VZCZCXRO1630
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHDE #0408/01 2781051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051051Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6647
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 9938

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 DUBAI 000408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CAIRO FOR RCO; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS; DEPT FOR KCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC AE
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, SEPTEMBER 2009 
 
REF: 08 State 74840 
 
¶1.  Country Conditions 
 
Fraud at Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General Dubai is low. 
Concern about visa fraud in the UAE is generally limited to visa 
applications from Third Country Nationals (TCNs) living in or 
visiting the UAE. UAE citizens ("Emiratis") are a minority in 
their own country, comprising less than 20 percent of the 
population. South Asians, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, make up 
50 percent of the population. The next largest expatriate ethnic 
groups are Filipinos (19.6 percent), Arabs from other parts of 
the Middle East (13 percent) and Iranians (2.5 percent.) 
 
Expatriate workers (many from high fraud countries) are the most 
likely to perpetrate general NIV fraud. Organized fraud efforts, 
such as document vendors or visa "touts," are uncommon in the 
UAE. 
Most IV applicants are Iranian and fraud is at times evident in 
fiance (K), and employment (E) visa applications. Both posts 
face 
the challenging task of verifying information provided by Iranian 
applicants in visa interviews. For example, family relationships 
are evidenced by documents Post views as susceptible to fraud. 
Neither post has viable means to regularly verify the 
authenticity 
of documents and information presented by Iranians and, 
therefore, 
relies heavily on the personal interview - and staff's knowledge 
of Iranian culture and procedures - to determine application 
validity. 
 
The UAE is a major regional and global transportation hub, and 
with 
this comes the potential to become a transit point for alien 
smuggling (particularly to Europe), travel of imposters, 
production 
of false documents, and other classic types of travel/immigration 
fraud. 
 
Airline and immigration officials note a number of male fide 
passengers routinely attempting to transit the UAE, but report 
very 
few passengers carrying fraudulent U.S. documents. This may 
change 
as the UAE's two major airlines (Dubai-based Emirates and Abu 
Dhabi-based Etihad) expand their direct service to the U.S.  Both 
airlines, along with several U.S. carriers also offer daily 
direct 
service between the UAE and USA. There are plans for greater 
aviation links in the future. 
 
Both Posts in the UAE (Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General 
Dubai) adjudicate a significant number of Iranian applicants. 
Approximately 50% of the total NIV workload in Dubai and 80% of 
the 
total IV workload in Abu Dhabi is Iranian. Consulate General 
Dubai 
is the primary global NIV application point for Iranians 
resident in 
Iran. Embassy Abu Dhabi is the second largest post for 
processing of 
Iranian immigration cases. General discontent with the Iranian 
political regime and continued increase in unemployment rates and 
inflation continues to drive desire for Iranians to migrate. 
Post 
anticipates a continued increase in both immigrant and 
nonimmigrant 
Iranian visa applications, with a concurrent potential for 
increased 
fraud. 
 
 
¶2.  NIV Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
There is generally little fraud associated with applications from 
UAE citizens. Among the expatriate community that applies for 
visas, 
detected fraud efforts are generally unsophisticated and include 
questionable bank statements, letters of employment, etc. Posts 
do 
not rely on such documents and do not 221-g applicants 
specifically for them. If an applicant cannot clearly establish 
entitlement to the visa, posts make use of Section 214(b). 
Photo-substituted documents are very rare. In general, detecting 
Iranian visa fraud in NIV cases sees remains complicated by the 
lack of direct knowledge of Iranian documents and systems. 
Concern about security and technology transfer issues add to our 
overall vigilance. 
 
The majority of posts' NIV fraud is with H and L employment 
visas. 
With numerous technical companies based in Dubai and a large 
 
DUBAI 00000408  002 OF 007 
 
 
expatriate population, Dubai continues to interview a 
significant 
number of H and L applicants. Typically, applicants submitting 
fraudulent employment-based applications rely more on job 
experience 
than education to qualify for the visa. Through a combination of 
checking documents, verifying job experience, close questioning 
of 
applicants, and the use of other resources (including assistance 
from 
KCC), posts routinely detect cases of false work letters and 
overstated qualifications. Fraudulent letters typically are 
unsophisticated, with applicants presenting several 
fresh-looking 
experience letters (looking much newer than the dates indicated) 
with scanned company logos. Many of these letters are discovered 
to 
be fraudulent through post research and job verification. 
 
Although both posts have had no specific reports of domestic 
servant 
abuse or trafficking in the A3 (Domestic Servants of Diplomats), 
G5 
(Domestic Servant of Government Official) or B1 (Temporary 
Visitor 
for Business) categories, we remain vigilant to potential abuse 
of 
these visa categories. 
 
To date, neither post has noticed a change in levels of NIV 
fraud due 
to the change in economic situation and increase in 
third-country 
nationals emigrating from the country. This does, however, 
remain a 
concern and is being watched for by the anti-fraud 
investigator. 
 
 
¶3.  IV Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Immigrant visa fraud is not prevalent but is at times found in K 
(fianc) petitions, E (employment-based) applications, and F 
(family-based) petitions. In fianc petitions, proof of a true 
relationship is often difficult to ascertain. Some of these cases 
involve Iranian fiances who speak only Farsi engaged to Americans 
who speak only English. There are often significant 
discrepancies in 
age between the applicant and the petitioner, even as much as 20 
to 
30 years. Applicants often provide generic "couples photos", 
usually 
taken outside of Iran, to provide evidence of a relationship. 
Legitimate fianc cases nearly always include numerous photos from 
the engagement party, which is held in Iran and includes extended 
family. The majority of Iranian K-1 petitioners obtained U.S. 
status 
through marriage to an American. Frequently, those marriages 
lasted 
only the time needed to obtain LPR status. Petitioners have also 
often been married numerous times and sometimes have already 
petitioned for one or two previous fiancs (or spouses) from Iran. 
Abu Dhabi continues to see numerous Internet relationships, 
first-cousin 
relationships and relationships with large age differences. 
 
Abu Dhabi has seen a number of fiance visa cases involving 
Iranians which 
raised concerns about "marriages of convenience," perhaps 
involving 
exchange of money, entered into for the sole purpose of 
immigration. 
In these cases, consular officers discovered during interviews 
with 
the Iranian fiance that a close American citizen relative - 
often an 
uncle or aunt residing in the same U.S. city as the petitioner - 
was 
responsible for introducing an American (who is most often not 
Iranian-American) to his/her relative in Iran and suggesting 
marriage. This appears to be well outside the practice of a 
simple 
"arranged marriage", which post accepts as a norm within Iranian 
culture and frequently legitimate, particularly when the 
petitioner 
is Iranian-American. The Iranian-American matchmaking relative is 
also yabwQ8ing enters the U.S. on a K-1 visa causing several 
other siblings 
to subsequently find their "soul mates" in the U.S., usually 
through 
the family of the original sibling's petitioning fiance or 
through 
 
DUBAI 00000408  003 OF 007 
 
 
personal profiles posted on the Internet and in Internet chat 
rooms. 
 
Post occasionally receives e-mails from disgruntled K-1 
petitioners, 
relaying stories of their fiance arriving in the U.S. and shortly 
thereafter either leaving them or meeting and marrying someone 
else. 
Often these e-mails from USC K-1 petitioners request the Embassy 
to 
take action against their fiances who were issued visas. 
 
In addition, every year post returns several K-1 (fiance) 
petitions 
to DHS for review after determining that the couple had already 
married. This issue is particularly prevalent with Iranian 
applicants. Iranian couples engage in religious ceremonies in 
Iran 
(which are legal marriages in that country) and then apply for 
fiance visas. Determining if a couple is already married is very 
difficult. Interviewing officers depend on the personal 
interview, 
but we realize that some applicants may be successfully 
concealing 
these marriages. These already married K-1 petitioners often 
claim 
that their U.S. lawyers advised them to petition as a fiance 
because 
"the process is quicker." The existence of "temporary marriage 
contracts" in Iran is also problematic as they are treated as a 
legitimate marriage just as a "normal" marriage. 
 
Employment-based IV petitions are also watched closely for fraud. 
Abu Dhabi is receiving a steady stream of E-3, "specialized 
skill" visa 
applications. It is often difficult to verify that the Iranian 
applicants possess the claimed work experience. Frequently the 
applicants are "self-employed" and thus can state that their 
experience matches the experience required in the employment 
petition. Contacting previous employers in Iran is time-consuming 
and ineffective. In many cases, the businesses have closed or the 
current manager has no record of the applicant's employment. At 
times, the petitioner is either a family member or a close 
friend of 
the petitioner. Post has also seen cases of the U.S. business 
misrepresenting the services it offers in the petition to justify 
the need for hiring the Iranian employee. The personal interview 
is 
of great importance in these cases. 
 
 
At times, falsified Iranian documents have been submitted to 
support 
an application. The applicants had different birthdates listed on 
their original petition and in their birth certificates (Shenas 
Namehs). Of particular note is that the Shenas Namehs provided 
were 
new (duplicate), and were not the original document provided at 
birth. The birth date on the original document made the 
individual 
over 21 years of age whereas the new birth date made the age of 
the 
applicant under 21. The birthdates were intentionally changed so 
that the applicant would qualify for the visa. Post is not clear 
what Iranian identity authorities require to issue a duplicate 
Shenas Namehs. Post notes that "unmarried" sons and daughters of 
LPRs/AmCits have also submitted duplicate Shenas Namehs. Post 
suspects that in many of these cases, the applicant is married 
and 
has obtained a duplicate Shenas Nameh to conceal their marriage 
data 
so that they qualify for a particular visa class. Post has 
discovered that the applicants were in fact married.  Post later 
sees petitions from American Citizens, who immigrated to the 
U.S. as 
"unmarried sons or daughters," for a spouse and children from 
that 
same period of time. 
 
Dubai does not process immigrant visas. 
 
 
¶4.  DV Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
All DV applicants in the UAE are TCNs - often from high-fraud 
countries including Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. 
Conoffs 
and LES have worked with fraud officers in Dhaka, Lagos, and 
other 
posts to authenticate documents, particularly birth certificates 
and 
education credentials. The most common reason for a DV 
 
DUBAI 00000408  004 OF 007 
 
 
application 
to be disqualified is failure to include names of all family 
members 
at the time of the original application. 
 
Dubai does not process diversity visas. 
 
 
¶5.  ACS and Passport Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
The American Citizen Services unit does not generally encounter 
U.S. 
passport fraud. Both posts are vigilant about possible false 
citizenship 
claims and forwards all CRBA applications of children born in 
Iran 
to U.S. Embassy Bern for adjudication. 
 
Consulate General Dubai encountered one case of possible 
imposter U.S. 
passport fraud at post during this period. A Nigerian citizen 
came to 
apply for a passport for her toddler AmCit child. The Consular 
Officer 
questioned the identity of the child with the woman as well as 
the 
authenticity of the documents presented in support of the 
application. 
In addition, the mother lied about the passport used by her 
daughter 
to travel from Lagos to Dubai. RSO questioned the mother and was 
not 
able to resolve the issue. Post did not issue a passport and 
instead 
referred the mother to apply at Embassy Lagos. Post alerted 
Embassy 
Lagos to the case. 
 
Individuals regularly appear at both posts requesting 
authentication of educational documents from diploma mills and 
unaccredited institutions located both inside and outside the 
United 
States.  Often the unaccredited certificates or degrees have been 
duly accredited at the state level and bear the authentication 
seal 
of the U.S. Secretary of State.  We continue to receive 
educational 
documents that were accredited by the District of Columbia even 
though the college or university is not located there. 
Educational 
documents accredited in a state different than the state of 
issue is 
a useful fraud indicator because this often implies that the 
document was rejected in the state listed on the diploma (i.e., 
Florida), so the individual submitted the document to DC for 
accreditation. 
 
Third country nationals often submit these documents as UAE labor 
and immigration law requires them to provide evidence of their 
expertise and education in a particular field.   The 
authentication 
process only certifies "the genuineness of the signature and 
seal or 
the position of a foreign official" and does not verify the 
validity 
of the document.  However, the UAE government and local companies 
often presume that the Embassy seal is a verification of the 
document's content and the subject's qualifications. 
 
CA/OCS/PRI has confirmed that the Embassy is under no obligation 
to 
authenticate these documents bearing the seal of the Department 
of 
State.  Both posts use U.S. Department of Education and Council 
for 
Higher Education databases to verify accreditation of educational 
institutions and refuse to authenticate documents from 
non-accredited institutions. 
 
 
¶6.  Adoption Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Abu Dhabi adjudicates very few local adoption cases. Adoption 
per se does 
not exist under Sharia law in Islamic countries, including the 
UAE. 
A court may only grant guardianship. The Department has advised 
that 
guardianship does not carry the same status as adoption for 
purposes 
of U.S. immigration, and thus post may only issue IR-4 visas for 
children whose adoption will be finalized in the US. 
 
DUBAI 00000408  005 OF 007 
 
 
 
Post does see several IR-4 visa applications originating from 
Iran 
each year and expects to see more Iranian-based adoption 
requests in 
the future. Adjudicating such cases is relatively difficult since 
U.S. legal requirements for completing an adoption and Iranian 
legal 
proceedings and documentation for guardianship do not easily 
collaborate.  Post again stresses the challenge of authenticating 
Iranian documents, especially provincial documents which are 
often 
more local in nature and vary from the standard documents 
normally 
submitted for visa adjudications or for adoption cases in other 
countries. The potential for fraud exists. Post is working with 
other posts, such as Ankara, to ensure consistent adoption 
processing. 
 
Dubai does not process adoption cases. 
 
 
¶7.  Use of DNA Testing - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Abu Dhabi has rarely had to request this for determinations of 
relationship in IV cases or for CRBA/passport determinations. 
 
DNA testing is available in Dubai. It is typically used to 
establish 
paternity when necessary for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad. 
No 
new ACS cases involving DNA Testing were recorded during this 
period. 
 
 
¶8.  Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Abu Dhabi processes Visa 92 (asylum) cases, which are not 
usually found 
to be fraudulent from the perspective of the consular officer's 
responsibility to determine the family relationship. However, 
based 
on interviews with the applicants, it appears that in many cases 
the 
underlying basis for the original asylum claim was likely to have 
been false. For example, post receives following-to-join visa 
requests based on successful asylum claims by Iranians who had 
reportedly converted from Islam to Christianity, claiming 
persecution in Iran. Interviews with following-to-join family 
members often result in disclosures that the "conversions" were 
not 
real. Often the interview reveals that the applicant has very 
little 
knowledge of the conversion and answers frequently appear to be 
coached. Post advised the Department and DHS/VSU about such 
concerns 
and continues to complete Visas 92 processing per Department 
guidance. DHS/VSU has advised that they have reported our 
concerns 
to appropriate DHS offices and established an internal dialogue 
about the phenomenon. 
 
Dubai does not process any refugee or asylum cases. 
 
 
¶9.  Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist 
Travel 
- Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
As Dubai and Abu Dhabi emerge as major airline transportation 
hubs 
between Europe, the U.S., Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, 
and 
East Asia - and with growing networks of direct flights to many 
locations in those regions - there is and will continue to be an 
expected increase in the level of fraudulent travel through the 
country. Over 80 percent of the UAE population is composed of 
TCNs 
and there are direct air links to almost every corner of the 
world, 
including service to at least eight U.S. cities. 
 
While there are no known major networks in the UAE itself, both 
Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai are popular transit points for fraudulent 
travelers 
(most frequently transiting to Europe.) It is unlikely that UAE 
nationals will become involved in the fraud industry; rather, 
this 
will more likely arise from within the TCN communities that see 
opportunities to assist persons entering the UAE illicitly or 
transiting to other parts of the world. 
 
DUBAI 00000408  006 OF 007 
 
 
 
 
¶10.  DS Criminal Fraud Investigations - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Neither post has an A/RSO-I for investigations. However, there is 
a strong relationship between the consular section, RSO, and the 
DHS 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Visa Security 
Unit(DHS/ICE/VSU). 
All offices at post mutually support one another in maintaining 
the 
integrity of the passport and visa processes. 
 
 
¶11.  Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil 
Registry - 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
UAE immigration authorities knowingly issue passports to UAE 
nationals born outside the UAE that incorrectly show their place 
of 
birth to be in one of the country's seven emirates.  The UAE 
Government instituted this practice to combat discrimination in 
administering the UAE law against dual nationality.  The 
decision to 
allow this practice is usually attributed to the former President 
and father of the nation, Sheikh Zayed. In 2002, boths posts 
consulted 
with the Department, which determined that these passports are 
not 
valid travel documents under U.S. law and can therefore not be 
used to 
travel to the United States.  Generally, bearers of such 
passports 
are qualified visa applicants with legitimate travel plans to the 
United States.  As well-intended as this UAE government policy 
may 
be, it nonetheless complicates efforts to identify UAE 
nationals who are potential security threats to the United 
States or 
have other visa ineligibilities. 
 
The UAE otherwise has modern, professional and secure nationality 
and identity documents and well-established procedures for 
obtaining 
and maintaining vital civil records, at least for those born 
within 
the last 30 years. Given that the modern state of the UAE only 
came 
into existence in 1971, it is more difficult to rely on any 
documents created before that date. However, almost all records 
on 
individuals and their families are now updated and established. 
UAE 
passports are ICAO compliant, and since they are valid for 5 
years, 
Post has no particular problems with older versions of the UAE 
passport. 
 
The UAE has also launched a mandatory national identity card 
program 
for all residents of the UAE. Several hundred thousand Emiratis, 
starting with those in the armed forces and the police, now have 
such cards. The identity card is scheduled to be mandatory for 
all 
residents - Emirati and TCN alike - by 2010. The ID cards carry 
all 
biometric data and fingerprints on an electronic chip and are 
intended to eventually be used as driver's licenses, for banking 
purposes, for residency status verification, and more. More 
information on the UAE national ID card can be found at the 
Emirates 
Identity Authority's website at 
http://www.emiratesid.ae/mainenglish.html. 
 
In 2003, the UAE began implementation of iris scanning at its 
airports for certain nationals. Individuals who are deported from 
the UAE, or are the subject of travel bans, are enrolled into the 
iris-scan lookout system prior to their removal/departure from 
the 
UAE. At time of entry into the UAE, travelers of certain 
nationalities are required to undergo iris scanning, and over 
30,000 
persons have been intercepted using the new technology. Iris 
scanning is also being deployed at land border crossings, and is 
currently active on the Omani border. 
 
 
¶12.  Cooperation with Host Government Authorities - Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai 
 
Generally, both posts have a good working relationship with the 
 
DUBAI 00000408  007 OF 007 
 
 
host 
government including cooperation on fraud issues as they arise. 
The 
UAEG, however, remains unresponsive to the serious passport 
place of 
birth concerns described above in paragraph 11. 
 
 
¶13.  Areas of Particular Concern - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Mission UAE again highlights the known inadequacy of the UAE 
passport in 
regards to true place of birth for UAE nationals born outside the 
UAE. (See paragraph 11.) 
 
A primary concern in IV and NIV work with Iranian applicants 
remains our limited ability to verify Iranian documents and 
information provided in interviews. Mission UAE relies on 
"Shenas Namehs" 
to confirm names, birthdates, marriages, divorces, and other 
data. 
Posts have seen several cases in which duplicate Shenas Namehs 
are 
submitted to verify identity. In many cases, Posts have found 
that 
the duplicate document does not retain the same data as the 
original and that opportunities exist for altering data. 
 
With no USG presence in Iran it is difficult to conduct research 
to 
verify suspicious information or documents. Both posts are 
concerned about 
fraud in Iranian cases and sees the potential for abuse (with 
possible security ramifications) of the U.S. immigration process. 
Mission UAE is working on improving our knowledge of Iranian 
documents. We 
are working with the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, our counterparts 
from 
other missions with presence in Iran, and with colleagues from 
other 
U.S. Missions that handle Iranian visa work to gather Iranian 
legitimate documents and analyze valid trends. Despite efforts 
made 
approximately 4 years ago to gather Iranian documents, neither 
post has 
had a set on documents against which to verify Iranian claims. 
Efforts are being made through the Swiss and the British 
Embassies 
to gather valid and current Iranian documents. 
 
Mission UAE suspects that the Iranian community has caught on 
that 
working for the Government of Iran often results in a delay of 
visa 
issuance.  Additionally, we suspect local Iranian travel agencies 
(which facilitate Iranians visiting the UAE, including 
accommodations in Dubai and transportation to Abu Dhabi) 
informally 
brief applicants on what to expect and say during visa 
interviews. 
Most recently, Mission UAE is working with CA/VO/L/C (the State 
group 
responsible for clearing Security Advisory Opinions) to clarify 
guidelines for the use of Security Advisory Opinions for Iranians 
with previous government and/ or military experience. 
 
 
¶14.  Staffing and Training - Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
 
Abu Dhabi does not have any dedicated fraud prevention staff. 
Visa 
team members - LES and officer alike - look for fraud on a 
case-by-case basis.  When the possibility of fraud is suspected, 
Post works to investigate that case.  With an Iranian- American 
IV 
Chief and 3 Iranian LES staff, much IV fraud work can be done in 
native language and by investigating original sources in Iran. 
The 
DHS Visa Security Unit provides excellent assistance on fraud 
prevention matters and provides training to our consular staff, 
UAE 
immigration, and others for the detection of fraudulent 
documents, 
travel, imposters, DHS database reviews, and the whole range of 
fraud issues. 
 
Dubai has one full-time LES NIV anti-fraud investigator who 
investigates petition-based visa cases. Post also has one 
American 
Citizen Services assistant who has participated in FSI 
anti-fraud 
training. 
SIBERELL