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RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL PG TW PGOV
SUBJECT: FORMER PREMIER SAYS OPPOSITION PARTY HAS A CHANCE 
AT COMEBACK 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 1109 
     ¶B. TAIPEI 1082 
     ¶C. TAIPEI 781 
 
Classified By: The Director for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Former Premier Su Tseng-chang told the 
Director on September 14 he was optimistic the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) could return to power by regaining 
the people's confidence.  The former DPP chairman criticized 
the current party leader as ineffective and hinted he wanted 
to lead the party's comeback himself. He did not rule out the 
possibility of running for Taipei County Magistrate in 2010 
and President in 2012.  While he acknowledged that peaceful 
ties with China were desirable, he expressed concern at the 
rapid pace of President Ma Ying-jeou's rapprochement with 
Beijing. Offering his opinion on the internal politics of the 
ruling Kuomintang (KMT), Su said Ma would face increased 
criticism from within his party once he assumed its 
chairmanship in October.  He also suggested that new Premier 
Wu Den-yih would unlikely be a calming force within the 
party.  End summary. 
 
An Opening For the DPP If It Can Prove Itself 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Former Premier and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang told 
Director Stanton at their introductory meeting that his party 
could make a political comeback after losing badly in the 
Legislative Yuan and Presidential elections of 2008.  He said 
the party did a good job handling the Typhoon Morokat 
aftermath this summer.  Instead of focusing on criticizing 
Ma's poor leadership, DPP members worked closely with the 
Taiwan people to overcome the devastation.  To return to 
power, the DPP needed a leader with empathy who could provide 
a contrast to Ma, whose stiff and distant manner Su argued 
left people disappointed and angry.  (Comment:  Su was 
probably suggesting he could fulfill that position but did 
not explicitly say so.  End comment.)  For now, Su said, a 
key DPP task would be to "supervise" Ma and his 
administration.  KMT control of presidential and legislative 
power left no institutional checks and balances, making it 
all the more important for the DPP to perform the role of 
watchdog. 
 
¶3. (C) Su acknowledged former President Chen Shui-bian's 
corruption conviction on September 11 (ref A) had hurt the 
party.  The DPP had made a mistake by not making an early and 
clean break from Chen.  He suggested DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen 
should focus her efforts on using Chen to advocate more 
broadly for Taiwan citizens' fair and impartial treatment by 
the judicial system and separate the party from Chen 
personally.  More broadly, Su argued that Tsai had not proven 
to be up to the task of revamping the party after its major 
electoral losses in 2008.  He said Tsai simply was not a 
strong leader and could not resolve problems quickly. 
 
Wu As Premier, Ma As KMT Chair May Spell Trouble for KMT 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶4. (C) In response to the Director's questions on recent KMT 
developments, Su claimed Ma's new choice for Premier, Wu 
Den-yih, could fuel KMT infighting.  This was particularly 
problematic for Ma because of what Su described as the 
lukewarm support the President received in his bid to become 
party Chairman.  Indeed, Su claimed, several party supporters 
had criticized Ma during his campaign visits throughout 
Taiwan this past summer.  (Note: Ma ultimately ran 
uncontested and won the KMT Chairmanship on July 26 with 92.5 
percent of the vote.  The turnout rate was 58 percent. End 
note.)  Su predicted the President would leave himself little 
room to maneuver politically after taking office as Chairman 
on October 17.  Ma would be the "first and front" line with 
nobody to run political interference and this, Su argued, 
could prove very "painful and difficult." 
 
Ma Should Move Slowly On China Ties 
 
TAIPEI 00001112  002 OF 002 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Taiwan had to overcome numerous significant 
challenges, such as reviving its ailing economy and coping 
with H1N1, Su said.  For Taiwan's sake, the former Premier 
hoped Ma would succeed as President.  The Director noted that 
the Taiwan people appeared to be pleased with Ma's effort to 
improve relations with China.  Su acknowledged that peaceful 
ties were good but stressed the importance of their 
development on equal terms.  It was fine for Taiwan 
businessmen to make money but not at the expense of 
"kowtowing" to China, he said.  Taiwan was already "listening 
to and obeying" China, a sign Ma was indeed moving too fast 
on deepening cross-Strait ties.  Tellingly, Su said, Ma had 
not repeated since becoming President his campaign stance 
that Taiwan's future should be decided by the Taiwan people. 
Also disturbing, Su added, was the refusal of KMT leaders to 
meet with the Dalai Lama during his recent Taiwan visit (ref 
B). 
 
On Su's Own Return To Politics: "Anything Is Possible" 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) Su clearly remained interested in Taiwan politics. 
"Anything is possible," he responded when the Director asked 
whether he would run for Taipei County Magistrate in 2010 or 
for President in 2012.  Su clearly was disappointed that the 
election for Taipei County Magistrate was postponed a year 
from December 2009, and he blamed the KMT for playing 
politics in orchestrating the delay (ref C). 
 
U.S. Remains A Key Taiwan Ally 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Su stressed Taiwan's relationship with the United 
States was "very important" and should not be ignored, 
suggesting that Ma had paid too much attention to improving 
ties to China.  He identified Taiwan's three important 
partners as China, Japan and the United States.  Whereas Su 
was leery of China's positive gestures to get what it wanted 
from Taiwan, he appreciated the steady support the U.S. had 
given the island. 
STANTON