VZCZCXRO8285
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0151/01 2860948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 130948Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1176
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0074
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1267

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/5/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA: MORE REACTION TO USG POLICY REVIEW 
 
REF: CHIANG MAI 141 (EXILES APPLAUD) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000151  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
-------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Former Thai Ambassador to Burma Poksak Nilibul told P/E 
Chief on October 5 he welcomed U.S. engagement, but opined that 
regardless of what policy the U.S. adopted, the Burmese regime 
would always have the upper hand.  The U.S. should work 
collectively with ASEAN and other interested players to build 
pressure on the regime for political reform, he argued.  Poksak 
also urged the U.S. to determine its stance on key issues (ASSK 
release, 2010 elections) now, a sentiment echoed in a separate 
meeting with Burmese exile Aung Naing Oo of the Vahu Development 
Institute. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Comment:  Our contacts' comments largely mirrored those 
from our earlier meeting with Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles 
(Reftel):  they welcomed the USG's policy review but were 
skeptical about what kind of near-term change could be expected 
from the regime; and they urged the U.S. to establish clear 
benchmarks that would guide our response to moves the regime 
would try to portray as major concessions.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
Engagement Welcome 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Following our recent discussion of the USG's Burma 
policy review with Chiang Mai based Burmese exiles (Reftel), we 
sought reaction from two additional sources.  On October 5, P/E 
Chief reviewed the conclusions of the U.S. policy review on 
Burma with former Thai Ambassador to Rangoon Poksak Nilibul. 
Poksak welcomed engagement, and asked whether U.S. engagement 
would be broad-based.  He argued that during his Ambassadorship 
(1997-2001), ASEAN's constructive engagement had been 
one-dimensional, focused exclusively on creating economic 
opportunities for ASEAN businessmen.  What Poksak advocated for 
with the Thai MFA, he asserted, was a broader engagement 
strategy that would target democratic opposition groups and 
ethnic minorities.  Unfortunately, the Ministry didn't listen to 
him, he lamented.  P/E Chief responded that while the USG was 
starting a dialogue with the regime, our goals remained 
unchanged, and we would still call on the regime to dialogue 
with the democratic opposition and ethnic minorities.  He also 
told Poksak that our Embassy in Rangoon constantly engages both 
the democratic opposition and ethnic minority groups. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In a separate meeting on October 6, the Vahu Development 
Institute's Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese exile based in Chiang Mai, 
echoed the call for broad-based engagement, encouraging the U.S. 
to establish a formal dialogue process with Burmese businessmen. 
 They are very close to the military, he pointed out, and are a 
good way for the U.S. to reach top leaders.  The USG's aim 
should be to focus on the hard-liners - they need to be 
convinced of the need to transition to democracy more than 
anyone else, he argued.  Aung Naing Oo also suggested that in 
the future, the U.S. should consider engaging working-level GOB 
officials on key issues like a transparent judiciary, security 
sector reform, and election procedures.  This engagement did not 
have to be carried out in the context of formal training, he 
opined, but could be as simple as providing speakers to address 
those topics, both inside and outside the American and Jefferson 
Centers. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
You Need a Roadmap 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000151  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Poksak repeatedly stressed the importance of the USG 
deciding where it stood on key issues early in the process.  How 
will the U.S. respond if Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) is released? 
What if the regime makes concessions on counternarcotics or 
election procedures in 2010?  Aung Naing Oo echoed these 
sentiments, saying "you need your own roadmap of sorts," and 
"you have to be prepared to respond to concessions."  That said, 
he cautioned that we should not expect much from the regime. 
They may release some political prisoners ahead of the 
elections, he asserted, and perhaps Aung San Suu Kyi will be 
allowed to campaign for the National League for Democracy, even 
though she herself cannot run. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
Engagement Alone Won't Work 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Poksak noted to us several times that "the regime has 
the upper hand."  It will only make concessions if it is in its 
self-interest to do so, he opined.  The regime will also 
continue to play countries in the region off against each other 
to get the best deal for itself, he asserted.  What the U.S. 
should do, he argued, is work with China, ASEAN, Russia, India, 
Japan and South Korea to build consensus on pressuring the 
regime to implement political reform.  "It's difficult," he 
said, but this is the best way forward.  The unfortunate truth, 
he asserted, is that the regime has the advantage no matter what 
the international community does, and it won't give it up. 
Thus, Poksak remains pessimistic about prospects for change in 
the short-term. 
MORROW