VZCZCXRO7755
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHSH #0173/01 2730336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300336Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8854
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0226
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0169
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0119
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0178

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR 
MOSCOW PASS TO VLADIVOSTOK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: CH EAID ECON KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLAR: DPRK SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED AND WILL 
AFFECT ENGAGEMENT 
 
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman.  Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a working-level Shenyang-based 
scholar, most Chinese scholars on Korean Peninsula affairs 
say that the issue of succession in North Korea is still 
unresolved.  They believe that this uncertainty may 
undermine any DPRK forwardness in its multilateral or 
bilateral discussions and may prevent the North Koreans from 
making any real headway at the table.  As far as what the 
current South Korean government has to offer, he and his 
colleagues maintain that the DPRK is simply uninterested. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) ConGenOff met with a working-level Northeast 
University scholar of Korean security issues on September 
¶25.  A graduate of Shandong University who later studied at 
Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 2001 courtesy of the 
Chinese government, he had just returned from participating 
in a two-month series of seminars in Beijing where he worked 
with Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholars 
assembled to discuss Northeast Asian security.  One of the 
hottest topics amongst CASS Korea specialists was succession 
in North Korea. 
 
DPRK SUCCESSION ISSUE IS STILL UNRESOLVED 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Our contact said that he, like many of his CASS 
colleagues, does not think the DPRK is "ready" for real 
engagement with the United States, nor is the DPRK ready to 
pursue any new directions while the succession issue is 
unresolved.  Our contact said this opinion was backed up by 
his fellow Kim Il-sung University exchangestudent alumni 
with whom he keeps in touch.  Even though the regime is 
clearly elevating the profile of the third son, Kim Jong-un, 
they were unsure if he had ever really been selected as the 
successor, as has been widely reported in the Western media. 
They believe any confusion on this point will be a serious 
roadblock to any sort of real progress in negotiations, and 
their estimation is that the succession issue is at best 
unclear. 
 
¶4. (C) Our contact said that he and his fellow Kim Il-sung 
University alumni are of the belief that as soon as Kim 
Jong-il is out of the picture, there will be significant and 
rational progress in the DPRK's relations with the outside 
world.  As long as Kim survives, the DPRK would not actually 
want any substantive improvements in U.S.-DPRK relations. 
This is because any meaningful move toward normalization 
and/or friendly cultural and economic ties did not bode well 
for the continuation of the Kim regime.  Thus, without any 
concrete plan for its own future, the DPRK under Kim Jong-il 
is not in a position to embark upon substantive engagement 
with the United States. 
 
¶5. (C) At the same time, our contact said that he did not 
think the DPRK feared U.S.-DPRK engagement, per se, even if 
it led to an expanded U.S presence in Pyongyang.  One of his 
exchange student classmates, a Chinese diplomat who had 
returned from an assignment in Pyongyang, told him that 
Chinese diplomats in Pyongyang were not free to move around 
town, but rather were hostages on their own compound who 
only moved when the DPRK authorities granted permission. 
Any American presence in Pyongyang would be equally 
meaningless.  North Korean authorities would be happy to 
invite a skeleton crew of American diplomats who were 
basically under house arrest and unable to interact with 
anyone.  As far as a possible North Korean presence in 
Washington goes, he said he and his colleague think that the 
North Koreans believe the DPRK Permanent Mission to the UN 
already fulfilled all the functions needed by the DPRK. 
 
SOUTH KOREA AND THE GRAND BARGAIN: YAWN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Our contact said that the North Koreans no longer 
"care" about what the South Koreans and President Lee Myung- 
bak has to say.  With regard to Lee's recent proposal of a 
"grand bargain," he said the North Koreans would simply 
"tune out" what the South Koreans were saying - they are "no 
longer interested".  Although they might eventually respond 
with some sort of public relations attack of the proposal, 
 
SHENYANG 00000173  002 OF 002 
 
 
he believed that, internally, the North Koreans simply do 
not care for, nor do they pay attention to, what the South 
Korean government "puppet" does or says. 
 
WICKMAN