VZCZCXRO1621
RR RUEHCHI RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHDT #0285/01 2890748
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160748Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4579
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1340
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0962
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1167
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1013
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1138
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 4128

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000285 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ASEC EAID TT
SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE: SECURITY SITUATION UPDATE 
 
REF: A) DILI 86, B) DILI 283 
 
DILI 00000285  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The security situation in Timor-Leste has 
improved dramatically following the political crises and 
violence in 2006, 2007, and early 2008.  Infrastructure has been 
rebuilt, the internally-displaced persons have been resettled, 
and the incidence of serious and even petty crime is low.  While 
much of this is due, of course, to the presence of international 
police and peacekeepers, significant measures have also been 
taken to professionalize the Timorese police and military and to 
delineate their respective roles.  The successful management of 
the tense security situation following the February 2008 
assassination attempts on the President and Prime Minister and 
the recent transfer of policing responsibilities in three 
districts from the United Nations to the Timorese police are 
important indications of improvement.  In addition, the ongoing 
progress in developing national security legislation and a 
national security policy is yet another positive indicator. 
That said, Timor-Leste will need to make good use of the 
"breathing space" afforded by the U.N.'s planned continued 
presence over the next three years to further strengthen its 
security institutions and ensure that the current stability is 
sustainable.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Timor-Leste has an unfortunate history of repeated 
cycles of violence and instability dating back for decades. 
Following the Timorese vote in the U.N. Popular Mandate on 
August 30, 1999, the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian 
militia unleashed a wave of widespread violence that claimed 
thousands of lives and destroyed as much as 90% of the country's 
physical infrastructure.  A mutiny by about half of the Timorese 
military, and disputes among the military and the police, led to 
another massive wave of violence in 2006 that destroyed much of 
the infrastructure that had been rebuilt since 1999, displaced 
150,000 people from their homes, and set off a nearly year-long 
period of lawlessness especially in the capital of Dili. 
Despite the redeployment of U.N. police (UNPOL) and 
international peacekeepers, additional violence accompanied the 
2007 elections and the President and the Prime Minister were the 
targets of assassination attempts in February 2008 by some of 
the disgruntled mutineers. 
 
 
 
Weathering the February 2008 Crisis 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Following the February 2008 assassination attempts, 
however, Timor-Leste has enjoyed one of its longest periods of 
peace and stability in recent history.  In the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks, the Prime Minister convened the 
Council of Ministers, reached out to the Parliament, and 
instituted a state of emergency.  State institutions responded 
effectively and an often volatile public remained calm.  Perhaps 
most significantly, the Council of Ministers mandated the 
creation of a Joint Command that integrated members of the 
Timorese military (F-FDTL) and the Timorese police (PNTL) to 
coordinate operations to apprehend the perpetrators of the 
attacks.  After the mutineers surrendered or were captured, the 
state of emergency was lifted and the Joint Command was 
disbanded.  Since then, the F-FDTL and the PNTL have enjoyed 
good relations and have even actively cooperated on certain 
issues, although accusations of human rights violations against 
members of both institutions are unfortunately raised all too 
frequently. 
 
 
 
UN Phased Handover of Police Responsibility 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Since the return of U.N. police and international 
peacekeepers in 2006, UNPOL has exercised formal responsibility 
for interim law enforcement in Timor-Leste.  UNPOL includes 
nearly 1,500 police from over 40 countries, many with limited 
law enforcement capacity, modest English language skills, and no 
 
DILI 00000285  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
knowledge of local languages or culture.  The core of UNPOL's 
force is four formed police units (FPU), detachments drawn from 
single countries numbering approximately 140 officers, from 
Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Portugal.  The FPUs are 
based in Dili, the eastern town of Baucau and the western town 
of Maliana. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) UNMIT's latest reauthorization instructed it to begin 
a phased transfer of policing responsibilities to the Timorese 
police once the PNTL in a given district demonstrated the 
ability to fulfill command responsibilities.  In particular, the 
PNTL must: (1) be able to respond appropriately to the security 
environment, (2) have at least 80 percent of its eligible 
officers certified as proficient, (3) have minimal operational 
logistical capabilities, and (4) demonstrate sufficient 
institutional stability, including proper command and control 
and acceptance by the local community.  Since the handover 
process began in May 2009, authority has been transferred in 
three of the country's 13 districts (Lautem, Oecussi, and 
Manatuto), all of which are considered especially low-threat 
areas.  Maintaining proper logistical support from Dili has 
proven the most difficult task in the first phase of the 
handover. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The second phase of the police handover is expected to 
begin by the end of the year.  It is likely to include three 
additional low-threat districts (Manufahi, Ainaro and Aileu), 
which did not have the institutional capacity to be included in 
the first batch, and Viqueque and Baucau, two eastern districts 
that are traditional hot spots of political violence.  The 
decision to move forward in Viqueque and Baucau is motivated in 
part by the UN's desire to phase out the Baucau FPU by the start 
of its next budget cycle beginning in July 2010. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) UNPOL has come under considerable criticism for its 
lack of progress in developing the institutional and human 
capacity of the PNTL despite its now three year-long mandate. 
Its inability to make more progress in professionalizing the 
PNTL partially is ascribed to UNPOL's structure: peacekeepers 
from 40 countries representing the same number of differing 
police cultures and few with the necessary skills to be 
effective training mentors.  UNPOL emphasizes that it will 
maintain a presence in the handed-over districts in order to 
provide continued operational support and to monitor the 
progress of PNTL officers.  If required, UN police could also 
resume interim law enforcement responsibilities.  The current 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Atul 
Khare has stated that UNMIT plans to remain until at least 2012 
to monitor and mentor the PNTL, a sign that the U.N. may have 
learned from its mistake of withdrawing from Timor-Leste too 
quickly after independence in 2002. 
 
 
 
The National Police of Timor-Leste 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Despite the progress that has been made, the PNTL 
continues to face challenges associated with poor resources, 
weak leadership throughout its ranks, and a legacy of 
politicization and indiscipline.  It is taking steps to overcome 
a pre-independence/post-independence generation gap but its 
recruitment process is still seen by many as partisan.  Basic 
equipment and best practices are not in place - in some 
districts, for example, officers take their weapons home because 
there is no secured armory facility.  In addition, although 
UNPOL has invested heavily in training and mentoring the PNTL in 
larger towns, some have told us that they have neglected the 
PNTL units in the remote sub-district areas leaving them less 
prepared to assume formal policing responsibilities. 
 
 
 
¶9. (U) In addition to the United Nations, the PNTL is also 
receiving considerable assistance from bilateral donors.  The 
Australian Federal Police have had a program to help strengthen 
 
DILI 00000285  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the PNTL since 2004 and have committed USD 53 million to fund 
their program from 2008 to 2010.  They have deployed 80 
capacity-builders to develop PNTL leadership and human capital, 
enhance vocational police skills and accountability, and 
implement a full range of operational policies, practices, and 
processes. In addition to providing a formed police unit to 
UNPOL, Portugal also provides extensive basic police training to 
the PNTL.  The U.S. provides extensive support to the PNTL 
through regular training opportunities at the International Law 
Enforcement Academy in Bangkok and at FBI facilities in the 
U.S., INL funding for the establishment of a computer-based 
training facility at the Dili Police Academy, and USAID support 
for a community policing project implemented by the Asia 
Foundation.  Other donors, like Japan, are also engaged with the 
PNTL on a smaller scale. 
 
 
 
The Current Situation 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Despite its history of violence and instability, the 
situation in Timor-Leste has steadily improved over the last two 
years and is remarkably stable and peaceful at this time. 
Statistics from UNPOL indicate that Timor-Leste enjoys crime 
rates that are below global averages and among the lowest in the 
region.  The number of assaults, for example, per 100,000 people 
in Timor-Leste was 169 in 2008 (compared to the worldwide 
average of 250 and 795 in the U.S. and 796 in Australia) and 
this year's statistics to date have registered a further decline 
(see ref A).  Crime rates outside of the capital city of Dili 
are even lower.  In addition, statistics and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that almost all violent crime is committed by Timorese 
against Timorese; foreigners are extremely unlikely to be 
victims of violent crime (although their conspicuous wealth may 
make them more likely to be the victims of robbery or theft). 
Reflecting the reduced threat to Americans, the Department 
removed its travel advisory on Timor-Leste in September 2008. 
Australia did the same in September 2009. 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT: President Ramos-Horta believes the 2006 
crisis marked the end of the first phase of Timor-Leste's 
experience as a post-conflict state.  Subsequent security shocks 
(after the formation of the AMP government in 2007 and the 
assassination attempts against the president and prime minister 
in February 2008) have proven progressively less destabilizing. 
The twenty months since February 2008 have been the longest 
uninterrupted period of general stability in Timor-Leste's 
history as an independent country.  The continuing drawdown of 
the UNPOL presence and that of the Australia-led International 
Security Force (ISF) is a sign of Timor-Leste's progress, but it 
will also remove an important safety net which has helped to 
discourage potential instability from breaking out.  In the last 
few months, the PNTL has performed well in maintaining order 
during the massive public celebrations for the tenth anniversary 
of the 1999 August 30 Popular Consultation and during the 
October 9 local elections throughout the country (see ref B). 
Challenges on the horizon, including the resumption of policing 
responsibilities in hot spot districts, will test Timorese 
security institutions and give an indication of the country's 
readiness to resume total control by 2012. 
KLEMM