VZCZCXRO4601
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0235/01 3031156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 301156Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1068
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0223
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0328
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0339
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0238
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0179
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0169
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0527
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0512
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0161
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0500
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1349

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000235 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR CNEARY 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR EAID CT
SUBJECT: CAR: PRESIDENT BOZIZE DELAYS IMPLEMENTATION OF USAID ROAD 
PROJECT 
 
BANGUI 00000235  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The USD 2.75 million USAID funded roads 
rehabilitation project set to launch on October 26, 2009 was 
delayed by President of the Central African Republic (CAR) 
Francois Bozize due to a perceived lack of government 
participation in the project. Despite fully informing the 
government (CARG) of Post's plans since January 2009, the 
President convoked the Ambassador to the Presidential Palace to 
ostensibly find a role for the Ministry of Equipment - nominally 
charged with road construction - in a project that is already 
obligated and funded with the nongovernmental organization 
ACTED. The ensuing meeting gave clear insights into the 
functioning and motivation of the President and his closest 
advisors, and demonstrates the significant lengths Bozize will 
go to try to manipulate foreign assistance. The presence and 
active participation of the Minister of Plans, Sylvain Maliko, 
as well as the Foreign Minister, Antoine Gambi, but not the 
Minister of Equipment, hints at the true poles of power in the 
CARG.  Unfortunately, this incident exemplifies that, while 
certain individuals in the CARG are forthright development 
partners, others at the highest levels of government are 
determined to try to interfere with development assistance to 
further private agendas. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On October 23, the Minister of Equipment, Cyriaque 
Samba Panza, who has a long and solid relationship with the 
Embassy, called Post to inform the USAID delegation that they 
could not leave as scheduled for a field visit and official 
project launch until the Ambassador met with Ministers Maliko 
and Gambi. On the October 26, the Ambassador met with Samba 
Panza who had been charged by the President to meet the 
Ambassador instead of Maliko and Gambi. During the discussion 
Samba Panza informed the Ambassador that ``certain ministers'' 
had ``misunderstood'' a statement by Bozize that the Ministry of 
Equipment should be charged with the project instead of ACTED. 
Samba Panza said he felt uncomfortable disagreeing with those 
ministers during the meeting and that when he spoke to the 
President after the meeting he believed he had come to an 
understanding - that the Ministry of Equipment would observe the 
project and would submit reports as needed. The Ambassador 
agreed to this and the meeting adjourned. 
 
¶3. (U) On short notice, the Ambassador was summoned to the 
Presidential Palace on the evening of the October 26. During an 
hour long meeting, the Ambassador affirmed the following about 
the roads project: 
 
-- Looking to employ 9,000 people over one year, the project at 
its core is about community development and empowerment and 
seeks to create durable microenterprises and encourage commerce. 
 
-- The project would be an integral part of an east/west road 
connection that directly responds to the Government's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper. 
 
-- Working through an NGO was included in the congressional 
appropriations spending plan and that money cannot go directly 
to the host government by US law in this case. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The President, with Maliko interjecting from time to 
time, insisted on the same theme - that the Ministry of 
Equipment, using heavy machines, could rehabilitate the road in 
a fraction of the time, at half the cost, and with better 
quality. Despite the Ambassador's repeated insistence that a 
qualified USAID engineer had confirmed that the price, safety 
specifications and legal regulations were in accordance with US 
legal standards, the President continued to insist that his 
vision was superior (NOTE: the President is a trained military 
 
BANGUI 00000235  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
officer with no background in engineering and neither the 
Minister of Equipment nor any other road experts were present 
during the meeting. END NOTE). By the end of the meeting two 
possible conclusions could be drawn: 
 
-- The President sought to have the Ambassador transfer the 
project funds to the Ministry of Equipment - this despite the 
Ambassador's clear assertion that this was not possible by US 
law in this case. 
 
-- The President does not understand the restrictions placed by 
USAID funding as similar restrictions upon the executive are 
nonexistent in the CAR. 
 
While the latter is possible, the former is more likely as 
Maliko, with extensive experience in the UN and other 
international institutions, is intimately familiar with the 
bureaucratic restrictions placed upon western governments and 
proposed possible ways to circumvent the regulations during the 
meeting. The Ambassador proposed a formal review of the project 
with the ministers of the President's choice. 
 
¶5. (U) The following day the Ambassador and the USAID delegation 
met the Samba Panza and Gambi and came to an agreement that 
Ministry of Equipment employees would follow the project closely 
- as had been previously agreed - and that if ACTED needed heavy 
machinery, that they would make a call to both private and 
public actors for competitive bids with all due consideration 
given the Ministry's bid. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the late afternoon of the October 27, French 
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Vidon called on the Ambassador to discuss 
the project at the behest of Bozize, who had asked him to 
``reason'' with the U.S. Ambassador. (NOTE: The timing of the 
call to the French is worrying as the meeting with Samba Panza 
and Gambi ended before the call. END NOTE). With clear 
reluctance, the French Ambassador asked for the details of the 
agreement and gestured in agreement when the Ambassador 
suggested the polemic was at its core likely a shakedown. 
President Bozize met with the Ambassador and the French 
Ambassador on the margins of ceremony on Friday, October 30, 
¶2009. During that conversation he asked the Ambassador directly 
if the French Ambassador had called him. The Ambassador assured 
the President that they had spoken and told him to expect a 
Diplomatic Note covering the project on Monday or Tuesday. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The meeting with Bozize and the surrounding 
events lead to the following impressions of the President and 
his inner circle: 
 
-- The President is personally interested in the monetary 
benefits that international development money brings and will 
seek to insert himself into the smallest details of the project 
if he sees a potential financial gain. 
 
--  The best interest of his citizenry is not be the President's 
priority. The use of heavy machinery from the Ministry of 
Equipment would take jobs away from the target population and 
the President did not swerve from his argument when this was 
made clear. 
 
-- Gambi, present at the meeting with the President and the 
second meeting with Samba Panza, is trusted by the President but 
is not an ``ideas'' person. He was relegated to note taking 
during the former meeting and during the later only reiterated 
the points made by the President without adding any new points 
or demands. He was likely at the second meeting to ensure that 
 
BANGUI 00000235  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Samba Panza did not make any mistakes. 
 
-- Maliko, along with Minister of Mines Sylvain Ndoutingui, are 
the primary figures in the CARG and upon whom the President 
counts for advice and strategy. Maliko is the primary 
interlocutor with international actors ranging from AmEmbassy 
Bangui to the UN to Sheikh Ben Jaber Youssouf Al-Thani of Qatar 
and should be considered the functional head of government while 
Prime Minister Faustin Archange Touadera plays a principally 
representational role. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  In the short term, a Note will be drafted by Post and 
submitted to the government with the principle elements of the 
project restated and the agreement reached between the 
Ambassador and Samba Panza enumerated. Despite this, it is far 
from certain that the project will be allowed to continue. This 
is clearly an inauspicious beginning for the project and is 
emblematic of the principal challenge facing Post - with all the 
troubles in front of President Bozize, from a failed state, to 
active rebellions, to extreme poverty, he chooses to focus his 
time on extracting payouts from foreign and domestic funding 
sources. The CARG is not an active partner in its country's 
development and thus Post will continue to ensure that 
development projects are closely monitored and all steps are 
taken to mitigate further issues on this and future projects. 
END COMMENT. 
COOK