VZCZCXRO1560
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0695 3001630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271630Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0837
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0690
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOAM//

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI ML
SUBJECT: THE HIGH ISLAMIC COUNCIL - A VIEW FROM THE 
PROVINCES 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 580 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 551 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Peter Newman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) In a recent conversation with the Embassy, Kidal's 
representative to the national High Islamic Council (HCI), 
Moussa ag Ali,  noted the presence of internal tensions 
between the provincial and national level of the HCI and 
between ethnic groups represented in the HCI.  Moussa's 
account indicates that the HCI is not a monolithic Islamic 
force in Mali, but rather a diverse and sometimes fractious 
organization still attempting to determine its appropriate 
role in a democratic Mali.  End summary. 
 
DISDAINFUL OF AQIM 
 
¶2. (C) By way of background, Moussa ag Ali is one of the 
Kidal region's leading imams and its representative at the 
national level of the HCI.  Although he is a member of the 
Dawa movement, a religious organization that arrived in Kidal 
in the 1990s and which has its origins in Pakistan, Moussa 
seems to align himself more closely with the Qadiriyya Sufi 
order, the form of Islam practiced by most Malian Tuaregs. 
Moussa has a political, as well as a religious role within 
the Kidal Tuareg community.  He remains in close contact, for 
example, with people like Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga, a former 
rebel leader and Chief of the ADC's military faction.   He 
also recently traveled to Oubari, Libya to attend the 
international Tuareg conference hosted by Muammar Khaddafi. 
¶3.  (C) In a recent conversation with the Embassy, Moussa 
said he does not consider the Salafists true muslims.  He 
noted that, in his opinion, AQIM and its Salafist adherents 
violate Islamic law by killing muslims and non-muslims alike 
without provocation, i.e. without a direct threat to their 
existence or their religious practice. 
 
DIVERSITY AND TENSION 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Malian press tends to characterize the HCI as a 
disciplined organization with only one point of view. 
However, Moussa explained that the HCI's member rolls 
generally reflect the ethnic and religious composition of the 
country, and most ethnic groups are represented.  The 
Tijaniyya Sufi order holds the greatest religious influence, 
followed by the Al-Sunna (reformists), and the Qadiriyya. 
Moussa said the HCI at the national level is a political 
bureaucracy, with an executive, a religious, and an 
administrative committee, which are replicated at the 
regional and county levels.  He noted that elections to the 
largest and most important executive committee are extremely 
competitive and political. 
¶4. (C) Moussa told the Embassy that ethnic tensions within 
the HCI tend to run north-south.  He expressed frustration 
that that the Tuareg community has not been able to place a 
representative on the national executive committee, despite 
the fact that he and other Tuaregs are members of the HCI at 
both national and local levels.  Tensions also exist between 
the national and local levels.  Moussa attributes the 
apparently sudden opposition to the Family Code to poor 
communication from the national level to the provinces, both 
on the part of the government but also of the HCI.  Just as 
the GOM did not appear to sufficiently explain the Family 
Code to regional assemblies and municipalities, neither did 
the national HCI explain it to the regional and county level 
HCIs; if they had, Moussa said, they would have understood 
the groundswell of opposition. 
¶5.  (C)  Moussa said he believes the executive committee had 
spoken with the GOM about the Family Code before it was sent 
to the National Assembly and simply did not take the 
opportunity to relay the information to the interior of Mali 
or, for reasons he did not provide, bother to express any 
opposition to the Code.  He commented that after the National 
Assembly approved the Code and it was made public, the local 
councils became the driving force behind the national 
council's forceful and overt opposition to the Family Code. 
MILOVANOVIC