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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0607/01 2680607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250607Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4745
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0370
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0011
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0162

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PTER KECF KGHA SW
SUBJECT: SWEDISH ENVOY TO HORN OF AFRICA TALKS ABOUT SOMALIA 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Laura Kirkconnel for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On September 15, Emboffs met with Swedish 
Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador Marika Fahlen 
to discuss her 12 day visit to Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Kenya and Djibouti.  Fahlen strongly emphasized the need for 
a combination of a bottom-up and top-down approach to 
stabilizing and developing Somalia. She singled out the 
following as being crucial to achieving this goal: 
 
- gaining greater credibility for the Transitional Federal 
Government (TGF), 
 
- getting President Sheikh Sharif out of his palace to gain a 
better grasp of the challenges his government is facing, 
 
- selecting military and police trainees from several 
different clans, 
 
- utilizing the various Somali diaspora more efficiently, 
 
- distributing aid more efficiently and with greater 
transparency, and 
 
- coordinating U.S. and EU aid efforts more closely. 
 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Swedish Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador 
Marika Fahlen told Emboffs on September 15 that in order to 
stabilize and develop Somalia, the international community 
needs to utilize a combination of a bottom-up and top-down 
approach to its aid efforts.  Fahlen, who was accompanied by 
General Pierre Joana, Advisor to Solana, the Council 
Secretariat, and Jeremy Lester, head of the Horn Africa 
Section, the EU Commission, returned in early September from 
a 12-day fact-finding mission to Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Kenya and Djibouti. Fahlen called the trip "successful" for 
three reasons:  (1) the different branches of the EU had the 
same impressions and made the same analysis independently; 
(2) the EU listened to others instead of "telling others what 
to do"; and (3) the EU strengthened partnerships with the 
African Union (AU), AMISOM, the U.S. and other regional 
actors. 
 
¶3. (C) The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is suffering 
from serious credibility problems, Fahlen opined.  Contrary 
to what many Western analysts think, Fahlen alleges that a 
growing number of Somalis are questioning why they should 
align themselves with a "weak partner," as Fahlen 
characterized President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed's TFG.  The TFG, 
a moderate Islamist government, is to some extent "imprisoned 
by its dependency on an international community that 
continues to scream security, security, security," Fahlen 
emphasized.  Fahlen alleged that Sheikh Sharif is heavily 
influenced by the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister. 
 She stated that "he sees what is going on but lacks the 
strong personality required to something about this."  Fahlen 
also told us that she feels Sheikh Sharif is not well 
advised.  He cannot gain a full grasp of the situation unless 
he moves out of his palace and continues to build on the 
modest gains he has made by emphasizing religion instead of 
clans, she stated. 
 
¶4. (C) Fahlen maintained that the international community can 
best support the TFG by trying to adapt its efforts to the 
structure the TFG has established.  The TFG, according to 
Fahlen, has organized its government around five clusters: 
Security; Economy and Accountability; Social Sector Service; 
Religion and Justice; and International and National 
Relations.  She stated that the EU can do a much better job 
of channeling its funds into this framework than the UN, as 
the latter is burdened by comprehensive procedures and 
regulations.  Fahlen commented that the TFG and the UN were 
"dragging their feet." 
 
¶5. (C) Fahlen said that the U.S. and the EU must work 
together to encourage our respective Somali diaspora to 
return and contribute to the development of Somalia.  There 
is a wealth of talent and cultural knowledge that we are not 
taking advantage of, she opined.  Many of the current TFG 
representatives are seen as corrupt and "in the pockets of 
donors," according to Fahlen.  In the case of humanitarian 
assistance, the international community simply has too few 
people in the field.  "Absentee management simply does not 
work," she stated.  How the international community 
distributes aid is crucial, and we need to re-examine our 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000607  002 OF 002 
 
 
efforts to reach out and make them more transparent, Fahlen 
emphasized.  She commented that Al-Shabaab controls large 
areas where this assistance is need most, and we cannot 
access those areas without the permission of this group. 
Fahlen told us that Al-Shabaab has even established its own 
NGOs and wants the international community to allow it to 
distribute aid, which would empower Al-Shabaab and help it 
gain support from the locals. 
 
¶6. (C) Fahlen told us she understands the EU's push to focus 
on security and police but feels that the international 
community does not recognize the problem involved in 
establishing a well-functioning professional force.  She 
cited the French effort to train soldiers in Djibouti as a 
case in point.  The government selects the soldiers for 
French training from a single large clan, which could fuel 
clan warfare, according to Fahlen.  She pointed out that the 
vast majority of these soldiers are young, illiterate and 
afraid of the "consequences they might experience" when they 
return home.  There is a great risk that these soldiers will 
not feel any "national loyalty" but will simply fight for 
whichever side pays them the most. 
 
¶7. (C) Although Fahlen did not visit the coastal area of 
Somalia, she did comment on the issue of piracy.  She 
characterized the pirates being captured as "small fish," 
adding that what the TFG and international community should 
do is to track the flow of the money obtained from hijacking 
ships.  Fahlen told us she observed some improved housing, 
more consumer goods and luxury cars for certain individuals, 
but she believes the bulk of the ransom money flows to Kenya, 
Dubai and even London.  The TFG is training a coast guard 
force, but once again, is making the same mistake by 
selecting trainees from only one clan.  The risk is too great 
that the "coast-guard clan" will simply look after its own 
interests and line its own pockets, thus fueling the already 
gigantic problem of corruption that exists throughout 
Somalia. 
 
¶8. Comment: Fahlen has a perspective that appears to differ 
from that of many Western analysts, at least when it comes to 
how widespread Sheikh Sharif's support is among the 
population.  She questions how extensive the much-touted 
"grass-roots" support for the TFG really is.  She favors a 
much closer cooperation with the U.S., mentioning several 
times in our discussion that the U.S. and the EU must 
coordinate efforts to stabilize and develop Somalia.  (This 
is a reoccurring theme we have been hearing from our Swedish 
interlocutors regarding aid and development efforts around 
the world.)  Fahlen's most interesting comment, however, was 
her opinion that the TFG is weakened by an international 
community that seeks security at the expense of other 
efforts, hinting perhaps that some sort of contact with 
Al-Shabaab might be necessary to distribute aid in certain 
areas.  End Comment, 
BARZUN