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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 101631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 
TAGS: OVIP SHANNON THOMAS PREL PGOV HO OAS
SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON,S SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING WITH HONDURAN 
FOREIGN MINISTER PATRICIA RODAS 
 
Classified By: WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon.  Reason: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. Classified by WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon.  Reason: 1.4 (b, 
d) 
 
¶2.  (U) September 22, 2009; 15:00; New York, USA. 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon 
USUN Special Advisor Ron Godard 
Barbara Rocha (Notetaker) 
 
Honduras 
Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas 
Vice President Aristides Mejia 
Ambassador Eduardo Enrique Reina 
Central Bank President Milton Jimenez Puerto 
Carlos Zelaya, brother of President Zelaya 
Hector Zelaya, son of President Zelaya 
 
¶4.  (C) SUMMARY.  Honduran Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas 
expressed concern for the security of deposed present Manuel 
Zelaya and increasing repression in Honduras.  She claimed to 
be unaware of Zelaya,s plans to return or details of how he 
entered the country.  Rodas described this as a &moment of 
ultimatum8 during which international pressure could create 
a &bubble8 to guarantee Zelaya,s security and open space 
for negotiations.  She detailed outreach efforts to get 
countries to denounce the de facto government during the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA).  Rodas arranged for A/S Shannon to 
speak to Zelaya by phone about conditions at the Brazilian 
embassy.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Zelaya,s Return, Threat to Peace 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Foreign Minister Rodas opened the meeting by 
expressing concern that the &golpistas8 were about to ask 
the Honduran Supreme Court for permission to violate the 
Vienna Convention and enter the Brazilian Embassy.  She said 
the de facto government had already occupied adjacent 
buildings and repression was increasing. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rodas claimed to be unaware of Zelaya,s plans to 
return to Honduras.  She said that they were scheduled to fly 
from Guatemala to New York for the UN General Assembly, but 
in Guatemala, she was separated from Zelaya and told he had 
&a private meeting.8  A few hours later, Zelaya called her 
from Tegucigalpa and asked her to tell President Colom that 
&he did not violate his borders.8  Rodas claimed to be 
unaware of the details of how Zelaya entered the country, but 
said his entry was well coordinated to maintain the peace. 
 
¶7.  (C) During the meeting, Rodas arranged for A/S Shannon to 
speak to Zelaya by phone.  A/S Shannon asked Zelaya about 
conditions in the Brazilian embassy and told him that 
Ambassador Llorens was working to facilitate food, water and 
security.  Zelaya reported that they had begun to receive 
food and water. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
&Moment of Ultimatum8 for International Community 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8.  (C) Rodas said she was reaching out to regional groups 
(SICA, ALBA, Rio Group, etc.) and asking countries to 
denounce the de facto government during UNGA and issue a 
strong UN resolution on the matter.  Rodas described this as 
a &moment of ultimatum8 during which international pressure 
is critical to create a &bubble8 to guarantee Zelaya,s 
security and open space for negotiations to resume.  Rodas 
also said she was asking the international community to 
return ambassadors to Honduras. 
 
¶9.  (C) Rodas said that pressure from the United States is 
critical because &70 percent of the Honduran economy is in 
the United States.8  She expressed confidence that 
commercial, financial, and military pressure combined would 
drive the de facto government to the negotiating table.  She 
warned that if de factos do not feel squeezed, they would 
 
STATE 00101631  002 OF 002 
 
 
just leave Zelaya trapped in the embassy until the November 
elections. 
 
¶10. (C) Vice-President Aristides Mejia noted that military 
pressure was crucial because the de facto regime is entirely 
dependent on the military.  He said most middle and lower 
level officers are against the &golpistas8 but are under 
tight control.  He said the Zelaya camp is warning the 
military that the weight of events will ultimately rest on 
their shoulders, hoping this pressure will lead to fractures 
in the military.  He added that SOUTHCOM has not pressured 
the military enough. 
 
¶11. (C) A/S Shannon noted our statement calling on the de 
factos to guarantee the peace, sign the San Jose Accord, and 
respect the Vienna Convention.  After Mejia mentioned that 
Zelaya planned to write to President Obama asking the United 
States to recognize what happened as a military coup, A/S 
Shannon noted that we have already applied all of the 
consequences associated with such recognition. 
CLINTON