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Viewing cable 09BRIDGETOWN622, C-AL9-01941) LEADERSHIP PROFILE: ST. VINCENT PM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRIDGETOWN622 2009-10-08 12:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Bridgetown
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWN #0622/01 2811249
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081249Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7838
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000622 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 
TAGS: PINR INRB PREL PGOV XL
SUBJECT: (C-AL9-01941) LEADERSHIP PROFILE: ST. VINCENT PM 
RALPH GONSALVES 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires D. Brent Hardt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C/NF) Politically rooted in 1970s leftist movements, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines' Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves is 
a pragmatic ideologue with a strong populist bent.  He has 
the charisma and political savvy needed to keep himself in 
power for years to come, though his popularity is gradually 
eroding.  "Comrade Ralph's" ties to Venezuela and the ALBA 
grouping as well as Cuba are close and built on both 
pragmatic economic interest and a healthy measure of populist 
spirit and socialist ideology.  His nascent relations with 
Iran appear to be more mercenary, but nevertheless bear 
scrutiny.  Gonsalves can be expected to work with us on 
common issues of concern, while at the same time taking 
public potshots at us to highlight his leftist credentials 
and rile up his domestic base.  Despite his affection for 
Chavez, fears that he could be in danger of becoming a Chavez 
puppet are overblown.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Rising to and Staying at the Top 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (C/NF) After becoming Prime Minister in 2001, following a 
lengthy political career in the opposition that included 
serving as legal counsel for some key Vincentian drug 
runners, Ralph Gonsalves moved methodically to establish a 
vertically-oriented government in which virtually all 
decision making comes to his desk and opposing viewpoints are 
not warmly embraced.  Easily the most intelligent and 
charismatic of Eastern Caribbean leaders, Gonsalves is a 
highly educated lawyer (and self-proclaimed legal scholar) 
with excellent political instincts and a style of interaction 
based on pragmatic self-interest -- "self" being defined as 
himself, his party, and his country in that order.  He is 
also a known philanderer, with numerous stories of sexual 
harassment and sexual assaults trailing him. Two rape cases 
against him appeared to have been foiled only by his ability 
to control the office of the Public Prosecutor.  "Comrade 
Ralph" remains popular with his base and, with St. Vincent's 
political opposition mostly emasculated by lack of leadership 
and money, he remains secure in his seat. 
 
3. (C/NF) Opposition figures and some in civil society see 
him more darkly, as the head of a centralized political 
system exercising near-dictatorial control over all aspects 
of Vincentian politics and economy.  Some of this is 
overblown rhetoric born of frustration with the inability of 
the opposition to mount any real challenge to Gonsalves' 
party, but there are kernels of truth as well:  St. Vincent 
is littered with relatives and former close friends of 
Gonsalves' who have lost positions in government or "kitchen 
cabinet" jobs for disagreeing with him on economic policy 
issues.  In a similar vein, it is undisputed that Gonsalves 
abused his position as National Security Minister and his 
personal relationship with the Public Prosecutor to 
circumvent the rule of law and ensure that rape charges were 
never filed against him.  Gonsalves has effectively secured a 
firm grip on the press by intimidating media outlets that 
challenge him in any way through litigation.  Gonsalves has 
sued successfully at least one such outlet, and trepidation 
amongst Vincentian media professionals has resulted in a 
measure of self-censorship. 
 
4. (C/NF) Currently, Gonsalves' main and ultimate objective, 
one he feels could define his premiership and secure his 
place in history, is to redefine St. Vincent's relationship 
with the British Commonwealth by redrafting the constitution. 
 He has called a referendum on a new constitution for 
November 25, but will need a nearly impossible two-thirds 
majority to win the referendum.  Despite the floundering 
opposition,s inability to mount an effective 
campaign,securing two-thirds support for the broad range of 
changes Gonsalves is seeking is a tall order )- probably too 
tall even for Gonsalves.  That he would pursue such far 
reaching changes and put his political capital on the line 
reflects one of Prime Minister Gonsalves, dichotomies:  at 
one level he is ambitious and self interested, while at 
another level, he is a disinterested academic and theorist 
willing to risk a short-term political loss for what he sees 
as fundamental political change in the region.  For while the 
constitutions the Eastern Caribbean were bequeathed at 
independence (modeled on the New Zealand constitution) have 
served the region relatively well, there are elements that 
could benefit from change.  For example, Gonsalves has 
proposed a hybrid system that would add a proportional 
representation system to the first past the post system that 
 
tends to generate lopsided parliamentary majorities unhealthy 
to democracy.  He is also seeking to move St. Vincent to the 
Caribbean Court of Justice from the UK Privy Council )- a 
long-overdue change that even the Privy Council has recently 
advocated. 
 
----------------- 
Out of Left Field 
----------------- 
 
5. (C/NF) Gonsalves is, among all the Eastern Caribbean 
leaders, the one most closely aligned philosophically with 
the leftist-populist "Chavista" crowd.  He attends most of 
the PetroCaribe, ALBA, and related meetings, and is regularly 
pictured with Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Raul Castro, and 
Daniel Ortega.  He has even taken on a sort of apprentice in 
Dominica PM Roosevelt Skerrit, who we suspect he egged into 
joining ALBA before St. Vincent to gauge regional reactions 
before moving forward to join himself.  Gonsalves has 
publicly supported ALBA and PetroCaribe, sent Vincentian 
defense forces to march in the ALBA summit parade, and taken 
potshots at the U.S. and the global financial system at will. 
 He even penned a slanderous letter to other CARICOM Prime 
Ministers supporting wild accusations made by Chavez and 
briefed by Venezuela,s ambassador to St. Vincent that the 
U.S. government was backing a plot to assassinate him -- a 
letter that surprised both his CARICOM colleagues and the U.S. 
 
6. (C/NF) Despite these personal political leanings, when it 
comes to foreign relations, Gonsalves is eminently practical. 
 He knows his country needs money, and he knows his party 
needs money to support the public infrastructure programs 
that bring jobs and buy votes.  He is not shy about reaching 
out to "non-traditional" sources of funding, to include Iran 
and Libya, to support these projects.  At the same time, 
Gonsalves has expressed his own reservations about Venezuela 
and the PetroCaribe arrangement.  He told PolOff in an August 
meeting that he suspects Venezuelan oil subsidies would not 
last forever, noting a recent PetroCaribe price hike, and 
hinted that he would attempt to stockpile reserves in case 
the situation worsened. 
 
7. (C/NF) Gonsalves has pledged to us privately that he will 
not participate in any military component of ALBA and insists 
he sees it only as a funding source in bad economic times. 
Similarly, he has worked hard to reassure us that, despite 
his decision to establish relations with Iran, he is only 
interested in whatever money Iran can bring to the table for 
his pet airport project.  He explained to the Ambassador in 
2008 that St. Vincent pursues a "mature" policy with respect 
to relations with Iran and other countries )- meaning that 
he believes himself capable of managing such relations in the 
best interests of his country without doing the bidding of 
other countries.  He points out that many U.S. allies have 
relations with Iran and questions why we believe smaller 
friends such as St. Vincent should be subject to a different 
standard.  He can probably be taken at face value as far as 
his intentions with Iran go, but it remains uncertain if a 
country with such porous borders and thinly stretched police 
forces will be able to maintain adequate checks on such a 
relationship.  As for Venezuela, his support for ALBA and 
PetroCaribe will continue to the last dollar these programs 
provide him.  The rest is all platitudes:  Gonsalves is not a 
Chavista satellite and will not become one.  He genuinely 
believes he can secure handouts from whoever will provide 
them and still maintain his freedom of action.  That is why, 
despite his ideological orientation, he nevertheless 
maintains ties with Taiwan instead of China )- he is happy 
with the Taiwanese and not willing to derail the gravy train. 
 
------------------------- 
Gonsalves as U.S. Partner 
------------------------- 
 
8. (C/NF) In keeping with this pragmatic approach to foreign 
relations, Gonsalves continues to work closely with us even 
as he uses the U.S. and the "colonial powers" as a foil to 
play to his foreign leftist audience and his hard core 
domestic base.  Gonsalves has agreed to sign on to a PSI 
Shipboarding Agreement, his counter-drug forces work closely 
with USG counterparts, his security forces are among our most 
reliable clients for training programs, and his financial 
intelligence unit was the first in the region to use asset 
forfeiture laws.  Privately, he has praised the historic, 
cultural and commercial ties shared by St. Vincent and the 
U.S., and has conveyed privately and publicly his admiration 
for President Obama.  Moreover, despite being blindsided by a 
poorly documented ranking in the most recent TIP report, 
Gonsalves has also pledged to work with the Department to 
address potential human trafficking concerns in St. Vincent, 
and is looking forward to additional engagement by G/TIP in 
 
the near future.  Gonsalves has adeptly walked a fine line 
between populist, occasionally anti-US rhetoric to bolster 
himself locally while maintaining good relations with us on 
security and law enforcement issues.  He knows we are his 
most reliable strategic partner and an important source of 
investment, tourists and trade, and he is unlikely to do 
anything to damage that relationship. 
HARDT