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DE RUEHGV #0822/01 2741731
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P 011731Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9446
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6232
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0700
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3145
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 
TAGS: GG PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: SOME POSITIVE TALK, 
LITTLE TO SHOW 
 
Classified By: Peter Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  At the seventh round of Geneva discussions 
on Georgia on September 17, all sides were fairly 
constructive at the outset, with everyone agreeing that the 
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) were 
working better than they had been initially.  Discussions on 
the main topic, a non-use-of-force agreement (NUF), became 
bogged down in political posturing and semantics, however, 
and little concrete progress was made.  Georgian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Bokeria started out with a more 
confrontational opening statement than usual, questioning the 
success of the Geneva talks in general, but showed 
flexibility and practicality as the day progressed.  Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin was relatively quiet, but 
laid down a firm marker on the need for an NUF to be signed 
between Georgia on the one hand and the de factos on the 
other.  EU Special Representative Morel worked hard to find 
areas of agreement, at times stretching to exaggerate the 
productivity of the session.  South Ossetian "presidential" 
representative Chochiev was on better-than-average behavior, 
generally avoiding emotional language and tirades, though he 
showed a bit of the old obstinacy on the IPRM issue.  There 
was no explicit mention of the Afghanistan battalion 
training in the sessions, but Chochiev made vague remarks 
about Georgia preparing for renewed aggression, and Karasin 
linked the training to the alleged "rearmament of Georgia" 
during his press remarks.  Parties agreed the next round of 
talks would take place November 11.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Basic positions: In his initial, uncharacteristically 
forceful statement, Bokeria expressed frustration with the 
lack of progress on major issues at Geneva, such as 
cease-fire implementation, IDP returns, and continued 
limitations on movements across the boundaries.  He added 
that in general Georgia still feels insecure in the face of 
continuing Russian occupation and therefore seeks 
arrangements not to recommit to the idea of the non-use of 
force, but to ensure the idea,s implementation.  He 
highlighted a proposal not only giving international monitors 
access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but establishing an 
executive police force.   Karasin focused on Georgia as the 
primary threat in the region, insisting that recovery of the 
regions by military means remains a political priority for 
Georgia.  Drawing a parallel with the so-called 
"Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan" between Russia and the EU, in which 
Saakashvili supposedly played only a bit part, he portrayed 
Russia and the EUMM as equally disinterested third parties 
that guarantee security on their respective sides of the 
administrative boundaries.  He praised the EUMM as having 
played a key role in keeping Georgia in check.  Without 
making any specific allegations, Chochiev said that Georgia 
was still re-arming. 
 
 
 
---------------- 
Non-Use-of-Force 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) As expected, NUF discussions were the highlight of the 
7th round in Working Group 1 (WG1).  Karasin started in by 
asserting that previous "reasonable" Russian proposals 
regarding the renewal of OSCE and UN mandates had been 
rejected; however, this was in the past, and now the security 
situation was noticeably improved with the Russians providing 
security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just as EUMM does on 
the Georgian side (thus equating the two in a manner the 
Georgians later objected to).  He even went so far as to 
praise the international agencies involved in the IPRM 
mechanism.  As a consequence, the real need now was for a 
political commitment between Georgia and South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  He went over in some detail the provisions of the 
paper that the Russians had handed over in a previous 
session. His remarks suggested, though they did not say 
explicitly, that the Russians might attempt to raise these 
issues in other fora (UN and OSCE) in the context of security 
discussions in those arenas. 
 
¶4. (C) DAS Kaidanow urged all sides to set aside status 
questions and focus on the substance of what a viable NUF 
might contain, rather than the contentious question of who 
would sign the document (a theme later echoed by the 
Georgians).  Verbeke made similar comments, noting that there 
were a variety of forms any NUF might take, but it was 
important to detail what the content of an NUF might look 
like and what implementing measures it would prescribe. 
Predictably unhelpful throughout, South Ossetian rep Chochiev 
suggested the Georgian refusal to sign an agreement now was a 
 
sign it was committed to aggression.  In what became a 
repeated effort to link the issues of humanitarian 
access/IDPs and refugees with the NUF concept, he proposed 
combining WG1 and WG2, which the co-chairs neatly rebuffed. 
Bokeria reiterated several times that Georgia already 
considers itself to be under a legally binding NUF agreement 
(August 12 cease-fire), and pointed out that Georgia would 
only consider a NUF agreement with Russia, and it would have 
to  contain serious and implementable measures to increase 
the international presence in the two regions.  Morel 
observed that a few months earlier, all sides had been close 
to agreeing on modalities for renewed UN and OSCE observation 
missions, and the implementing measures suggested by the 
co-chairs derived from those draft renewals.  Karasin and the 
two de factos, however, continued to  insist that the basic 
issue of signatories should be resolved first and would not 
agree to settle on the principles elaborated in the 
co-chairs, non-paper as a basis for a future framework 
document, though the Georgians pushed them on this issue. 
 
¶5. (C) Morel proposed the co-chairs should consult with all 
parties before the next round and prepare some basic 
principles for a framework of a draft non-use-of-force 
agreement.  Karasin insisted the framework focus on existing 
drafts, and argued the non-paper circulated just prior to 
this 7th round was insufficiently fleshed out to form the 
basis of a proper framework, though his real point was that 
he would not agree to the specific principles elaborated in 
the non-paper (on international monitoring presence, 
separation of forces, etc).  Bokeria said the non-paper 
circulated by the Co-Chairs was a firm foundation, but that 
Georgia might propose additions (such as executive policing 
power).  The Co-Chair agreement to work on this document 
became the day,s only deliverable, though the parties could 
not even agree on a formal title for the framework, and the 
co-chairs agreed to skirt the title issue in their public 
comments. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) As in the 6th round, all sides agreed the IPRMs are 
useful and important and noted progress, including more 
consistency in meetings.  Haber acknowledged South Ossetia,s 
removal of preconditions and improvement in cooperation. 
Both Karasin and Chochiev helpfully expressed openness to 
establishing a new roving OSCE presence, comparable to the 
new roving UN presence,  that would enable the OSCE to have 
people on the ground and therefore be in a better position to 
contribute to the work of both the IPRMs and the Geneva 
process in general.  South Ossetia did raise the chairmanship 
issue, proposing three possible variants (all of which 
Georgia has rejected in earlier discussions): a rotating 
chair between Georgia and South Ossetian de facto 
authorities; a rotating chair among all the parties; and a 
joint EUMM-Russia chairmanship.  With no consensus on the 
chairmanship issue, Morel proposed agreeing to disagree. 
South Ossetia also expressed interest in minutes of the 
meetings, or "protocols," prepared by a chairman, but said it 
would not accept minutes prepared by the EUMM.  Haber 
suggested that the EUMM could prepare a first draft minutes 
and then circulate them for comments by all parties. 
 
----- 
Ships 
----- 
 
¶7. (C) As expected, the Abkhaz condemned Georgian seizure of 
ships as "piracy" and called it a serious test of the Geneva 
process.  Russia referred to the "piracy" issue once as part 
of its arguments for non-use of force agreement between 
Georgia and the separatists, but otherwise did not harp on 
the issue.  Georgia said that, in accordance with 
international law, it would address the issue with Turkey and 
the flag country of the vessels, but not with the Russians or 
Abkhaz.  Morel said that Turkey and Georgia had established a 
working group, and that international best practice would be 
to allow that mechanism to work.  The issue was not raised 
again during the day, nor was it raised in the press 
conference afterwards. 
 
---------- 
Detentions 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) Both Georgia and the de facto South Ossetian 
authorities expressed concerns on this issue.  Haber said 
EUMM was ready to continue helping, but noted he did not have 
 
any formal investigation authority.  Morel raised the idea of 
a second commission to address the issue, though Chochiev 
asked why that was necessary since the IPRM had been working. 
 Morel noted that a separate commission could include groups 
outside the Geneva Talks, such as ICRC. 
 
---------------------------- 
IDPs and Humanitarian Issues 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Working Group 2 (WG2) was side-tracked only briefly by 
angry remarks about the UNGA resolution on Georgian IDPs. 
Abkhaz Lana Agrba insisted that the resolution did not 
provide a context for refugee returns, taking no account of 
the "countries" to which displaced persons would return. 
She accused the international community of "trying to get 
things done unilaterally" and of considering politics, not 
people.  Russia,s Mikhail Lebedev accused Georgia of 
undermining the Geneva discussions through unilateral action 
and stated that Russia had been offended by not having been 
consulted on the resolution in advance - an accusation the 
Georgians easily dismissed. 
 
¶10. (C)The group turned to a non-paper circulated the day 
before the session called "Agreed Undertakings," in which the 
Co-chairs had distilled key points of agreement 
participants, views in previous rounds on rehabilitation, 
water supply, status of displaced persons, facilitation of 
returns, and property issues.  South Ossetia,s delegation 
immediately objected to the opening paragraph stating that 
the participants, "based on previously agreed principles, 
agree to move forward,"  and they insisted on the need to 
define those principles.  The Russian delegation took it 
further and disputed that the participants had ever agreed on 
principles. 
 
¶11. (C) Rather than take up the substance of the non-paper, 
however, the other WG2 participants focused on what was 
missing.  The Georgian delegation cited the omission of a 
discussion of access (referring to both access of 
humanitarian actors to South Ossetia -- which the U.S. 
strongly supported -- and access of ethnic Georgians in 
Abkhazia to Georgian territory, especially unhindered passage 
across the ABL for children attending school in undisputed 
Georgia.  The Georgians pushed for inclusion of protection of 
human rights as an agreed principle, alleging systematic 
human rights violations in the Gali region of Abkhazia. 
Objecting to press statements from previous working group 
sessions that asserted progress not commensurate with the 
Georgians, assessment of proceedings, the delegates insisted 
that conclusions should not report that the group had made 
progress until there was agreement on all elements of the 
non-paper.  A member of the Georgian delegation told us 
privately that inordinately positive statements emanating 
from the discussions supported Russian efforts to move more 
issues into the Geneva Discussions, where the de facto 
authorities had a greater voice than in other international 
fora. 
 
¶12. (C) The Russians and South Ossetians reverted to familiar 
arguments that progress on WG2 issues was only possible once 
an environment of trust had been created, including resolving 
thorny issues being handled by WG1.  The South Ossetians 
raised again the cases of specific missing persons and unjust 
detentions and ignored Georgian offers of an immediate 
exchange of all detainees.  The Abkhaz were not specific, but 
pushed for time to draft comments to the non-paper.  U.S. 
interventions and side discussions continued to urge 
pragmatism, commended the utility of the non-paper, called on 
the Georgians to accept incremental progress, and urged all 
participants to maintain sight of our objectives:  continuing 
support for humanitarian activities and working toward 
creation of conditions conducive to safe, voluntary, and 
dignified returns. 
 
¶13. (C) The group eventually came to agreement on a redrafted 
opening paragraph for the co-chairs, paper, but failed to 
reach consensus on priorities, deferring discussion until 
they had an opportunity to submit comments on the non-paper 
and additional areas for consideration.  Even the chairs, 
attempts to summarize the accomplishments of WG2 in the 
traditional post-session press communique devolved into an 
unseemly argument when participants disputed that they agreed 
to consider any particular areas or sectors for humanitarian 
intervention, either the five original or any additional 
ones. 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT.  Despite the good feelings over the IPRMs, 
improved functioning and the improved security environment in 
 
general, the session did not accomplish much.  The IPRMs have 
helped reduce, although not eliminate, the immediate security 
concerns over regular shootings, explosions and other 
incidents, so the Geneva talks can begin to move on to some 
of the underlying issues.  These questions, like 
comprehensive arrangements for ensuring security and IDP 
returns, are less pressing, but more contentious, and it is 
therefore likely to take longer to make concrete progress. 
This session saw the first tentative steps toward tackling 
those thorny issues, and the circular discussions about such 
red herrings as a non-use of force agreement (which is 
unlikely ever to be concluded) indicate the difficulty of 
making real progress.  There are still some areas, especially 
in Working Group 2, that offer opportunities for rapid 
 
progress on what should be non-controversial topics, such as 
humanitarian access and water distribution.  Despite the 
stonewalling in WG2, we should continue to reach for what 
should be low-hanging fruit in those areas.  Nevertheless, as 
we prepare for future sessions, we will need to think 
carefully about where real progress is actually possible, and 
what we will need to do either within or outside Geneva to 
enable that progress. 
GRIFFITHS