VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1892 2731958
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301938Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 101892 
 
SIPDIS 
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE 
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR
SUBJECT: UPDATE CONCERNING CONVERSION OF SPACE LAUNCH 
VEHICLES TO BALLISTIC MISSILES 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham. 
Reasons:  1.4 (B), (D), (H). 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 2. 
 
¶2. (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Department requests Embassy Paris 
provide the interagency cleared paper "Update Concerning 
Conversion of Space Launch Vehicles to Ballistic Missiles" in 
paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all 
Partners.  Info addressees also may provide to host government 
officials as appropriate.  In delivering paper, posts should 
indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our 
preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in 
conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. 
NOTE:  Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. 
END 
NOTE. 
 
¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: 
 
(SECRET REL MTCR) 
 
Update Concerning Conversion of Space Launch Vehicles to 
Ballistic Missiles 
 
Introduction 
 
      The MTCR has consistently recognized proliferation 
concerns associated with the shared technology and 
interchangeable components of Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) and 
ballistic missiles.  Nearly identical fabrication methods and 
common subsystems result in development and production efforts 
that are essentially indistinguishable from one another.  The 
previous several decades are replete with examples of 
ballistic missile conversions to SLVs, such as the Atlas or 
Soyuz, and ballistic missile capability resulting from SLV 
development, such as India,s Agni missile.  In 2009, Iran and 
North Korea both conducted launches that - although portrayed 
as 
peaceful space launches - indicate these countries are making 
progress in their ability to develop long-range ballistic 
missiles. 
 
      The fundamental technologies used in SLVs are the same 
as 
the technologies used in ballistic missiles.  Historically, 
countries have developed long-range missiles and SLVs nearly 
simultaneously in order to capitalize on their investment in 
these interchangeable technologies.  The use of existing 
ballistic missile hardware to develop major components of an 
SLV is typical.  This is especially true for major subsystems, 
such as propulsion, thrust vector controls, and guidance and 
navigation.  Not only does this provide for an added level of 
reliability in newly-designed systems, it provides a testing 
ground to further refine and advance the existing ballistic 
missile technologies.  Additionally, new technologies and 
components that are integral to ballistic missile programs can 
be developed and tested in an SLV program.  Of particular 
concern are the development and testing of technologies 
associated with staging, upper-stage engine development, post- 
boost control systems, and advanced guidance, navigation, and 
control systems.  This combination of refining existing 
technologies and developing new capabilities under the 
auspices of an SLV program provides a direct opportunity to 
transfer components and knowledge into a viable long-range 
ballistic missile program. 
 
Iran 
 
      On February 2, 2009, Iran successfully used the Safir 
SLV, in only its second launch of this system, to place the 
Omid satellite into orbit.  Like its historic predecessors, 
the Safir program was the beneficiary of Iran,s longstanding 
ballistic missile development.  Its successful launch almost 
certainly advanced Tehran,s ability to develop longer-range 
ballistic missiles.  Based on the significant details made 
public concerning the Safir, including photographs of the 
complete vehicle and various components, Iran has clearly 
capitalized on existing ballistic missile hardware in 
designing and building its SLV. 
 
      It is apparent from the photos that the first stage of 
the Safir is based on Iran,s Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic 
missile (MRBM).  Furthermore, the second-stage of the Safir 
utilizes steering engines that are almost certainly derived 
from the Soviet-era SS-N-6 (Soviet designation: R-27 or RSM- 
25) submarine-launched ballistic missile.  Iran could have 
acquired this technology from North Korea,s probable transfer 
of the BM-25 MRBM, which is a variant of Pyongyang,s SS-N-6- 
derived Musudan IRBM.  In addition to the successful staging 
of these two main boosters, it is likely that Iran made 
progress with the use of high performance hypergolic (self- 
igniting) propellants in the SS-N-6-derived second stage.  The 
adaptation of this propellant technology to missile systems 
could significantly enhance Tehran,s ability to develop a new 
generation of more-advanced ballistic missiles. Finally, the 
Safir successfully demonstrated the use of two-axis gimbaled 
engines for steering in the second stage.  All of these 
technologies, demonstrated in the Safir SLV, are critical to 
the development of long-range ballistic missiles and highlight 
the possibility of Iran using the Safir as a platform to 
further its ballistic missile development. 
 
North Korea 
 
      On April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted its second 
attempted launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2).  Although the TD- 
2 failed to place a satellite into orbit, it demonstrated that 
North Korea is making progress in developing technology that 
can directly contribute to the production of long-range 
ballistic missiles.  From the video of the TD-2 launch 
publicly released by North Korea, it is apparent that the TD-2 
first stage makes use of hydrocarbon-based propellants.  The 
system likely uses a first stage that incorporates a 
clustered-engine design of main engines and steering (vernier) 
engines. 
 
      The linkage of short-range ballistic missile technology 
adaptation to long-range ballistic missiles is evident in 
North Korea,s TD-2 program.  The mass of the TD-2 and the 
relatively low thrust of Scud engines make it likely that the 
TD-2,s first stage was comprised of more than Scud-based 
engines.  North Korea,s No Dong missiles, derived from Scud-B 
technologies, almost certainly utilize the same mix of 
hydrocarbon-based propellants as the original Soviet Scud-B. 
It therefore appears logical that the TD-2,s first-stage 
would 
have been comprised of a clustered set of the higher- 
performing No Dong engines.  While the details of the exact 
TD-2 launch configuration are unclear, it is logical to 
presume North Korea is following the time-tested concept of 
incorporating proven systems with newly developed technology 
to mitigate risk and speed development of longer-range 
systems. 
 
      While systems such as the Safir and TD-2 provide fertile 
ground for the development and testing of long-range ballistic 
missile technologies, there are still significant hurdles to 
overcome.  In addition to more precise guidance and 
navigation, advanced thrust vector control systems, and 
sophisticated staging and separation systems, reentry systems 
pose unique challenges.  The design and manufacture of 
warheads able to survive ICBM-range reentries is non-trivial 
and would require testing to validate the design and 
production process. 
 
      There should be no doubt that both the Safir and the 
TD-2 
programs have advanced each country,s ballistic missile 
capabilities.  While major technological hurdles still exist, 
the development times for long-range ballistic missiles can be 
greatly reduced by leveraging the technological advancements 
achieved with these two systems.  These events of 2009 
underscore the importance of continuing to recognize the fact 
that any rocket capable of putting a satellite into orbit is 
inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction 
against surface targets.  This recognition, coupled with the 
virtually identical and interchangeable technologies of SLVs 
and ballistic missiles, confirms the imperative for rigorous 
MTCR nonproliferation efforts. 
 
END TEXT OF PAPER. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR 
issues for ISN/MTR.   A word version of this document will be 
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON