 
     - Additionally, it appears there is some inconsistency 
with what is written in the U.S. Protocol and the Russian 
Annex and our respective Treaty Article VIIs.  This will 
require our attention to ensure the texts align in meaning 
and intent. 
 
     - The issue of the requirement for specificity in 
conversion or elimination procedures bears comment.  I am 
sure you have noticed we did not change procedures for 
eliminating mobile ballistic missile systems.  Our view is 
that because we do not possess such systems, we will seek the 
Russian view of procedures that might be less difficult and 
costly, but that will meet the fundamental criteria specified 
by the treaty. 
 
     - Colonel Ryzhkov, you stated in our first meeting that 
very specific conversion or elimination procedures with many 
people involved leads to a confrontational environment.  You 
brought up examples,such as the issues with SS-25, SS-24 and 
Peacekeeper eliminations. 
 
     - The U.S. position is that specific procedures to some 
extent can also have quite the opposite effect.  Specific 
procedures provide predictability, a clear understanding of 
the procedures, a certain way for confirmation and an 
appropriate level of transparency for verification.  However, 
the United States agrees with Russia that START contained 
procedures that were cumbersome and costly and in this new 
treaty the United States and Russia can develop procedures 
that are more efficient and less costly. 
 
 
 
     - Moreover, Russia asserts that all conversion or 
elimination can be verified through national technical means 
of verification.  To aid national technical means of 
verification for SLBM launchers and heavy bombers, Russia 
proposes to have submarine launch tube hatches removed or 
destroyed and for heavy bombers to have basic design elements 
removed or destroyed. 
 
     - Additionally, for conversion of SLBM launchers, Russia 
proposes another precondition in that they have external or 
functional differences.  This speaks to the need to verify 
that changes have been made and is consistent with the U.S. 
belief that national technical means will not be sufficient 
in all cases. 
 
     - Since our last session in the beginning of September, 
the United States has amended its views on conversion or 
elimination.  The U.S. proposes to retain the concept of 
elimination in the treaty and as such we have proposed an 
Elimination Protocol. 
 
     - The United States believes that "elimination" is the 
process by which a Party alters an accountable item to make 
it incapable of being employed for nuclear armaments; i.e., 
its original purpose.  Thereafter, it is no longer subject to 
the limitations of the treaty--both the numerical limits and 
the broader treaty limits. 
 
     - Under START, conversion procedures were applied 
primarily to heavy bombers and then only as a mechanism to 
re-categorize them as a heavy bomber of another category. 
There was no provision for a procedure to remove a heavy 
bomber from being subject to START's limitations while 
maintaining the possibility of its use for purposes not 
limited by the treaty. 
 
     - The United States proposes that the concept of 
"elimination" apply to a procedure to physically alter an 
item and the act of removing that item from accountability 
under the treaty.  An SOA is either destroyed or is altered 
in such a way that it no longer can be used for its original 
purpose.  In both cases, the SOA is eliminated for treaty 
purposes. 
 
     - Thus, the U.S. recognizes that methods short of 
physical destruction are equally advantageous to each Party, 
1) as a means of removing an item from accountability under 
the Treaty, 2) to retain use of the item for purposes not 
inconsistent with the Treaty, and 3) to save costs. 
 
     - In this connection, the United States proposes a range 
of procedures to eliminate an item, any of which may be used 
by a Party for elimination. 
 
     - Additionally, the United States acknowledges that in 
the future a Party may develop a different procedure that was 
previously not considered during negotiations that may 
leverage advanced technologies or save time and money.  In 
this instance, the United States proposes an option to use 
these procedures provided there is a sufficient level of 
transparency during the process. 
 
 
     - You will note that in several cases the United States 
proposes a pre-elimination demonstration.  This demonstration 
would be an opportunity to provide, in advance, details of 
the elimination procedures. 
 
     - With this demonstration, the United States intends to 
create additional transparency and an opportunity for Russia 
to ask questions for U.S. consideration. 
 
     - For instance, the recent Minuteman III RVOSI One-Time 
Demonstration could be used as a model for success and 
cooperation, understanding and awareness. 
 
End points. 
 
¶8.  (S) Ryzhkov asked Elliott to confirm that the United 
States proposed to drop the term "conversion" from the new 
text.  Elliott responded in the affirmative and stated that 
the United States planned to only eliminate and not convert 
treaty accountable items.  Ryzhkov indicated his 
understanding and asked Elliott to continue with the 
section-by-section description of the U.S.-proposed 
Elimination Protocol (REF A). 
 
Begin points: 
 
     - Section I covers the Procedures for Elimination of 
ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Launch 
Canisters.  Since the beginning of our talks on the START 
Follow-on Treaty, the United States has been clear about its 
view that the unique challenges associated with mobile 
missiles make it necessary to retain, in the new treaty, 
specific provisions for their elimination.  The United States 
would encourage Russia to propose specific procedures to 
simplify mobile ICBM and launcher elimination.  Again there 
needs to be a balance that will assuage U.S. concerns 
regarding their elimination and Russia's need for simpler and 
less costly procedures.  However, the United States does 
propose the following changes. In Paragraph 1 we propose 
removing phased elimination (tied to SS-24s in Ukraine).  In 
Paragraph 3 we changed wording to allow inspection at any 
time during elimination versus inspection of the entire 
process.  In Paragraph 4(b) we removed wash-out and drilling 
procedures (tied to SS-24s in Ukraine). 
 
     - Section II covers the Procedures for Elimination of 
Silo Launchers of ICBMs.  Overall, we removed references to 
silo training and silo test launchers.  Under the U.S. 
concept, such launchers will not count as deployed launchers, 
so there is no need to subject them to treaty elimination 
procedures.  In Paragraph 5 we added alternative procedures 
for silo elimination.  In Paragraphs 7 to 10 the United 
States added inspection provisions.  I would emphasize that 
items 7-10 include NTM for verification.  Section III covers 
Procedures for Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, 
Mobile Training Launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile 
ICBMs.  Overall we removed specific references to road mobile 
and rail mobile launchers. 
 
      - Our approach was to capture basic START procedures 
and add to them.  Section IV, Procedures for Elimination of 
SLBM Launchers, has been modified.  In Paragraph 7 covering 
newly proposed procedures, before the first elimination of an 
 
 
SLBM launcher of each type, the possessing Party shall also 
exhibit an unmodified SLBM launcher of that type.  In 
Paragraph 8 covering additional newly proposed procedures, 
eliminated launchers shall be subject to inspection within a 
20-day period beginning on the date of notification of 
elimination. 
 
     - In Section V we deleted the procedures for soft-site 
launcher elimination.  The U.S. approach would not subject 
soft-site launchers to the treaty. 
 
     - In Section VII (Renumbered to Section V), the 
procedures for the Elimination of Heavy Bombers have been 
modified.  We removed references to former heavy bombers. 
Our proposed treaty removes the concept of former heavy 
bombers.  We removed specific procedures for ALCM-equipped 
heavy bombers. In paragraph 2, we removed pre-elimination 
inspections.  Inspection would be allowed within a 20-day 
window following completion of the elimination process.  In 
Paragraph 4 we added alternative procedures for heavy bomber 
elimination.  In Paragraph 6, for newly-proposed procedures, 
before the first elimination of a heavy bomber of each type, 
the possessing Party shall also exhibit an unmodified heavy 
bomber of that type.  Our objective is to create clarity in 
the process, not to create difficult or cumbersome procedures. 
 
     - Section VII (Renumbered to Section VI) covers the 
procedures for Removal from Accountability of ICBMs for 
Mobile Launchers of ICBMs as a Result of Flight Tests or 
Static Testing.  We removed references to the first stage 
rule which is tied to Peacekeeper and which is no longer an 
existing type. 
 
     - Section VIII (Renumbered to Section VII) covers other 
Procedures for Removal from or Changes in Accountability.  We 
removed references to silo training launchers, silo test 
launchers, soft-site launchers, and former heavy bombers.  In 
paragraph 6 we removed the requirement to eliminate an item 
in accordance with elimination procedures when removed from 
static display (i.e., it is eliminated when it is placed on 
static display).  Russia seems to have a similar view about 
static displays. 
 
      - In Section IX, renumbered to Section VIII, we cover 
the procedures for Elimination of Facilities.  In Paragraph 1 
we deleted the right to inspect completion of elimination of 
facilities.  Paragraph two includes a description of "support 
equipment" from the START Supplemental Documents. 
 
      - If and when we agree on the concept, the United 
States will propose a relevant definition that elimination 
includes removing an accountable item from accountability by 
physical alteration, short of physical destruction, of the 
accountable item such that it can no longer be used for its 
original purpose.  Let me make clear, this is not the entire 
definition.  We propose to add this to the definition of 
elimination, which also involves destruction. 
 
End points. 
 
¶9.  (S) Elliott again reiterated the U.S. concept of 
elimination after the Russian side asked a second time to 
clarify.  Ryzhkov proposed a short break so that his side 
 
 
could prepare additional questions. 
 
------------------------------- 
WHEAT IN SILOS AND ROAD-MOBILES 
TO RECREATIONAL VEHICLES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that the U.S. proposal not only 
changed procedures, but also fundamentally changed the 
overall concept of elimination.  He took particular issue 
with the statement that items could be eliminated but be 
utilized for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. 
Using this logic, Ryzhkov jokingly asked whether Russia could 
store wheat in its eliminated silos rather than destroying 
them by explosion.  Elliott responded that the U.S. proposal 
provided a selection of elimination options, but that some 
eliminated items would not have any other useful purpose.  As 
long as the new use was not inconsistent with the treaty then 
it would be possible, although not very practical. 
 
¶11.  (S) When asked by Smirnov about how Russian mobile 
launchers could be eliminated under the new U.S. concept, 
Elliott responded that while the launcher/erector mechanism 
had to be altered, the chassis of the vehicle could be used 
for another purpose.  Ryzhkov then asked whether their 
Iskander SS-26 missile (Begin comment:  The Iskander is short 
range ballistic missile, not an ICBM.  End comment.) would be 
allowed to be deployed on an eliminated mobile launcher 
platform's chassis.  Elliott responded that he would have to 
take this issue back to U.S. technical experts, but that on 
its face, it sounded reasonable if it was not inconsistent 
with the treaty. 
 
--------------------------- 
SUBMARINES ARE MORE 
DANGEROUS THAN ROAD-MOBILES 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Ryzhkov brought up the issue of conversion of U.S. 
SSBNs and opined that SSBNs were more dangerous than Russia's 
road-mobile launchers.  A mobile launcher carried only one 
missile and traveled only within an area in Russia, while 
SSBNs carried a group of missiles and moved throughout the 
world's oceans.  He asked Elliott to explain why the 
elimination procedures for Russian mobile launchers were more 
stringent than the procedures for SSBNs.  Elliott responded 
that the simple answer was that the platforms were different 
and that nothing was unequal--both sides would have to show 
that its choice of elimination procedure fulfilled the new 
treaty's requirements. 
 
¶13.  (S) Adm Kuznetsov stated that the United States had 
created a new category of Strategic Offensive Arm (SOA).  The 
Russians did not create any new categories in its proposal. 
Both sides were subject to the same procedures, and he felt 
the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol focused on the Russian 
systems and not the U.S. systems. 
 
¶14.  (S) Elliott responded that the United States was open to 
suggestions from the Russian side on elimination procedures 
for mobile missile launchers.  He noted, however, that when 
new procedures were proposed, for example, elimination of 
U.S. SLBM launchers, a demonstration would have to take place 
 
 
so the other side could understand the scope of the proposed 
elimination procedure.  Elliott offered that Russia could do 
this for their mobile ICBMs and launchers. 
 
---------------------- 
YOU HAVE YOUR PROCESS, 
WE HAVE OURS 
---------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Ryzhkov turned to the elimination of ICBMS, 
specifically how the Russian process of burning missile 
propellant differed from the U.S. procedure of washing-out 
the missile's propellant.  Since burning made the stages 
unusable, it was excessive to require further cutting.  He 
opined that there were easier procedures, such as drilling 
holes in the sides of ICBMs, and that the current inspection 
procedures related to missile elimination were excessive and 
costly.  Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether Russia could propose 
procedures with more specificity, perhaps in a short paper, 
the United States would consider them, as long as the 
procedures rendered the item unusable for its original 
purpose and that it was verifiable by the other Party. 
Elliott made the point that burning rocket propellant might 
be verifiable by NTM but that drilling holes in the sides of 
ICBMs was not. 
 
---------------------------- 
ELIMINATION OF HEAVY 
BOMBERS AND CONTINUED VISITS 
--------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Col Zaitsev brought up the issue of eliminating 
heavy bombers.  He said that it would not be difficult to 
restore a nuclear armaments capability to an HB that had been 
eliminated using U.S. logic.  He said if the new U.S. 
Administration was exploring a more rigorous verification 
process, this seemed to be counter to that. 
 
¶17.  (S) Elliott responded by using the U.S. B-1 heavy bomber 
as an example of a heavy bomber that was converted, under 
START, from nuclear capable to non-nuclear capable.  He noted 
further that the Russian side was well aware that the B-1 has 
not been used in a nuclear role since the early 1990s.  He 
agreed that, if given enough time and money, anything is 
reversible.  Elliott clarified the fact that the 
U.S.-proposed text did not use the term "irreversible", 
because it was an impossible concept to verify.  Elliott 
concluded that both sides needed to get past the thinking 
that all actions are meant to circumvent the treaty. 
 
¶18.  (S) Ryzhkov reminded the group that the new treaty was a 
bilateral undertaking and that both sides would be held to 
the same standards.  He submitted that, in the new treaty, 
excessive and costly procedures should be eliminated all the 
while ensuring the verifiability of the limits. 
 
¶19.  (S) Colonel Ilin added that there were some common 
threads between the Elimination WG and the Inspection 
Protocol (IPWG).  The new elimination concept presented by 
the United States was important and further study by the 
Russian side was required. 
 
¶20.  (S) Ryzhkov informed the group that the Russian side had 
 
 
completed its previous homework assignment on heavy bomber 
eliminations and Colonel Novikov would present the Russian 
views.  Novikov provided the following comments. 
 
Begin Novikov comments: 
 
     - In Russia's view, both nuclear and non-nuclear heavy 
bombers must be considered to be strategic heavy bombers 
 
     - Nuclear capable heavy bombers should be stationed 
separately from non-nuclear capable heavy bombers.  Nuclear 
weapons should be not be stored at the same air base where 
non-nuclear heavy bombers are based. 
 
     - Even though non-nuclear capable heavy bombers would 
not be accountable under the central limits of the treaty for 
deployed heavy bombers, notifications on the location(s) and 
numbers of the heavy bombers should be recorded in the 
baseline MOU and its six-month updates. 
 
     - Photos and technical data should be exchanged, as 
these are tools inspectors use to confirm. 
 
     - Russia proposed visits to the non-nuclear capable 
heavy bombers to confirm the MOU data received. 
 
     - During these visits, the inspecting party would have 
the right to confirm that nuclear arms do not exist on the 
heavy bombers, the base(s) itself, and in their weapons 
storage areas. 
 
     - This approach corresponds to the U.S. provided 
approach. 
 
End Novikov comments. 
 
¶21.  (S) Elliott asked whether visits to bases for 
non-nuclear heavy bombers would continue through the life of 
the treaty, to which Novikov responded that the visits would 
be conducted for the duration of the treaty.  Russia's 
current proposed text would allow five visits per year. 
Elliott asked whether the reason for this new proposal was a 
confidence-building measure, since these procedures were not 
conducted under START.  Ryzhkov replied that Elliott was 
correct and that the visits would be conducted to confirm 
that the non-nuclear heavy bombers had not been re-converted 
and that nuclear armaments were not being stored in the 
weapons storage area.  Ryzhkov and Elliott both agreed that 
there were currently inconsistencies with language concerning 
visits and inspections in the respective protocols and 
annexes being discussed.  Elliott stated that he felt the 
issues would become clearer as we moved through the process. 
 
----------------------------- 
A FINAL NOTE ON NOTIFICATIONS 
BEFORE CONCLUDING 
----------------------------- 
 
¶22.  (S) Concerning notifications, Siemon stated that he had 
reviewed an initial English translation of the Russian 
proposal on notifications and that he had seen both 
similarities and differences in his initial reading.  In some 
instances, the similarities were striking.  Siemon's view was 
 
 
to start with the similarities and work from there.  Ryzhkov 
suggested that, at the right time, the notifications working 
group should break off from the elimination group.  Siemon 
agreed that this made sense, but that it would come much 
later in the process. 
 
¶23.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶24.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Siemon 
LCDR Brons 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Dwyer 
Dr. Fraley 
Mr. Hanchett 
Lt Col Leyde 
Mr. McConnell 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Strauss 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Amb Antonov 
Col Ilin 
Mr. Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Col Zaitsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶25.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS