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S E C R E T GENEVA 000820 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA 
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DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING 
GROUP, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) 
     ¶C. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021) 
     ¶D. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022) 
     ¶E. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023) 
     ¶F. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024) 
     ¶G. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-010. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 23, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 - 5:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The second meeting of the Inspection Protocol (IP) 
Working Group (WG) was held at the Russian Mission on 
September 23, 2009, to discuss similarities and differences 
in the U.S. and Russian approaches to inspection procedures 
provided for under the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty.  The 
Russian Delegation conveyed its vision of inspection 
activities presented in the Russian-proposed draft of Section 
V to the Treaty Annex regarding "Inspections, Visits, and 
Exhibitions" (REF A).  The U.S. Delegation expressed concern 
regarding the Russian use of the word "visit," as well as on 
the absence of detailed procedures in the Russian-provided 
draft and how leaving such details to be agreed upon later 
within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was 
unacceptable, especially considering that previously agreed 
language on those details was already recorded in the START 
Treaty and had been updated in the draft IP developed by the 
U.S. side.  Several differences between the U.S. and Russian 
draft versions of the IP were identified and discussed, with 
no decisions being made.  Both sides agreed to study the 
respective drafts to determine what could be added to the 
Russian version, reduced from the U.S. version, or whether 
some details could be relocated elsewhere, such as being 
moved into a "third-tier" document below the level of the 
U.S.-proposed protocol or the Russian-proposed annex similar 
to the annexes to the IP developed for START. 
 
------------------ 
COMPARING U.S. AND 
RUSSIAN APPROACHES 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting by presenting 
similarities and differences that had been identified between 
the U.S. (REF B) and Russian approaches to inspection 
procedures provided for under the SFO Treaty.  He used a 
chart to illustrate the correlation between the U.S. and 
Russian approaches associated with specific inspection 
activities to show how the two approaches mapped against one 
another.  According to the chart, what the United States 
calls a "nuclear warhead inspection," used to confirm the 
declared numbers of deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and 
deployed heavy bombers and their associated nuclear 
 
 
armaments, is called an "inspection" under the Russian 
approach.  What the United States calls a "data update 
inspection," used to confirm declared data on deployed ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and their associated launchers, is also called an 
"inspection" under the Russian approach.  However, while the 
United States refers to the activities carried out to confirm 
declared data on non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, non-deployed 
heavy bombers, and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers as 
"data update inspections," the Russian approach refers to 
these activities as "visits."  The U.S. side proposes to use 
the initial data update inspection at a new facility to 
confirm data on relevant items at that facility, while the 
Russian approach calls this activity a "visit."  A 
"Conversion or Elimination Inspection" under the U.S. 
approach, which is used to confirm completion of conversion 
or elimination procedures on strategic offensive arms, was 
called both a "visit" or "exhibition" in different sections 
of the Russian draft Treaty.  A "formerly declared facility 
inspection" that has been used under START to confirm that 
eliminated facilities were not being used for purposes 
inconsistent with the treaty, continues to be called for in 
the U.S. draft, but appears to have been omitted under the 
Russian approach.  Both approaches referred to the activity 
to confirm the technical characteristics of new types of 
strategic offensive arms as "exhibitions" and both sides 
dropped the requirement for "close-out inspections" on 
facilities no longer used for purposes related to SFO. 
 
-------------------- 
CLARIFICATION OF THE 
RUSSIAN APPROACH 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Colonel Ilin explained that the Russian approach 
envisions three types of inspection activities:  1) 
inspections; 2) visits; and 3) exhibitions.  "Inspections" 
are to be the toughest and most stringent type of inspection 
activity, since the purpose is to verify data on deployed 
strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the 
treaty.  Inspections will be used to not only confirm the 
number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, accountable heavy bombers, 
and deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, but also to confirm the 
number of deployed warheads installed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
heavy bombers.  Ilin added that, while the U.S. approach 
combined the launcher and delivery vehicle into a single 
entity, the Russian approach counted the launchers 
separately.  Inspections would be conducted only at ICBM 
bases, submarines bases, and air bases for heavy bombers. 
The total number of inspections that could be conducted each 
year would be five, which was said to be based on the results 
of START inspections and from the previous U.S. draft SFO 
Treaty given to the Russians in October 2008.  Warner 
reminded Ilin that the U.S. proposed to allow each side to 
conduct up to 14 nuclear warhead inspections annually as well 
as 12 data update and 2 formerly declared facility 
inspections, many more than the five inspections and five 
visits offered by the Russians. 
 
¶6.  (S) Ilin explained that "visits" are to be used for the 
confirmation of the numbers of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, 
heavy bombers and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, as 
well as for confirmation of data associated with new 
facilities, and the technical characteristics of non-deployed 
 
 
items.  The Russian side proposes that each side may conduct 
no more than five visits annually.  The inspecting Party 
would also have the option of using a visit to confirm the 
completion of conversion or elimination procedures of 
strategic offensive arms, but such a visit would be 
considered one of the overall annual quotas of visits. 
Visits would be less rigorous than inspections, since, 
according to the Russians, all activities within this 
category could also be verified by national technical means 
of verification.  While step-by-step procedures could be 
developed for inspections, only a few procedures would be 
necessary for visits.  Visits to inventory non-deployed 
strategic offensive arms would be conducted at ICBM bases, 
submarines bases, air bases for heavy bombers, storage 
facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination 
facilities, test ranges, and training facilities. 
 
¶7.  (S) Similar to practices under START, "exhibitions" are 
to be used to confirm the technical characteristics and 
distinguishability of new ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, ICBM 
and SLBM launchers, and converted strategic offensive arms. 
They would be conducted at ICBM bases, submarines bases, air 
bases for heavy bombers, storage facilities, repair 
facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, test 
ranges, training facilities, production facilities, and 
flight test centers for heavy bombers.  The difference in the 
Russian approach from current START provisions is that the 
inspected Party would set the schedule and details of how 
such exhibitions would be conducted.  When asked whether an 
exhibition would be conducted before or after the conversion 
procedures were completed, Ilin replied that the Russian 
Delegation did not want to establish that procedure now, but 
the option of conducting a demonstration of procedures after 
the completion of the conversion would not be excluded.  The 
procedures associated with exhibitions would be much softer 
than the present START requirements. 
 
---------------------------------- 
"VISITS" -- A NEGATIVE CONNOTATION 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Warner expressed concerns regarding the Russian use 
of the word "visit" in their proposal, viewing it as a 
troubling direction.  START provided for various types of 
inspections and exhibitions, but not visits.  Admittedly, the 
previous U.S. Administration had provided Russia with a 
proposed version of the SFO Treaty that introduced the 
concept of visits into the negotiations.  Under that concept, 
there were to be no inspections and visits were intended to 
be far less regulated, voluntary in nature, preceded by 
30-day advance notification (vice 24 hours of advance notice 
for a START inspection), and the inspected Party had the 
right to refuse a proposed visit.  As such, the use of the 
word "visit" in SFO implied that these types of activities 
were much less stringent than START inspections and much less 
important sources of information on treaty compliance.  The 
current U.S. Administration seeks to have a very rigorous 
verification regime built on various types of inspections, 
not visits.  The inspection activities used to confirm data 
exchanged on non-deployed systems should be just as rigorous 
as those used for deployed systems, so there should be no 
difference between inspections and visits, as defined by the 
Russian approach.  The U.S. Delegation believed that 
 
 
inclusion of the word "visit" would pose significant problems 
with the U.S. Administration's ability to achieve 
ratification of the SFO Treaty in the Senate. 
 
9 .  (S) Ilin responded that, in principle, there had to be a 
difference between inspections and visits.  Differences in 
the procedures for conducting inspections and visits were 
essential from the treaty perspective since the verification 
of treaty limits should be more regulated than the 
confirmation of information provided voluntarily. 
 
------------------ 
THE DETAILS MATTER 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (S) Warner observed that there was a dramatic difference 
in size and scope of the inspection activities and associated 
procedures that have been proposed by the U.S. and Russian 
sides.  It is obvious, from simply looking at the documents, 
that the U.S. proposal is much more extensive and detailed 
than the Russian-proposed text.  Moreover, the initial U.S. 
review showed some of the substantive differences to be very 
significant.  The Russian version lacked specific details in 
several areas while the U.S. version included detailed 
procedures that had been worked out and agreed to previously 
under START that the U.S. believed should continue since the 
availability of those detailed procedures had been extremely 
useful in the successful execution of the START verification 
regime.  Warner suggested that, if Russia did not want 
 
detailed procedures included in the IP, perhaps those 
procedures could be relocated into a "third level" annex. 
 
----------------------- 
ARE DETAILED PROCEDURES 
REALLY THE PROBLEM? 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Mr. Rust, speaking from the perspective of both a 
former inspector and escort of Russian inspectors, commented 
on the importance of having detailed procedures and observed 
that mutual respect and predictability was based on the 
detailed knowledge and ability to implement the agreed 
procedures that had been developed by both sides.  Although 
extensive, and sometimes complicated, the detailed procedures 
have been a key element in the successful implementation of 
START.  Colonel Ryzhkov countered by asking how many 
ambiguities and problems have arisen in the presence of those 
detailed procedures for conducting inspections.  Rust 
admitted that many "ambiguities" (instances of perceived 
non-compliance identified by the inspecting side) had been 
documented during inspections, but the professionalism and 
expertise of the inspectors and escorts allowed many problems 
to be resolved during the inspections.  Rust concluded by 
suggesting that the Russian Selegation consider just how many 
ambiguities there might have arisen in the absence of 
detailed inspection procedures. 
 
¶12.  (S) Col Zaytsev claimed that the Russian Delegation had 
attempted to take into account both U.S. and Russian concerns 
while drafting their proposal.  Inspections that lead to 
ambiguities and problems are those that are more rigid and 
regulated, while "softer" inspections would, in their view, 
cause fewer problems. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Ryzhkov cited the lack of problems that Russia had 
encountered during implementation of Vienna Document 
inspections as an example of why detailed procedures were 
undesirable.  He asserted that Russia has conducted about 70 
inspections under that treaty and there were usually few 
ambiguities.  He opined that too many detailed procedures 
tended to produce ambiguities and confrontation, but he 
believed a solution could be found if the sides worked 
together carefully.  It would be difficult to agree on 
detailed inspection procedures, he noted, since each side has 
a specific operational approach to its own strategic weapon 
systems and the differences in approach were very significant. 
 
¶14.  (S) Warner agreed that standards should be applied that 
made practical sense and did not reveal classified national 
security information, but there is no formula regarding the 
conduct of inspection activities that could guarantee no 
ambiguities will arise and be detected. 
 
------------------------------ 
WORKING OUT INSPECTION DETAILS 
IN THE BCC IS A BAD IDEA 
------------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (S) Warner reiterated that there were significant 
differences in the philosophies reflected in the U.S. and 
Russian IP proposals.  He again expressed serious concern 
regarding Russia's proposal to develop and agree upon the 
details of specific inspection procedures within the 
framework of the BCC after the treaty was signed.  It will be 
far preferable for all procedures to be agreed upon within 
the SFO negotiations, well before the first inspections could 
be conducted.  It would be highly problematic to expect that 
the two sides, acting through the BCC, could develop these 
procedural details from scratch after conclusion and signing 
of the SFO Treaty, and to commit the sides to follow such a 
course would inevitably result in a lengthy delay in the 
initiation of inspections under the new treaty.  It will be 
important to document specific procedures since new personnel 
that come to work this issue over the next decade will need 
to know how inspections are to be conducted.  Recognizing 
that there was very little  negotiation time left before the 
deadline set by our Presidents for completing the new treaty, 
it is unclear why the specific procedures could not be 
included when previously agreed language on those details is 
presently available.  While parts of the previously agreed 
language may no longer be useful, we should not simply 
disregard everything.  Provisions on which there are no 
outstanding problems, such as equipment lists and account 
settlement procedures, are examples of where the previously 
agreed language needs to be reintroduced.  Warner asked Ilin 
to clarify whether the removal of the detailed procedures 
meant that Russia was unhappy with the previously agreed 
language or that it was just too lengthy and burdensome, to 
which he received no answer. 
 
¶16.  (S) Ilin thanked the U.S.Delegation for the effort it 
put into preparing such a detailed protocol.  While all 
formulations should be carefully examined, it will be 
important to progress step-by-step to determine what appears 
excessive and what is lacking.  For example, the U.S. 
proposal contains many restrictions and inspection activities 
 
 
regarding mobile missiles as well as other provisions that 
are no longer topical and needed in the new treaty.  However, 
the Russian Dslegation understood the U.S. point that more 
details were necessary. 
 
--------------------------- 
DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) On the provision of the legal status of inspectors 
and aircrew members (Part II of Section V of the 
Russian-proposed draft), Ilin stated that there was much 
commonality in the U.S. and Russian proposals, but the 
wording was different.  Russian ideas were present at various 
places within the U.S. draft.  The differences were primarily 
related to the drafting principle.  The Russian draft 
concentrated all of the ideas on this subject in one or two 
places, while the U.S. draft had scattered them throughout 
its draft.  It was not necessarily a bad thing, just 
different.  Therefore, a common philosophy is needed as to 
how to formulate the text.  The philosophy should be 
positive, build on common ideas, and incorporate what is good. 
 
¶18.  (S) Warner pointed out that, under the U.S. concept for 
the treaty, the IP was by far the most extensive section of 
the new treaty that the sides would need to deal with.  As 
such, it is important to decide whether to maintain a large 
protocol that includes specific details or to try to work out 
a leaner protocol with the details relocated into a series of 
expanded annexes.  In START, the annexes were more detailed 
than the protocols.  The U.S.-proposed draft inspection 
annexes, which are still being translated into Russian, are 
very extensive and contain detailed procedures.  Therefore, 
choices need to be made. 
 
------------------------- 
DETAILS, DETAILS, DETAILS 
------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Warner acknowledged that the U.S. Delegation had not 
yet had time to fully evaluate the Russian-proposed draft of 
the Section/Protocol on Inspections since it was only 
recently received.  However, one of the things found in the 
initial U.S. review was that, in order to shorten its 
proposed draft Section on Inspections, the Russians had 
removed information on notifications from the 
Russian-proposed Section on Inspections and relocated it to 
the Notifications Section/Protocol.  But, in some cases, the 
elements moved did not necessarily relate to notifications. 
For example, no references to visas remained in the 
Russian-proposed draft, but provisions on visas were now 
present in the Section on Notifications.  We should be able 
to track such things, but it will take time to do so.  Other 
differences that were identified in the initial review of 
Part II of Section V of the Russian draft included:  reducing 
the number of individuals on the list of inspectors to 200 
(U.S. proposal -- 400); increasing the period for making 
amendments to the list of inspectors to no more than once in 
three months (U.S. proposal-once every three weeks); 
decreasing the number of inspectors conducting an inspection 
to nine (U.S. proposal -- ten0); decreasing the number of 
inspectors conducting a "visit" to seven (U.S. proposal -- 
ten); decreasing the number of inspectors conducting an 
 
 
exhibition to 10 (U.S. proposal -- 10 to 20); each side has 
the option to object to individual inspectors without reason; 
and a reduction in the number of points of entry to two, a 
point with which the U.S. could agree.  Differences 
identified in the initial review of Part III of Section V 
included the removal of all details pertaining to inspection 
aircraft procedures, such as flight plans and call signs. 
 
¶20.  (S) Ilin reiterated his belief that the U.S. and Russian 
proposals had much in common.  Regarding the numerical 
reductions, it only made sense that the number of people 
involved in the inspection process would be reduced since the 
number of inspections would be dramatically decreased as 
well.  However, the final numbers of inspectors would be 
settled once agreement was reached on the number of 
activities that would be permitted. 
 
¶21.  (S) Warner asked whether there had actually been 
problems with the list of inspectors.  Ryzhkov responded that 
an agreement was being worked by the Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers on increasing the timing of the exchange of the list 
of inspectors, but that agreement was not yet finalized. 
However, from the practical perspective, Russia only changes 
its list of inspectors once or twice a year. 
 
-------- 
HOMEWORK 
-------- 
 
¶22.  (S) Ilin concluded by saying that it was clear that some 
information the Russian Delegation initially deemed as being 
excessive might need to be reexamined.  Following this 
reexamination, both sides could study the drafts to see what 
could be added to the Russian version and reduced from the 
U.S. version.  Warner suggested also contemplating whether 
some details could be relocated, such as into a third-tier 
document below the level of the U.S.-proposed protocol or the 
Russian-proposed annex.  For the next meeting, both sides 
were to focus on the provisions that were thought to have the 
most commonality (legal status of inspectors) and would 
ensure that each Delegation would have its respective lawyers 
in attendance to provide legal advice. 
 
¶23.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶24. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Fortier 
Dr. Fraley 
Maj Johnson 
Mrs. Pura 
Mr. Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Ms. St. Julien 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
Col Ilin 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Izrazov 
Col Kamenskiy 
Mr. Leontiev 
Col Novikov 
Gen Orlov 
Col Petrov 
Gen Poznihir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶25.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS