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Viewing cable 09BEIJING2968, DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S SEPT 29, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING2968 2009-10-26 00:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO0668
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2968/01 2990042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260042Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6602
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002968 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2029 
TAGS: OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL MNUC ECON KS KN
JP, IR, CH 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S SEPT 29, 2009 
CONVERSATION WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER YANG JIECHI 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1. 
4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (SBU) September 29, 2009; 2:30 p.m.; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Beijing 
 
2.  (SBU) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
The Deputy Secretary 
Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing 
Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State 
Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI 
Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense 
Sung Kim, Special Envoy to the Six Party Talks 
Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary 
Gregory May, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker) 
James Brown, Interpreter 
 
CHINA 
----- 
 
Yang Jiechi, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Zheng Zeguang, Director General, Department of North American 
and Oceanian Affairs, MFA 
Zhang Kunsheng, Director General, Protocol Department, MFA 
Ding Xiaowen, Deputy Director General, Department of North 
American and Oceanian Affairs, MFA 
 
3. (C) SUMMARY:  In a September 29 meeting with Chinese 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the Deputy Secretary stressed 
the urgency of the Iran nuclear issue and the importance of 
the P5-plus-1 showing a united front to Iran.  FM Yang said 
the P5-plus-1 should "go the extra mile" to send a positive 
signal to Iran at the October 1 Geneva talks.  The P5-plus-1 
should be willing to discuss regional issues in Geneva 
provided Iran engaged on the nuclear question.  FM Yang 
reiterated PRC desire for a diplomatic solution and praised 
the United States' willingness to engage with Iran.  The 
Deputy Secretary said the United States was open to a 
diplomatic resolution but Iran had to take steps to build 
confidence and transparency and put itself on a different 
path.  FM Yang offered a positive assessment of U.S.-China 
relations and urged greater cooperation on transnational and 
global issues.  China was looking forward to President 
Obama's visit and hoped the United States would create a 
"good atmosphere" by recognizing China's concerns over 
Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and trade protection.  On climate 
change and the Copenhagen summit, FM Yang said China hoped 
the issue would not be politicized and the United States and 
the world would recognize China's sincere efforts.  The 
Deputy Secretary stressed that the United States and China 
should work together to make Copenhagen a success.  FM Yang 
praised the success of the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh and 
U.S.-China cooperation in responding to the financial crisis. 
 The Deputy Secretary said the United States hoped China, 
Japan and South Korea would coordinate policy on North Korea 
at their upcoming October 10 trilateral meeting.  End Summary. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
4. (C) In a September 29 meeting with Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi, the Deputy Secretary stressed that 
events of the past several days had crystallized the 
importance of the Iran nuclear issue.  The P5-plus-1 foreign 
ministers statement issued at UNGA was very important, and 
the United States valued China's role in creating the 
statement.  The P5 had to continue to work together and 
present a united front to Iran.  The next few weeks would be 
critical.  The United States would not shut itself off from a 
diplomatic solution and would come to the P5-plus-1 talks 
with Iran in Geneva October 1 with proposals for concrete 
steps that Iran could take to build confidence and 
transparency.  Iran had to be serious about a diplomatic 
solution and take the necessary steps.  The United States 
realized that reaching a long-term resolution would take 
time, but Iran had to act now to set itself on a different 
path. 
 
BEIJING 00002968  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5. (C) FM Yang noted that Presidents Obama and Hu had 
discussed Iran at their last meeting and China understood the 
importance of the issue to the United States.  The P5-plus-1 
statement at UNGA, FM Yang said, was "good and balanced" and 
sent the right signal to Iran and the international 
community.  China looked forward to a good start to the 
Geneva discussions October 1.  The Iranians were a "clever 
people" and the "heart of the issue must be handled 
properly."  Iran was a regional power and an important 
country in the Middle East, and Iran wanted to discuss 
regional issues in Geneva.  China believed such issues could 
be addressed provided the nuclear issue was also discussed. 
All sides should "go the extra mile" to send a positive 
signal to Iran and see what the response was.  China agreed 
to a dual-track approach to Iran, but ultimately there had to 
be a diplomatic solution.  Sanctions, could only work up to a 
point.  Hopefully, FM Yang continued, the Geneva talks would 
stir up internal discussions inside Iran given the Obama 
Administration's openness to engagement. 
 
Bilateral Relations and POTUS Visit 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Deputy Secretary said Presidents Obama and Hu had 
established a strong personal relationship and President 
Obama was excited about his upcoming visit to China.  The 
center of gravity in the bilateral relationship had shifted 
from what came between us to how the United States and China 
could work together.  The Deputy Secretary said both sides 
should increase work on nonproliferation and preparations for 
the nuclear security summit next spring. 
 
7. (C) FM Yang commented that the two presidents had had a 
good meeting on the margins of UNGA and noted that the 
session had gone over the scheduled time.  The two sides now 
had to carry out the consensus reached by Presidents Obama 
and Hu.  The United States and China should intensify 
interaction on transnational issues like climate change, the 
G-20, and Security Council reform.  There should first be a 
"meeting of the minds" on Security Council reform before the 
issue could go forward, and the United States and China 
should consult each other "from time to time."  In an 
environment of increasing globalization, the information age, 
climate change, and the financial crisis, the U.S.-China 
relationship had to be anchored by cooperation on critical 
international and global issues.  The two sides, FM Yang 
said, had to transcend ideological barriers and take a new 
approach to transnational issues. 
 
Need "Good Atmosphere" on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. (C) China, FM Yang continued, was looking forward to 
President Obama's state visit and wanted to make it as 
substantive as possible.  The visit would offer a chance to 
discuss climate change, the financial crisis, and "hot spot 
issues."  FM Yang stressed that Taiwan, Tibet, East Turkestan 
independence (Xinjiang), and trade protection were issues of 
"major, major concern to China."  China hoped to have a "good 
atmosphere" for President Obama's state visit.  This, FM Yang 
added, could make a difference in furthering the relationship. 
 
Climate Change 
-------------- 
 
9. (C) FM Yang said China hoped the climate change issue 
would not be politicized.  China believed in taking "common 
but differentiated" responsibility, and the United States and 
China needed to make a positive and collaborative signal on 
climate change during President Obama's visit.  China wanted 
Copenhagen to be a success.  During these "trying times," 
China was working to grow its economy yet was still paying 
attention to environmental protection.  Provincial governors 
and city mayors had "hard targets," and all had to toe the 
line on the environment.  China hoped that its achievements 
and sincere efforts to deal with climate change would be 
recognized by the United States and the world. 
 
10. (C) The Deputy Secretary responded that while Washington 
and Beijing might have a history of pointing fingers at one 
another on climate change, both sides had to work together to 
ensure the success of the Copenhagen summit.  Both the United 
 
BEIJING 00002968  003 OF 003 
 
 
States and China would be blamed should Copenhagen fail. 
Neither side could evade the issue, and the United States and 
China both had responsibilities.  President Hu Jintao's 
speech at UNGA had demonstrated a welcomed commitment to 
addressing climate change, and President Obama had been 
dedicated to the issue from the beginning.  The United States 
and China, the Deputy Secretary said, should do more 
brainstorming and exchange ideas on global warming. 
 
Financial Crisis and G-20 
------------------------- 
 
11. (C) FM Yang praised the success of the Pittsburgh summit 
and remarked that the United States and China had enjoyed 
good cooperation in addressing the financial crisis.  The 
views China presented at the G-20 had been "echoed by most 
around the table."  The Deputy noted that the financial 
crisis had created new opportunities to change some global 
governance structures, and the United States wanted China to 
play a more central role in the future. 
 
China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Meeting 
----------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) FM Yang told the Deputy Secretary he had just 
returned from a Shanghai meeting with his Japanese and South 
Korean counterparts.  The session, Yang said, was to prepare 
for the October 10 meeting in Beijing between Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, and South 
Korean President Lee Myung-Bak.  The Deputy Secretary said 
the United States was "untroubled and enthusiastic" about 
China-Japan-South Korea trilateral exchanges, which had 
always been conducted in a transparent manner.  The United 
States hoped the three sides would use the October 10 meeting 
to discuss North Korea. 
 
13. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message. 
HUNTSMAN