VZCZCXRO6892
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0212/01 2821503
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 091503Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1055
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0218
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0323
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0334
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0233
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0174
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0164
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0522
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0510
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0156
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0495
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1321

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000212 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR CNEARY 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
IO FOR TBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: MINURCAT PERFORMING WELL, BUT VIOLENCE IN NE CAR NEEDS A 
POLITICAL SOLUTION 
 
REF: A : 09 BANGUI 195 and Previous 
 
BANGUI 00000212  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 8th, 2009, the United Nations 
Mission in Chad and the CAR (MINURCAT) hosted an Ambassadorial 
level  (attended by POLOFF) trip to Birao, Central African 
Republic (CAR) as an informational session ahead of the October 
21 Security Council meeting on the Mission's role. The 
northeastern town in the Vakaga prefecture suffered two attacks 
by ethnic Kara militias in June (Ref A) and ethnic tensions have 
simmered since. With the rains coming to an end, and suffering 
from a poor harvest due to the conflict, Birao and the 
surrounding area risks descending into renewed violence. 
MINURCAT in Birao is functioning well and is up to full 
capacity, but suffers from a fundamental mission flaw: it was 
sent to Birao to protect Darfur refugees and the humanitarians 
providing them services but is now facing an unexpected civil 
conflict. The solution to the quarrel in the region is a 
political one and MINURCAT is ill equipped to facilitate this. 
It is therefore the opinion of Post that the UN Office in the 
CAR (BONUCA) be pushed to take a more active role in the 
conflict with MINURCAT's mission in Birao supporting its efforts 
at mediation. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The town of Birao is still marked by the violence from 
June. The abandoned Kara area is over grown with weeds sprouted 
during the rains. The Prefet of Birao claims that all is 
returning to normal, citing evidence that the markets, empty in 
July, are now full again. Yet, when the delegation drove by, the 
market it was empty. The Prefet had no idea why the market was 
closed and it was only later that the delegation found out that 
it was because the Houssa ethnicity traders were on strike 
because of a violent reprisal the day before by a few Kara who 
had a bike stolen three days previous.  The deficient knowledge 
of the Prefet was telling of the overall lack of engagement and 
understanding by the Central African Government (CARG). Though 
there was a marked increase in military (FACA) elements (NOTE: 
in June about 30 FACA were in Birao, now, the Prefet claims to 
have 100. END NOTE), the government has only three functionaries 
in the city. Furthermore, though MINURCAT offered to transport 
the teachers from Bangui needed to start the school year, the 
Prefet has until now not gotten back to them and schools have 
yet to open. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The delegation then met with the Sudanese Consul. The 
Consul is the only accredited member of the diplomatic corps 
residing outside of Bangui and he is widely thought to be the 
true center of power in the town. As stated previously (Ref A), 
Birao and the cities in the east down to Bambari, 250 km away, 
depend almost exclusively on Sudan for their commercial goods. 
In exchange, this fertile area provides western Sudan with 
agricultural goods, diamonds and even ivory. As a result, the 
government of Sudan (GOS), through the Consul, is more active in 
Birao politics than the CARG. According to the Consul, the GOS 
sent the peacemaking mission of early July that halted major 
hostilities and is organizing a meeting in November for all the 
ethnic groups. He did not give any more details about the 
gathering and said that the ``ball is now in the CARG's court''. 
Alarmingly, the Prefet did not mention anything about the 
meeting.  It is also very clear that the GOS interests lay with 
the Kara. The Consul stated with conviction that the town, which 
is thought to be majority Goula, is a Kara one. Therefore, it is 
a strong possibility that the GOS' role as an arbiter will not 
produce a peaceful consensus. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The last meeting was with the humanitarian actors 
(NGOs) who were all pessimistic about the coming months. They 
believe that when the roads open after the rains - probably in 
 
BANGUI 00000212  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
late October or mid November - there will be renewed fighting. 
Each of the NGOs agreed that they would not be able to leave 
Birao without armed protection and one said they had been 
informed by the Kara militia that if they left Birao, their cars 
would be stolen.  To a person, the NGOs do not see any political 
motive for the threats towards the international actors; instead 
the militias are simply seeking the finances to buy more arms. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The NGOs also are receiving troubling humanitarian 
reports from the west and south of Birao. They have heard that 
the Goula dominated west has suffered two serious floods that 
have decimated the area, but do not yet know the extent. To the 
south, there are unregistered displaced persons camps that very 
likely lack all basic needs. 
 
¶6. (SBU) A new armed group now operates in the area and is run 
by two former Union of Democratic Forces for Unity(UFDR) 
officers who broke from the now Goula dominated group. According 
to the Prefet, they seek integration into the DDR process and do 
not seem likely to participate in the violence. Post worries 
that with the slow roll out of the DDR, and the logical 
inability of the UFDR to disarm with the threat posed by the 
Kara, that this group may add another destabilizing element to 
the witch's brew currently developing. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The Minister of Interior and the Minister of 
Communication are expected in Birao over the coming month, with 
the later there to start the DDR process. But if the rebels' 
frustrations with DDR first stages in the northwest are anything 
to go by, there risks being more discontent then less after the 
high level visits. In concert with the poor performance by the 
Prefet, Post believes the CARG has still not made the Vakaga a 
top priority. Though very influential, the GOS should be seen as 
a neutral arbiter either. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)Therefore, in order to stop the region from descending 
into bloodshed, it will take a concerted effort by an uninvolved 
third party. MINURCAT's endeavor to understand the situation on 
the ground and protect humanitarians is admirable, but they 
simply do not have the capacity to broker a political solution. 
As a result, only BONUCA, with its political mandate and 
presence in Bangui can truly engage with all the relevant 
actors. To do so BOUNUCA must install an office in Birao - which 
it plans to do - and develop a truly effective political office, 
which is currently does not have. The relations between the 
current Representatives are better than with the previous ones, 
but there needs to be more pressure from New York to clearly 
define the rolls of each, giving BONUCA the political lead and 
MINURCAT the capability to enforce BONUCA's negotiations and 
protect the NGO and civilian population.  END COMMENT. 
REYNOLDS