VZCZCXRO0916
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0981/01 2881420
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 151420Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2995
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000981 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PINS GCC PBTS SA AQ AE
SUBJECT: (S) A LONG HOT SUMMER FOR UAE-SAUDI RELATIONS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
REF (A) ABU DHABI 611; REF (B) ABU DHABI 849; REF (C) ABU DHABI 853; 
REF (D) 05 ABU DHABI 3851 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) This summer witnessed a sharp uptick in tensions between the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, beginning with the UAE's May decision to pull 
out of the GCC Monetary Union (after the Headquarters went to Riyadh 
when the UAE had lobbied for Dubai).  Shortly thereafter the Saudis 
effectively closed a major border crossing, and later refused to 
allow UAE citizens to enter on ID cards (a GCC norm) because of an 
irredentist rendering of the UAE border on the back of the card. 
While Emiratis almost universally interpret these actions as being 
evidence of the Kingdom's overbearing attitude toward smaller Gulf 
states, the UAE leadership was careful not to escalate the conflict 
and worked the issues quietly behind the scenes.  The success of this 
approach has been confirmed by the fact that Saudi Prince Mohammed 
bin Nayef Al-Saud paid a lengthy visit on UAE Crown Prince Mohammed 
bin Zayed last week in Rabat.  According to one of MbZ's courtiers, 
the MbN call constitutes a significant step toward reconciliation. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) While the UAE pays lip service to the idea of GCC unity, 
the reality is that Abu Dhabi is deeply skeptical of multilateral 
approaches particularly on military matter.  And while publicly 
expressing close ties with Riyadh, the UAE privately regards the 
Kingdom as its second greatest security threat after Iran (Israel is 
not on the list).  This is based on historic enmity between the 
Wahabi tribes of the Najd and the Maliki Bedouin/merchants of the 
UAE, as well as deep seated if rarely articulated anxiety about what 
might happen if Saudi Arabia came under a more fundamentalist regime 
than the Sudairi/Abdullah reign. 
 
¶3. (C) Fortunately for the US, the UAE and Saudi Arabia see 
eye-to-eye on Iran (and the UAE sees Saudi as a bulwark against 
Qatari and Omani accommodationism and Kuwaiti wobbliness).  That 
said, the underlying border dispute between the UAE and the Kingdom 
is real, and unlikely to get better over time.  This is an issue that 
bears our continued attention.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
UAE - More than an Extra on International Stage 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C) Since the death of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nayhan in late 
2004, his sons President Khalifa bin Zayed , Crown Price Prince 
Mohammed bin Zayed, and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, have 
demonstrated less willingness to defer to the Saudis on all issues. 
Recent examples of Emirati activism in the regional and international 
arena include: UAE withdrawal from the GCC Monetary Union in May when 
Riyadh was chosen over Abu Dhabi to host the Union's central bank; 
Emirati granting of debt relief to Iraq in June; and, the UAE's 
successful diplomatic campaign to host the headquarters of the new 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi -- beating 
the Germans. 
 
¶5. (C)  The younger Emirati successors find themselves increasingly 
at odds with what they view as geriatric Saudi leadership as they 
attempt to step out from the shadow of their giant neighbor and carve 
out a uniquely Emirati identity, seeking greater leadership 
opportunities, within the region and the international community. 
 
 
It's Not Ancient History to Houses of Saud and Nahyan 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (U) The struggle between the Al Saud and Al Nahyan dynasties can 
be traced to 1810 when the Al Saud, already in control of most of 
eastern Arabia, took control of the Buraimi Oasis, the traditional 
home of the al Nahyan, at the time poor herdsman and pearl fishermen. 
 The Al Saud brought with them a puritanical form of Islam -- 
Wahabism -- which Emirati leaders still complain about today as 
responsible for extremism and intolerance in the region. 
 
¶7. (U) For 150 years control of the Buraimi Oasis fell in and out of 
Al Saud control.  In 1952 Sheikh Zayed, then the son of the Ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, refused a 42 million dollar bribe from the Saudis to give 
up Abu Dhabi's claim on Buraimi; the amount was recorded in the 
Guiness Book of World records as the highest bribe ever offered.  In 
1955 the Saudis were expelled by force by Abu Dhabi and Omani troops 
with the support of Britain.  When the UK announced the end of its 
treaty arrangement with the trucial emirates in 1968, Saudi King 
Faisal again set his sights on Buraimi, claiming the area stretching 
eastward to the coast of Abu Dhabi was rightfully Saudi. 
 
1974 Border Agreement 
--------------------- 
 
ABU DHABI 00000981  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. (U) Never actually published, Saudi Arabia "registered" the text 
of its 1974 border agreement with the UAE with the UN in 1993.  It 
can be found in the UN Treaty Series titled, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates Agreement of the delimitation of boundaries 
(with exchange of letter and map);" signed at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 
on 21 August 1974 by Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, King of Saudi 
Arabia, and Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, President of the 
United Arab Emirates. 
 
¶9. (U) According to the terms of the agreement, the KSA gave up its 
claim on the al Buraimi Oasis (located in eastern Abu Dhabi and 
including the traditional home territory of the Nahyan Abu Dhabi 
ruling family).  Abu Dhabi, in turn, gave up a 23-kilometer strip of 
land near Khor al Odeid, cutting off any land connection between 
Qatar and the UAE. Under the agreement both parties have "joint 
sovereignty" over the entire area linking the territorial waters of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high seas. (Note: Many argue that 
the Saudis primary target here was to isolate Qatar.  Disagreement 
over interpretation of territorial waters also allowed Saudis to 
dispute the UAE-Qatar Causeway project in 2005.  End Note). 
 
¶10. (U) The 1974 Agreement granted Saudi Arabia 80 percent of the 
land area encompassing the giant al Shaybah oil field, discovered in 
1968 by Emiratis, and, unusual for this type of agreement -- 100 
percent hydrocarbons rights to exploration and drilling of the entire 
field, including the 20 percent that remained inside UAE territory. 
 
Did Zayed Sign Under Duress? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Leading up to Sheikh Zayed's death in November 2004 and 
since, the Emirati leadership has increasingly and publicly tested 
the Saudis will to reconsider parts of the 1974 agreement, which they 
believe Sheikh Zayed signed under duress.  The ruling generation 
feels the Saudis mistreated Sheikh Zayed;  the agreement was the 
price the Saudis insisted on in return for recognizing the new 
nation.  It is also possible Zayed feared that if he failed to agree 
to the 1974 borders, the Emirati confederation would be swallowed up 
by the Saudi state. 
 
Is the Treaty in Force? 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) We understand that the Saudis view the treaty as being in 
full force, and likely refer to Article 9 "this agreement shall enter 
into force immediately on signature."  In addition to disputing the 
substance of the treaty, the UAE has taken the position that the 
agreement is not in effect because the UAE has not ratified it as 
called for in the UAE constitution. 
 
The Causeway Controversy 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) In 2005 tension emerged between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over 
a decision by the UAE to build a causeway connecting Abu Dhabi to 
Qatar over the Khor al Odeid waters (The UAE held it had not ceded 
the territorial waters associated with Khor al Odeid).  President 
Khalifa is reported to have been "furious", and tried to use the 
Saudi objection to the causeway to reopen negotiations on the entire 
1974 agreement.  Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef appears to have 
by 2005 assumed the role of SARG point person on this issue and 
refused to reopen the issue (Ref D).  (Note: The Prince Nayef 
connection is notable as KSA actions taken this summer (below) 
against UAE concerning border and immigration issues in July and 
August were executed by arms of the Ministry of Interior.  End Note.) 
 
 
So What's Happened Lately? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) On May 27 the UAE pulled out of the GCC Monetary Union in 
response to the selection of Riyadh as the new organization's 
headquarters.  As the second largest GCC economy, the UAE's move may 
well tank the entire project.  Most economic observers agree, 
however, that Saudi Arabia is the only GCC country with the 
sufficient banking infrastructure and know-how to host a central bank 
for a common Gulf currency. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In July more than 2000 trucks backed-up on the UAE side of 
the Saudi Border awaiting entry to the Kingdom (Ref A).  UAE customs 
officials reported that the problem was technical and related to the 
institution of a new Saudi fingerprinting system.  The delays caused 
thousands of drivers to be trapped in temperatures of 110 degrees 
Fahrenheit, ruining many UAE perishable exports.  Although neither 
side gave any public indication that the delays were politically 
motivated, local commentators suggested the "humanitarian crisis" was 
a Saudi attempt to retaliate against the UAE for withdrawing from the 
 
ABU DHABI 00000981  003 OF 003 
 
 
GCC Monetary Union. 
 
¶16. (U) On August 19, the SARG announced that Emirati citizens would 
have to use their passports to enter the Kingdom, rather than the 
identity cards traditionally accepted for GCC nationals. Saudi MOI 
officials explained the decision as a protest of the UAE map depicted 
on the front of Emirati national ID cards showing a land border 
between UAE and Qatar.  The SARG move was in violation of a GCC 
agreement allowing member states to enter other GCC countries with 
only national ID cards.  SARG Immigration Chief told the Saudi press 
that "the Kingdom has taken the step because the map...is not in line 
with the border agreement signed between the two countries...despite 
several attempts to address this issue with the UAEG including 
official diplomatic requests urging the UAE to rectify the map." 
In a move no doubt meant to trump Prince Nayef, President Khalifa 
took the moral high ground by announcing in early September that the 
UAE would continue to allow Saudi citizens to enter the Emirates on 
their national ID cards (Ref C). 
 
Generation and Religious Gap 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (S/NF)  As formerly Bedouin, Arab Gulf oil producing states, the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia indeed share a similar culture and history. 
Differences in age, religious attitudes, and approach to modernity 
among the two successor generations of Al Saud and Al Nahyan, 
however, should not be discounted.  The leadership in Abu Dhabi never 
misses an opportunity to let visiting senior USG officials know that 
they regard the Kingdom as run by cantankerous old men surrounded by 
advisors who believe the earth is flat. 
 
¶18. (S/NF) While Emirati officials acknowledge and lament the 
presence of a Salafi or Wahabi strain of Islam in the UAE (note: 
most Emiratis are from the Maliki school, although in the two 
emirates ruled by the Qawasim, the Hanbali school predominates), 
senior Abu Dhabi ruling family members have made clear their concern 
about extremism and have taken concrete actions to minimize both the 
presence and influence of extremist Islam in the Emirates.  Although 
part of controlling terrorist incitement falls to the security 
services, perhaps nowhere are UAEG efforts more recognizable that in 
the sphere of educational reform. 
 
UAE Forges Ahead to Create Its Own Identity 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (S/NF) A UAE determined to succeed in establishing a national 
identity not necessarily in conflict with, but separate from, its big 
GCC neighbor has inevitably lead to an erosion of Saudi influence 
over UAE decision-making.  These so called squabbles should not be 
dismissed as mere bickering.  Distrust among GCC countries (which 
goes back to tribal days) weakens the effectiveness of the GCC as a 
collective and as an effective moderate player in the region. 
 
¶20. (S/NF) The UAE is clearly out in front of the other GCC nations 
on the war in Afghanistan, where it is the only Gulf nation with 
troops ground fighting the Taliban (and joins Jordan as one of two 
Arab states with military forces aiding the coalition).  In Pakistan, 
the Saudis and the Emiratis actually back different sides, with the 
Emiratis supporting the U.S. position to back the elected Prime 
Minister's government.  When it comes to Middle East Peace, the UAE 
leadership is privately forward thinking, but still prefers to be in 
line with the  Saudis for guidance on its public stance. 
 
¶21. (S/NF) Comment:  On what is perhaps our most pressing concern, 
Iran, the Emiratis report that they continue to work with the Saudis 
to convince the other GCC members to take a stronger public stance to 
pressure Iran on its nuclear program  With each member demonstrating 
a clear preference for conducting bilateral rather than multilateral 
relations with other powers, as well as each other, real collective 
action presents a challenge.  Ironically, although the UAE and KSA 
are of one mind about what the perceive to be the existential threat 
from Tehran, other GCC members, also fearful of Iran, take their own 
bilateral approach with Iran which is quite different and appears 
entrenched, particularly in the case of Oman and Qatar.  Where 
UAE-KSA tensions certainly have implications for U.S. priorities in 
the region, on our most pressing priority at this moment, although 
the UAE and KSA are united, it is unclear they can produce meaningful 
collective GCC words or deeds from the GCC.  End Comment. 
 
OLSON