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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 000447 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - Add SIPDIS to Caption Line 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO; NEA/ARP BMCGOVERN 
NSC FOR PUNEET TALWAR, AARON JOST 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/18/2019 
TAGS: PREL PTER KNNP ETRD ECON ETTC AE IR
SUBJECT: UAE'S RAS AL KHAIMAH: ROGUE OR REFORMER? 
 
DUBAI 00000447  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Principal Officer, U.S. 
Consulate General, Dubai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  Ras Al Khaimah (RAK), the UAE's 
northern-most emirate, has emerged into the media spotlight 
amidst a blitz of recent accusations by a deposed former Crown 
Prince that, among other things, RAK facilitates illicit trade 
with Iran, in particular cargo related to Iran's nuclear and 
missile programs, and that RAK authorities are negligent in 
guarding against Al Qaeda infiltration of the UAE.  Timing of 
the accusations appears linked to the approaching deadline 
(approximately October 25) for Congressional consideration of 
the US-UAE "123 Agreement" related to civilian nuclear 
cooperation, and is perhaps aimed to engender doubt about the 
UAE's ability or willingness to control Iran-related trade of 
proliferation concern.  USG agencies at post, to include GRPO, 
have no evidence to suggest RAK is being used as a transshipment 
point for material related to Iran's weapons or nuclear 
programs.  In fact, the UAE, of which RAK is a part, has emerged 
as one of the USG's closest partners in interdicting Iran-bound 
shipments identified as a proliferation risk. Similarly, there 
is no evidence to suggest RAK authorities had prior knowledge 
of, or were in any way complicit in, a recently-disrupted Fatah 
al Islam cell composed of non-UAE citizens located in the RAK. 
Covert Iranian presence in RAK ports is a noted concern by UAE 
Federal Intelligence Authorities.  Drug-related transshipment 
through RAK is a concern for DEA elements at post, which 
maintain an ongoing dialogue with RAK authorities on the matter. 
 End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C)  Known in earlier times as the "Pirate Coast" for the 
support allegedly provided to seafarers that harassed 
India-bound British shipping, Ras Al Khaimah is today a 
relatively sleepy backwater within the UAE's seven-emirate 
federation.  The population of roughly 260,000 is 60 percent 
Emirati, the highest proportion of UAE nationals within any of 
the emirates that comprise the federation.  RAK relies upon UAE 
federal government (read: Abu Dhabi) support for energy, 
housing, hospitals, and schools.  It lacks significant oil or 
gas deposits and has therefore pursued a development strategy 
featuring trade and port services and light manufacturing. 
Significant limestone deposits have made RAK a primary supplier 
of rock and stone throughout the world.   While the RAK 
Government has voiced its desire to one day compete with Dubai 
as a destination for investment and tourism, the Emirate remains 
underdeveloped.  (Note:  While RAK has talked to Iran about 
possible future gas supplies, there are no indications either 
side is currently pursuing a deal.  Crown Prince Saud Al-Qassimi 
told Ambassador that negotiations had fallen apart because the 
Iranians were too difficult.  End note.) 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
The Pretender:  Khalid bin Saqr al Qassimi 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) In recent weeks, the former Crown Prince of Ras al 
Khaimah, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr al Qassimi, has pursued meetings 
with Congressional and Executive Branch officials to raise 
questions about the policies and allegiance of his half-brother 
and current Crown Prince, Shaykh Saud bin Saqr al Qassimi. 
Shaykh Khalid was removed as Crown Prince by a Royal Decree 
issued in 2003 by his father, the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, 
Shaykh Saqr bin Mohamad al Qassimi.  The same decree appointed 
Shaykh Saud as the new Crown Prince.  Shaykh Khalid had remained 
relatively quiescent (and in exile in Oman) until about a year 
ago when he began a campaign to influence US public opinion. 
While post is unclear on Shaykh Khalid's aim, it would appear 
that the timing of his accusations is intended to influence 
Congressional views with regard to the pending US-UAE "123 
Agreement" to enable US civilian nuclear cooperation.  This 
agreement is due to enter into force about October 25 upon the 
completion of Congressional review. 
 
DUBAI 00000447  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
The Current Crown Prince:  Saud bin Saqr al Qassimi 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Since his ascent in 2003, Ras Al Khaimah's current Crown 
Prince, Shaykh Saud bin Saqr al Qassimi, a graduate of the 
University of Michigan, has embarked on a development strategy 
focusing on an expansion of port and maritime services, 
manufacturing, and tourism.  Saud's mother is from one of 
Dubai's well-established merchant families and Saud is said to 
be close to Dubai's Ruler Mohamed bin Rashid al Maktoum, 
pursuing reform and development policies that mirror in reduced 
scale the strategy pursued by Dubai.  Saud refers to himself as 
a "friend of the United States;" his eldest son recently 
returned to RAK after receiving a Political Science degree from 
UCLA.  He has invited Consulate General Dubai staff to review 
RAK port's "open books" and expresses frustration with the 
allegations of his half-brother Shaykh Khalid which he holds 
responsible, among other things, for sinking RAK's bid to host 
the America's Cup yacht race. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
Facilitating Illicit Trade with Iran? 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Northern Emirates ports of Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and 
Dubai maintain a robust re-export trade with Iran, some of which 
is organized by Iranian front companies to evade U.S. and other 
international sanctions regimes.  However, USG elements at post, 
including GRPO, have no reason to conclude RAK is being used as 
a transshipment point for material related to Iran's weapons or 
nuclear programs, as is alleged by Shaykh Khalid.  Rather, the 
UAE, of which RAK is a part, is one of our closest partners in 
interdiction cooperation of Iran-bound shipments identified as a 
proliferation risk.  Ras Al Khaimah's ports lie within the UAE 
and are staffed by Emirati nationals, not controlled by Iran and 
staffed by Iranian customs, as alleged in one particularly 
sensational report circulated by the deposed Crown Prince.  That 
said, Federal UAE officials, including at the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence, have voiced concern to Embassy Abu Dhabi 
Naval Attache of possible Iranian "infiltration" of RAK's ports, 
including covert elements of the IRGC Quds Force.  (Comment: 
this local concern is consistent with broader UAEG concern over 
a covert Iranian presence in the UAE which might be activated in 
the event of conflict between Iran and Israel over the Iranian 
nuclear program.  End comment.)  According to figures released 
by RAK customs, Iran is fifth in terms of export trade volumes 
from RAK (measured in value) behind Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and 
Kuwait.  Iran is tenth in RAK re-export trade behind Oman, 
Ukraine, Qatar, Lithuania, Russia, Bahrain and RAK's duty free 
stores. RAK's port director told Consul General in September 
that cargo to Iran is "scanned", though the extent of such 
scanning is unclear and is unlikely to include bulk or 
non-containerized cargoes. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Resident DEA attache in Dubai engaged Ras Al Khaimah 
Narcotics Unit in October to raise concern about information 
that RAK had emerged as a staging point for Afghan-origin heroin 
and hashish.  Such cargoes are reportedly stored in RAK until 
buyers in Africa or Europe can be located for onward shipment. 
RAK officials acknowledged that storage of such contraband may 
occur in the RAK free zone, and agreed to investigate the 
 
DUBAI 00000447  003.4 OF 003 
 
 
allegations.  They vehemently denied, however, that such goods 
arrived via RAK ports.  Brigadier General Abdullah al Haddidi 
asserted at an October 6 meeting with DEA Attache, attended by 
RAK Royal Family member Major General Talib bin Saqr al Qassimi, 
that drugs must be smuggled into RAK from other Emirates.  DEA 
continues to investigate and has agreed with the RAK Narcotics 
Bureau to initiate a first-ever joint training program aimed at 
deepening counter-narcotics cooperation. 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
Facilitating Al Qaeda? 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Another of Shaykh Khalid's accusations is that RAK is 
a staging ground for Al Qaeda operations in the Emirates.  The 
charge presumably relates to the March 2009 discovery of a Fatah 
al-Islam cell with plans to attack targets in the UAE.  The cell 
was identified by UAE intelligence and special operations forces 
and disrupted before its planning reached the operational phase, 
however, the cell had stockpiled explosives.  As with the 
previous allegation regarding RAK complicity in Iran 
proliferation activity, there is no evidence to suggest that RAK 
officials had prior knowledge of or provided any support to the 
Fatah al-Islam group, which was composed of non-RAK citizens. 
Within the UAE's federal structure, intelligence 
responsibilities for all Emirates apart from Dubai are handled 
by the State Security Department (SSD) in Abu Dhabi.  Extremism 
born of discontent remains a concern in Ras Al Khaimah, as it 
does in each of the UAE's poorer regions.  One of the two 
Emirati 9/11 hijackers came from Ras Al Khaimah at a time when 
the former Crown Prince now lodging the allegations was in 
power. 
 
 
 
------- 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) It remains unclear to post what Shaykh Khalid, the 
deposed Crown Prince, intends with his current campaign to 
discredit his half-brother.  Internal rivalry is a common, but 
ordinarily discreet feature of Royal family politics in the UAE. 
 A Washington, DC-based lobbyist told a CG Dubai political 
officer in late 2008 that his services had been sought by Shaykh 
Khalid to wage a publicity campaign "shining a light" on the 
RAK-Iran relationship in order to gain (presumably USG) support 
for a return to power on the promise of a harder line towards 
Iran.  The threat of these accusations to derail the strategic 
US-UAE 123 Agreement cannot have endeared Shaykh Khalid to the 
Abu Dhabi leadership, upon whom he would presumably have to rely 
were he to be restored to his former position.  Irrespective of 
his motivations, the allegations are serious and bear continued 
monitoring and investigation.  It is not beyond reason that 
Iran, and others who seek to evade trade restrictions, would 
attempt to exploit a distant port like Ras Al Khaimah for a 
variety of purposes.  Links to Iran are long-standing throughout 
the Emirates.  But that does not mean that UAE officials, 
including in RAK, have any interest in furthering Iran's 
proliferation agenda. 
SIBERELL