VZCZCXRO3755
RR RUEHAT
DE RUEHAT #0083/01 3021646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291646Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1545
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0079
INFO RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 1579

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 AMSTERDAM 000083 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
DEPT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
DEPT PASS TO EUR/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC NL
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - NETHERLANDS 
 
REF: (A)  STATE 57623, (B)  AMSTERDAM 46, (C)  AMSTERDAM 74 
 
¶1.  Per the instructions in Ref A, Amsterdam submits the 
following post summary of fraud-related activity during the 
period from March 1, 2009 to August 31, 2009 updating Ref B. 
 
-------------------------- 
Country Conditions 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  The Netherlands is a highly developed European nation.  In 
2008, The Economist Intelligence Unit ranked The Netherlands the 
fourth most democratic country in the world.  The CIA World 
Factbook estimates that Dutch per capita income in 2008 was 
approximately $40,000, more than Canada, Japan, or France. 
 
¶3.  The Netherlands has a well-structured and easily accessible 
social welfare system and is well known for its generous asylum 
policy.  According to the UNHCR, 9,298 new asylum applications 
were lodged from January to August 2009 in The Netherlands. 
Recent controversy in Dutch society over racial integration and 
Muslim extremism in The Netherlands has led the Government of 
the Netherlands (GONL) to take measures to stiffen requirements 
for refugees and asylum-seekers.  Immigrants from non-Western 
countries now face stricter requirements and must demonstrate 
knowledge of Dutch society, language, and culture by 
successfully passing the Dutch Immigration and Citizenship Test. 
 
¶4.  The Netherlands is considered a low fraud country.  Host 
government corruption is very low; The Netherlands ranks eighth, 
behind Iceland and ahead of Australia, on Transparency 
International's 2008 Global Corruption Perceptions Index.  Most 
government documents contain high-tech security features and are 
easily verifiable. 
 
 
--------------- 
NIV Fraud 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  During the reporting period Amsterdam adjudicated 11,366 NIV 
applications from citizens representing 135 countries.  7,275 of 
the applicants were Dutch travelers whose purpose of travel did 
not meet Visa Waiver Program (VWP) requirements or who were not 
entitled to avail themselves of the VWP. 
 
¶6.  Post encounters a small amount of fraudulent low-tech 
documents submitted in support of NIV applications; most are 
fabricated employment letters or letters of invitation.  Other 
fraud committed by applicants is associated with attempts to 
hide prior refusals by applying with passports with different 
names and birth dates.  Post's Fraud Prevention Manger (FPM) 
discovered through IDENT that a recent Nepalese B1/B2 applicant 
submitted his application under a different name and date of 
birth than the one he used during a prior refusal in Nepal.  The 
applicant explained that, after he was initially refused an F 
visa in 2002, a visa handler in Kathmandu urged him in March 
2004 to procure a Nepalese passport with a false name and date 
of birth in order to increase his chances of being issued an H2B 
visa.  Post is coordinating follow-up with Embassy Kathmandu. 
 
¶7.  Twenty-three cases were referred to the Fraud Prevention 
Unit (FPU) for investigation.  Of these cases, only the Nepalese 
applicant mentioned above was confirmed as fraudulent. 
 
------------- 
IV Fraud 
------------- 
 
¶8.  Post processed more than 220 IV applications during the 
reporting period, roughly half of which involving TCNs. It is 
often difficult to determine the authenticity of TCN supporting 
documents.  Post occasionally identifies fraudulent documents in 
the IV workload. FPU routinely uses LexisNexis Accurint to 
verify information or to create a new line of questioning during 
an interview. 
 
-------------- 
DV Fraud 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  Post issued 81 DV visas during the reporting period, 
including 28 to TCN applicants.  Problems periodically 
encountered with non-Dutch DV applicants include difficulties in 
verifying educational qualifications and in obtaining police 
records.  For example, despite several attempts, one Eritrean 
applicant waited more than 7 months for a police record from 
Kenya, where he had spent several years as a refugee.  Post 
occasionally encounters applicants who swear to the accuracy of 
 
AMSTERDAM 00000083  002 OF 004 
 
 
information included in application forms they admit they did 
not complete or even read. 
 
---------------------------------- 
ACS and Passport Fraud 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  Post handled 2,268 passport applications, of which 272 were 
EPDPs issued at post, and processed 318 applications for 
additional visa pages.  An average of 50-75 lost and stolen 
passports are returned to post each month from the local Dutch 
police and/or Dutch Immigration.  Post issued 200 CRBAs during 
the reporting period. 
 
¶11.  Several cases of suspected passport fraud were referred to 
FPU for further investigation.  In one case, post collaborated 
with DS to resolve a four decades-long investigation into an 
American citizen who stole the identity of a suicide victim in 
1969 in order to fraudulently secure a United States passport. 
The subject is currently awaiting extradition to the United 
States. 
 
¶12.  An increasing number of American citizens have been 
victimized by Advance Fee (419) and other internet-related fraud 
scams originating in the Netherlands.  Most of these scams have 
a link to Nigeria or Ghana. 
 
--------------------- 
Adoption Fraud 
--------------------- 
 
¶13.  Post occasionally provides passport services for Dutch 
parents who are in the process of adopting American children and 
have temporary child custody while the adoption is finalized. 
Adoptions from the United States are never final until the 
parents have had at least three home visits by the relevant 
social services office in The Netherlands.  The adopted child 
leaves the United States with a limited validity passport, 
normally issued for one year, which needs State Department 
approval for renewal.  A full-validity passport is not issued 
until the adoption is final, and adoptive parents need to 
present the final adoption decree and new birth certificate when 
applying.  Because an original court order from the originating 
state government conferring custodial rights is required for 
Post to process such passport requests, the likelihood of fraud 
is limited. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Use of DNA Testing 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14.  Post did not request DNA testing during the reporting 
period. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Asylum and other DHS Benefits Fraud 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶15.  Post processed six asylum/refugee (Visas 92/93) cases 
during the reporting period. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------- 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------- 
 
¶16.  The Netherlands is both a destination and transit point for 
alien smugglers, traffickers, and organized crime groups.  Post 
has no evidence that any have targeted the Consulate General in 
an attempt to facilitate travel to or operations in the United 
States.  Post works closely with onsite Customs and Border 
Protection staff and immigration and airport contacts to follow 
trends related to these issues and remain current on information 
pertinent to identifying such opportunities for misuse of visa 
and passport application processes.  Please refer to the related 
fraud reporting section on CAWeb for Amsterdam's Schiphol 
Airport Fraudulent Travel Report. 
http://intranet.ca.state.gov/fraud/14273.aspx ?gid=686. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  The Consular Section has an excellent working relationship 
 
AMSTERDAM 00000083  003 OF 004 
 
 
with the Regional Security Office at the Embassy in The Hague. 
Amsterdam has been identified as a post to receive an A/RSO-I 
position should funding become available.  There were no 
investigations conducted during the reporting period. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------ 
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------ 
 
¶18.  Dutch passports are burgundy red, with the Coat of Arms of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands emblazoned on the front cover. 
The words "EUROPESE UNIE" (English: European Union) and 
"KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN" (English: Kingdom of the 
Netherlands) are inscribed above the Dutch national coat of arms 
and the word "PASPOORT" (English: passport).  The Model 2006 
biometric passport features the ICAO biometric passport symbol 
on the bottom-right of the cover. 
 
¶19.  Dutch passports comply with European Union (EU) and ICAO 
security standards.  Each of the 34 pages of the Model 2006 
biometric passports features a "Shadow" water-mark of the Dutch 
national coat of arms and conical laser image perforations. 
Security features on the synthetic, polycarbonate biographical 
data page include a Kinegram image that changes shape and color, 
a laser engraved image perforation of the bearer's photo, and 
micro-printing above the machine readable zone repeating the 
text "Koninkrijk der Nederlanden."  A contact-free chip 
containing the same data stored in the Machine Readable Zone 
adds an extra level of security. 
 
¶20.  In response to an EU agreement calling for additional 
biometric data to combat identity fraud and misuse,  the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs instituted a policy on September 21, 
2009, that all Dutch passport and identity card applicants must 
provide four fingerprints, two of which are stored in a 
microchip in the documents.  Dutch diplomatic and civil service 
passports have included fingerprint data since June 2009.  GONL 
plans to store the fingerprint data in a centralized location 
accessible by Dutch law enforcement agencies are the focus of 
heated public debate.  See Ref C for additional information. 
 
¶21.  The Netherlands has invested heavily in technology in its 
efforts to forestall and intercept fraudulent travel.  The Dutch 
Expertise Center for Identity and Document Fraud (ECID) 
maintains a massive physical archive and digital database of 
fraudulent materials - including travel documents - confiscated 
by the Dutch government.  The ECID operates the National 
Documentation System (NDS), formerly the Verification and 
Identity System (VIS), a national database of lost and stolen 
passports and drivers' licenses.  Using fax, telephone and 
e-mail links to the ECID, authorized Dutch users can quickly 
check passport and drivers' licenses against the NDS system to 
weed out mala fide applicants.  NDS users include police 
bureaus, immigration services, the national credit bureau, the 
post office and all Dutch banks.  More than ten million 
documents from more than 62 countries are recorded in the 
database.  NDS contains only document serial numbers and 
expiration dates.  Names and personal information are not 
entered into the system. 
 
¶22.  The Dutch operate the NDS database on a fee-for-service 
basis.  In 1999, the Dutch offered the Fraud Prevention Unit 
free access to NDS, but we were unable to accept for computer 
security reasons.  Through our contacts, however, we are able to 
run queries on a case-by-case basis.  Each month, Post's FPU 
forwards serial numbers and expiration dates of all lost and 
stolen U.S. passports replaced at post to the ECID for entry 
into NDS. 
 
¶23.  Since its addition to the Consular Consolidated Database 
(CCD) in January 2009, Post has regularly utilized the Edison 
Travel Document database, a software application created and 
managed by the Dutch government.  Edison, which provides a 
centralized library of foreign travel document images and 
descriptions of their security features, has improved Post's 
ability to detect possible forged or altered travel documents 
and thus prevent illegitimate travel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------- 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------- 
 
¶24.  Post enjoys a high level of cooperation with host 
government counterparts.  Post's FPU regularly meets with the 
 
AMSTERDAM 00000083  004 OF 004 
 
 
Royal Dutch Border Police, known as the Koninklijke Marechaussee 
(KMAR), at Schiphol International Airport to gather information 
on fraudulent documents and travel trends.  This exchange of 
information, while comprehensive, has been kept low-key and 
informal at KMAR's request.  Please refer to the related fraud 
reporting section on CAWeb for Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport 
Fraudulent Travel Report. 
http://intranet.ca.state.gov/fraud/14273.aspx ?gid=686. 
 
 
¶25.  The Dutch also informally exchange information on alien 
smuggling, trends in illegitimate travel, and document fraud at 
monthly meetings of The Netherlands Immigration Liaison Team 
(NIL).  The NIL is comprised of the Dutch immigration service 
(IND), KMAR, and Dutch National Police (KLPD) representatives, 
as well as United States, British, Canadian and German 
Immigration Liaison Officers. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Areas of Particular Concern 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶26.  Schiphol International Airport is the fifth busiest airport 
in Europe behind London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Madrid, with over 
47 million passengers in 2008.  As a major transportation hub 
and transit center it is a source of a wide range of fraud 
issues and other criminal activities.   Please refer to the 
related fraud reporting section on CAWeb for Amsterdam's 
Schiphol Airport Fraudulent Travel Report. 
http://intranet.ca.state.gov/fraud/14273.aspx ?gid=686. 
 
----------------------------- 
Staffing and Training 
----------------------------- 
 
¶27.  Post has availed itself of several fraud-related training 
opportunities in the last six months.  In September 2009, a 
CA/FPP representative visited Amsterdam to train staff on the 
new Fraud Reporting System.  Shortly thereafter an LES from 
Stockholm, on a TDY assignment to Amsterdam's ACS section, 
volunteered additional training as Stockholm is a pilot site for 
the reporting system.  Later that month, post's Visa Section 
Chief attended the CA/FPP-organized Iranian Fraud Conference. 
 
 
¶28.  Post's FSN Investigator (FSNI) received fraud prevention 
training at FSI in 2006 and continues to enhance her skills by 
attending training sessions conducted by the local police, 
immigration officials, and other diplomatic mission fraud 
experts.  Post's efforts to prevent fraud are successful in 
large part due to the vigilance of Post's FSNI and her good 
rapport with Dutch interlocutors.  Post is currently seeking to 
provide FSI fraud prevention training for a back-up FSNI. 
RUTERBORIES