VZCZCXRO9577
RR RUEHCHI RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHDT #0289/01 2990448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260448Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4584
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1343
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1170
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 4135

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DS/IP/EAP AND EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC CMGT AEMR AODE ASEC TT
SUBJECT: EVACUATION EXERCISE REINFORCES AMCIT OUTREACH, EXPOSES 
SHORTCOMINGS 
 
DILI 00000289  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY: The Embassy conducted a non-combatant evacuation 
operation (NEO) exercise on October 20 as part of the MAREX 2009 
combined military exercise.  U.S. Marines evacuated three dozen 
volunteers drawn from both the Embassy and the private American 
citizen community, using CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters to 
transport them from the Embassy compound to the amphibious 
assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard.  As a result of the lessons 
learned in the exercise, the Embassy will expand its use of text 
messaging for emergency communication, will establish a proper 
warden system, and will update its F-77 list of potential 
evacuees.  Post requests Washington guidance on the hardware and 
software available for processing evacuees, a State Department 
bottleneck which fell way short of the Marines' NEO Tracking 
System.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
MAREX 2009 
 
 
 
¶2.  2500 U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine personnel deployed to 
Timor-Leste from October 13 to 23 as part of the MAREX 2009 
combined military exercise with the Defense Force of Timor-Leste 
(F-FDTL) and the Australian-led International Stabilization 
Force (ISF) (septel).  The Embassy on October 20 conducted a 
non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) exercise in order to 
test its emergency preparedness and to reinforce outreach to the 
private American citizen community.  The Consular Section 
solicited volunteers to participate in the drill as mock 
evacuees.  A total of 36 evacuees and 5 international observers 
took part in the day's events. 
 
 
 
NEO Chronology 
 
 
 
¶3.  The Embassy Compound served as the rally point for evacuees. 
 Two waves of Marines arrived at the compound via helicopter the 
morning of the drill, first to secure the area (assumed to be an 
uncertain environment due to political unrest targeted at the 
international community) and then establish an Evacuation 
Control Center (ECC).  The Embassy's RSO and Consular Officer 
worked with the NEO Site Commander to establish three stations 
inside the Embassy wall: an initial search and screening point; 
a processing center to compile the personal data of evacuees and 
to collect signed promissory notes and privacy act waivers; and 
an embarkation point to manifest evacuees onto particular 
flights.  Marines escorted evacuees from their entry on the 
compound until their departure on an evacuation flight. 
Evacuees were processed again upon arrival to the ship anchored 
offshore.  After refreshments and a brief tour, evacuees 
returned to the Embassy Compound and the drill ended. 
 
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
 
 
¶4.  The Ambassador chaired an after-action review in the days 
following the end of MAREX 2009.  In addition, the volunteer 
evacuees from the private American community provided feedback 
on the experience from their perspective.  The Embassy learned 
the following lessons and will make the following changes. 
 
 
 
¶5.  Means of Communication.  The private American community 
expressed a strong preference for receiving emergency 
information via text message and not email.  Internet access in 
the country is slow and intermittent, particularly in private 
residences, and particularly in comparison to nearly ubiquitous 
cell phone usage.  When a late change in helicopter availability 
necessitated moving the drill's start time ninety minutes 
earlier, Post sent out simultaneous notifications to the 
volunteers via text and email.  All the volunteers received the 
text and showed up for the drill on time, whereas some were 
unaware that an email had been sent.  Had communication been 
 
DILI 00000289  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
only by email, most of our private Americans would have missed 
the evacuation.  ACTION: Post will establish a text message 
listserv for all Americans in Timor-Leste and will utilize it in 
tandem with the existing email system to distribute warden 
messages and emergency information. 
 
 
 
¶6.  Means of Communication (cont.).  Post was limited in its 
communications by not having a functioning cascade-style warden 
system.  No private Americans have Embassy radios, for example, 
which forces exclusive reliance on externally-provided 
telecommunications services which could easily break down in an 
emergency.  Additionally, several evacuees expressed concern 
about transportation arrangements and would have preferred 
pooling resources with someone in their geographic area. 
ACTION: Post will endeavor to identify individuals to serve as 
wardens, particularly in remote areas unlikely to receive normal 
communications and in areas with high concentrations of 
Americans. 
 
 
 
¶7.  Substance of Communication.  Many Americans reported being 
confused by the specifics of the drill and expected to have 
clearer information in advance.  Questions included what items 
to bring with them, where to report on arrival, and where to 
park their vehicles.  The participants in the drill answered 
these questions in the process of the exercise, but their 
initial uncertainties likely mirror those of the larger American 
community at large.  ACTION: Post will compile an evacuation 
frequently-asked-questions sheet and provide it to all Americans 
at the next Amcit Town Hall meeting. 
 
 
 
¶8. Processing Station.  The Marines utilized a hardware/software 
combination it called the NEO Tracking System (NTS).  It 
consisted of multiple suitcase-sized packs with flip-up laptops 
and machine-readable passport scanners.  The packs were linked 
together wirelessly so data was instantly transferred from one 
station to the next and evacuees could move swiftly to the next 
processing station.  In contrast, our consular officer labored 
with paper-based rosters and dramatically slowed the processing 
of Amcits in order to compile our reports for CA and the crisis 
management center.  ACTION REQUEST: Post requests guidance on 
any available civilian system compatible with or comparable to 
NTS that it may deploy for its own processing of evacuees. 
Absent such a system, Post will either be a bottleneck in the 
evacuation process or it will be unable to keep Consular Affairs 
and other Washington offices adequately informed of the status 
of evacuees. 
KLEMM