VZCZCXRO0236
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0455/01 2991603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 261603Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0223
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0263

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD PASS TO OSD/P 
STATE PASS TO EUR/CE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/26/2019 
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR BIH LO AF
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETING WITH SLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER LAJCAK: 
GOOD NEWS ON AFGHANISTAN, CONCERNS ABOUT BOSNIA 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000455  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., State. 
 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
1.(C) SUMMARY:  In an October 22 meeting prior to the opening of 
the Bratislava NATO defense ministerial, FM Lajcak told ASD 
Vershbow that the Slovaks would use the ministerial to announce 
a 150-soldier increase in their troop strength in Afghanistan 
(to 400), as well as the lifting of most -- but not all -- of 
the caveats under which their forces now operate.  Lajcak also 
reviewed a laundry list of European security issues, expressing 
deep personal concerns about the situation in Bosnia, citing a 
`window of opportunity' on Macedonia, and expressing the hope 
that the preparation of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept 
would be transparent and inclusive, giving countries such as 
Slovakia a real voice in the drafting process.  Vershbow 
welcomed the Slovak decisions on Afghanistan, reassured Lajcak 
that the U.S. was committed to all NATO allies contributing to 
the new Strategic Concept, and agreed with the Slovak foreign 
minister on the importance of managing NATO-Russia relations 
well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) Slovak Foreign Minister Lajcak opened his October 22 
meeting with visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow by 
expressing Slovakia's appreciation for Vice President Biden's 
ongoing trip to Central Europe; he said that the Vice 
President's public statements -- including the speech he had 
just delivered in Bucharest -- were sending `all the right 
messages' to the region.  He particularly welcomed Biden's 
recognition that the CEE countries are no longer transitional, 
but have now become solid, `normal' members of the western 
community.  Lajcak said `it's now our turn to demonstrate that 
you made a good investment' in Central Europe.  He added that 
this was the message he was hearing from both President Obama 
and the Vice President Biden, and Slovakia took this message to 
heart. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) In this regard, Slovakia intended to use the NATO defense 
ministerial to announce an increase in its troop commitment of 
approximately 150 soldiers, raising its total contribution to 
¶400.  The Slovaks also intended to lift most (albeit not all) 
caveats on the deployment of those troops.  Defense Minister 
Baska would discuss the details on October 23, but Lajcak said 
the increase would include creating a Slovak-led OMLT, as well 
as providing patrol units and "multi-task" troops who could 
provide protection for Slovak engineering units, who will now be 
allowed to leave the bases to which they had previously been 
restricted.  Lajcak said Prime Minister Fico was not yet 
prepared to allow "combat units" (meaning Special Forces acting 
independently from support of Slovak engineers) until after the 
June 2010 Slovak parliamentary elections, fearing that such a 
move would be used against him by the opposition.  Vershbow 
welcomed the immediate Slovak decision, and also urged them to 
continue to expand both the size and scope of their mission once 
a new government was in place in 2010. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) With regard to NATO's next Strategic Concept, Lajcak 
welcomed new SYG Rasmussen's approach, but emphasized that the 
preparation and drafting of the documents needs to be 
"transparent and inclusive."  Given that not all NATO members 
are represented on former-Secretary of State Albright's team of 
experts, he said it would be unwise simply to present the NAC 
with a "final" document for approval.  The entire NAC -- meaning 
all NATO Allies -- needs to be fully involved in the development 
of the new Strategic Concept throughout the process; otherwise 
he feared that NATO would face the same problems the EU did when 
it presented its ill-fated European Constitution to member 
states, many of whom did not feel they had been adequately 
involved in the drafting.  Vershbow responded that ex-Secretary 
Albright well understood the needs of Central Europeans, and he 
said the U.S. agreed that all Allies should have a hand in 
preparing the new Strategic Concept.  He said the U.S. also 
supported SYG Rasmussen's overall approach to reforming Alliance 
structures, which we hope will lead to budgetary savings. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Lajcak noted that the Strategic Concept drafters will be 
hard-pressed to find the right balance between Article 5 
commitments and NATO's out-of-area commitments and needs, 
particularly given the divergent views of Allies (e.g., Poland 
and the Baltic states vs. older members).  He suggested that the 
exercise might also provide a good opportunity to increase 
cooperation and communications with NATO's international 
partners, particularly the UN and EU.  He opined that it was 
`insane' not to have official communications channels between 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000455  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
NATO and the EU.  Vershbow agreed and noted the renewed efforts 
the U.S. was putting into seeking a Cyprus solution that would 
-- by extension -- permit greater NATO-EU communications.  On 
Article 5, Vershbow assured Lajcak that the U.S. was equally 
committed to finding the right balance between expeditionary 
missions and core Alliance security requirements. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) On Russia, Lajcak suggested that the U.S. and NATO take 
Moscow's actions at face value, not adopting policies that were 
either reflexively pro-Russian or anti-Russian.  The Alliance 
needed to be open with and to Moscow, but without compromising 
our core principles.  We need Russian cooperation on difficult 
issues such as Afghanistan, piracy, terrorism and Iran, and thus 
we need pragmatic, open relations.  But Russia cannot be given a 
veto over NATO membership decisions, Lajcak insisted, nor can it 
assume a renewed sphere of influence in the old Soviet space. 
Lajcak noted that he had been in Moscow just before the U.S. 
announced its new approach to missile defense (which, he added, 
the Slovaks welcomed as addressing the needs of all Allies), and 
found his Russian interlocutors in a relatively positive mood 
vis-a-vis NATO and the U.S.  Vershbow said the U.S. was 
encouraged but realistic about the Moscow's response to the 
President's decision on missile defense, and noted that we were 
seeking to implement the Obama-Medvedev agreement to conduct a 
common threat assessment with the Russians.  The big question, 
Vershbow continued, was whether the Russians would be able to 
acknowledge that Iran presented a real threat; even now they 
were offering mixed signals on sanctions.  Lajcak agreed, noting 
that the Russians wanted it both ways on Iran, but he opined 
that waiting for Iran to actually create a nuclear warhead would 
be much too late for all concerned. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) On NATO's `open door' policy, Lajcak suggested that the 
recent Greek elections have opened a window of opportunity for 
bringing Macedonia into the Alliance sooner than anticipated. 
He said the Greek government was signaling that it was open to a 
quick compromise on Macedonia's name as it begins its new term 
from a position of relative strength; the longer we wait, the 
more difficult it will be.  On MAP for Montenegro, Lajcak was 
also quite positive and said Slovakia supports it; Montenegro is 
now a `normal' country, whose small size shouldn't matter. 
Lajcak also leaned toward early MAP for Bosnia, even if the 
country doesn't meet all the criteria, given the positive 
political signal it would send to a number of different 
audiences. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Continuing on Bosnia, Lajcak -- the former UN/EU high 
representative there -- noted that he had just returned from a 
trip to the Balkans with Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Carl 
Bildt.  He opined that the political situation was worse than 
when he (Lajcak) left Sarajevo in mid-winter to take over the 
Slovak MFA.  The Bosniaks were frustrated by the EU's position 
on visa liberalization, and believe the Serbs are effectively 
preventing them from getting NATO MAP status.  The Republika 
Srbska leadership is -- according to Lajcak -- generally 
supportive of MAP, but the ethnic Serbian population is not. 
Putting objective criteria aside, giving MAP to Bosnia would be 
a powerful political signal that NATO should consider.  And we 
should be cautious, he added, about any linking of MAP for 
Western Balkan states to the separate path Ukraine and Georgia 
are following.  To delay Montenegro and Bosnia because of 
Ukraine and Georgia would, in effect, be giving the Russians 
undue power over the Western Balkans and NATO's own 
decision-making.  Statements such as that by Ukraine's former 
Acting Foreign Minister that MAP for Montenegro would be a 
`hostile act' shouldn't be given undue weight; otherwise Ukraine 
would be holding other prospective members hostage. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Vershbow agreed that the former Soviet space -- 
particularly questions involving Ukraine and Georgia, but 
extending eastward -- was `still scratchy' and problematic. 
NATO needed to keep the "open door" open, and we were certainly 
encouraging the Macedonians to make every effort with the Greeks 
to reach an accommodation on the name issue.  We need to keep 
working on Ukraine and Georgia, with their `functional 
equivalent' of MAP, but recognize how tricky the issues are 
vis-a-vis Russia; Vershbow pointed to the Black Sea Fleet issue 
as one example of a festering problem that Moscow seeks to 
exploit. 
 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000455  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) With regard to Bosnia, Vershbow acknowledge U.S. 
worries, and asked whether Lajcak was serious about Dodik's 
willingness to endorse MAP for Bosnia.  Lajcak said that Dodik 
was indeed in favor of MAP and eventual NATO membership, but his 
constituency still was not.  Nor was Dodik so committed that he 
would put NATO ahead of other, domestic issues.  Lajcak lamented 
that the sides in Bosnia were now further apart than we left the 
High Representative in March to become Slovak foreign minister. 
We are without sticks or carrots, he suggested, and the status 
quo suits the ethnic Serbs' needs at present.  Taking something 
-- like MAP -- away as a `punishment' was not going to have an 
effect, and would only further isolate the country.  He 
therefore encouraged early MAP as a way to wrap Bosnia a bit 
more closely into Europe, perhaps giving Dodik some additional 
cover for further work within the ethnic Serb community. 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) On Georgia and Ukraine, Lajcak said that in recent 
meetings he found the Georgian foreign minister more realistic 
than his (just replaced) Ukrainian counterpart, who seemed to be 
seeking `something spectacular' in advance of the Ukrainian 
presidential elections.  Vershbow agreed that the Georgians were 
more realistic and better understood the constraints, pointing 
to their acceptance of a gradual step-by-step approach to 
security assistance that started with training, doctrine 
development and military education to promote reform of the 
armed forces before weapons acquisition could be considered. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) Turning to Kosovo in response to Vershbow's query about 
recognition, Lajcak confirmed that Bratislava would not be 
granting formal recognition `within the next year or two' given 
political realities in Slovakia.  But he assured Vershbow that 
Slovakia would be `practical and pragmatic,' noting that he had 
taken a number of steps as foreign minister to make the 
Slovakia-Kosovo relationship more normal (e.g., accepting Kosovo 
passports, accepting IMF and World Bank membership).  Lajcak 
also noted that Slovakia actually wanted to slow down the 
reduction of Slovak forces in KFOR; he said he thought a 
drawdown from 140 to two was too precipitous and sent the wrong 
political signal.  Thus, the Slovaks would be working within 
NATO to slow down their withdrawal so that they retained a more 
appropriate proportion of forces there over the coming years. 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) On Serbia, Vershbow explained that the Southern European 
Defense Ministers (SEDM) had just agreed to accept Serbia as a 
full member along with Montenegro, despite some concerns about 
Belgrade blocking future Kosovo membership; the U.S. supported 
this, however, as a step in encouraging Serbia's integration in 
the Euro-Atlantic community.  Lajcak welcomed the move, noting 
that the Serbs could act pragmatically; he pointed to a recent 
Visegrad Four event in Budapest at which the V4 found a formula 
that permitted both Serbia and Kosovo to attend and sit at the 
same table.  The key Lajcak said, was to focus on substance, not 
symbols, as well moved forward with reintegrating Serbia into 
Europe. 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT:  ASD Vershbow's October 21-22 bilateral 
program -- prior to the formal opening of the Bratislava 
informal NATO defense ministerial -- was an extremely useful 
opportunity for us to engage with key Slovak international 
security and foreign policy interlocutors.  In addition to his 
meeting with Lajcak, Vershbow saw Political Director Slobodnik, 
Chief of Defense Staff General Bulik, and MOD Secretary General 
Demetrian.  He also met with an influential group of 
non-governmental foreign and security policy experts (on the 
margins of a Slovak Atlantic Commission conference at which he 
also spoke), and effectively engaged with the press on issues 
such as missile defense, Afghanistan, and the future of NATO. 
 
 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT, continued:  Slovak officials such as Lajcak -- 
as well as Deputy Prime Minister Kalinak and Defense Minister 
Baska (who met with Secretary Gates, septel) -- generally take a 
solid, Atlanticist line in their dealings with U.S. and NATO 
officials.   And on many issues they cooperate closely with us. 
But they often find themselves having to walk back Prime 
Minister Fico's loose rhetoric, as they did October 22-23 
following Fico's unsolicited statement to the press that he 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000455  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
would "never agree to locate any element of the missile defense 
system in Slovakia."  Lajcak, in his meeting with Vershbow, 
shook his head wearily as he sought to explain his PM's comments 
as referring to "sovereign prerogatives," while reiterating -- 
as did Kalinak with Secretary Gates -- that Slovakia fully 
supported and endorsed the new U.S. scheme as a valuable NATO 
project. 
 
 
 
¶15. (U) This telegram was cleared by ASD/ISA Vershbow. 
EDDINS