VZCZCXRO7135
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0572/01 2591516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161516Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9535
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000572 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR SI ICTY ICJ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES SLOVENIA, BOSNIA, KOSOVO, 
SERBIA AND ICTY IN INITIAL CALL WITH FM JANDROKOVIC 
 
REF: A. ZAGREB 559 
     ¶B. LJUBLJANA 286 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolEcon Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
& (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Ambassador paid his initial call on FM Gordan 
Jandrokovic late in the afternoon on September 14.  Most of 
the hour-long meeting was spent discussing the recent 
agreement with Slovenia to get EU accession talks going again 
and to reach an agreement on an arbitration process for the 
disputed border.  Jandrokovic said the two sides were 
communicating much better than in the past, and that it was 
vital to stress the "win-win" nature of the agreement.  He 
confirmed Croatia's readiness to use the latest, June 15 
draft of an Arbitration Agreement as the starting point for 
new talks, and welcomed the idea that negotiations on both 
accession and arbitration should re-start at the beginning of 
October.  The Ambassador responded that the U.S. believed an 
Arbitration Agreement was achievable, but that Croatia would 
need to be prepared to accept reference to the possibility of 
Slovenian contact or junction with international waters, as 
long as that was not a foreordained outcome.  Jandrokovic 
also commented on relations with Serbia, Bosnia and the ICTY. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
SLOVENIA 
------- 
 
¶2. (C) Jandrokovic opened the meeting by noting his 
appreciation of U.S. support for Croatia's NATO and EU 
membership.  The GoC sees NATO and EU membership for all the 
countries of SE Europe as the only sustainable way to resolve 
regional issues and bring stability to SE Europe. 
 
¶3. (C) For this reason, Jandrokovic welcomed USG praise for 
the September 11 agreement between PM Kosor and Slovene PM 
Pahor on unblocking Croatia's EU accession talks (REFS A and 
B).  The talks had not been easy, but the result was 
"excellent" and truly a "win-win" outcome.  The atmosphere 
between the two governments was much better now.  The 
Croatians had a better understanding of how difficult this 
issue is for Pahor, and there was increasing trust on both 
sides.  Croatia was keen to keep pursuing "silent diplomacy" 
as much as it could; indeed Jandrokovic considered 
maintaining this approach critical to the ultimate success of 
negotiations.  He said GoC statements would avoid 
"triumphalism" and would always focus on the balanced nature 
of the agreement and the "win-win" result.  But every day, he 
warned, the media would try to provoke disagreement, using 
one sides' comments to try and prod the other side into 
denials or intemperate comments. 
 
¶4. (C) Therefore, the Croatians hoped the process could move 
forward quickly.  Jandrokovic said he had spoken with Swedish 
FM Bildt, and Bildt had replied that the Slovenes had 
indicated they did not want to move too fast.  Jandrokovic 
suggested scheduling an intergovernmental conference (IGC) 
for accession negotiations by the end of September.  Bildt 
replied he would be traveling Sept. 19 to Oct. 1, but would 
look at holding in IGC soon thereafter. (NOTE: On Sept. 15, 
GoC officials informed post that an IGC would be scheduled 
for October 2.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶5. (C) Jandrokovic once again confirmed Croatia was ready to 
re-start negotiations on an Arbitration Agreement for the 
border on the same day as an IGC, and to use the June 15 
draft from Rehn as the starting point.  He said the challenge 
would be to find language regarding the arbitrators' 
consideration of Slovenia's "junction" with the High Sea that 
could be acceptable to both sides.  Croatia would be able to 
accept any decision the Arbitral Tribunal might make.  What 
Croatia could not accept, however, was an Arbitration 
Agreement that would virtually require the Tribunal to give 
Slovenia territorial contact with international waters.  That 
decision needed to be left open for the arbitrators to 
decide.  Given the improved atmosphere, he said he was 
confident an agreement was achievable.  "We have a much 
better understanding of the Slovenes' fears," he said.  "We 
both need an agreement that we can explain to our publics." 
 
¶6. (C) Regarding the timing of the process, Jandrokovic said 
that it was in Croatia's interest to reach an Arbitration 
Agreement as soon as possible and "finish this story."  He 
also claimed that both Croatia and Slovenia had already 
agreed that the actual decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on 
the border should only be announced after Croatia's EU 
accession process was complete and the Accession Treaty 
ratified. 
 
ZAGREB 00000572  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that Washington was very pleased 
that Croatia and Slovenia had reached agreement on unblocking 
the EU talks and re-starting the process of negotiating an 
Arbitration Agreement.  Both sides had done an excellent job 
maintaining "silent diplomacy", and we hoped this could 
continue as much as possible.  When it came time to negotiate 
the Arbitration Agreement, the Ambassador emphasized that 
Croatia needed to find a way to accommodate explicit 
reference to junction or contact with the High Sea as a real 
possible outcome of the arbitration.  At the same time, he 
noted that Croatia's need to ensure that such an outcome was 
not presupposed or foreordained would also have to be 
accommodated in the text. 
 
SERBIA, KOSOVO AND THE ICJ 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Jandrokovic told the Ambassador that Croatia has 
already notified the ICJ Registry of its intent to offer an 
oral argument in the Serbia-Kosovo case in December.  Croatia 
expected this to prompt a negative reaction from Belgrade, 
and Jandrokovic looked to the US to help explain to the Serbs 
why Croatia's step was not a hostile action.  At the same 
time, Croatia would be looking for other avenues of 
cooperation with Serbia to try and "cool down" relations. 
Croatia had recently agreed with Hungary's proposal to host a 
trilateral (Croat, Serb, Hungarian) conference on economic 
development in Budapest this fall, and would look for similar 
opportunities to engage with Belgrade. 
 
¶9. (C) Jandrokovic also noted the continuing difficulties 
regarding Kosovar participation in regional meetings and 
cooperation.  He suggested that all the partners who support 
Kosovar participation should do a better job of coordinating 
their approach to such sessions, so that common positions 
could be reached on how to handle the Serbs and when to stay 
away from or downgrade attendance at events where Kosovo is 
not represented. 
 
BOSNIA 
------ 
 
¶10. (C) Jandrokovic observed that the situation in Bosnia was 
not good, and was not improving.  Croatia needed a 
functioning state there, in part because of the requirements 
of the long border and the management of the port of Ploce. 
But "we can't even find anyone who is in charge of decisions 
there."  Jandrokovic mentioned that he would soon be visiting 
Sarajevo to speak at a meeting with one hundred or so ethnic 
Croatian business people.  His message to the Croatian 
community there would be consistent -- your capital is 
Sarajevo, and you need to fight for a functioning state in 
B-H that respects your national identity as well. 
 
ICTY 
---- 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that, with the Slovene blockade 
being lifted, the issue of whether Croatia was fully 
cooperating with the ICTY would assume renewed urgency and 
importance.  The U.S. understood Croatia's frustration that 
it had been unable to convince ICTY Prosecutor Brammertz that 
the outstanding documents requested had either never existed 
or been destroyed or purloined in the intervening years.  The 
need, however, for Croatia to satisfy the ICTY's requirements 
was unavoidable.  Jandrokovic replied that Brammertz would be 
coming to visit Croatia at the end of September.  (NOTE: The 
visit is scheduled for Sept. 28.  END NOTE.)  "But it is 
impossible to persuade him," Jandrokovic complained.  Croatia 
has asked Brammertz for proposals on further steps that 
Croatia should take to demonstrate its good will and prove 
that no documents are available, but had not been given 
specific ideas.  Croatia would continue to engage with 
Brammertz, but felt that he was unlikely to bend.  Therefore, 
the GoC was also seeking to get the ICTY bench to rule on 
whether or not Croatia's efforts to find the documents had 
been sufficient.  The Ambassador reiterated that Croatia 
needed to think anew and think creatively such that by the 
end of the process all conceivable opinions and remedies had 
been exhausted. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Throughout this introductory call, Jandrokovic 
repeatedly expressed appreciation for Croatia's relationship 
with the U.S., and showed an interest in hearing our advice 
on issues facing the country.  (NOTE: On September 15, 
Jandrokovic's Ministry issued a press release explicitly 
stating that the June 15 draft of the Arbitration Agreement 
would be the starting point for further talks, thus helping 
 
ZAGREB 00000572  003 OF 003 
 
 
Slovene PM Pahor's position in his domestic debates, even at 
the risk of negative reaction from within Croatia.  END 
NOTE.)  We will continue to stress to the Croatians that they 
should be able to accept a reference to the possibility of 
Slovenian maritime contact with international waters in an 
Arbitration Agreement, as long as the Agreement does not 
presuppose such an outcome.  If that double message is 
understood and accepted in both Zagreb and Ljubljana, we 
believe conclusion of an Arbitration Agreement is definitely 
achievable.  END COMMENT. 
FOLEY