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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000375 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019 
TAGS: AFDB MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING: NATO'S SYG GETS 
STRATEGIC ON AFGHANISTAN 
 
USNATO 00000375  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Kate Byrnes. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) AND (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
used the September 2 meeting of the North Atlantic Council to 
advance his goal for increased NATO strategic policy 
coordination and guidance for political and military 
authorities involved in Afghanistan.  Allies generally 
supported this approach.  Work on this initiative will pass 
to NATO,s Policy Coordination Group with the aim of 
developing priorities and benchmarks of future success to 
present to Defense Ministers at the October 22-23 meeting in 
Bratislava. In a discussion on the separate issue of the Shia 
Personal Status Law, Rasmussen concluded from the Allies' 
discussion that NATO should not make any public statements on 
the issue for the time being. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen used the 
September 2 meeting of the North Atlantic Council to advance 
his goal for increased NATO strategic policy coordination and 
guidance for political and military authorities involved in 
Afghanistan.  At the SYG's instigation, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General for NATO Operations Larry Rossin identified 
to PermReps five strategic outcomes in NATO,s Comprehensive 
Strategic Political-Military Plan (CSPMP) that he said were 
integral to ISAF progress for the remainder of 2009 and 2010. 
He suggested that NATO should define success factors and 
proposed that NATO also select benchmarks to assess progress 
in these five areas between now and the 2010 NATO Summit. 
¶3. (C) The five Desired Strategic Outcomes (DSOs) Rossin 
highlighted were: ensuring that opposing militant forces do 
not pose a threat to the Afghan government,s ability to 
exercise authority across the country; Afghans taking over 
lead security responsibility from ISAF; ensuring Afghans are 
able to fully participate in the democratic process, both 
nationally and sub-nationally; ensuring Afghanistan has good 
 
USNATO 00000375  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
and close relations with its neighbors, particularly 
Pakistan; and ensuring effective assistance to the Afghan 
government, including through the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams, to enable it to extend its authority throughout 
Afghanistan. 
¶4. C) Allies generally supported this approach. Germany and 
France agreed, stating coordination with other international 
actors already present in Afghanistan was also important to 
measuring progress.  Spain remarked that NATO should not lean 
towards a mathematical or a purely technical approach but, 
instead, should include political criteria as benchmarks are 
prioritized.  Ambassador Daalder said the ability to measure 
success within the next 12-18 months was critical to 
maintaining support for the ISAF Afghanistan mission among 
our domestic publics.  NATO should be clear on benchmarks and 
specific on how it measures progress.  He said it was 
critical that NATO be clear and concise on the NATO/ISAF 
role. The Ambassador said there is a need for a NATO "effect 
on the ground," highlighting the importance of NATO 
benchmarks and metrics.  He encouraged the Alliance to be 
clear on what NATO could do and where others, such as UNAMA, 
should lead.  Norway agreed and said there is a need for NATO 
to ensure priorities identified are, in fact, priorities that 
NATO as an institution can affect on the ground.  Poland 
encouraged the Council to also consider the public message on 
NATO,s DSO work.  The Polish Ambassador said a public 
statement during the October Ministerial would shine a 
positive light on NATO,s work in a time when public opinion 
has grown increasingly critical of ISAF,s mission in 
Afghanistan. 
¶5. (C) The SYG himself suggested a push for no more than 
three DSOs to simplify explaining NATO's focus to the public. 
 Rasmussen's top three DSOs for ISAF progress were: that 
opposing militant forces do not pose a threat to the Afghan 
government,s ability to exercise authority across the 
country; Afghans taking over lead security responsibility 
 
USNATO 00000375  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
from ISAF; and incorporating a comprehensive approach which 
would show demonstrable change within the daily lives of the 
people of Afghanistan.  The SYG also clarified that the DSOs 
should be limited to issues that could be impacted by ISAF, 
i.e. areas where ISAF could lead and ensure the military 
chain of command prioritized attention and resources. The 
SYG,s said his goal is for NATO to submit a final, decision 
invoking text for consideration at the October Defense 
Ministerial in Bratislava. 
¶6. (C)  The NAC agreed that the PCG should discuss the DSOs 
in the coming weeks. (Note: The basis of this Council 
discussion was the NATO Assistant Secretary General for 
Operations, Martin Howard,s, Food For Thought paper 
distributed to the PCG on July 10.  End note.) 
¶7. (C/NF) COMISAF,s 60-day Assessment. Almost every PermRep 
intervention mentioned the need to view COMISAF,s 60-day 
report before NATO could identify and prioritize benchmarks 
for success from the CSPMP document (Note:  Perm Reps chose 
the tactic of subtly expressing their frustration of not 
receiving a copy of the report, leaving their privately 
expressed more forceful complaints at the door for this first 
gathering in a public forum since the report went forward. 
End note.). 
¶8. (C)  Shia Personal Status Law.  Rasmussen said NATO Senior 
Civilian Representative, Ambassador Fernando Gentilini, would 
continue to inform the Council on the latest Shia law 
developments and NATO would closely coordinate with the 
United Nations on all public remarks. The SYG reassured 
Council members that NATO, at this time, would refrain from 
any public statements unless absolutely necessary, as in a 
response to a significant turn in events.  Norway summed up 
today,s Council views well, stating, the Secretary 
General,s letter to President Hamid Karzai, that expressed 
his preliminary views on the law was sufficient in advance of 
election results and the ISAF Commander,s 60-day assessment 
rollout.  Although NATO must allow the U.N to lead on the 
 
USNATO 00000375  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
issue, the Norwegian Ambassador reiterated the need to keep 
the Afghan people first, by upholding the Afghan government 
to international human and women,s rights standards, while, 
simultaneously, walking the fine line between addressing 
public opinion and remaining silent on the issue. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Daalder said human and women,s rights are 
a high priority for the U.S. and NATO should lend support to 
efforts by the Afghan civil society.   However, he noted that 
Afghan civil society itself had concerns about the possible 
outcomes of public external comment, and asserted that NATO 
should not take  to the pulpit on this issue. Rasmussen 
concluded that NATO would not make any public statements on 
the Shia Personal Status Law and promised NATO coordination 
with the U.N., the organization seen to have the lead on the 
issue. 
 
¶10. (C)  NATO AWACS Deployment.  Luxembourg,s Ambassador 
briefed the Council that, if NATO agreed all AWACS flights 
would turn off all radar and surveillance equipment during 
transit of Azeri territory, Azerbaijan would agree to AWACS 
overflight clearances.  There was no objection from the 
Council.  Ambassador Rossin briefed that NATO still awaited a 
response from the UAE on the NATO AWACS MOU.  He said 
negotiations with Turkmenistan were on hold until an 
agreement with Azerbaijan is completed (Note: A robust AWACS 
discussion is on the agenda for the next NAC discussion, at 
which time, details of progressing basing negotiations with 
other Gulf nations will be unveiled.  End note). 
 
¶11. (C) 2009 UNODC Report.  The British Ambassador previewed 
the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report as 
containing good news on counternarcotics efforts.  He said 
the report announced a 22% decrease in opium production, a 33 
% decrease in Helmand province, specifically, and ISAF,s 
work to disrupt the insurgency narcotics trade as positive. 
 
USNATO 00000375  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
The U.K. Ambassador encouraged NATO to capitalize on the 
report,s positive counternarcotics trends through NATO 
strategic communications.  Rasmussen responded positively to 
this suggestion, stating he would highlight the UNODC report 
analysis in his next press conference.  The UNODC report will 
be discussed in detail at the September 18 Council meeting. 
BYRNES