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DE RUEHGI #0209/01 2800727
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P R 070727Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
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RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1316

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000209 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR CNEARY 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CAR: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DISCUSSES VISION; 
FEELING PRESSURED 
 
REF: A. A 09 BANGUI 183, 68, 56 
     ¶B. REF: B 09 BANGUI 195 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. REF: C 08 BANGUI 256 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶D. REF: D 09 BANGUI 207 
 
BANGUI 00000209  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 5, 2009, the Charge (CDA) met with 
Martin Ziguele - former Central African (CAR) Prime Minister and 
2005 Presidential candidate - who is President Bozize's 
principle challenger for the anticipated elections of 2010. 
Engaging, erudite and shrewd, Ziguele covered a range of topics 
including the state of his party, the Movement for Liberation of 
Central African People (MLPC), his vision for the 2010 elections 
and his rivalries with Bozize and former President Ange-Felix 
Patasse.  He also gave the Charge a troubling letter currently 
circulating the National Assembly that proposes an extension of 
both the Deputies' and the President's terms in office.  Ziguele 
is clearly feeling pressured by Patasse and knows that Bozize 
holds a significant incumbent's advantage in organization, 
funding and the influence spread by his ministries. Therefore, 
he is trying to involve the international community as much in 
possible in the lead up to the elections to try to create a more 
level playing field. Ziguele insists that the UN Office in the 
CAR (BONUCA) take a prominent role as a watchdog for the 
electoral process and that it must take the lead in establishing 
firm and unequivocal benchmarks that Bozize must be forced to 
meet.  END SUMMARY 
 
---------------------------- 
ZIGUELE'S VISION FOR THE CAR 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Martin Ziguele, head of the CAR's opposition MLPC (Ref 
A), is a rare politician in Bangui who can explain his political 
vision rather than resorting to a litany of disagreements with 
the current incumbent. He declared that his platform for 2010 
would consist of three principle points: 
 
-- Restoring the power of the State and bringing peace to the 
CAR through stronger leadership and diminished emphasis on clan 
loyalties (an overt reference to Bozize). If he wins, he claims 
he will form a government of consensus, involving 60 percent of 
members from his party, 30 percent from the opposition, and 10 
percent from non-aligned parties. He acknowledged that a 
winner-takes-all approach would only lead to more rebellions. 
While he stated there would be no witch hunts against Bozize 
loyalists, he did insist that those who had ``stolen'' from the 
State would be expected to reimburse it. (COMMENT: This caveat 
might risk the same net effect he claims to want to avoid.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
-- Economic reforms - such as the encouragement of agriculture, 
the support private development through increased transparency 
in the mining sector, and a crackdown on corruption. 
 
-- Greater investment in human capital: Ziguele lamented the 
state of the national education system. He conceded that the CAR 
would need significant help from the international community in 
this regard. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Ziguele, despite the harassment suffered 
at the hands of regional authorities, the MLPC has set up 
offices in 13 of the CAR's 16 prefectures. He plans to open 
offices in the remaining three, but appears to be playing 
politics in at least one of the cases: though technically he 
does not need authorization, he is waiting for the Minister of 
Interior to grant the MLPC permission to go to the populous 
Ouham Prefecture (COMMENT: While MLPC activists have been 
impeded, but not stopped, from freely circulating, and 
 
BANGUI 00000209  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
permission would likely smooth their travels, their delay in 
setting off for Ouham seems as much a ploy for sympathy and 
attention as a necessary precaution. END COMMENT).  Ziguele 
noted that the violence ridden Vakaga (Ref B), while worrying, 
will not play a major role during the election due to its remote 
location and low population. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ziguele dismissed out of hand the thought of boycotting 
the elections, stating that boycotts in the African context are 
``self defeating'' as the victor simply goes on without 
legitimacy. 
 
---------------- 
FEELING INSECURE 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ziguele framed his attacks on Bozize in the context of 
the President's lack of leadership and vulnerability to 
international pressure. Conceding that Bozize is deficient in 
long-term strategic planning, he believes that Bozize is an 
astute tactician - one who is capable of playing competing 
national and international interests off each other for his 
short term benefit. Yet, he continued, when faced by a forceful 
response, Bozize will always bend to the international 
community. Citing examples of international pressure that 
resulted in concessions like the Inclusive Political Dialogue of 
2008, if faced with a united international response, Ziguele 
believes Bozize will make the election process relatively 
transparent and increase accountability within his own 
government. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Rumors that former President and longtime MLPC leader 
Ange-Felix Patasse's declared candidacy for the elections is 
making some in the MLPC reconsider their allegiances are also 
contributing to Ziguele's insecurity (NOTE: On October 6, 100 
members of the MLPC from the prefecture of Mambere Kadei in the 
southwest [Ref D], released a statement that they were rallying 
to Patasse, the first members since those from his home town 
joined him upon his declaration of candidacy.  END NOTE). It is 
unclear how much support Ziguele has lost, but he did go so far 
as to suggest that the international community pressure Libya - 
Patasse's current host - to expel Patasse. He also intimated 
that Patasse's mere presence would ``send people into the 
streets''. Surprisingly, he even stated that the head of BONUCA 
declared that she too wished to avoid seeing Patasse in Bangui. 
While such a statement by BONUCA seems very unlikely, it does 
contribute to an overall picture of a man feeling pressured by 
his former boss and rival - a position that Bozize clearly 
appreciates and encourages. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
WORRYING NEWS FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ziguele provided the CDA with an unsigned letter 
submitted on October 2 to members of the National Assembly. It 
proposes that the National Assembly extend its and the 
President's mandate for an unspecific amount of time to allow 
for: 
 
-- The role out of the Disarmament Demobilization Reinsertion 
(DDR) - scheduled to last three years. 
 
-- The return of the estimated 200,000 refugees and internally 
displaced people - no time frame exists. 
 
-- The expulsion of the LRA from the CAR. 
 
BANGUI 00000209  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
This letter is likely a test balloon floated by the President's 
entourage. On September 5, 2009, the Prime Minister discreetly 
proposed the idea that perhaps the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) might be formed without with participation of 
the opposition, but after a resounding rejection by 
international and national actors, the idea died. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: While Post shares Ziguele's opinion of 
Bozize's likely response to concerted international pressure, 
Ziguele's focus on international engagement in the electoral 
process points to a more fundamental insecurity on his part: the 
electoral deck is stacked in Bozize's favor. Though the 
population is frustrated with the culture of impunity among 
those close to the President and with the deplorable nature of 
country's development, at least Bozize has brought a measure of 
stability to Bangui after the turmoil of Patasse's regime (which 
included military mutinies and the presence of Libyan soldiers 
and Congolese mercenaries). As a result, it is proving difficult 
for Ziguele to shake off the memories of him as Patasse's last 
Prime Minister.  This history, coupled with the resources of the 
government, means the President is still the odds on favorite to 
carry the elections. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The signing of the amended electoral law on October 3 
by President Bozize, and the expected formation of the IEC 
expected for the October 9, hopefully deflates the specter of 
the government and the legislature extending their mandate 
indefinitely.  Yet, if the fundamental problems cited by the 
letter remain (likely), or the IEC reaches some new deadlock 
(quite possible considering the level of recrimination) this 
idea may resurface and should be highly discouraged. As for 
Ziguele, he remains outwardly confident and buoyant, but it is 
clear he is feeling the heat. His idea that the BONUCA take a 
more forceful position is a good one and is already envisaged by 
the transformation of BONUCA into BINUCA (Integrated Office of 
the United Nations in the CAR) in the new year.  The head of 
BONUCA, Ambassador Sahle-Work Zewde, has indeed intervened with 
the CARG on several occasions to keep the elections process 
moving along and chairs a coordination group to manage the 
efforts of the international community.  END COMMENT. 
SMITH