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Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA415, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT): On-Site

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA415 2009-09-03 06:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0415/01 2460648
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030648Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0002
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ AFTAC PATRICK AFB FL
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000415 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/MNA, VCI/NA, L/ACV, IO/UNP 
DOE FOR NN-40 
JCS FOR J5/DDIN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, ATSH/NCB/NT, AND DTRA 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM AORC KTBT IR
SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT): On-Site 
Inspection (OSI) Discussions at Working Group B (WGB)-33 
 
REF: STATE 85155 (PCG-235) 
 
1.  This cable reports discussions of On-Site Inspection (OSI) 
issues that took place during the first half of the thirty-third 
session of Working Group B (WGB-33), August 17 - 25.  International 
Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC) and OSI 
discussions taking place during the second half of the Working Group 
B meeting will be reported septel.  The U.S. delegation executed 
guidance (ref A, paragraphs 16-22). 
 
2.  CONTENTS 
SUMMARY         3 
OPENING PLENARY (I BLINKED, DID I MISS IT?)  4 - 7 
ON-SITE INSPECTION OPERATIONAL MANUAL   8 - 90 
 DO YOU MIND WAITING FOR OUR EXPERTS?  8 - 11 
 THEME 15 (POSITION-FINDING AND BOUNDARY MARKING) 
          12 - 16 
 THEME 7 PAPER (PASSIVE SEISMIC)   17 - 27 
 THEME 13 PAPER (ISP ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES) 
28 - 40 
 THEME 13 PAPER (AMENDMENTS TO THE OPS MANUAL) 
      41 
 IRANIAN NATIONAL PAPER     42 - 49 
 THEME 2 PAPER (IT HEALTH AND SAFETY)  50 - 60 
 PLANNING FOR FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE 
      OSI OPERATIONAL MANUAL     61 - 69 
 THEME 10 (REPORTING AND POST INSPEC ACTIVITIES) 
      70 - 84 
 THEME 5 (INSPECTION EQUIPMENT)   85 - 89 
 WGB REPORT TEXT      90 
      OSI OPERATIONAL TASK LEADER SMALL GROUP  91 - 94 
 FIELD INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  91 - 93 
 SIDEBAR MEETING WITH TASK LEADER COXHEAD 94 
      ON-SITE INSPECTION ISSUES MAJOR PROGRAM  95 - 107 
 INTEGRATED FIELD EXERCISE (IFE08)   95 - 98 
 OSI ACTION PLAN      99 - 103 
 EVALUATION PLAN FOR SECOND CYCLE OF 
      OSI ACTIVITIES       104 
 REPORT ON OSI WORKSHOP 16    105 - 106 
 FURTHER REVISION OF OSI MILESTONES   107 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
3.  In discussions of the seven non-papers covering proposed changes 
to the OSI Operational Manual Model Text, circulated by the OSI 
Operational Manual Task Leader, the U.S. delegation drew upon the 
U.S. proposed revisions (line-in/line-out) to the text provided in 
each of the Task Leader Issue Papers.  Most U.S. proposals were 
accepted, and those that were not will be discussed at subsequent 
sessions of WGB.  Contingent upon funding and approval of the annual 
program of work by the Policy Making Organizations, WGB-33 will 
endorse the OSI Action Plan provided that the timelines contained in 
the Action Plan are viewed as target date, not deadlines.  The WGB 
OSI Milestones will be further revised based upon discussions during 
WGB-33. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
OPENING PLENARY (I BLINKED, DID I MISS IT?) 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  The On-Site Inspection (OSI) Operational Manual Task Leader (TL) 
Malcom Coxhead opened the plenary and briefly reviewed the agenda 
and schedule for the session.  The schedule called for OSI and OSI 
Operational Manual issues to be discussed during the first week.  He 
suggested that any delegation wishing to make an opening plenary 
statement should save their statement for the next plenary session 
that would occur on Monday, 24 August 2009.  The agenda was adopted 
without comment and Coxhead then turned the floor over to the OSI 
Task Leader, Vitaliy Shchukin. 
 
5.  Shchukin briefly reviewed his plan for the session, highlighting 
the various topics on the agenda.  He also indicated that the first 
OSI task meeting on Wednesday morning would begin with a video 
presentation on the 2008 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE 08). 
 
6.  OSI Operational Manual Task Leader returned to the schedule for 
the review of the Model Text of the Operational Manual and indicated 
there would be 8 sessions through the course of WGB-33that were 
focused primarily on the various theme papers that he had developed 
 
and that were posted to the Experts Communication System (ECS) and 
subsequently circulated by the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
(PTS). 
 
7.  The U.S. delegation then read a brief statement from guidance 
(ref A, para 16).  The plenary was closed without further comment. 
 
------------------------------------- 
ON-SITE INSPECTION OPERATIONAL MANUAL 
------------------------------------- 
 
DO YOU MIND WAITING FOR OUR EXPERTS? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  The Argentine delegation made the first intervention in the WGB 
Task Group and explained that their experts would not arrive until 
week 2 of WGB and asked to have an opportunity to make inputs into 
the Model Text at that time. 
 
9.  The Chinese delegation echoed Argentina's comments and explained 
that their experts were having trouble obtaining visas for WGB-33. 
Coxhead assumed both delegations that they would have the 
opportunity to make inputs but also highlighted the fact that there 
would not be an opportunity to completely re-address all the issues 
that had been discussed earlier in the session. 
 
10.  The Iranian delegation then criticized the methodology that the 
OSI Operational Manual Task Leader had proposed.  The Iranian 
position was that nothing was final until it was approved by the 
Conference of States Parties, so until then, these issues could be 
reviewed as needed. 
 
THEME 15 (POSITION-FINDING AND BOUNDARY MARKING) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  A representative of the PTS began the discussion of the first 
theme paper, Theme 15: Ad Hoc IFE Lessons (ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_15). 
 He explained that the August-September 2008 Integrated Field 
Exercise (IFE 08) highlighted the need to carefully identify and 
mark the inspection area (IA) boundaries.  The theme paper was an 
effort to better define those procedures in the Model Text. 
 
12.  WGB worked on line-in/line-out changes to the relevant 
paragraphs in the Model Text (CTBT/WGB/TL-18/40).  This process 
resulted in discussions on several different themes.  Several 
delegations offered suggestions to increase the specificity 
regarding position-finding.  Both the Iranian and Russian 
delegations wanted to identify in the model text specific types of 
position-finding equipment and procedures to be used.   In addition, 
the Croatian delegation asked about procedures for boundary marking 
and whether that should have been included in the Model Text. 
 
13.  The Chinese delegation opined that setting boundaries under the 
CTBT regime was similar to the process used by CWC and in any case 
was a difficult and contentious task.  The Task Leader cautioned 
that the group should avoid such comparisons and explained that CTBT 
and CWC were very different regimes. 
 
14.  The UK delegation and the Task Leader both highlighted the need 
to ensure that inspectors have the greatest flexibility possible and 
explained that including such specifics would limit what flexibility 
they had. 
 
15.  The Iranian delegation next raised an issue regarding the need 
for the Inspection Team (IT) and the Inspected State Party (ISP) to 
agree before any boundary markings were made.  The U.S. delegation 
countered that safety considerations or specific inspection 
techniques presented situations where either side would want to 
unilaterally mark boundaries.  In those cases there simply was not 
time to reach agreement over where to mark boundaries.  A compromise 
was put forward that changed the language.  The new text identified 
the need for consultation on boundary marking. 
 
16.  The Task Leader noted that the text required some cleaning up 
and promised that he would present some revised text later in the 
session. 
 
------------------------------- 
THEME 7 PAPER (PASSIVE SEISMIC) 
------------------------------- 
 
17.  TL Coxhead explained that the purpose of Theme 7 Paper 
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_7) was to modify paragraphs 6.5.12 to 6.5.17 
of the Model Text and to better describe OSI procedures regarding 
the conduct of passive seismic techniques. 
 
Iran's Eight Points 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
18.  The Iranian delegation stated that although passive seismic 
techniques were an important component of the OSI regime, the Model 
Text would need to address eight points that were not adequately 
covered in the Theme 7 Paper: 
 
-- Point 1:  IT procedures on how to establish a network of 
seismology stations. 
 
-- Point 2:  IT guidelines on how to determine the number of 
seismology stations that would be required. 
 
-- Point 3:  IT equipment descriptions (technical specifications, 
capabilities, and limitations). 
 
-- Point 4:  IT decision making guidance (when, where, and how to 
deploy passive seismic techniques). 
 
-- Point 5:  IT site selection guidance (how to select a section of 
the IA to deploy passive seismic techniques). 
 
-- Point 6:  IT topographical guidance (how to use different 
seismology techniques in different areas). 
 
-- Point 7:  Manual of seismic observables (to guide the IT on which 
equipment to use). 
 
-- Point 8:  Seismic station network detection (IT procedures on how 
to determine event magnitude -- including a sufficient definition of 
the term "Expected Detection Thresholds" that is cited in the 
proposed draft text). 
 
19.  The TL stated that many of the issues addressed in the eight 
points were already addressed in the Model Text, and requested the 
Iranian delegation provide the PTS with a written statement on the 
eight points to facilitate additional discussion during WGB.  The 
Iranians replied that they had a draft statement prepared, however, 
it was not ready to be presented to the PTS.  Despite this, the 
Iranian delegation stated its belief that WGB had enough information 
to respond to their concerns.  The OSI Operational Manual Task 
Leader left it to the Iranian delegation to work with the PTS on how 
best to move forward during this session. 
 
Deployment of Passive Seismic Sensors 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
20.  The U.S. delegation proposed a change to paragraph 6.5.16 of 
the Model Text that clarified when focused deployment of passive 
seismic sensors was to be used.  The U.S.-proposed text was adopted 
with non-substantive changes. 
 
Passive Seismic Techniques During the Continuation Period 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
21.  The Japanese delegation expressed interest in creating specific 
guidelines for the use of passive seismic techniques.  They believed 
that the use of passive seismic techniques during the continuation 
period should only be done on a case-by-case basis.  The Egyptian 
delegation added that passive seismic techniques should only be 
conducted during the initial period and not during the continuation 
period. 
 
22.  The TL indicated that the use of passive seismic techniques 
during the continuation period was permitted under the Treaty and, 
as such, was a strategic versus a legal issue.  He added that 
extending an OSI into the continuation period simply meant that the 
IT was making progress in fulfilling its mandate but had not been 
able to complete all of its planned activities during the initial 
period and needed additional inspection time.  He reasoned that 
decisions about the use of passive seismic techniques during the 
continuation period should be left to the IT Leader (ITL) and not 
micromanaged in the Model Text. 
 
Distance of Separation Between Adjacent Seismic Stations 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
23.  The Japanese and Iranian delegations asked why the PTS was 
proposing to change the distance of separation between adjacent 
seismic stations from a range of 3-6 km to a range of 3-5 km.  The 
Japanese delegation also questioned whether this change was 
consistent with other text in the Theme 7 Paper that stated 
seismometers should be deployed within a few kilometers of the 
source.  The Japanese stated that guidance needed to be inserted in 
the Model Text that provided the IT with specifics regarding 
location of the seismic stations.  The Task Leader stated that this 
issue would need to be studied further. 
 
24.  The U.S. delegation voiced concern about making changes in the 
Model Text that were too detailed and tied the hands of the IT 
regarding use of passive seismic techniques.  The U.S. reasoned that 
at some point you needed to trust the expertise of the IT.   The UK 
delegation agreed that the Model Text should be practical and 
provide the IT with a large degree of flexibility.  The Iranian 
delegation replied that while it would be up to the IT to decide how 
best to use these techniques, the Model Text needed to provide 
specific guidelines for making such decisions.  The Task Leader 
agreed with the U.S. position that flexibility should be given to 
the ITL. 
 
25.  A PTS representative stated there was always a threshold that 
you would want the stations to detect in order to perform an 
analysis.  He remarked that Table A1.3-1 in the Model Text provided 
estimates on the necessary separation distance that allowed the IT 
to determine the number of needed seismic stations.  In addition, 
demonstrations and field testing of PTS equipment had shown that the 
3-5 km distance was preferable.   If the stations were placed beyond 
the 6 km range, detection capabilities were severely affected and 
limited the utility of the passive seismic techniques. 
 
Analysis of Data from Adjacent Seismic Stations 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
26.  The Iranian delegation raised concern with the proposal in the 
Theme 7 Paper that each [seismic] station should monitor its 
immediate vicinity for at least two to three days.  Iranian experts 
felt this was too long because they believed it took at least 10 
days to analyze data obtained from such stations.  Given the limited 
time available to detect evidence of seismic aftershocks, and the 10 
day period to analyze the data, Iran questioned whether use of data 
from such stations was viable.  The PTS representative replied that 
the results of IFE08 showed that it took less than 10 days to 
process the data.  In fact, the entire analysis process took only 
4-5 days to complete. 
 
To Grid or Not to Grid? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
27.  The U.S. delegation asked the PTS representative whether he 
believed that seismometers would be deployed in a pattern other than 
a grid to detect seismic aftershocks.  The PTS representative 
replied that it was envisioned that a grid pattern would be used. 
The U.S. asked the question because of concern that the draft text 
had too much specificity regarding the use of passive seismic 
techniques.  The PTS representative replied that although the PTS 
shared similar concerns, he did not believe the current (and 
proposed) Model Text was too detailed.  In line with its concerns, 
the U.S. proposed alternative text for paragraph 6.5.12 of the Model 
Text to provide greater flexibility for the IT. 
 
28.  Begin U.S.-Proposed Text:)  A systematic survey may be 
conducted using a network of stations based on on-site specific 
considerations, topography, noise sources, and other issues that 
will affect the configuration.  The station separation should be 
based on these considerations.  Each station should monitor as long 
as the Team Leader directs.  (End Text.) 
 
29.  The Iranian delegation stated that the last sentence of the 
U.S.-proposed text required further clarification.  The Task Leader 
interjected that the U.S.-proposed text and all of the other 
proposed changes to the Theme 7 Paper needed to be studied further 
by States Signatories and the PTS and would be discussed further at 
the next WGB session. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THEME 13 PAPER (GENERAL PROVISIONS; 13b: 
 
ISP ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
30.  TL Coxhead proposed to focus first on issue 13b (Inspected 
State Party Roles and Responsibilities) from the Theme 13 Paper 
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18_13).  With respect to issue 13b, the PTS saw a 
need to have provisions in the Model Text that broadly outlined ISP 
obligations based on experiences obtained during IFE08 in which the 
"ISP" was not aware of key Treaty obligations and responsibilities. 
The U.S. delegation noted that the paragraph contained a mixture of 
rights and obligations in addition to practical proposals for 
fulfilling such rights and obligations.  The U.S. delegation 
proposed the chapeau for the proposed paragraph 2.1.xx clarify that 
the ISP had a right and obligation to enable the IT to fulfill its 
inspection mandate, and proposed to list several activities 
consistent with ISP Treaty rights and obligations. 
 
31.  The Chinese delegation countered that the U.S. proposal 
complicated matters since most of the ISP rights and obligations 
listed in the paragraph were logistical in nature.  The Iranian 
delegation supported the Chinese position. 
 
32.  The UK delegation added that although it supported the U.S. 
proposal, it believed that the text should be inserted into Chapter 
4 of the Model Text (In-Field Coordination and Support) instead of 
Chapter 2 (General Provisions).  The UK articulated its view that 
ISP adherence to its Treaty rights and obligations required both a 
political and a logistical commitment.  As a result, the Model Text 
should not tell the ISP what to do.  Without a logistical commitment 
to back it up, the underlying political commitment would become an 
empty promise.  The German delegation stated its support for the UK 
position to have the text inserted into Chapter 4. 
 
33.  The U.S. delegation highlighted the fact that the chapeau of 
paragraph 2.1.xx mixed ISP Treaty obligations with practical 
assistance the ISP could provide to the IT.  Following that thought, 
the Russian and UK delegations proposed that the draft text list ISP 
obligations separately from other types of assistance.  The Russians 
stressed the importance of ensuring that the ISP roles and 
responsibilities listed in the paragraph were accurate and 
inclusive.  The Chinese and Iranian delegations countered that any 
list of ISP roles and responsibilities needed to be stated broadly. 
 
34.  The U.S. delegation proposed a new subparagraph to be added to 
the list of ISP roles and responsibilities that specified the ISP 
should limit activities in or near the IA to prevent interference 
with IT activities and measurements.  The Iranian delegation 
countered that this was contrary to provisions of the Protocol that 
required the inspection team to arrange its activities in a way that 
provided for the least possible inconvenience to the ISP and 
disturbance to the inspection area. 
 
35.  The U.S. noted that the Treaty required the ISP to make every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the Treaty and 
to enable the IT to fulfill its mandate. 
 
36.  The U.S. delegation proposed an additional modification to the 
list of roles and responsibilities to ensure the ISP facilitated 
entry and exit of the IT and its equipment into and out of the IA, 
in addition to ISP territory.  The Iranian delegation objected to 
this proposal because this text potentially would require inspection 
equipment to be moved within ISP territory on a continuous basis. 
The U.S. replied that the proposed text was consistent with ISP 
obligations as defined by the Treaty and its Protocol.  The Russian 
delegation indicated concerns over how the U.S.-proposed changes 
would be interpreted by States Parties in terms of complying with 
ISP domestic laws and regulations and the possibility that the draft 
text contradicted the Treaty and Protocol. 
 
37.  The TL opened by informing the participants that the Issue 
Papers to be reviewed were modifications to the Operational Manual 
Model Text which included text he had prepared based on Lessons 
Learned from IFE08 and States' contributions.  The IFE08 Lesson 
Learned stated that "States Parties should be aware of the 
logistical support that they may be required to provide to the IT 
during an OSI.  An indicative list of requirements may be included 
in any standing arrangements that the TS [Technical Secretariat] 
will enter into with States.  Such a list should also be readily 
available for viewing by States.  It could be published online." 
 
38.  There was general agreement that Roles and Responsibilities 
 
(R&R) involve many important considerations. The Iranian delegation 
stated that they would like to see an equitable balance between the 
R&Rs for the IT and the ISP.  There was considerable discussion of 
the 8 items listed as "steps the ISP should take."  It was stated 
that this is a mix of obligations and voluntary actions.  It was 
suggested that a Reference to Paragraphs 60 and 61 be added to the 
introductory paragraph. 
 
39.  Regarding the item addressing the transportation of the IT and 
its equipment into and out of the ISP territory and within the 
Inspection Area (IA), the discussion became quite involved over the 
issue of access to sites within the IA. Access is covered in other 
areas of the Treaty and can be negotiated.  The discussion shifted 
to the issue of Managed Access.  There was some question about where 
managed access should be addressed within the Model Text and the 
consistency of language. The TL stated that managed access should be 
included in section 2.1.  Because further consideration of these 
issues is warranted, bracketed text remains. 
 
40.  The next major discussion involved the preparation of and 
support for a base of operations for the IT.  The Slovakian 
delegation expressed concern that the language is too vague and 
could be interpreted as a minimum effort (identify an area) or a 
maximum effort (construction of a facility).  The term "reasonable 
effort" is not defined in either the Treaty and its Protocol or in 
the Model Text.  TL decided to take the issue off line to resolve 
later.  The TL's concluding statement made the point that this 
suggested list of logistical items was intended to remind the ISP 
that there are a number of considerations for the ISP. 
 
41.  For the second paragraph, it was agreed that there should be 
some type of framework that the TS and the ISP can use to negotiate 
what the ISP provides.  These provisions may take the form of 
standing arrangements.  There were concerns about the language.  The 
Russian delegation stated that the word "guidance" is too much of a 
directive and that "recommendations" would be better. The TL 
concluded by saying the tone of the entire section will be adjusted 
to indicate that negotiations will be involved and directives will 
be avoided. 
 
42.  The U.S. proposal regarding the ISP limiting its activities in 
or near the IA to prevent interference with IT activities was 
promoted from the list in paragraph 2 to become a separate 
paragraph. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THEME 13 PAPER (GENERAL PROVISIONS; 13a: 
AMENDMENTS TO THE OPERATIONAL MANUAL 
--------------------------------------- 
 
43.  In contrast to the initial morning session, the later part of 
the morning involved a relatively uncontentious discussion of the 
U.S.-proposed text addressing procedures for "Changes to the 
Operational Manual" after entry into force of the Treaty.  There was 
some discussion of what constitutes "substantive" changes as opposed 
to "administrative" changes.  "Substantive" was defined as technical 
and "administrative" was defined as editorial.  These definitions 
were generally accepted, with the understanding that the Executive 
Council would decide the nature of a proposed change to the 
Operational Manual.  The U.S. delegation-proposed provision of 
accelerated notifications to the IT of changes involving safety 
issues was agreed.  The Iranian delegation stated that substantive 
changes to the manual agreed to by the Executive Council would only 
become effective for a State Party if that State Party gave its 
affirmation during a period of time following the decision of the 
Executive Council.  The U.S. delegation countered this requirement 
for affirmation of changes could result in different OSI procedures 
for different States Parties.  Bracketed text was added to the 
effect that formal approval is required by each State of a 
substantive change before the change is effective for that State. 
This text will be resolved later. 
 
---------------------- 
IRANIAN NATIONAL PAPER 
---------------------- 
 
44.  Discussions continued on the Iranian paper CTBT/WGB-32/NAT.2 
which identified issues that were left out of the model text as it 
migrated from the Interim Draft Rolling Text to the Model Text.  TL 
Coxhead began with proposal 7 and gave a brief introduction.  The 
Iranian delegation emphasized that the paper was trying to raise 
 
 
issues not faithfully reflected in the Model Text.  They stressed 
not to focus on the words, which could be changed, but the concepts. 
 They asked the TL to put the concepts into bracketed text 
somewhere, or as a Task Leader Note, so they wouldn't be lost.  The 
Iranians stated they wanted to have results from their paper which 
they could report back to capital.  The TL stated that the Iranians 
would be best served if they themselves drafted the text. 
 
45.  Iran was very concerned about how OSI equipment would be 
procured by the CTBT Organization and evaluated by the States 
Parties if it was specialized equipment, not commercially available 
off-the-shelf equipment.  The UK delegation suggested that the OPCW 
equipment familiarization model was placed in the Model Text at 
paragraph 3.3.2 to allow for States Parties to evaluate the 
equipment.  This issue came up again concerning the transparency of 
the equipment acquisition process and a list of all the equipment. 
The U.S. delegation stated that before the (P)TS is allowed to 
purchase equipment for use during an OSI, the States (Parties) have 
to approve it, and, as part of this approval process, States will be 
afforded the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
functionality of the equipment.  Russia stated that, at some point, 
the task group would need to have a real discussion about real 
equipment. 
 
46.  The next discussion was the Iranian proposal to define the 
Treaty provision requiring the IT to leave the ISP "as soon as 
possible" within a fixed time, advocating 72 hours.  The UK 
delegation stated that it took six days during IFE08 to leave 
Kazakhstan.  The U.S. delegation pointed out that such a restriction 
would leave the ISP with the same time period in which to undertake 
and conclude all ISP post-inspection activities.  Paragraph 12.6.1 
was bracketed to reflect the issue. 
 
47.  The Iranian delegation wanted to introduce the concept that the 
Requesting State Party (the State or States requesting the OSI) was 
responsible for the observer and his/her actions with regard to 
issues of confidentiality once the OSI was completed.  It was 
pointed out that paragraph 4.8.4 of the Model Text addressed the 
issue.  The TL, however, questioned the legality of either 
paragraph. 
 
48.  A key discussion took place on the meaning of paragraph 37 of 
Part II of the Protocol, "The on-site inspection request shall be 
based on information collected by the International Monitoring 
System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national 
technical means [NTM] of verification in a manner consistent with 
generally recognized principles of international law, or on a 
combination thereof."  The Iranian delegation expressed the view 
that this meant that the NTM data should be put to a consensus vote 
within the Executive Council on the relevance of such data and the 
means by which it was obtained prior to the Executive Council voting 
on whether to consider such data during its deliberations to 
authorize an inspection.  The NTM data would not be allowed if there 
was no consensus.  The U.S. delegation pointed out that such a 
decision was within the purview of the individual States and not 
within the purview of the Executive Council as a whole and that the 
Iranian proposal was not only outside the bounds of the Treaty but 
also had no place in the Operational Manual. 
 
49.  The Iranian delegation also introduced a concept that did not 
allow for inspectors and inspection assistants to leave the ISP and 
return at a later date during the conduct of an OSI.  The U.S. 
delegation pointed out that the Treaty required inspectors to be 
granted multi-entry visas and Iran pulled its suggestion. 
 
50.  The Iranian delegation introduced the concept that the ISP 
could go to the Director General with the claim of a frivolous or 
abusive inspection as a direct means to stop an inspection, as well 
as direct the Executive Council to punish the Requesting State 
Party.  The UK delegation responded that the Iranian proposal was 
revolutionary.  It went around paragraph 67 of Article IV of the 
Treaty and the Executive Council's ability to terminate the 
inspection.  Iran stated it felt the OSI Operational Manual relates 
to all parts of the Treaty and Protocol and so feels that the Manual 
can address the issue.  The U.S. delegation stated that the starting 
and termination of the inspection was in the manual as well as the 
ability of the Executive Council to address frivolous and abusive 
inspections.  Germany supported the U.S. and UK position and stated 
they would never support the Iranian text. 
 
51.  The Iranian delegation wanted to add language to the Model Text 
 
 
requiring an agreement between the ITL and the ISP on the number of 
IT personnel that would be permitted in the ISP and the IA during 
the drilling phase of an OSI.  The TL stated that the Treaty was 
very clear in not specifying a limit on the number because of the 
unknowns involved.  The TL recalled that the increased number of 
personnel would be known to the ISP by means of a revised inspection 
mandate and the subsequent notification of the ISP regarding arrival 
at the ISP point of entry of additional IT personnel.  Iran wanted 
to consult with other delegations on this issue. 
 
------------------------------------ 
THEME 2 PAPER (IT HEALTH AND SAFETY) 
------------------------------------ 
 
52.  TL Coxhead presented Theme 2: IT Health and Safety 
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_2) for consideration.  This paper addresses in 
part issues identified in Annex B of TL-18/42 on security of the 
inspection team. 
 
Security of IT, Samples, Data, and Facilities 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
53.  The U.S. delegation asked for clarification on the distinction 
between "safety" and "security," as well as definitions of "IT 
premises" and "joint" as in "joint storage."  The TL confirmed that 
"IT premises" is the location where the IT is housed and has its 
offices, as defined in Part II, paragraph 27(b) of the Protocol. 
 
54.  The TL indicated that "safety" and "security" are understood 
using the traditional dictionary definitions.  The Russian 
delegation offered the following definitions, which were generally 
accepted: "safety" is protection from natural phenomena; "security" 
is protection from illegal acts, e.g. "by restless natives." 
 
IT vs. ISP Responsibility 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
55.  The Iranian delegation expressed concerns with the balance 
between ISP and IT responsibilities and expectations.  The German 
delegation indicated that during  IFE08 safety within the base of 
operations seemed to be overlooked by the IT. The Croatian 
delegation cited the "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rights" but 
stated that the TS and the IT need to take some responsibility. 
 
56.  The U.S. delegation offered text changes to the theme paper, 
which it understood would be inserted into Chapter 4 of the Model 
Text.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the US-revised text were adopted with 
 
no substantial changes. 
 
57.  On paragraph 3, Iran questioned whether the Director General 
can be responsible for safety or security when DG is in Vienna and 
not on-site. 
 
58.  The UK delegation pointed out that the U.S. proposal is based 
on para 102 of the Protocol.  The PTS questioned whether ISP can 
provide for safety and security within IT premises, which should be 
off-limits to ISP when IT is not present. 
 
59.  The U.S. delegation stated that the security of IT equipment, 
data, and samples should be the responsibility of the IT unless the 
IT is not present.  The UK delegation offered that the IT is 
responsible for its own operational security, but that overall 
security and protection from harm is the responsibility of the ISP. 
The Russian delegation expressed concern with ISP having 
responsibility for samples, because these will be under seal and 
should be protected by IT against tampering. 
 
60.  The TL suspended discussion on paragraph 3, requesting 
suggestions for alternative text. 
 
61.  On paragraph 4, the Iranian delegation, with concurrence by the 
Russian delegation, indicated that "coordination" with ISP is 
insufficient for TS to provide additional support to ensure the 
security of the IT.  Further, this paragraph may be contradictory to 
ISP obligations. 
 
62.  After discussion of exactly what kind of support the TS can 
provide to the IT in the field, other than requesting additional 
support from the ISP, the provision enabling TS support was deleted. 
  The TL set aside the remainder of Theme 2 for later discussion. 
 
----------------------------------- 
PLANNING FOR FURTHER ELABORATION OF 
THE OSI OPERATIONAL MANUAL 
------------------------------------ 
 
63.  TL Coxhead presented CTBT/WGB/TL-18/42, Planning for the Third 
Round of Elaboration of the Draft OSI Operational Manual.  This 
paper provides clarity on WGB plans and allows for input from States 
Signatories and the PTS. 
 
64.  Table 1 in Annex A, "a living document" according to TL, 
presents a plan for addressing various parts of the Model Text over 
the next 8 sessions of WGB. No specific timelines are provided, 
although with 8 WGB sessions at 2 per year, review of the current 
Model Text, without identifying or discussion further issues, would 
not be completed until 2013. 
 
65.  The Japanese delegation fully endorsed the TL plan, especially 
with the issues identified in the Annexes, and requested flexibility 
in later sessions to amend the plan as needed.  The UK delegation 
indicated that active seismic and multispectral technologies are 
missing from the Table.  The UK also suggested using workshops to 
draft text for the OSI manual, which could then be considered by 
WGB.  The U.S. delegation noted that WGB was trying to write 
operational manual text for concepts on which there is no 
agreement. 
 
66.  The German delegation recommended against using workshops or 
the ECS to draft text, recommending instead holding extra sessions 
of WGB.  France concurred with holding extra WGB sessions and 
expressed support for the plan. 
 
67.  The Iranian delegation rejected the concept of any artificial 
deadlines for development of the OSI manual.  Iran also indicated 
that the following issues were missing from the TL-proposed plan: 
compensation to the ISP, abusive/frivolous OSI requests, managed 
access, phenomenology, confidentiality, and general provisions. 
Iran supports using workshops to discuss technical issues but not to 
draft text for the manual. Iran supports using the ECS to make 
intersessional progress on draft text. 
 
68.  Iran ultimately rejected the TL paper and will not agree to it 
being referenced in the report of WGB-33.  The Task Leader indicated 
that the text is his and thus not up for acceptance by WGB. 
However, the Annexes can be separated for future reference. 
 
Now what? 
- - - - - 
 
69.  The U.S. Delegation requested that the task group define and 
present what was meant by the States Signatories in the expression 
"intensify our efforts" in the report of WGB-32 with respect to the 
development of the OSI Operational Manual Model Text.  The U.S. 
delegation indicated the need for additional intersessional work, 
extra sessions of WGB, and workshops to address areas where 
conceptual agreement is lacking. 
 
70.  The Iranian delegation again expressed its view that making 
textual changes to the Model Text at workshops is unacceptable. 
Iran also reiterated that WGB should not set timelines for 
development of such a text.  WGB needs time to address lessons 
learned and incorporate future changes based on activities occurring 
before the first Conference of State Parties (CSP) which will 
approve the OSI Operational Manual currently under development. 
States have a right to introduce issues until the manual is 
approved. 
 
71.  The UK delegation indicated that nothing in the Treaty prevents 
finishing the manual before the first CSP.  Furthermore, the TL plan 
calls for a target of 8 WGB sessions to finish the 3rd round of 
elaboration and "targets are not deadlines."  The TL indicated that 
he would draft text for agreement on the OSI Model Text plan later 
in the week. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
THEME 10 PAPER (REPORTING AND POST INSPECTION ACTIVITIES) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
72.  TL Coxhead opened discussion of Theme Paper 10 
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_10) by reminding the task group that the 
non-paper incorporates lessons from IFE08.  The TL opened up the 
 
floor for proposed text changes on the subject paper.  He also 
reiterated that an executive summary would possibly be required on 
the preliminary findings report. 
 
73.  The U.S. delegation requested clarification on the introduction 
to paragraph 11.1.1. of the Model Text, which designates various 
mandatory communications between the IT and the Director General as 
"reports."  The U.S. delegation pointed out that some of the items 
identified in this paragraph are not reports according to the Treaty 
and the Protocol.  By identifying these mandatory communications as 
"reports" and requiring a single template be used for all reports, 
the Model Text conveys rights of the ISP and obligations on the part 
of  the IT that are not conveyed by the Treaty. 
 
74.  The TL responded that the U.S. observation was noted; however, 
WGB would need further discussion about how to address this issue at 
a later date. 
 
75.  The Iranian delegation raised a fundamental problem with the 
word "executive" when discussing the need for a TL-proposed 
"executive summary," namely, that it implies that there will be some 
further actions required.  The TL responded that the executive 
summary does not imply any further action and exists in a document 
purely to act as a high-level summary. 
 
76.  When addressing paragraph 11.6.3, printed vs. electronic copy 
of the preliminary findings report, the UK delegation noted that 
during the Integrated Field Exercise, the Base of Operations was 
being dismantled around the teams while the report was still being 
reviewed.  The UK felt that having an electronic copy to review 
would facilitate better organization for both the Inspected State 
Party and the Inspection Team. 
 
77.  A PTS representative disagreed and emphasized the need to have 
signed and countersigned copies of the preliminary findings report 
to ensure confidence in the authenticity of the final document. 
 
78.  The Chinese delegation echoed the PTS' comments on the need for 
a hardcopy report and further elaborated that, in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, the final report is a signed and countersigned 
hard copy because of the concern with potential manipulation of the 
electronic copies.  The Chinese also noted that the hardcopy should 
take precedence over the electronic copy and that if there is an 
electronic copy it should not be regarded as official. 
 
79.  The TL moved the review on to paragraph 11.6.4 regarding 
attachments to the preliminary findings report.  The TL counseled 
that the word "list" would be replaced with "materials". 
 
80.  The U.S. delegation raised an issue about radionuclide sample 
analysis.  Any analysis performed outside of the inspection area at 
designated laboratories would be provided directly to the Director 
General, and it was unclear how the Inspection Team would gain 
access to this information to include it in the inspection report. 
 
81.  The UK delegation offered an explanation: the assumption here 
is that results would be from the Inspection Team's on-site 
analysis.  It was proposed to add the word "available" to make clear 
that only 'immediately available' radionuclide sample analyses would 
be attached to the report. 
 
82.  The Iranian delegation agreed with the UK's clarification and 
also raised concerns regarding subparagraph (q).  They argued that 
WGB cannot ensure highly protected information would not be attached 
to the report.  The German delegation agreed and argued that highly 
protected information should be handled separately.  The TL proposed 
that a small group should be formed to address the issue of handling 
highly protected information. 
 
83.  The Chinese delegation agreed with the TL's suggestion of a 
small group but also brought up a point for clarification regarding 
the legal status of attachments to the report.  They were concerned 
that it was not clear if the attachments themselves were also to be 
signed.  The TL recognized the Chinese delegation's concerns and 
recommended that the concerns be forwarded to the PTS legal body for 
study. 
 
84.  The Iranian delegation also raised an issue regarding the 
ability at the ISP to provide comments to the preliminary inspection 
report.  Iran was unsure if the ISP should submit comments through 
the ITL or if comments should be submitted directly to the Director 
 
General.  The UK argued that this point is inconsequential, because 
the ISP would make their case in the Executive Council whether or 
not they insert formal comments at the time of delivery of the 
inspection report.  Iran further suggested that there should be some 
sort of mediation period in the Executive Council when the 
preliminary inspection report is submitted. 
 
85.  France offered that, due to the short timeline of the progress 
report review, the ISP should send comments directly to the Director 
General to relieve the ITL of any additional burden.   The TL took 
all remaining comments and closed the floor due to the late hour. 
He further commented that this document would be revisited at a 
future Working Group B. 
 
------------------------------------ 
THEME 5 PAPER (INSPECTION EQUIPMENT) 
------------------------------------ 
 
86.  TL Coxhead opened the floor for discussion of the Theme 5 
Paper, Inspection Equipment (ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18_5).  The Iranian 
delegation requested clarification on the meaning of "approved 
equipment."  The UK delegation, a member of which was asked by the 
Task Leader to chair the session due to his expertise and 
familiarity with the proposed text, provided that, any time the text 
refers to approved equipment, it is referring to equipment approved 
by the Conference of States Parties.  However, the Russian 
delegation requested that it be made clear exactly what equipment is 
being addressed.  As Russian pointed out, there is equipment 
approved by the Conference of States Parties, as well as the 
approved equipment that is included in the inspection mandate, and 
equipment that is approved for use during an OSI by the ISP. 
 
87.  The U.S. delegation sought clarification from the TL and from 
the floor on what exactly the Technical Secretariat is being asked 
to confirm during "certification" of equipment intended for use 
during an OSI.  In the U.S. view, according to the Protocol, the 
Technical Secretariat is certifying that the OSI inspection 
equipment has been properly calibrated, maintained, and protected 
and nothing more. 
 
88.  The Russian delegation disagreed with the U.S. delegation's 
characterization of the scope of TS certification, and in a confused 
presentation further argued that certification is different than 
calibration.  The inspection equipment can have more than one 
function and the text needs more detail on what equipment serves 
which purpose.  The Russian delegation argued that because of 
differing concepts of the scope of TS certification, the WGB needed 
to develop common standards for equipment. 
 
89.  The U.S. delegation offered that the intent of the word 
"certification" in the Protocol is to confirm that the equipment 
meets the requirements of the Treaty.  The ISP needs to verify that 
the TS has done its job correctly, and as such, must check to make 
sure that all equipment has been certified.  However, the Russian 
delegation would not agree with any of the proposed changes to the 
Model Text to reflect the discussion.  The TL offered that, based on 
time constraints, the issue should be addressed in the next OSI 
manual session.  All agreed. 
 
90.  The U.S. delegation provided revisions for the text in the 
theme paper.  The task group adopted the U.S. changes as the basis 
for discussions.  Nearly all of the U.S. changes were adopted, while 
some were modified by the discussions but leaving the substance 
intact.  Different delegations indicated concerns about the specific 
paragraphs or general equipment concerns.  The Iranian delegation 
indicated that the ISP should check all IT equipment at the POE. 
The Chinese delegation was concerned about the amount of time to 
check.  The Italian delegation questioned what "data" would be 
loaded onto IT equipment upon its arrival at the point of entry of 
the ISP.  The Russian delegation insisted that source code for all 
software be available for the ISP.  PTS suggested that the software 
could be validated with a checksum test at familiarization and 
compared to the results obtained at the POE. 
 
--------------- 
WGB REPORT TEXT 
--------------- 
 
91.  TL Coxhead reviewed his proposed text for the WGB-33 report, 
summarizing the deliberations by WGB-33 on the TL Theme Papers and 
the future work of WGB on elaborating the Model Text of the OSI 
 
Operational Manual.  There was very little objection over the text 
until the Iranian delegation objected to the idea of workshops 
preparing text for the Operational Manual and for the recognition 
that WGB needs addition sessions to address OSI.  The Iranian 
delegation proposed text that aimed to prevent additional meetings. 
The UK delegation suggested that the word "meeting" be dropped so as 
to emphasize the need for more time, without prejudice to the 
decision on more WGB sessions.  The Japanese delegation asked that 
the phrase "accelerate consideration by WGB" be inserted in the 
draft text of the report.  The U.S. delegation pointed out that the 
Preparatory Commission is the approving authority for the annual 
schedule of WGB meetings and proposed wording that got the Iran 
delegation to drop their wording request. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
OSI OPERATIONAL MANUAL TASK LEADER SMALL GROUP 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
FIELD INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
92.  A small group of experts from the U.S. delegation attended a 
series of sidebar meetings with the Task Leader Coxhead, members of 
the PTS OSI Division and experts from selected delegations 
(primarily delegates from the P-5) on the Field Information 
Management System (FIMS) being developed by the PTS for OSI.  The TL 
Coxhead wanted to address the rights of the IT, ISP rights to 
observe, and duplication of the data for the ISP, along with an 
overview of the FIMS concept of operations.  Jean Michelle Millon, 
PTS OSI Division project officer, provided a presentation of the 
system and answered questions from the U.S. concerning how the FIMS 
would work with non-binary data.  U.S. experts noted that more 
discussion is needed on this issue.  John Walker of the UK stated a 
concern over the reliance of FIMS on forms at each of Jean 
Michelle's concept of operations steps.  He stated that unless the 
inspectors were thoroughly trained in the FIMS it would cause 
problems. 
 
93.  In its presentation of the FIMS, the PTS acknowledged that the 
Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) processed data outside 
of FIMS.  Russian experts challenged the premise being built into 
FIMS.  This is a data receiving and classification area that then 
sends data into the correct bin.  Russian experts did not believe 
this would work.  U.S. experts discussed the fact that some data 
needs to be processed outside of FIMS in order to determine 
sensitivity and, therefore, could not be loaded directly into FIMS, 
which serves in part as a management tool after a 
sensitivity/classification decision.  It was also possible for 
inadvertent recording of data that is not even recognized by the 
team.  This data would be relevant to the inspection, processed in 
the "green," but subsequently be recognized as classified by the 
ISP. 
 
94.  Experts were asked to provide at a subsequent meeting scenarios 
for the processing of data collected during the OSI that would be 
loaded into FIMS.  The Task Leader wanted to run these scenarios 
through the FIMS model and generate discussions before the PTS 
invested too much time and resources.  Italian, French, Chinese, UK 
and U.S. experts attended the meeting.  Russian experts were absent. 
 The PTS brought the OSI Division SAMS expert to the meeting to show 
how SAMS interfaced with FIMS.  He showed that SAMS really does not 
interface with FIMS.  Experts felt this processing of data outside 
of FIMS would be a common occurrence with the data collected with 
Continuation Period Technologies.  The small group went through a 
number of scenarios that demonstrated that it was possible for 
higher classification data (defined by the current Operations 
Manual) to get into the general data system unless it was "screened" 
beforehand.  However, the UK expert stated that they had written a 
paper (Background Paper for OSI Workshop 13: Clandestine Underground 
Nuclear Tests and Confidentiality) on this issue and had concluded 
that the amount of higher level data would be only a few percent of 
the data collected during an OSI.  U.S. and UK experts agree to 
produce additional scenarios for further consideration by the 
group. 
 
------------------------------- 
SUDEBAR MEETING WITH TL COXHEAD 
------------------------------- 
 
95.  The U.S. delegation met with the OSI Operational Manual Task 
Leader Coxhead to continue discussions on U.S. perceptions of OSI 
 
Manual Chapter 10 on Confidentiality, discuss answers previously 
provided by the Task Leader to a series of questions posed by the 
delegation, and listen to what support the Task Leader might need 
from the U.S.  The U.S. delegation expressed concerns about the use 
of three separate levels of confidentiality and the accompanying 
"need to know" requirement that would limit access to data, which in 
turn could limit OSI IT effectiveness.  The Task Leader understood 
the arguments and stated that WGB spent a lot of time and capital on 
putting together the current Chapter 10.  The U.S. delegation voiced 
concern about the ability to abuse the levels of confidentiality. 
The group discussed reporting templates and how they evolved to 
reflect the Preliminary Findings Document template, the fact that 
there is no other template specified in the Treaty or its Protocol, 
and the concern that without specifying templates in the Operational 
Manual, the ISP could object to any other report format. 
Additionally, the U.S. delegation expressed concern about the 
equipment checking at the point of entry (POE) and the need for a 
familiarization process by the State Parties to speed the POE 
activities.  The Task Leader expressed interest in help in all 
aspects of the OSI Operational Manual but singled out review and 
revision of text dealing with radionuclides, in particular Noble Gas 
sampling strategies, subsurface and aerial for serious consideration 
by the U.S. 
 
-------------------------------- 
ON-SITE INSPECTION MAJOR PROGRAM 
-------------------------------- 
 
INTEGRATED FIELD EXERCISE (IFE08) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
96.  Task Leader Vitaliy Shchukin opened the first of the three 
sessions by showing a training video prepared by the PTS using 
footage from IFE08.  The video was an illustrated overview of the 
entire OSI process that emphasizes major elements of OSI 
implementation.  Copies of the video were made available to 
delegations. 
 
97.  PTS Executive Secretary Tibor Toth attended this session and 
summarized the IFE08 as a "defining moment" for the PTS.  The 
exercise was "... of a scale 1-2 orders of magnitude ..." greater 
than any field exercise previously done under any arms control or 
nonproliferation treaty or agreement.  The exercise involved three 
years of preparation with a concentrated involvement of about one 
third of the PTS staff over a period of six months.  The exercise 
has been evaluated by various groups, internal and external to the 
PTS, and by several workshops.  Toth said that the evaluation review 
of the exercise represented a backward look, while the current OSI 
Division Action Plan (discussed later) represented a forward look 
based on the lessons learned from the exercise.  The implementation 
of the Action Plan is the next important step in the development of 
OSI capability.  He pointed out that serious attention will have to 
be paid to resources in determining how to support such large events 
as IFE08 in the future in light of a "flat" organization (zero real 
growth and no increase in staff). 
 
98.  Brazil asked if there was a particular benefit from having 
IFE08 take place at a former nuclear test site.  Kvok indicated that 
this was a primary consideration (and benefit) in light of the 
observable and detectable signatures that such a site presents. 
 
--------------- 
OSI ACTION PLAN 
--------------- 
 
99.  Kvok presented the new OSI Action Plan (CTBT/PTS/INF.1020) 
developed by the OSI Division that provides the strategic framework 
for the OSI regime over 2009-2013, leading to operational readiness 
at entry into force of the Treaty.  The Action Plan takes into 
account the Evaluation Report on IFE08.  Key elements of the Action 
Plan are five main areas of OSI development with many detailed 
sub-elements and sub-projects.  The plan calls for a series of 
annual directed exercises leading up to another large scale exercise 
in 2013 that will be a major test of OSI readiness.  This 
presentation provoked considerable discussion among the delegates. 
 
100.  TL Shchukin, in reference to the Action Plan, pointed out 
three requirements for its implementation:  availability of 
resources and expertise; importance of reaching agreement on a 
definition of OSI readiness; and testing OSI readiness with a large 
scale field exercise. 
 
 
101.  General support for the Action Plan was expressed by the UK, 
Australia, Israel, Croatia, France, and the U.S.  South Africa and 
Brazil stated that they were not yet in a position to support the 
Action Plan.  Several states expressed concern over issues such as 
links to (or lack of) a definition of OSI readiness, lack of 
priorities for development of Action Plan elements, and the lack of 
budget and other resource information.  China highlighted technical 
issues needing focus and the need for assessments of technical 
effectiveness.  The U.S. delegation followed guidance (ref A, 
paragraph 19) and noted that the Policy Making Organizations (PMO) 
have a responsibility to provide guidance and resources to help the 
PTS develop the OSI regime. 
 
102.  In further discussion on the OSI Action Plan, Iran expressed 
the view that the plan should take into account (1) prospects of 
entry into force (EIF) of the treaty, (2) availability of resources 
to execute the plan, and (3) the sustainability of techniques and 
equipment required to carry out an OSI.  A major theme in subsequent 
comments by Iran was relaxing the time frame for the conclusion of 
the Action Plan to allow for unforeseen circumstances.  Iran 
presented many comments on the report either requesting 
clarification or changes.  Iran again expressed procedural concerns 
about using OSI workshop reports to modify text in OSI Operational 
Manual.  Surprisingly, Shchukin interpreted Iran's comments as a 
general acceptance of Action Plan and Iran did not counter. 
Director Kvok further expressed that the document is living (subject 
to change) as a strategic vision based on IFE08 about how to reach 
readiness by EIF.  He made additional comments about evaluating 
untested OSI technologies and training of inspectors for OSI.  In 
response to Iran's concern regarding deadlines, the UK delegation 
expressed that the Action Plan is not couched in deadlines but 
rather target dates. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
EVALUATION PLAN FOR SECOND CYCLE OF OSI ACTIVITIES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
103.  Silvia Alamo (Chief, PTS Evaluation Section) gave a 
presentation that addressed how OSI techniques, methods, and 
components are validated.  The approach is to embed quality control 
in all project phases using a project-management-based approach, 
define quality requirements, and apply quality reviews during 
project implementation.  She emphasized the need for "ownership" of 
evaluations and use of external evaluators.  The UK delegation 
expressed strong support for the ownership comments.  The Iranian 
delegation expressed the need to do enough preparation to carry out 
proper evaluation.  The U.S. delegation supported the UK's comments 
and asked if the PTS Evaluation Section becomes involved on exercise 
design.  Alamo stated that this is not always done well and that it 
needs to start earlier in the design process.  Japan concurred with 
the report and emphasized that independence is a key factor to 
successful evaluation. 
 
------------------------- 
REPORT ON OSI WORKSHOP 16 
------------------------- 
 
104.  Wang Jun (Chief, Documentation Section, OSI Division) gave a 
presentation on OSI Workshop 16 focusing on IFE 08 lessons learned. 
Main points of discussion were radionuclide and noble gas sampling 
and analysis, visual observation, multispectral and Infra-Red 
imaging methods, active seismic methods, and recognition of the 
importance of signatures.  Wang stated that the technical areas have 
been covered at different levels of understanding and detail during 
the course of past and current workshops.  He observed that there 
was a clear drop in intensity and coverage of these OSI technical 
areas in 2000 when major players (i.e., the United States) left the 
program.  Topics (e.g., identification of essential inspection 
techniques and equipment, concepts of application of key techniques, 
identify key R&D projects, etc.) were listed for upcoming workshops. 
 Other events proposed for 2010 include further elaboration on draft 
text for the operational manual and underground nuclear explosion 
phenomenology (signatures). 
 
105.  The U.S. delegation asked the planned location and time for 
the next workshop, learning that no venue or date have been set, 
although it may be near Vienna.  The UK delegation expressed that 
future topics should include drilling.  The Iranian delegation 
expressed procedural concern that workshop recommendations should 
not be directly used in OSI-related text development without first 
 
being considered by WGB.  The Brazilian delegation also stated that 
it could not support endorsements of workshop recommendations, 
although it will take note of reports but not rubber stamp 
endorsements from a workshop.  In support of adopting workshop 
recommendations, the U.S. noted that there are two types of 
workshops (those sponsored by a State Signatory and those sponsored 
by WGB) and that OSI Workshop-16 was a WGB workshop.  Italy agreed 
with U.S. position.  TL Shchukin acknowledged that consensus could 
not be obtained for WGB endorsement of the recommendations of OSI 
Workshop-16. 
 
---------------------------------- 
FURTHER REVISION OF OSI MILESTONES 
---------------------------------- 
 
106.  TL Shchukin stated that WGB is to produce a revision of its 
milestones covering the next several years.  Regarding Shchukin's 
paper on the revised milestones (CTBT/WGB/TL-4/37), Iran questioned 
whether there was a clear picture of the readiness level of the CTBT 
OSI regime at EIF.  Further discussion by UK, U.S., Iran and Japan 
ensued on readiness at EIF.  Iran made the suggestion, supported by 
Germany and Australia, to add information to the OSI milestones on 
the anticipated state of readiness as of the last day of the 
Conference of States Parties.  The U.S. delegation expressed the 
concern that more detailed information was needed to describe 
readiness levels, the timing and interrelationships of the various 
steps comprising the basic elements of the OSI development program, 
and that the WGB Milestones also should reflect elements for which 
WGB is responsible, not just the tasks for which the PTS is 
responsible.  Brazil suggested streamlining documents and combining 
them where possible.  France supported the U.S. view on the 
structure of the OSI Milestones and for the redesign of the table in 
the document. 
 
------------------------- 
EQUIPMENT CONCEPTUAL IDEA 
------------------------- 
 
107.  The PTS briefed WGB on paper CTBT/PTS/INF 1018 OSI Equipment 
Conceptual Idea; Refinement of specifications for testing and 
training.  This led to a confused conversation because the equipment 
did not appear to be thought of in the context of operations for an 
OSI.  Most of the equipment was shallow electromagnetic and did not 
reflect field results and experiences of the states parties.  The 
Israeli delegation suggested a workshop on equipment.  The Egyptian 
delegation queried whether the equipment was for use in the initial 
vs. continuation phase.  It appeared to be continuation phase 
technologies but the PTS was using it in the initial phase.  The 
Iranian delegation wanted more details on the uses of the equipment 
at a non technical discussion level. 
 
------------------ 
OSI TRAINING CYCLE 
------------------ 
 
108.  The PTS then briefed WGB on the 2nd OSI Training Cycle.  This 
will increase the number of surrogate inspectors from 50 to 100 
prior to the 2013 large scale exercise.  The plan was generally 
accepted, but delegations asked specific questions.  The U.S. 
delegation asked how the inspectors were evaluated, since trainees 
were volunteers.  Italy asked if the PTS had the resources to carry 
out the plan.  The PTS responded that they were using consultants 
for the advanced courses.  The UK delegation queried about how the 
refresher training of the first 50 would be done.  Brazil queried 
what the qualification for visual observation was.  Iran requested 
the P5 train inspectors on visual observation and phenomenology.  It 
also became clear in the discussions that each country expected to 
nominate at least one inspector to fill the 50 new inspectors. 
Nearly all nominees have no experience in nuclear matters or on-site 
inspection.  PTS was putting together a new note verbale to better 
specify the inspectors' qualifications. 
 
------- 
WRAP UP 
------- 
 
109.  TL Shchukin indicated he saw general acceptance by WGB of the 
PTS presentations and encouraged them to move forward.  Iran 
indicated it was nervous about which options the PTS would choose as 
it moved forward.  PTS showed the OSI budget for next year.  The 
overall PTS budget is flat but OSI is going to have a 23 percent 
 
increase.  The Task Leader then showed the subjects to be addressed 
in next Working Group B.  The UK delegation led a discussion on 
whether the WGB Radionuclide Experts Group could be tasked to 
address OSI questions.  The Task Leader was going to put together a 
tasking and discuss with other task leader. 
 
DAVIES