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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002872 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2029 
TAGS: PREL PHUM MARR PGOV NK SK JP RU IN CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S DINNER WITH CHINESE ACADEMICS: 
NORTH KOREA, POTUS VISIT, MIL-MIL, JAPAN, INDIA, SCO 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor 
Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  At an October 13 dinner with EAP 
Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, three leading 
Chinese international affairs experts urged the 
United States to start bilateral talks with North 
Korea.  China had done its part by keeping pressure 
on the DPRK, they said, but now it was up to the 
United States to engage Pyongyang directly.  The 
scholars urged President Obama to use his upcoming 
visit to interact with average Chinese and express 
concern for China's underclass.  President Obama 
remained popular in China, they said, though the 
decision to impose new duties on Chinese tires and 
the President's plans to meet with the Dalai Lama 
after his China visit had caused this public support 
to soften.  All agreed that the U.S.-China military- 
to-military relationship lagged behind political and 
economic ties, and they endorsed the idea of 
building "strategic reassurance."  One guest said 
China was pleased by the Japanese Prime Minister's 
promise not to visit the Yasakuni Shrine or meet 
with the Dalai Lama.  China was "cautious but open" 
toward Japan's proposal for an East Asia Community, 
but wanted to first conclude a trilateral free trade 
pact with South Korea and Japan before considering 
new regional multilateral initiatives.  The scholars 
said the United States should not be concerned by 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would 
remain functional in nature and had limited 
potential to expand.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The DCM hosted a dinner with Chinese 
international relations experts October 13 in honor 
of EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell.  The 
Chinese participants were Jin Canrong, Vice 
President of People's University's International 
Relations Institute; Yuan Peng, Director of American 
Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR, a think tank 
affiliated with the Ministry of State Security); and 
Zhu Feng, Director of the International Security 
Program at Peking University's School of 
International Studies. 
 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶3. (C) CICIR's Yuan Peng told A/S Campbell that 
China hoped the United States would "seize the 
opportunity" presented by Premier Wen Jiabao's 
recent visit to Pyongyang and engage North Korea in 
bilateral talks.  The North's most recent missile 
launches, he said, were "another test" to gauge the 
United States' reaction.  He urged the United States 
not to react in a "harsh way" to the latest missile 
firings.  The goal of all sides, Yuan added, should 
be to prevent a third nuclear test by the DPRK.  Zhu 
Feng, of Peking University, agreed that the "ball 
was now in the United States' court" and Washington- 
Pyongyang bilateral talks were necessary to move the 
process forward.  China, Zhu said, was still unclear 
about the DPRK's ultimate goals -- whether the North 
wanted denuclearization, withdrawal of U.S. troops, 
or something else -- and bilateral U.S.-North Korea 
talks could help clarify this question.  If 
Washington-Pyongyang talks failed, "then we could 
think of next steps."  China had done its part by 
keeping pressure on North Korea to return to the 
Six-Party Talks, Zhu said, but now it was up to the 
United States. 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Campbell responded that the United States 
was willing to engage in bilateral discussions with 
the DPRK.  However, the U.S. would not engage in a 
protracted series of bilateral meetings with the 
DPRK.  The North would need to return to the Six- 
Party Talks after one or two meetings.  The DPRK 
would also need to reaffirm its past commitments 
made in the Six-Party Talks.  A primary goal of the 
United States, A/S Campbell stressed, was to 
maintain solidarity among the five parties.  The 
North's recent missile tests, A/S Campbell added, 
fit a well-established pattern of North Korea trying 
to create higher anxiety at a critical moment. 
 
POTUS Visit 
----------- 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Campbell told the scholars that President 
 
BEIJING 00002872  002 OF 004 
 
 
Obama was looking forward to his visit to China in 
November and viewed the bilateral relationship with 
great importance.  People's University's Jin Canrong 
said the majority of young people in China held 
positive views of President Obama although the Nobel 
Peace Prize decision had generated some controversy. 
Yuan Peng, while agreeing that President Obama's 
image in China remained good overall, said the 
President's decision to impose duties on Chinese 
automobile tires had put a dent in his popularity. 
The White House announcement that President Obama 
would meet with the Dalai Lama after his trip to 
China also sparked a negative public reaction, 
according to Yuan.  "There is a feeling," Yuan said, 
"that Obama needs China but still does not take 
China's interests seriously." 
 
¶6. (C) Zhu Feng urged President Obama to use his 
visit to show concern for China's lower classes. 
The President could meet with local-level social 
workers and volunteers working with the disabled and 
the poor.  Yuan Peng, however, warned that such an 
event could be misinterpreted as a criticism of the 
Communist Party for not caring enough about 
disadvantaged groups.  Rather, President Obama 
should meet with average people in a "less 
political" way.  President Hu Jintao had recently 
visited Beijing's Summer Palace, where he shook 
hands with Chinese tourists and rode a newly opened 
subway line.  President Obama could do something 
similar, and this would show that Presidents Obama 
and Hu were "coordinated" and that both leaders 
cared about ordinary citizens.  More generally, Yuan 
added, President Obama should talk directly to 
China's interests during the visit and "show respect 
for China's model, social system and sovereignty." 
 
Mil-Mil and Strategic Reassurance 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Campbell told the scholars that the 
American and Chinese militaries remained too 
distrustful of one another and the USG wanted to see 
a resumption of mil-mil dialogue.  Yuan Peng agreed 
that the mil-mil aspect of the relationship lagged 
behind political and economic ties.  The first 30 
years since U.S.-China normalization had been marked 
by many political and economic successes, Yuan said, 
but military and security ties represented the 
"future" of the bilateral relationship over the next 
30 years.  Zhu Feng observed that the People's 
Liberation Army remained "very conservative" in its 
approach to mil-mil relations.  Zhu said he was 
familiar with Pentagon complaints that the PLA did 
not reciprocate with adequate openness.  The 
relationship between the PLA and the U.S. military 
was in a "downturn, but not a spiral," Zhu said, and 
the mil-mil dialogue "still needs a critical push 
from the top leadership" to get off the ground.  Jin 
Canrong, however, disagreed that PLA distrust of the 
United States was on the rise.  PLA views of the 
United States, he argued, were actually steady. 
What had changed in recent years was the Chinese 
military's increasing outspokenness within China's 
political system.  In the past, Jin said, the PLA 
had remained silent.  Now, the PLA was more 
confident and willing to speak out.  The U.S. side 
needed to "be patient" about the mil-mil 
relationship and get used to a PLA that "speaks 
louder."  The two sides should continue to let the 
political relationship develop and, if things stayed 
on the current track, then the mil-mil side would 
eventually improve too, Jin said. 
 
¶8. (C) Yuan Peng, referring to Deputy Secretary 
Steinberg's September 24 speech to the Center for 
New American Security, asserted that building 
"strategic reassurance" and trust was more important 
than mil-mil dialogue.  The U.S. counter-terrorism 
front, he said, was moving eastward and pushing 
against China's western border and its security 
interests in Xinjiang.  The PLA, meanwhile, was 
seeking to expand its space in the Indian Ocean and 
the South China Sea, which also created potential 
friction with the United States.  Hence, the two 
presidents should speak frankly about their 
respective strategic intentions, and the United 
States side could do more to explain its counter- 
terrorism strategy.  The Deputy Secretary's concept 
of "strategic reassurance" was a "positive idea from 
China's perspective" and showed that the U.S. 
 
BEIJING 00002872  003 OF 004 
 
 
intended to adapt to China's rise, but, Yuan said, 
it was unclear how much President Obama supported 
the concept.  A first step toward building greater 
strategic trust, Zhu Feng said, would be to change 
the tone of the Quadrennial Defense and Nuclear 
Posture Reviews.  Zhu said the China language in the 
last QDR had worried the PLA and Chinese military 
leaders would be watching the upcoming QDR closely. 
A/S Campbell said the strategic reassurance concept 
needed to be fleshed out and the two sides had to 
think about how to put the idea into operation.  The 
Obama Administration, A/S Campbell stressed, wanted 
to create a new vision for relations with China that 
focused on constructive issues and not threats. 
 
India 
----- 
 
¶9. (C) Asked about the state of China-India 
relations, Jin Canrong said China wanted a stable 
relationship with India but "the mentality of Indian 
elites," who were fixated on the memory of the 
India-China border war, was standing in the way. 
Some in China, Jin added, were concerned about 
expanding U.S.-India ties, but the mainstream view 
in the Chinese government was that India could have 
good relations with both the United States and 
China. 
 
Japan, East Asia Community 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Turning to China-Japan relations, Zhu Feng 
said China had been pleasantly surprised by Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama's announcement that none of 
his cabinet members would visit the Yasakuni Shrine. 
Zhu claimed that Hatoyama had also pledged not to 
meet with the Dalai Lama.  China, however, remained 
uncertain in its dealings with Japan because the 
Chinese side was unsure how long Hatoyama's 
government would be able to stay in power.  If the 
new Japanese government survived beyond a year, Zhu 
said, then the two sides would have a "historic 
opportunity" to improve long-term relations.  A/S 
Campbell asked how China had reacted to Hatoyama's 
proposal to establish an East Asia Community.  Zhu 
said China was "cautious but open" to Hatoyama's 
idea.  China's current focus, however, was on 
reaching a trilateral free trade agreement with 
South Korea and Japan.  Such an FTA, if achieved, 
could become the cornerstone of an East Asia 
Community.  But if the FTA failed, Zhu said, then 
"we can forget the EAC proposal."  Jin Canrong added 
that there was no desire in China to create an East 
Asia version of the European Union.  Future 
multilateral cooperation in East Asia would continue 
to be issue oriented, Jin said.  Jin added that 
there were already "too many multilateral 
arrangements and meetings" and this was creating 
fatigue in the Chinese government.  Jin said Premier 
Wen Jiabao had reportedly complained to his staff 
about having to attend "one conference after 
another" with few concrete results. 
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The three scholars downplayed the 
significance of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), characterizing it as having 
little potential to expand.  The SCO, Zhu Feng said, 
remained in a "nascent" stage with a narrow focus on 
functional issues.  Yuan Peng said China viewed the 
SCO as important for combating the "three evils" 
(terrorism, extremism and separatism) and for 
creating a "buffer zone" to China's west.  China was 
witnessing the expansion of U.S. influence in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian states. 
The SCO, Yuan said, thus offered China a way to 
"play a role" in the region, though China did not 
view the SCO as a "hedge" against the United States. 
Jin Canrong said there were still "natural limits" 
on the SCO.  The SCO, he said, had been initiated by 
the Central Asian states that wanted to reduce their 
traditional reliance on Russia by reaching out to 
other big powers.  The "stans" had proposed the SCO 
as a way to engage China, and this remained the 
driving dynamic behind the organization.  The 
Central Asian states, however, also wanted to pursue 
relations with other powers, including the United 
States, India, Japan and the EU.  Russia also did 
 
BEIJING 00002872  004 OF 004 
 
 
not want the SCO to become too active, according to 
Jin. 
 
¶12. (U) A/S Campbell's delegation cleared this 
message. 
HUNTSMAN