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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, S/SANAC, ISN/NESS, IO/GS 
DOE FOR NA-243 GOOREVICH, OEHLBERT, SYLVESTER 
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE 
NRC FOR OIP DOANE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2014 
TAGS: AORC ENRG PREL KNNP TRGY IAEA NAM
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS - FEW VOICES LIKELY TO RISE IN 
SEPTEMBER BOG 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 364 
     ¶B. UNVIE 301 
     ¶C. STATE 76708 
     ¶D. STATE 80019 
     ¶E. STATE 83455 
     ¶F. STATE 85122 
     ¶G. STATE 91199 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The IAEA Secretariat will not release a 
discussion paper on assurance of nuclear fuel supply in time 
for the September meeting of the BoG, and few Member States 
other than the U.S. appear troubled over this inaction.  The 
Board Chair wishes to avoid a re-heated version of the June 
Board discussion that fails to take the issue forward.  DG 
ElBaradei indicated offhandedly to Ambassador that the issue 
had fallen victim to a North-South divide in the Agency, yet 
ElBaradei "hoped" agreement on a mechanism could be attained. 
 The UK will present a paper on its concept in a September 8 
midday briefing and in the Board under AOB.  Ambassador 
privately urged P5 1 and other like-minded ambassadors to 
make national statements calling for engagement on the 
practicalities.  NSC Senior Director Holgate acknowledged to 
EU President Sweden and a pessimistic Germany the G-77/NAM 
position, reaffirmed in U.S.-South African talks, that the 
matter is "pre-mature".  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Despite U.S. demarche (refs A, C) and a parallel 
appeal in July by the Swedish EU Presidency's special 
ambassador Bjorn Skala, the IAEA Secretariat will not provide 
the September 7-11 Board of Governors meeting a paper 
commenting on the Board's June discussion of assurance of 
nuclear fuel supply.  (Comment:  In light of IAEA/EXPO Tariq 
Rauf's indication to us in late July that ElBaradei had 
authorized such a paper, we have expressed disappointment 
about its non-availability, which reflects ElBaradei's 
decision to slow the debate.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  (C) With senior Secretariat staff present, Board 
Chairwoman Feroukhi (Algeria) explained to Ambassador in 
their introductory meeting that the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) states wanted the Secretariat's written replies to the 
questions raised in the G-77/NAM's June statement (ref B) 
before engaging in further discussion.  In the absence of the 
paper, a call for Board discussion this time, she forecast, 
would bring nothing but a repeat of June's statements. 
Feroukhi confirmed that the United Kingdom would use the Any 
Other Business (AOB) agenda item to make a statement on its 
concept and that the floor would be open for others. 
Feroukhi added that she wondered if the formality of the 
Board made it the best forum for advancing the fuel 
assurances issue.  The Ambassador noted the need for 
advocates to explain the proposals better but said it 
"pained" him that we may not advance the discussion under 
Feroukhi's chairmanship; he pointed as well to the practical 
challenge that "the money is there" for an Agency fuel 
assurance mechanism. 
 
¶4.  (C) Mission has been told in weeks past by the EU, U.A.E. 
and Kazakhstan that they would speak on the issue in the 
upcoming Board meeting.  Swedish special envoy Skala told NSC 
Senior Director Holgate August 31 the EU was still 
deliberating on its statement and wanted to bring about a 
"clear procedural path" in the Secretariat and Board for 
instituting fuel assurances.  The same day, however, German 
Ambassador told Holgate he questioned the advisability of 
making an EU statement this time in the face of G-77/NAM 
antagonism and DG ElBaradei's apparent abandonment of the 
issue (more below). 
 
¶5.  (C) DG ElBaradei made only passing reference to fuel 
assurances at the outset of his introductory conversation 
with the Ambassador September 3.  The DG initially seemed to 
consign the issue to a category of victims of the North-South 
divisions in the Agency, but then corrected himself by saying 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000419  002 OF 002 
 
 
he hoped "we" could still succeed.  Earlier in the week, 
German Ambassador Luedeking had told NSC Senior Director 
Holgate he sensed ElBaradei had given up; whereas in March 
the DG wanted a fuel bank to be part of his legacy, it now 
seemed to Luedeking that ElBaradei saw its achievement was 
not in reach by the time he departs office in November. 
Holgate shared with Luedeking and with Swedish MFA Special 
Envoy Skala in a separate conversation the very complicated 
posture that South Africa's IAEA Governor Abdul Minty had 
taken on the issue in U.S.-South African talks the week 
before in Pretoria.  She said Minty had warned that the NAM 
is rigorous in its position that Board consideration of any 
fuel assurance mechanism is "pre-mature," but then 
(typically) offered himself as a bridge to help build a more 
consensual approach to this issue. 
 
¶6.  (C) On September 4 Ambassador informed his colleagues 
from the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China that U.S. 
would make an AOB statement encouraging practical discussion 
of implementation issues raised in the June Board, and he 
asked all others to do the same.  He related some of the 
effort USG has made in its "listening campaign" demarches in 
skeptical capitals.  UK Ambassador confirmed that he would 
present his government's concept with an AOB statement (and, 
in fact, the UK will provide a briefing during the lunch 
break on Tuesday, September 8, open to all Member States). 
Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy stated in contrast that he had 
as yet no instruction that Russia would speak on the 
assurance of supply issue. 
 
¶7.  (C) Later the same day the Ambassador and Msnoffs 
similarly briefed the Ambassadors of Australia, Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.  Australia and Canada 
reported that in their individual pre-Board consultations 
with Chairwoman Feroukhi, she had pitched them strongly not 
to speak on the issue in the Board meeting, reasoning that a 
rehash of June would be ineffectual or worse.  Both 
ambassadors said they had the impression Feroukhi had hoped 
to dissuade the UK from making an AOB presentation on its 
concept (but that under instruction from London this was 
going to go forward).  Australia noted that assurance of 
supply was not a "front-of-the-mind" issue in Canberra and 
confirmed it would have no Board statement this time; Canada 
also plans no statement. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment: ElBaradei reportedly warned EU ambassadors 
at the early July kick-off of the Swedish Presidency to 
recognize G-77/NAM resistance, as evidenced in the June 
Board, and not to aggravate that resistance by pressing for 
early Board action.  Our discussions in Vienna since that 
time have suffered an overlay of ElBaradei's presumed sense 
of resignation on this topic.  We have pressed like-minded 
and selected nuclear newcomers, including fuel bank funding 
donors Kuwait and the U.A.E., to reinforce with the DG and 
Secretariat that they must provide an impetus for more 
detailed, technical, and practical discussion.  The U.S. 
appeal to capitals (refs C - G) to depoliticize the issue is 
not yet translating into engagement here.  As in the past two 
Board meetings, we will work the aisles in the opening days 
to drum up as many supportive interventions as possible in 
order to go beyond a "placeholder" treatment of the issue. 
At this point, however, Russian activism to move toward 
formal Board consideration of the Angarsk LEU reserve is the 
catalyzing event the USG can best advocate.  S/SANAC Einhorn 
likewise shared with incoming DG Amano on September 3 our 
hope for early progress on the Russian proposal.  Amano 
agreed that Board approval of the Russian proposal before the 
end of 2009 would be a good way to put the issue back on 
track.  End Comment. 
DAVIES