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Viewing cable 09STATE96890, PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE96890 2009-09-17 20:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO8378
OO RUEHAP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDT RUEHGI RUEHGR RUEHKN RUEHKR RUEHMJ
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHYG
DE RUEHC #6890/01 2602111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 172051Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 096890 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PRELEZ
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED 
MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION (PART ONE OF TWO PARTS) 
 
1. (U) This is an ACTION REQUEST.  Please see paragraph 
3. 
 
2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The White House announced a 
Presidential decision on September 17 regarding a U.S. 
European-based BMD adaptive regional architecture, which 
is significantly different from the Bush Administration's 
plan to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and 
a BMD tracking radar in the Czech Republic. END 
BACKGROUND. 
 
3. (U) ACTION REQUEST: All Posts, as they determine 
appropriate, may draw upon the Fact Sheet in paragraph 4 
and the  Presidential Statement of September 17, 2009, in 
paragraph 5 for public affairs/diplomacy purposes.  Part 
Two of this Public Affairs Guidance contains Questions and 
Answers septel. END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF FACT SHEET (FACT SHEET CAN BE FOUND 
AT WWW.WHITEHOUSE.GOV): 
 
Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy - 
A "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in 
Europe 
 
President Obama has approved the recommendation of 
Secretary of Defense Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in 
Europe.  This approach is based on an assessment of the 
Iranian missile threat, and a commitment to deploy 
technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable 
to an evolving security environment. 
 
Starting around 2011, this missile defense architecture 
will feature deployments of increasingly-capable sea- and 
land-based missile interceptors, primarily upgraded 
versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and a range of 
sensors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic 
missile threat from Iran.  This phased approach develops 
the capability to augment our current protection of the 
U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile 
threats, and to offer more effective defenses against more 
near-term ballistic missile threats.  The plan provides 
for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their families, 
and our Allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively 
than the previous program, and involves more flexible and 
survivable systems. 
 
The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended to the President that he revise the previous 
Administration's 2007 plan for missile defense in Europe 
as part of an ongoing comprehensive review of our missile 
defenses mandated by Congress.  Two major developments led 
to this unanimous recommended change: 
 
- New Threat Assessment:  The intelligence community now 
assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly 
than previously projected, while the threat of potential 
Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
capabilities has been slower to develop than previously 
estimated.  In the near-term, the greatest missile threats 
from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as 
to U.S. deployed personnel - military and civilian - and 
their accompanying families in the Middle East and in 
Europe. 
 
- Advances in Capabilities and Technologies:  Over the 
past several years, U.S. missile defense capabilities and 
technologies have advanced significantly.  We expect this 
trend to continue.  Improved interceptor capabilities, 
such as advanced versions of the SM-3, offer a more 
flexible, capable, and cost-effective architecture. 
Improved sensor technologies offer a variety of options to 
detect and track enemy missiles. 
 
These changes in the threat as well as our capabilities 
and technologies underscore the need for an adaptable 
architecture. This architecture is responsive to the 
current threat, but could also incorporate relevant 
technologies quickly and cost-effectively to respond to 
evolving threats.  Accordingly, the Department of Defense 
has developed a four-phased, adaptive approach for missile 
 
STATE 00096890  002 OF 004 
 
 
defense in Europe.  While further advances of technology 
or future changes in the threat could modify the details 
or timing of later phases, current plans call for the 
following: 
 
- Phase One (in the 2011 timeframe) - Deploy current and 
proven missile defense systems available in the next two 
years, including the sea-based Aegis Weapon System, the 
SM-3 interceptor (Block IA), and sensors such as the 
forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance 
system (AN/TPY-2), to address regional ballistic missile 
threats to Europe and our deployed personnel and their 
families; 
 
- Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe) - After appropriate 
testing, deploy a more capable version of the SM-3 
interceptor (Block IB) in both sea- and land-based 
configurations, and more advanced sensors, to expand the 
defended area against short- and medium-range missile 
threats; 
 
- Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe) -  After development 
and testing are complete, deploy the more advanced SM-3 
Block IIA variant currently under development, to counter 
short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats; 
and 
- Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe) - After development 
and testing are complete, deploy the SM-3 Block IIB to 
help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range 
missiles and the potential future ICBM threat to the 
United States. 
 
Throughout all four phases, the United States also will be 
testing and updating a range of approaches for improving 
our sensors for missile defense.  The new distributed 
interceptor and sensor architecture also does not require 
a single, large, fixed European radar that was to be 
located in the Czech Republic; this approach also uses 
different interceptor technology than the previous 
program, removing the need for a single field of 10 
ground-based interceptors in Poland.  Therefore, the 
Secretary of Defense recommended that the United States no 
longer plan to move forward with that architecture. 
 
The Czech Republic and Poland, as close, strategic and 
steadfast Allies of the United States, will be central to 
our continued consultations with NATO Allies on our 
defense against the growing ballistic missile threat. 
 
The phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in 
Europe: 
 
- Sustains U.S. homeland defense against long-range 
ballistic missile threats.  The deployment of an advanced 
version of the SM-3 interceptor in Phase Four of the 
approach would augment existing ground-based interceptors 
located in Alaska and California, which provide for the 
defense of the homeland against a potential ICBM threat. 
 
- Speeds protection of U.S. deployed forces, civilian 
personnel, and their accompanying families against the 
near-term missile threat from Iran.  We would deploy 
current and proven technology by roughly 2011 - about six 
or seven years earlier than the previous plan - to help 
defend the regions in Europe most vulnerable to the 
Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat. 
 
- Ensures and enhances the protection of the territory and 
populations of all NATO Allies, in concert with their 
missile defense capabilities, against the current and 
growing ballistic missile threat.  Starting in 2011, the 
phased, adaptive approach would systematically increase 
the defended area as the threat is expected to grow.  In 
the 2018 timeframe, all of Europe could be protected by 
our collective missile defense architecture. 
 
- Deploys proven capabilities and technologies to meet 
current threats.  SM-3 (Block 1A) interceptors are 
deployed on Aegis ships today, and more advanced versions 
are in various stages of development.  Over the past four 
years, we have conducted a number of tests of the SM-3 IA, 
and it was the interceptor used in the successful 
engagement of a decaying satellite in February 2008. 
Testing in 2008 showed that the sensors we plan to field 
bring significant capabilities to the architecture, and 
additional, planned research and development over the next 
few years offers the potential for more diverse and more 
capable sensors. 
 
STATE 00096890  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
- Provides flexibility to upgrade and adjust the 
architecture, and to do so in a cost-effective manner, as 
the threat evolves.  Because of the lower per-interceptor 
costs and mobility of key elements of the architecture, we 
will be better postured to adapt this set of defenses to 
any changes in the threat. 
 
We will work with our Allies to integrate this 
architecture with NATO members' missile defense 
capabilities, as well as with the emerging NATO command 
and control network that is under development.  One 
benefit of the phased, adaptive approach is that there is 
a high degree of flexibility - in addition to sea-based 
assets, there are many potential locations for the 
architecture's land-based elements, some of which will be 
re-locatable.  We plan to deploy elements in northern and 
southern Europe and will be consulting closely at NATO 
with Allies on the specific deployment options. 
 
We also welcome Russian cooperation to bring its missile 
defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common 
strategic interests.  We have repeatedly made clear to 
Russia that missile defense in Europe poses no threat to 
its strategic deterrent.  Rather, the purpose is to 
strengthen defenses against the growing Iranian missile 
threat.  There is no substitute for Iran complying with 
its international obligations regarding its nuclear 
program.  But ballistic missile defenses will address the 
threat from Iran's ballistic missile programs, and 
diminish the coercive influence that Iran hopes to gain by 
continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities. 
 
Through the on-going Department of Defense ballistic 
missile defense review, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to provide 
recommendations to the President that address other 
aspects of our ballistic missile defense capabilities and 
posture around the world. 
 
END TEXT OF FACT SHEET. 
 
 
5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT (STATEMENT CAN 
BE FOUND AT WWW.WHITEHOUSE.GOV): 
 
Remarks of President Obama 
Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe 
Washington, D.C. 
September 17, 2009 
 
Good morning. As Commander-in-Chief, I am committed to 
doing everything in my power to advance our national 
security. That includes strengthening our defenses against 
any and all threats to our people, our troops, and our 
friends and Allies around the world. 
 
One of those threats is the danger posed by ballistic 
missiles. As I said during the campaign, President Bush 
was right that Iran's ballistic missile program posed a 
significant threat. 
That is why I am committed to deploying strong missile 
defense systems which are adaptable to the threats of the 
21st century. The best way to responsibly advance our 
security - and the security of our Allies - is to deploy a 
missile defense system that best responds to the threats 
that we face, and that utilizes technology that is both 
proven and cost-effective. 
 
In keeping with that commitment and a 
congressionally-mandated review, I ordered a comprehensive 
assessment of our missile defense program in Europe. And 
after an extensive process, I have approved the unanimous 
recommendations of my Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to strengthen America's defenses against 
ballistic missile attack. This new approach will provide 
capabilities sooner, build on proven systems, and offer 
greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than 
the 2007 European Missile Defense program. 
 
This decision was guided by two principal factors. 
 
First, we have updated our intelligence assessment of 
Iran's missile programs, which emphasizes the threat posed 
by Iran's short and medium range missiles which are 
capable of reaching Europe. There is no substitute for 
Iran complying with its international obligations 
regarding its nuclear program, and we - along with our 
 
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allies and partners - will continue to pursue strong 
diplomacy to ensure that Iran lives up to its 
international obligations. But this new ballistic missile 
defense program will best address the threat posed by 
Iran's ongoing ballistic missile programs. 
 
Second, we have made specific and proven advances in our 
missile defense technology, particularly with regard to 
land and sea-based interceptors, and the sensors that 
support them. 
Our new approach will therefore deploy technologies that 
are proven and cost-effective, and that counter the 
current threat - and do so sooner than the previous 
program. Because our approach will be phased and adaptive, 
we will retain the flexibility to adjust and enhance our 
defenses as the threat and technology continue to evolve. 
 
To put it simply: our new missile defense architecture in 
Europe will provide a stronger, smarter, and swifter 
defense of American forces, and America's allies. It is 
more comprehensive than our previous program. It deploys 
capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.  And it 
sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the 
U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile 
threats. And it ensures and enhances the protection of all 
of our NATO allies. 
 
This approach is also consistent with NATO's missile 
defense efforts, and provides opportunities for enhanced 
international collaboration going forward. We will 
continue to work cooperatively with our close friends and 
allies - the Czech Republic and Poland - who had agreed to 
host elements of the previous programs. I have spoken to 
the Prime Minister of both the Czech Republic and Poland 
about this decision, and reaffirmed our deep and close 
ties. Together, we are committed to a broad range of 
cooperative efforts to strengthen our collective defense, 
and we are bound by the solemn commitment of NATO's 
Article 5 that an attack on one is an attack on all. 
 
We have also repeatedly made clear to Russia that its 
concerns about our previous missile defense program were 
entirely unfounded. Our clear and consistent focus has 
been the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile program, 
and that continues to be our focus and the basis of the 
program that we are announcing today. In confronting that 
threat, we welcome Russian cooperation to bring its 
missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our 
common strategic interests, even as we continue our shared 
efforts to end Iran's illicit nuclear program. 
 
Going forward, my Administration will continue to consult 
closely with Congress and with our Allies as we deploy 
this system, and we will rigorously evaluate both the 
threat posed by ballistic missiles, and the technology 
that we are developing to counter it. I am confident that 
with the steps that we have taken today, we have 
strengthened America's national security, and enhanced our 
capacity to confront 21st century threats. Thank you. 
 
END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. 
CLINTON