VZCZCXRO3830
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0145/01 2800419
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 070419Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1169
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1254

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/5/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND:  PM PUSHES SECRET DIALOGUE, BUT IT WON'T 
BUDGE 
 
REF: BANGKOK 2096 (DIALOGUE RESUMES) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000145  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, Consul General. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
(U)  This cable was jointly drafted by ConGen Chiang Mai and 
Embassy Bangkok. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (S)  The recently renewed secret peace dialogue between the 
RTG and southern insurgents is - despite strong support from PM 
Abhisit - making little progress, according to sources involved 
in the talks.  The two biggest confidence-building measures on 
the table - investigation of the June 8 mosque killings and 
release of an imprisoned Muslim spiritual leader - are both 
stalled in the RTG machinery.  Moreover, Abhisit and RTA 
Commander Anupong continue to be at odds over the utility of the 
dialogue.  In the meantime, more modest CBMs are under 
consideration, such as forming an academic study group to 
examine reconciliation issues and conducting a joint development 
project in the South.  The last round of talks was in 
mid-August; the next round is expected no earlier than November, 
in hopes this would provide sufficient time for forward movement 
on the stalled issues.  Two key members of the Thai team engaged 
us on how they believe U.S. assistance to civil society in the 
South could make a positive contribution in building 
continuencies in support of dialogue, while warning of the need 
to proceed carefully due to numerous sensitive issues. 
 
 
 
¶2. (S)  Comment:  The resumption of the secret dialogue over the 
summer, while welcome, has not been particularly fruitful.  On 
the insurgent side, questions remain about the extent to which 
its participants in the talks (nearly all exiles) speak with one 
voice, and can speak for insurgent commanders on the ground.  On 
the government side, the RTG's ability to move the process 
forward is hamstrung by broad national political dynamics and 
military commander perspectives on the situation in the South, 
which conspire to leave Abhisit rather alone in pushing toward a 
political solution through dialogue, unwilling or unable to use 
the power of his office.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
PM Pushing, But Dialogue Won't Budge 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶3. (S)  Bangkok PolCounselor touched base with HD Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)  representative Michael Vatikiotis 
September 30 on the margins of a  conference on Political and 
Extremist Islam in Southeast Asia convened by the Open Source 
Center. Vatikiotis said he had met September 29 with PM Abhisit 
and Deputy Democrat Party leader/South activist Kraisak 
Choonhaven to talk about the recently renewed HDC-brokered talks 
between the RTG and insurgents in southern Thailand (Reftel). 
The good news was that Abhisit remained very much on top of 
developments and committed to pushing a policy of dialogue 
forward.  Unfortunately, Abhisit indicated that RTA Commander 
Anupong Paochinda was not at all on board with the dialogue 
approach.  Vatikiotis' impression was that Abhisit was rather 
alone at the top, and either unwilling or unable to use the 
power of the office of the PM. 
 
 
 
¶4. (S)  In an effort to bring the army in as a stakeholder, 
Vatikiotis reported, Abhisit has asked retired General Kasem, 
formerly a 4th area (South) army commander and current Anupong 
advisor, to join the RTG dialogue team led by Payap University's 
Mark Tamthai, with Kraisak and NSC staffer Somkiat Boonchu as 
the other members.  A gambit to make a gesture to the insurgents 
by releasing from prison Muslim spiritual leader Baba Betong has 
stalled, with Kraisak indicating that the Justice Minister may 
be the subject of a scandal to break publicly soon.  But the 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000145  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
biggest stumbling block for moving forward with dialogue was the 
lack of accountability for the June 8 mosque killings, with the 
sole subject of an arrest warrant having vanished.  Abhisit 
reportedly confirmed that the RTG believed Royal Aide de Camp 
General Naphol was protecting "his man," but that there was no 
higher cover.  (Note:  Since General Naphol oversees the 
Queen-sponsored Village Defense Force project in the South, 
there has been speculation regarding direction of VDF 
activities.  We have heard separately from a palace official 
associated with the Queen, M.L. Anuporn Kashemsant, that the 
Queen sent signals to PM Abhisit for the investigation into the 
mosque attack to proceed/justice be served without regard to the 
position of those implicated.  End Note). 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
Key CBMs Stalled 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (S)  Tamthai echoed Vatikiotis' concerns in a separate 
conversation with Chiang Mai CG on October 2.  He expressed 
frustration at the RTG's lack of movement on what he considers 
to be the two primary confidence-building measures on the table: 
 
 
 
--  June 8 mosque attack investigation.  The sole subject of an 
arrest warrant has yet to be found by law enforcement 
authorities.  The suspect, a military informant, was "clearly 
being hidden and protected" by General Naphol, Tamthai said.  He 
observed that the RTG's inability to deliver accountability for 
these killings signaled to the insurgent "movement" that there 
were certain people who were above the law and could act with 
impunity in the South.   As a result, the movement had little 
choice but to draw one of two unfortunate conclusions:  either 
the RTG was not serious about its talk of pursuing a political 
reconciliation with the insurgency; or the RTG was indeed 
serious but could not deliver. 
 
 
 
--  Prisoner release.  The possible release of Baba Betong 
remained mired in legal process and complications (see Reftel). 
Tamthai said it was hard to cut through all this because the 
secrecy of the dialogue meant the NSC could not be forthright 
with the justice bureaucracy about why the release needed to be 
done.  As a result, the judicial officials involved in the 
matter were dragging their feet. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Lesser CBMs Under Consideration 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (S)  With movement on the key confidence-building measures 
stalled, Tamthai described two more modest measures that the 
parties to the talks were pursuing: 
 
 
 
--  Academic study group/Track II approach.  At the last round 
of talks on August 14, the parties agreed to name three or so 
scholars from each "side" to form a group that study the broad, 
long-term issues involved with reconciliation.  The group's 
findings would be publicized, perhaps via a conference.  Tamthai 
would chair the group and select the "Thai" members, whereas the 
movement would select its representatives - presumably ethnic 
Malay Muslim scholars who lived in the South, spoke Thai well, 
and were free to travel. 
 
 
 
--  Joint development project.  At the August talks, the sides 
agreed to shift away from earlier discussions of a pilot 
cease-fire in Yala province and instead look at formulating a 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000145  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
large joint development project.  Both sides lacked confidence 
that the Yala cease-fire could succeed, given its large 
territorial scale and doubts that cease-fire violators could be 
held accountable by either side.  As an alternative, the sides 
were contemplating a development project in the South that would 
marry RTG resources with local community involvement - and be 
backed by a local cease-fire in the locality of the project 
activity.  Both sides' stake in seeing the development project 
succeed would help ensure the cease-fire was honored.  According 
to Tamthai, the King's Royal Project was ready to engage in the 
effort, which would help solidify RTG and RTA support for it. 
 
 
 
¶7. (S)  Tamthai said the next round of talks would not take 
place until November at the earliest, in hopes that this would 
provide sufficient time for movement not only on the study group 
and development project ideas, but also on the larger issues of 
the mosque attack investigation and prisoner release. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
Abhisit, Anupong Not on Same Page 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶8. (S)  Again echoing Vatikiotis' concerns, Tamthai said that 
relations between PM Abhisit and RTA Commander Anupong on the 
South issue were "not good."  Whereas in previous discussions 
with CG over the last 18 months Tamthai had spoken favorably of 
Anupong's open-mindedness toward a non-military solution to the 
southern insurgency, this time he said Anupong "has changed." 
In contrast to Anupong's previous comments to Tamthai that he 
was "just a soldier" and willing to follow the civilian 
leadership's direction on the political strategy of the southern 
issue, Tamthai now felt Anupong had become more politicized and 
willing to take a stand on strategic political issues.   Tamthai 
also asserted that the vast majority of RTA officers in the 
South were convinced that a military solution was not possible - 
but none were willing to convey this up the chain of command to 
Anupong. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
Tamthai, NSC's Somkiat on Civil Society Role, U.S. Assistance 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (S)  In a break from previous practice of meeting separately 
in Chiang Mai, Tamthai joined the NSC's Somkiat Boonchu for a 
September 25 meeting in Bangkok with PolCouns, USAID Regional 
Director, and USAID Program officer, acknowledging his dual role 
engaging on southern issues as peace studies professor (openly) 
and facilitator for "dialogue for all sides" (secretly, under 
NSC direction).  Somkiat and Tamthai convened the meeting to 
discuss the implications for their southern dialogue efforts of 
the recent USAID Request for Proposal (RFP) for bids to provide 
nation-wide assistance to independent organizations and civil 
society, as well as to support peace-building in the South. 
 
 
 
¶10. (S)  Somkiat and Tamthai suggested the proposed U.S. 
assistance program could make a positive contribution by 
empowering local community leaders in the deep south to become 
part of the process and solution, by raising their voice/profile 
in decision-making and sharing responsibility for what happens 
in their communities.  While the ten southern representatives on 
the 2006 National Reconciliation Commission would be a useful 
starting point for engagement, a "walk and talk" would be 
required to reach out and engage the local community elders. 
 
 
 
¶11. (S)  Somkiat and Tamthai warned, however, that the release 
of the RFP had created quite a stir, turning elements of civil 
society against each other as different bidders competed to 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000145  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
assemble teams, including attempted poaching from existing civil 
society organizations (CSOs).  While the proposal could build a 
constituency for dialogue, it also potentially cut across some 
very sensitive issues, such as their secret dialogue.  Tamthai 
explained that the proposal also fell along a fault line of 
Bangkok-based academics and CSOs versus southern communities, 
which resented those who parachuted in from Bangkok; southerners 
feared the USAID proposal could be a vehicle for Bangkok-based 
actors rather than local empowerment. (Note:  We have heard 
similar fears from two other contacts with extensive networks 
across the deep south.  End Note).  Tamthai said he would engage 
150 southern civil society representatives at an upcoming 
seminar in Hat Yai about their possible value-added role in 
peace-building activities. 
MORROW