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DE RUEHC #0312 2690046
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260026Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NAYIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 100312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDRG KU
SUBJECT: GUANTANAMO CLOSING S/E FRIED SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING 
WITH KUWAITI PM 
 
REF: (A)KUWAIT 0755, (B)STATE 72438 
 
CLASSIFIED BY S/E DANIEL FRIED.  REASONS: 1.4 (B)&(D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a September 21 meeting at the Kuwaiti 
Permanent Mission in New York, S/E for the Closure of 
Guantanamo, Dan Fried told the Kuwaiti PM that the way forward 
to resolve the Kuwaiti detainee issue is to finalize the draft 
diplomatic note outlining proposed GOK security measures. 
Recalling President Obama's security concerns expressed to the 
Amir on August 3 and the desire by both parties to avoid a 
repeat of the April 2008 suicide attack in Mosul, Iraq by a 
Kuwaiti released from Guantanamo, the note would put both 
parties on the strongest possible footing to act on the Amir's 
request while protecting the national security and foreign 
policy interests of both countries. 
 
¶2. (C) Welcoming the Administration's desire to work with the 
GOK,the PM requested both al-Mutairi and al-Rabiaa, who 
recently won his habeas case, be sent home together.  FM al- 
Sabah underscored the GOK's desire to be able to report to 
Parliament the return of two detainees, followed by the return 
of the other two upon conclusion of U.S. legal proceedings, as 
well as the provision of U.S. intelligence on all four 
detainees.  Both the PM and S/E Fried agreed that Kuwait's 
commitment at the most senior levels paved the way for 
continued work in this area. Fried looked forward to GOK 
feedback on the draft diplomatic note, the contents of which 
could form the framework for the return of Kuwaiti detainees. 
The note plus Kuwait's success with respect to its 
rehabilitation center would be key factors in U.S. 
consideration of the possible return of all Kuwaiti detainees. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay 
Detention Facility, Ambassador Daniel Fried, met with Kuwait 
Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah at the 
Kuwaiti Permanent Mission in New York September 21 to discuss 
the contents of the proposed diplomatic note outlining 
security measures to be undertaken by the GOK following the 
transfer from Guantanamo to Kuwait those Kuwaitis found 
eligible for transfer. 
 
¶4. (C) Flanked by TV cameras, Sheikh Nasser warmly greeted 
Ambassador Fried and ushered him into a large Majlis room 
filled with the PM's entourage and other Kuwaiti diplomatic 
staff. Recapping recent diplomatic developments, Fried praised 
Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S. Sheikh Salem al-Sabah for 
pushing forward the detainee issue and presenting a strong, 
serious case on their behalf when the two met on July 9 (Ref 
B).  This meeting led to the visit of a USG interagency 
delegation to Kuwait to discuss security measures with the GOK 
and to tour the al-Salam Rehabilitation Center (Ref A).  The 
success of this visit paved the way for staff members of the 
al-Salam Center to interview all four Kuwaiti detainees at 
Guantanamo September 2/3. 
 
¶5. (C) Citing the August 3 meeting between President Obama and 
the Amir of Kuwait, Ambassador Fried reiterated the serious 
security concerns raised by the President, but stressed the 
President's desire to move forward.  One detainee will be 
returned to Kuwait (Khaled al-Mutairi (213)) he said, and 
there is serious consideration for returning more.  Raising 
the draft diplomatic note, Fried said the USG looks forward to 
receiving feedback from the GOK.  Forewarned about GOK concern 
regarding the point restricting detainee movement outside of 
the house between dusk and dawn, Fried assured the PM that the 
U.S. certainly did not intend to impede the religious practice 
of attending mosque and that alternative language could be 
developed to the satisfaction of both sides. (NOTE: This 
language in fact is drawn from a Kuwaiti diplomatic Note 
transmitted from the Kuwaiti Embassy July 23 to S/E Fried 
outlining GOK security measures.  END NOTE) 
 
¶6. (C)Ambassador Fried stressed that the exchange of 
diplomatic notes would put Kuwait and the U.S. in the 
strongest possible position to move forward and achieve what 
President Obama and the Amir discussed in their meeting. 
(Fried did not comment on the release of any detainees not 
already approved for release by the Interagency process.) 
 
¶7. (C) Sheikh Nasser thanked the Obama Administration for its 
consideration of the detainee issue, underscoring that the 
Amir gave his personal word as guarantee regarding security 
measures related to the return of the Kuwaiti detainees from 
Guantanamo.  Secondly, he raised the September 17 court 
decision granting Kuwaiti detainee Fouad al-Rabiaa his 
petition of habeas.  Sheikh Nasser expressed his desire that 
al-Mutairi and al-Rabiaa be returned to Kuwait together, and 
lastly, the GOK will study the diplomatic note thoroughly.  He 
reiterated GOK concern that "no one can stop another from 
performing his religious duty," referring to the dusk-to-dawn 
movement restriction.  Ambassador Fried stated that the U.S. 
will not stand in the way of legitimate religious obligations, 
and he will work with the interagency to find alternative 
language that is acceptable to both parties.  On al-Rabiaa, 
Fried noted that the legal process of his case needed to be 
concluded.  Finalizing the exchange of diplomatic notes would 
put the USG in a strong position to move forward by setting 
the conditions to act on the Amir's request.  Sheikh Nasser 
said that Kuwait would like to see the return of the other two 
"boys," reiterating the Amir's personal guarantee. 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Fried recognized the Amir's request for the 
return of all four detainees. Raising the unsuccessful habeas 
case of Fawzi al-Awda (232), Fried said that this legal 
outcome recognized the U.S. Government has the authority to 
detain al-Awda, though that does not mean that the U.S. must 
continue to detain him. We should not stop at al-Mutairi and 
al-Rabiaa, he said, expressing his readiness to work with the 
GOK towards the  possible transfer of the other two detainees 
(232 and 552). As President Obama said, there are serious 
security concerns, hence the development of the diplomatic 
note outlining security assurances.  The last thing either 
government wants is another incident like the suicide bombing 
that occurred in Mosul,Iraq in April 2008 carried out by 
returned Kuwaiti detainee Abdullah al-Ajmi.  The way forward 
is the exchange of diplomatic notes containing security 
assurances.  This will pave the way for the return of al- 
Mutairi and, possibly, al-Rabiaa, whose success in the 
rehabilitation center forms the strongest basis for resolution 
of the detainee issue.   Fried acknowledged the great effort 
taken by the GOK to establish the rehabilitation center. 
 
¶9. (C) Sheikh Nasser noted the positive response of the USG 
interagency team upon conclusion of the visit to the al-Salam 
Center.  Ambassador Fried agreed, adding that the team was 
impressed by the professionalism of the medical staff.  Fried 
said he wished other countries in the region would set up a 
rehabilitation center of the same caliber as the al-Salam 
Center.  Fried said he will continue to work with Kuwaiti 
Ambassador al-Sabah to expedite forward movement. He would 
report to Secretary Clinton, NSA Jones and senior DOD 
officials the seriousness and commitment of the GOK to 
resolving this matter. 
 
¶10. (C) Kuwaiti FM Sheikh Mohammed al-Sabah thanked Fried for 
recognizing the seriousness of the Kuwaiti request and the 
Amir's personal guarantee.  He raised last month's arrest of a 
network of Kuwaitis linked to al-Qaida planning to carry out 
terrorist attacks targeting Kuwaiti and U.S. interests. 
Speaking pointedly, Sheikh Mohammed conveyed to Ambassador 
Fried his desire that Sheikh Nasser be able to report back to 
the Kuwaiti Parliament that the PM had met with Kuwait's U.S. 
allies and they had agreed to return two of the Kuwaiti 
detainees for transfer into the al-Salam Center. 
Additionally, Sheikh Nasser should be able to present a 
timeline for return of the other two, as the U.S. will 
conclude its legal review of their cases and turn them over. 
Kuwait should not have to wait another six years for return of 
its detainees.  Lastly, the PM also must be able to tell the 
Kuwaiti Security Services that intelligence on the detainees 
will be forthcoming, claiming that none was made available to 
them when the previous eight were tried in Kuwaiti courts 
following their return in 2004. 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Fried said that he would inquire about 
intelligence on the four detainees.  Both parties will engage 
in intense discussions but it will not take another six years. 
Talks to date have given the U.S. and Kuwait the best way 
forward.  The security undertakings contained in the note 
should lead to progress on return of the first two, and, 
possibly, subsequent progress on the other two.  The U.S. 
intends to prosecute all those who it believes it can 
prosecute successfully. It is unclear if the U.S. will 
prosecute two of the four Kuwaiti detainees.  He reiterated 
that he will remain in close touch with Ambassador al-Sabah 
and work with him in a frank and transparent way. 
 
¶12. (C) In closing, Sheikh Nasser expressed his pleasure at 
having had the opportunity to discuss the detainee issue with 
Ambassador Fried and hoped to see him again.  Fried said he 
hoped to visit Kuwait at some point to conclude this important 
issue. 
CLINTON