VZCZCXRO2142
RR RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0057/01 3010838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280838Z OCT 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0932
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0510
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0970

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000057 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SOCI ECON PREL PGOV SMIG IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRA: THE SLUMS OF HAYYANIYAH 
 
BASRAH 00000057  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Hayyaniyah is a poor and politically 
sensitive Basra city neighborhood with a history very similar to 
Baghdad's Sadr City.  Wracked by extreme poverty, high 
unemployment, and an extremely dense population, the enclave of 
about 300,000 is largely comprised of Shi'a Marsh Arabs from 
surrounding rural and tribal areas who have arrived in waves 
over recent decades.  Though other Basrawis often stereotype the 
inhabitants of Hayyaniyah as poor, illiterate and potentially 
criminal, there is a recognition of their toughness and 
resilience.  While Hayyaniyah was a militia stronghold in the 
past, today provincial and military officials insist that this 
threat is dramatically diminished. In the past, Hayyaniyah was 
such a notorious slum that even Saddam's police left it alone. 
Today's provincial government is far more involved, but efforts 
are still inadequate in the face of the neighborhood's poverty 
and density.  Working with local officials, the USG has many 
initiatives to improve the delivery of essential services. 
Those efforts cannot and should not be a substitute for the 
elected provincial government's own solutions to the enclave's 
deep-seated problems.  Hayyaniyah remains one of Basra's most 
vulnerable and precarious neighborhoods.  End summary. 
 
History 
------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Then president Abdul Karim Qassim established 
Hayyaniyah in 1958 as a public housing project for former rural 
agricultural workers in Basra and other rural southern 
provinces.  The beneficiaries were particularly Marsh Arabs from 
Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar Provinces that had moved to Basra 
City to find work.  The area was officially known as Hay 
Al-Husayn, but residents began calling it Al-Hayyaniyah after 
then-Governor Muhammad Al-Hayani.  The Iraqi agricultural sector 
was suffering from a severe economic crisis as the oil industry 
began to expand.  The result was a significant rural exodus to 
Iraqi cities.  Government officials parceled the area into 
thousands of 100 square meter sections.  Residents later 
subdivided these plots as the number of inhabitants grew, often 
sharing their land with extended family members.  At first the 
houses were made of mud; the government later began building 
them of cement blocks; still later, some streets were paved. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Another well known public housing project also 
developed in Baghdad at the same time, also on Qasim's order: 
"Revolutionary City," now known as Sadr City.  It was designed 
and built by the same architect for the same purpose.  Both are 
densely-populated and impoverished, comprised primarily of 
Shi'a, have histories of militia activity, and could be 
catalysts for instability. 
 
Demographics: The Young and the Restless 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The population of Hayyaniyah has grown over the years. 
As with much of Iraq, the PRT is unaware of any official 
population estimates, but most contacts and analysts place it in 
the range of 300,000, about the same density as 
very-high-density city states of Macau, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong.  (Note: Hayyaniyah is the name for the both the original, 
1.2-square-mile enclave, as well as the roughly twice as large 
surrounding sub-district which encompasses a few other slums of 
similar socioeconomic situation.  For most Basrawis, 
"Hayyaniyah" refers to this latter area.  End note.)   According 
to a recent DoD Human Terrain Team (HTT) study, the average 
household is comprised of around 8-10 people, usually living in 
two rooms (each about 540 square feet).  Provincial government 
data places a staggering 50% of the population under 25 years 
old.  Formal unemployment rates are well over 30%. 
 
Social outcasts and negative stereotypes 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Most of Hayyaniyah's original and subsequent arrivals 
came from rural and tribal areas largely lacking schools, 
hospitals, electricity, and running water.  Many had lived in 
reed huts in the marshes.  Those who took refuge in the city 
found assimilation, to the extent they attempted to assimilate, 
difficult.  Tribal values and traditions are still evident as 
different sections of Hayyaniyah display their own distinctive 
tribal norms.  Most early arrivals were semi-literate at best, 
and subsequent generations appear to be caught up in a vicious 
cycle.  Primary school completion rates are much lower than Iraq 
as a whole. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) For middle class Basrawis, relations with public 
housing enclaves such as Hayyaniyah have always been uneasy. 
Other Basrawis sometimes stigmatize the "Ma'dan" or "Garamsha" 
(names of some of the more prominent Marsh Arab tribes) as 
illiterate, criminal, and all "from Maysan with 10 kids."  They 
consider the neighborhood a crowded maze of open sewers and 
trash-strewn walkways with high levels of crime.  They 
 
BASRAH 00000057  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
generalize large households crammed together in ramshackle 
homes, dogs and goats feeding on heaps of garbage, all suffering 
from insufficient supplies of water and electricity. 
Consequently, a resident of Hayyaniyah--often identifiable by 
dress, accent, or surname--can sometimes face impediments to 
employment and marriage prospects. 
 
But the truth is more complex 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) While some of these stereotypes have foundation in 
reality, they can be a caricature.  Hayyaniyah faces massive 
problems, but few areas of the city are without them.  The rate 
of formal unemployment is high, but people are not idle.  There 
is an active informal employment network.  Most residents are 
proud of their neighborhood.  Many jobs are menial and informal 
(largely construction), but Hayyaniyah is also home to some 
educated professionals - doctors, lawyers, and engineers - who 
live in some of the relatively cleaner and safer areas of 
Hayyaniyah.  Many Basrawis will also openly acknowledge their 
respect and admiration for Hayyaniyans' toughness and fortitude. 
 They are well aware that the 1991 uprising began in Hayyaniyah, 
and that thousands from that district paid with their lives. 
According to the Basra Investment Commission Chairman, many 
residents of Hayyaniyah own their own property.  It is not an 
insignificant asset; depending on location, it can be worth as 
much as USD 50,000-USD 100,000. 
 
Ethnic, Tribal Composition 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) According to a recent HTT analysis, up to 95% of 
Hayyaniyah's population consists of Shi'a Marsh Arabs that have 
arrived in irregular waves since 1958, and with only small 
changes since 2003.  Deciphering the precise tribal and ethnic 
composition is more difficult.  The HTT and GOI's Ministry of 
Interior's Directorate of Tribal Affairs contends that 
Hayyaniyah has several major and mixed tribes, mainly the Albu 
Muhammad/Al-Zubaydi and Al-Muntafaq confederation, the latter 
which encompasses the influential Al-Maliki (or Bani Malik) sub 
tribe, related to the Prime Minister.  Apart from the Maysan and 
Dhi Qar marsh areas, the remaining population comes from 
Baghdad, the Middle Euphrates, other northern and western 
provinces, and tribes straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border. 
 
Waves of internally displaced 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) After its 1958 beginning as a home for economically 
displaced Iraqis, the first large-scale wave of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) (also largely Marsh Arabs) came in the 
wake of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.  A second wave, also of 
Marsh Arabs, arrived in the 1990s, comprised of those driven out 
by Saddam who had punished them for their uprising against him 
during the first Gulf War by destroying their marshes and 
traditional habitat.  A third wave came after 2003.  Like Basra 
City and Province, the majority of IDPs have been there since 
before 2003 invasion, with relatively small changes since. 
After decades of distinct IDP waves, today it is hard to say for 
certain who is an IDP and who is a settled resident.  The HTT 
study cited International Organization of Migration and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures indicating that 
about 5-15% of Hayyaniyah's population is recently displaced 
persons, the majority of whom came after 2003. 
 
Many have returned; some have stayed 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) As the security situation has improved, many of the 
more recent IDPs have returned to their villages, and sometimes 
with the assistance of the ISF and other GOI agencies.  In the 
case of those who remain and who had fled other urban areas, 
some lack the money to rebuild destroyed homes.  Others find 
former homes are occupied and residents unwilling to return the 
property to the original family.  Some are reluctant to return 
to where a loved one was killed.  In still other cases, some 
have stayed in Hayyaniyah due to better economic opportunities 
or a more promising life for themselves and their children in 
Iraq's second largest city.  As the cost of living is less than 
in Baghdad, some can buy or build homes in Hayyaniyah. 
 
Past militia control 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Hayyaniyah was a Jayash al Mahdi (JAM) stronghold 
leading up to the March 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign when 
Coalition Forces and the ISF reclaimed this Sadrist stronghold. 
Local sheikhs have told us that they "lost control" of some of 
their tribe members during this time to the militias.  Today, 
while some observers assert that Hayyaniyah could still be an 
active breeding ground for Iran-backed militias such as the JAM, 
 
BASRAH 00000057  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the PRT's Basra military and police contacts insist that the JAM 
presence and threat has dramatically decreased.  In any event, 
both sides agree that the JAM still enjoys some amount of local 
support and some isolated JAM elements could still be resident 
there.  Given the enclave's extreme poverty, it remains a 
potential militia recruitment center.  Local sheikhs have also 
told us that Iranian officials frequently visit the area, and 
discuss assistance projects - but nothing has come to fruition 
so far. 
 
A more involved, but still ineffective, government 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Hayyaniyah was such a notorious slum that even 
Saddam's security forces largely left it alone.  Saddam also 
considered it to be inhabited by criminals or anti-Baathist 
elements.  Today's provincial government is much more involved 
and making a credible attempt to improve the situation.  It is 
still insufficient.  They face massive challenges.  While the 
provision of basic services (water, sewage, electricity, trash 
removal) still falls far short, contrary to the claims of some 
local sheikhs and others, the enclave actually receives roughly 
the same amount and quality of services as other neighborhoods. 
The problem is that this supply is overwhelmed by the sheer 
density and poverty of Hayyaniyah, and years of neglect means 
that the infrastructure is that more degraded.  Illegal housing, 
off-the-grid electricity hook-ups, squatters, and non-licensed 
markets overstrain services exacerbating the prevalence of 
blackouts, irregular supplies of water, open sewers, and 
insufficient trash removal.  Though this is common throughout 
Basra, the situation is worse in Hayyaniyah.  The Directors 
General of water, sewage, electricity, and trash indicate that 
they do not have the authority to hook up illegal homes and 
markets to their services.  The government plans to move some of 
these unauthorized residents to new homes (the "one thousand 
homes" project), but supplies are limited, and such moves could 
also disrupt some residents' work and family networks.  The ISF 
has also done some limited recruitment drives in Hayyaniyah. 
 
U.S. and other donor engagement 
------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Hayyaniyah has been a focus of USG assistance efforts 
in recent years, including those of the 364th Civil Affairs 
Brigade, the 34th Infantry Division, the Task Force for Business 
Stability Operations (TFBSO), the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2/4 
BCT), the 17th Fires Brigade (17FiB), USAID, and the PRT.  Other 
foreign donors, international organizations and NGOs have also 
have been involved.  The 17FiB, working with local DGs, has 
programs for water, electricity, solid waste, and sewage, and is 
also contemplating a schools infrastructure effort.  TFBSO is 
presently rehabilitating an open air market.  The 2/4 BCT 
removed an enormous scrap metal heap in Hayyaniyah.  The United 
Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) 
constructed several water towers which the GOI and the 17Fib, 
with CERP funds, plans to connect to the Hayyaniyah water 
distribution network.  All these efforts are not without risks: 
17Fib teams entering the neighborhood are sometimes greeted with 
rocks, and one soldier recently had his jaw broken and some 
teeth knocked out during a recent mission. 
 
Comment: Elected government must do its job 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The poorest of Basra's poor, Hayyaniyah problems can 
appear almost insurmountable.  Like poor neighborhoods in 
virtually any city in the world, the problems are deep-seated in 
nature, and there are no easy fixes.  The provincial government 
has slowly begun to step up its efforts to improve services, but 
much more is needed, including in the areas of reconciliation, 
job creation, and education.  The many USG efforts to provide 
essential services are important.  At the same time, they should 
not be a substitute for the proper role of the elected 
provincial government assisting one of Basra's most vulnerable 
and precarious neighborhoods.  End comment. 
NALAND